
Annamalai University Philosophy Series—2

NĪTIMĀLĀ

BY

NĀRĀYANARYA



EDITED WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

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1940

DEDICATED

TO

RAJAH SIR ANNAMALAI CHETTIAR, KT, LL.D,
OF CHETTINAD

Founder Pro-chancellor, Annamalai University.

॥ श्रीः ॥

॥ नीतिमाला ॥

नारायणार्यविरचिता

सम्पादकौ—

र. रामानुजाचार्यः

कृ. श्रीनिवासाचार्यः

CONTENTS

PREFACE

In preparing the text of *Nītimālā* for the press the following manuscripts have been collated:—

1 R No 3744—Paper—Devanāgari script, belonging to the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras

2. A manuscript in Telugu script kindly supplied to us by Panditaraja D. T Tatachariar, M O L, and Tarkarnava T. Viraraghavachariar

3 A manuscript in Telugu script, belonging to the University Library, Annamalainagar

These manuscripts are in fairly good condition and contain no lacuna Suggestions of better readings have been given in brackets

We wish to acknowledge our deep sense of gratitude to our friends, Panditaraja D. T Tatachariar, M O L, and Tarkarnava T Viraraghvachariar of the Śrī Venkateswara Sanskrit College, Tirupati, for securing us a manuscript copy of Nītimālā and making many valuable suggestions. Sri T. E Viraraghavachariar, Professor, Raja's College of Sanskrit and Tamil Studies, Trivadi, has throughout taken a very kindly interest in this work and helped us in manifold ways Sri P S Ramanujachari, Nyaya Siromani, has assisted us most willingly in copying the manuscript for the press, reading the proofs and preparing the index To them we express our sincere thanks We are very grateful to Professors M R Rajagopala Ayyangar, M A, L T., K R Applachariar, M A, L T and V. A Ramaswami Sastriar, M A., for having read the Introduction and made several useful suggestions We are thankful to Mahāmahopādhyāya Professor S Kuppuswami Sastriar, M A, L T, I E S (Retd) for writing a Foreword to this work. Our grateful thanks are due also to our colleague Dr B. V. Narayanaswami Naidu, M A., B Com., Ph.D., Bar-at-Law, Editor of the Journal of the Annamalai University for the very helpful interest he has evinced in the publication of this treatise in the Journal.

We cannot adequately thank Rajah Sir Annamalai Chettiar of Chettinad, Kt, LL.D, Founder Pro-Chancellor of the Annamalai University, for the kind permission he has given us for dedicating this book to him.

Annamalainagar,
May 25, 1940.

R R.
K. S.

FOREWORD

By

MAHAMAHOPADHYAYA PROF S KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI, M A , I.E S , (*Retd*)

The handbooks on Viśistādvaita-Vedānta, which were hitherto available in print, are either too scrappy or too difficult Śrī Rāmānuja's *Vedārthasamgraha* and Śrī Vedānta-Deśika's *Nyāyasiddhāñjana,* though they come under the category of *Prakaranas,* are difficult classics not quite suitable as introductory primers on Viśistādvaita The *Yatīndramatadīpikā* and the *Tattvatraya* are scrappy and are designed more as Primers of Viśīstādvaita theology than as Primers of Viśīstādvaita philosophy

By publishing the *Nītimālā* of Nārāyanārya, with summaries in Samskrt as well as English, Pandit Sri K Srinivasacaryar of the Sanskrit department and Professor R Ramanujachariar of the Philosophy department of the Annamalai University, have supplied a longfelt desideratum to all serious students of Vedānta-darśana •A sound knowledge of any one of the Vedāntic schools would be impossible without a critical and comparative study of Advaita, Viśistādvaita and Dvaita systems In this connection, Śrī Nārāyanārya's *Nītimālā* would be of very great value as a reliable and easy introduction to the distinctive doctrines of the Viśistādvaita system in contrast with the comparable doctrines of the Advaita system. The characteristic features of the *Nītimālā* are that it is written in a lucid style and that, under ten convenient heads arranged in logical sequence, the crux of each important question at issue between the exponents of Advaita and of Viśistādvaita is brought out and explained in a masterly manner.

This work is now critically edited for the first time The author—Śrī Nārāyanārya—is a high authority on Viśistādvaita, who flourished before Śrī Vedānta-Deśika, about the end of the twelfth or the beginning of the thirteenth century A D The two learned editors of this work deserve warm commendation for making the *Nītimālā* and such other Viśistādvaita works available in handy and carefully prepared editions, with all the up-to-date accompaniments of introduction, summary and index , and the world of scholars interested in Indian philosophy and Samskrta learning would have very good reason to feel highly gratified that the enlightened academic facilities provided in the Annamalai University have made it possible for such good editions of good Samskrta works to appear in rapid succession

S KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI.

INTRODUCTION

I

THE LIFE AND WORKS OF NĀRĀYANĀRYA

Among the treatises on Viśistādvaita philosophy now extant, *Nītimālā* holds an honoured place Its reputed author, Nārāyanārya, was a bold and original thinker Vedānta Deśika holds him in high esteem, and frequently cites him in support of his own views [1]

As in the case of other eminent Indian thinkers, it cannot be definitely ascertained when he flourished and where Since *Nītimālā* contains numerous references to the *Śrī-Bhāsya* and alludes also to *Vedārtha-Samgraha*,[2] and since Vedānta Deśika refers in his writings to Nārāyanārya and his works, it can be said with certainty that he must have lived in the period subsequent to Rāmānuja and anterior to Vedānta Deśika (i.e , some time between 1075 and 1250 A D).

The author of *Nītimālā* is not to be confounded with Śrī Ranganārāyanārya, otherwise known as Vangīpurattu Nambi, who has composed some well-known Kārikās The latter was one of the direct disciples of Bhagavān Rāmānuja and the guru of one Nārāyanamuni Whenever Vedānta Deśika refers to the author of the Kārikās, he

1. " Sūtroktam nūnam anyat 'Prājñair Nārāyanāryaih' . . " *Mīmāmsā-Pādukā*, stanza 11, " Yat tu Nītimālāyām Nārāyanāryair uktam-jñānasya tu parāktvābhāvamātram eva, na tu pratyaktvam ", *Nyāya-Siddhāñjana, Jada-dravyapariccheda*, p 16, " Nārāyanāryais tu sambhūti-vināśa-śabdau phaladvārā lakṣanayā vidyā-karma-visayāv uktau 'viduso vidyāsādhyasya apavargasya samyag-abhivrddhi-rūpatvāt' ityādinā " , *Nyāya-siddhāñjana*, *Jīvapariccheda*, pp 162-3 , " ayam evārthah Nārāyanāryaih apy uktah ' Gunaih iyattārāhityāt, vastunā aparic-chinnatvañca avagamyate' iti " , *Nyāya-Siddhāñjana, Īśvarapariccheda*, p 212 , " Yat tu Nārāyanāryair uktam 'samsthānam eva jātih , tat pratipindam bhinnatvepi dvitī-yādipindeṣu sausādrśyāt pratisandhīyamānam svāśrayesu vastusu ekabuddhi-śabda-nibandhanam bhavati ' ", *Nyāya-Siddhāñjana, Adravyapariccheda*, p 375 In *Sarvārthasiddhi* while commenting on the verse from the *Tattva-muktā-kalāpa* commencing with the word "Devaprītyādikam vā " Vedānta Deśika quotes the following verse from Nārāyanārya's *Nītimālā* " āptasya hita-kāmasya niyogam kecid ūcire," *Tattva-Muktā-Kalāpa* with *Sarvārthasiddhi*, Benares edition, p 680 This verse is also quoted in *Nyāyapariśuddhi*, (memorial edition) p 283 Nārā-yanāryaistu evam uktam

   ' āptasya hita-kāmasya niyogam kecid ūcire |
   Bhāṣyakāropi Bhagavān evam evā'nvamanyata | ' "

2. *Nītimālā*, p. 54.

takes special care to give his full name,[3] lest he should be mistaken for Nārāyanārya, the author of Nītimālā.

In his *Nyāya-pariśuddhi*[4] and in his *Tātparya-Candrikā*[5] also, which is an elaborate commentary on Bhagavān Rāmānuja's *Gītā-Bhāsya,* Vedānta Deśika refers to a gloss on the Bhagavad-Gītā by one Nārāyanārya In the course of his commentary on the Gītā verse " Sarvadharmān parityajya ", Vedānta Deśika mentions a number of thinkers who have commented upon the Bhagavad-Gītā and classifies them under two heads[6] —(i) eminent exponents of Viśistādvaitic thought, such as Bhagavad Yāmunācārya and Bhagavān Rāmānuja, and (ii) rival Vedāntins, such as Piśāca, Rantideva, Gupta, Śamkara, Yādavaprakāśa, Nārāyanārya and Yajñasvami In another context, he describes this Nārāyanārya as a follower of Yādavaprakāśa[7] Nārāyanārya who has commented on the Gītā must be different from Nārāyanārya, the author of *Nītimālā,* who is referred to as an ardent Viśistādvaitin While explaining the verse in *Tattva-Muktā-Kalāpa,* wherein the expression " Āptasyāhur niyogam " occurs, Vedānta Deśika states in his *Sarvārthasiddhi*[8] that in the ranks of the Viśistādvaita thinkers some maintain that *vidhi* is the Lord's command That he is evidently thinking here of Nārāyanārya is clear from another place in *Sarvārthasiddhi*[9] and from *Nyāya-Pariśuddhi*[10] where he actually quotes the relevant verse of *Nītimālā* found in p 54.

3 *Pañcarātraraksā,* p 30.

4 " Uktañca Nārāyanāryaih Bhagavad-Gītā-Bhāsye-
'Prasiddham api vijñānam vāde Yo nāma nihnute |
Sa sadasyaih niyantavyah vyavasthā nā'nyathā yatah ||' "
Nyāyapariśuddhi (Memorial edition), p 101

5 " aniyatadharma-parityāgah atra vivaksitah iti Nārāyanārya-vyākhyāyām api na anusthāna-virodhah " *Gītā-Bhāsya* with *Tātparya-candrikā* (Ānandā Press), p 947

6 "Piśāca-Rantideva-Gupta-Śamkara-Yādavaprakāśa-Bhāskara-Nārāyanārya-Yajñasvāmi-prabhrtibhih svam svam matam āsthitaih paraśśataih Bhāsyakrdbhih asmat-siddhānta-tīrthakaraiśca Bhagavad-Yāmunācārya-Bhāsyakārādibhih avigīta-parigrhītah ayam atra sārārthah . " *Gītā-Bhāsya,* with *Tātparyacandrikā,* p 952

7 *Saccaritraraksā*

8 " Svapaksanisthānāmeva kesāmcid Īśvara-niyogarūpa-vidhipaksam vivicya darśayati " *Tattva-Muktā-Kalāpa* with *Sarvārthasiddhi* (Benares edition), p. 684.

9 *Tattva-Muktā-Kalāpa,* p 680

10 " Nārāyanāryaistu evam uktam—
'Āptasya hita-kāmasya niyogam kecid ūcire |
Bhāsyakāro'pi Bhagavān evam evā'nvamanyata ||' "
Nyāya-pariśuddhi, p. 283.

Besides *Nītimālā*, Nārāyanārya has written a treatise on Pūrva-Mīmāmsā This work is just alluded to in verse 11 of the *Mīmāmsā-Pādukā* But Kumāra Varada Deśika in his *Mīmamsā-Pādukā-Paritrāna*,[11] a commentary on *Mīmāmsā-Pādukā*, tells us that Nārāyanārya has attempted in this work to give up needless repetitions and to condense the thousand adhikaranas (topics) of Jaimini's *Pūrva-Mīmāmsā-Sūtra* into five hundred topics Nārāyanārya's views, however, are not different from those of Jaimini While the latter elaborately expounded his views even at the risk of repeating himself, so that even the student of mediocre ability could follow them, Nārāyanārya had in view the intelligent and talented reader who would naturally be impatient of tiresome repetition

Nītimālā is written in simple prose interspersed with verse. The ease with which Nārāyanārya handles philosophic arguments and the purity of his style are commendable *Nītimālā* contains a brief, but exceedingly lucid, exposition of the essentials of Viśistādvaita philosophy It is divided into ten chapters The first is devoted to showing that the aspirant for Brahma-vidyā should have previously studied the *Karma-Mīmāmsā* In the second chapter, he refutes the Mīmāmsā doctrine that the Veda has action for its ultimate significance and the Nyāya view that the existence of God can be proved by reason and also shows that the Upanisads are not the complements of ritualistic injunctions, but have independent logical validity as statements of what exists as a fact (Brahman) In the third chapter he subjects to critical examination the Advaitic doctrine that the world is only a phenomenal appearance of Brahman Brahma-parināma-vāda as expounded by Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa comes in for criticism in the fourth and fifth chapters The next chapter inquires into the nature of Brahman, and is followed by a discussion of the nature of the finite soul in the seventh chapter The precise significance of *vidhi* is explained in the following chapter. The ninth chapter considers the significance of '*jñāna*' which is admitted by all Vedāntins to be the means for attaining moksa. An inquiry into the ultimate goal of life (moksa) is the subject of the last chapter.

11 "Ata eva prājñā Nārāyanāryāh —
parimita-gabhīrāni paraspara-virodhādi-rahitāni sūtrāni pranīya adhikaranānām pañcaśatīm eva Mīmāmsā-Śāstram ācaksate Anyāni punah adhikaranāni paunaruktyādi-dosa-dūsitāni akathayan Yat tu prājñair Nārāyanāryaih samgrhya kathanam na tat Jaimini-vacana-dūsanāyate Jaiminir hi mandāmanda-sakala-śisyajana-samvitti-saukaryārtham mandaprayojanāni adhikaranāni prthak anukathayāñcakāra Nārāyanāryās tu praudha-vidvajjana-parigrahābhisandhinā pradhānārtha-prakāśanena tulya-nyāyatayā sarvam api artha-jātam parimitena grantha-sandarbhena prācīkaśan iti dvayor api aikarasya-siddhih iti na virodha-gandhah."
Mīmāmsā-Pādukā-Paritrāna, p 16.

II

ARGUMENT

1. HOW INQUIRY INTO BRAHMAN PRESUPPOSES INVESTIGATION INTO KARMA

(*Brahma-vicārasya karmavicārānantarya-nirṇayādhikāraḥ*)

The Advaita Doctrine

The opening chapter of *Nītimālā* discusses the question Does the study of the Vedānta presuppose as a necessary preliminary an investigation into the *Karma-Kānda*? The Advaitins answer this question in the negative and contend that, just as the inquiry into the *Karma-Kāṇḍa* (*Karma-jijñāsā*) presupposes only the memorising of the *Karma-Kānda, Brahma-Mīmāmsā* (the inquiry into Brahman) presupposes only the memorising of the *Jñāna-Kānda,* and not the inquiry into sacrificial duties

Objection may be taken to this view on the following grounds:— (i) The two inquiries must be undertaken in the order in which the two parts of the Veda—the *Karma-Kānda* and the *Jñāna-Kāṇḍa*—have been memorised (ii) Since the Vedānta enjoins meditation on *udgītha* and the like, which are auxiliary to sacrificial ritual (karma), such meditations presuppose acquaintance with sacrifices (iii) As the injunction 'The Veda should be studied' (svādhyāyo'dhyetavyaḥ) insists not merely upon memory by rote, but also upon an understanding of the significance of the texts memorised, even the person who is keen on attaining moksa must necessarily have inquired into the import of the *Karma-Kānda* before taking up Vedānta-śāstra This injunction (*adhyayana-vidhi*) must be taken to insist upon an understanding of the significance of the Vedas for the following reasons: (a) It is least likely that anybody should strive enthusiastically for unintelligently memorising the Vedas, unaccompanied by an insight into their meaning (b) The injunction, 'The Veda should be studied' meaning thereby, "By study the Veda must be made to acquire a certain excellence or sanctity (*samskāra*)," [12] implies that the Veda thus sanctified should subserve some purpose This purpose could be no other than grasping the meaning (*artha-grahana*) of the Vedic texts. (c) Unless this injunction is taken to prescribe also the inquiry into the meaning of the Veda, there would be no opportunity for the pupil to learn the import of the Veda, for the pupil would, in pursuance of another *vidhi* (*adhītya snāyāt*), leave the *gurukula* immediately after having memorised the Veda.

12. 'Adhyayanena svādhyāyam samskuryāt'

None of these difficulties, says the Advaitin, is insuperable The first objection is pointless, for the *Karma-Kānda* and the *Jñāna-Kānda* are intended respectively for two sorts of aspirants—those who aspire for advantages, such as celestial bliss, and those who are desirous of attaining moksa Not setting much store by inferior *purusārthas,* the latter class is under no obligation to study the *Karma-Kāṇda.*

Against the second objection, it is urged that mediation on *udgītha* and the like only serves to heighten the effects of karma and is, in no sense, an indispensable preliminary to the fruition of karma, and that there is nothing improper in the inquiry into the Upanisadic texts preceding the inquiry into karma

The third difficulty is met by saying that the *adhyayana-vidhi* enjoins only memory by rote, for that alone is the immediate result of *adhyayana.* The insight into the import of the Vedic texts which may come later cannot be treated as the goal of *adhyayana.*

Of the three considerations advanced against the Advaitic position, the first is brushed aside For there is nothing strange in making unintelligent memorising a *purusārtha* Though it may have little value in itself, it may be treated as a legitimate object of human aspiration in so far as it paves the way for the ultimate goal of life, by successively leading to a knowledge of the significance of the Vedas, and the performance of karmas enjoined therein In fact, even on the view that *adhyayana* includes the understanding of the significance of the Vedas, it has to be admitted that men value this understanding not for its own sake, but for the results which it eventually yields The second is no serious difficulty, because its serviceability in leading to a grasp of the meaning (*artha-grahana*) is not the only use of the Veda sanctified by study (*adhyayana*), in itself it is useful for the purpose of *japa.* As for the last, none need be commanded to study the meaning of the Veda, for it is a matter left entirely to the discretion of individuals Even after returning home, the earnest pupil may go to the *guru* again and seek instruction regarding the meaning of the Veda The plea that he who has returned home has his time fully taken up by a round of duties, and can possibly have no time to seek the *guru* again needs no serious consideration In the midst of his multifarious duties, sacred and secular, the eager person can still spare time for this purpose Further there is nothing in the injunction, *adhītya snāyāt,* to suggest that the student should leave the gurukula *immediately after adhyayana.* He may well stay on to inquire into the import of the Veda All that it emphasises is that he should not think of returning home *before* finishing the study (*adhyayana*)

The Advaitin continues that even he who maintains that the knowledge of the import (*artha-grahana*) is the goal of study (*adhyayana*) has to make an exception in two cases.—(i) the study of meaningless expressions found in the Veda, such as *hum* and *phat*, and (ii) the study of those portions of the Veda which describe the sacrificial duties that the learner concerned is not expected to discharge He will also have to admit that the fruit of their study is either some unseen merit (*adrsta*) or mere memory of the text (*aksaragrahana*) Rather than make this needless discrimination between two sorts of Vedic texts, it would be preferable to maintain that mere verbal memory or some unseen fruit (*adrsta*) is the universal result of *adhyayana* (study)

From this it would not follow, says the Advaitin, that none need inquire into the significance of the Veda All that is contended is, it is not part of the injunction that the Veda should be studied (*adhyayana-vidhi*) As the person memorising the Veda does so with the help of the *angas* (supplementary studies), he is sure to have understood the general drift of Vedic teaching even while engaged in memorising the Veda Only he cannot be said to have understood it fully If he is desirous of getting a fuller and clearer knowledge of Vedic teaching there is nothing to prevent him from obtaining this enlightenment from the *guru* Once it is shown that the injunction, viz, 'the Veda should be studied' does not prescribe inquiry into the meaning of the Veda, it would be clear that there is no point in saying that one should have inquired into the meaning of the *Karma-Kānda* before taking up the *Jñāna-Kānda,* as that is the order in which one has studied the Veda Therefore, the person desirous of obtaining moksa may straightway study the *Jñāna-Kānda*

Refutation of the Advaitic Doctrine.

While conceding that the injunction that the Veda should be studied (*adhyayana*) does not insist upon the inquiry into the import of the Vedas memorised, the author is not prepared to accept the Advaitic view that the aspirant for *Brahma-vidyā* may straightway study the Vedānta On the contrary, he urges that the inquiry into the nature of sacrificial duty (*karma*) should precede the investigation into Brahman.

Three considerations are advanced by Nārāyanārya in support of this thesis: (1) The scriptures explicitly assert that the performance of sacrificial duty is the means of acquiring knowledge of Brahman One scriptural text, for example, says, "They desire to acquire knowledge with the aid of sacrifice (*yajña*), gift (*dāna*), and austerities (*tapas*) of the nature of freedom from desire for the fruit of actions (*anāśakena*)" This is enough to demolish the Advaitic contention that, as the *Karma-Kāṇda* and the *Jñāna-Kāṇḍa* are intended for two sorts of aspirants

(*adhikāri*), the person who is desirous of attaining moksa may straightway study the latter without having inquired into the former

The Advaitin might raise the objection that the text quoted makes sacrifice (*yajña*) the means of the desire for knowledge (*vividisā*), and not of knowledge itself (*vedana*) The reply to this is twofold — (a) In accordance with the well-known dictum that the goal (*sādhya*) of endeavour is either some result (*phala*) or what leads up to it (*phala-sādhana*), the goal of *yajña* should be either the fruit or what leads up to it But desire for knowledge is neither the result itself nor the means therefor (b) The sentence, "He desires to go with the aid of horses" (aśvena gigamisati) obviously makes horses the means for 'going', and not for 'the desire to go' Likewise, the proposition, "They desire to obtain knowledge by means of *yajña, dāna* and *tapas* . . ", means that *yajña* is the means of knowledge (*vedana*), and not of the desire for knowledge (*vedanecchā*)

The Advaitin may object and say that knowledge of reality (*tattva-jñāna*) is to be obtained from a study of the Vedāntic texts, and not from sacrifices This objection is met by the remark that by knowledge is not meant 'knowledge born of Vedāntic texts' (*vākya-janya-jñāna*), but knowledge which is of the nature of meditation (*upāsanātmaka-jñāna*) If a person performs his religious duties in the spirit of non-attachment to the fruits of his actions, he obtains first mental purification and then knowledge (*vedana*)

While conceding that *upāsana* may stand in need of sacrifice, the Advaitin may still urge that acquaintance with *karma* is unnecessary for inquiry into Brahman The reply to this is that *Śārīraka-Śāstra* discusses three important problems · (i) the nature of Brahman; (ii) the *upāsana* necessary for realising Brahman, and (iii) the goal (*phala*) of Vedānta Inquiry into *Karma-Kānda* is essential for the second of these problems. It is but reasonable that the investigation of the *sādhana* (means) should precede the inquiry into the nature of the goal (*phala*) This principle has been followed in the *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā* also Hence, it must be concluded that *Karma-vicāra* should precede *Brahma-vicāra*

(2) As the scriptures declare that he who neglects his duties falls into sin, even the person longing for moksa is obliged to perform his karma in order to avoid sin (*anistaparihāra*) He too is, therefore, required to study the *Karma-Kānda*

(3) The student of the Vedānta must be acquainted with the *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā,* because the *Uttara-Mīmāṁsā* employs some of the rules (*nyāyas*) followed in *Pūrva-Mīmāmsā* For example, in distinguishing

the several *vidyās,* such as *Dahara* and *Bhūma,* from one another, the *Vedānta-Sūtra*[13] employs *Mīmāmsā-nyāyas* which serve to distinguish the karmas from one another

The Advaitin may further argue as follows —The knowledge that Brahman is a pure unity (*advitīya-vijñāna*) is the means to moksa For acquiring this knowledge of oneness the aspirant must necessarily possess, so the Upanisads declare, mental and moral excellences such as control of the mind (*śama*), restraint of the senses (*dama*), renunciation (*uparati*), fortitude (*titiksā*) and power of concentration (*samāhita*) It would, therefore, follow that the possession of mental and moral traits, such as *śama* and *dama,* and not sacrifice (*yajña*), is the means to moksa Besides, there is an insuperable difficulty in considering *yajña* as a means to *apavarga* (liberation) *Yajña* implies plurality How can sacrifice which can flourish only in the soil of diversity be the means for obtaining knowledge of oneness ?

To this Nārāyanārya replies that it is nowhere stated in the Upanisads that knowledge of Brahman who is without distinction leads to moksa Far from asserting that knowledge of *nirviśesa* Brahman leads to *mukti,* the Upanisads proclaim that he who understands Brahman as being endowed with *viśesanas,* as having the entire universe consisting of sentient and non-sentient objects as His body, and as possessing illimitable perfections, attains immortality A *Śvetāśvatara* text, for example, declares · "He who knows the soul and matter to be distinct from their controller, secures the grace of the Lord and thereby attains immortality "

Nārāyanārya goes on to say that the text "They desire to acquire knowledge with the aid of sacrifice (*yajñena*) . " by using the term yajña in the instrumental case definitely asserts that sacrifice is the cause of the saving knowledge *Śama, dama* and other virtues are to be treated as auxiliary factors (*anugrāhaka*) The Advaitin may ask: How can yajña and qualities such as *śama* and *dama,* which are wholly contradictory in character, the former standing for what could be accomplished by activity (*vyāpāra-sādhya*) and the latter taking the form of cessation of activity (*uparama-rūpa*), be the conjoint means for the selfsame knowledge (*vedana*) , Nārāyanārya replies that they serve two aspects of the same and are not contradictory, because the *vyāpāra* refers to the actions enjoined in the Veda, while *uparati* pertains to those actions that have been prohibited and that arise from desire for fruits.

13 Vide *Vedānta-Sūtra,* III, iii. 26 and 42.

2. ON THE VALIDITY OF THE VEDĀNTA.

(*Vedānta-prāmānya-nirnayādhikāra*)

Taking a pragmatic view of knowledge, the Prābhākara school of Mīmāmsā asserts that every proposition, whether it be Vedic or not, must point to something to be accomplished (*sādhya* or *kārya*), and not to an existent something (*siddha*) Although the Bhātta school admits that propositions may either state facts (*siddha*) or reveal some task to be performed (*sādhya*), it yet maintains that, so far as Vedic utterances are concerned, they have action for their final import. Thus, both the schools of Mīmāmsā are at one in declaring that the Veda has action for its ultimate meaning On this view, the Vedāntic texts, though apparently statements of fact, are really to be construed as lending support to the injunctions and prohibitions conveyed in other portions of the Veda Thus, the Upanisads are reduced to a position of unimportance, being denied independent logical value (*prāmānya*) Surely, the Vedāntin, who regards the Upanisads as the final authority for our knowledge of ultimate reality, cannot allow this doctrine to go unchallenged Nor can he countenance the Nyāya doctrine that God's existence is proved by reason (*anumāna*); for, though the Naiyāyika concedes that the scriptures convey knowledge of matters of fact, his belief that God is established through inference, and not through scripture, as in the Vedānta, deprives the Vedas of all authority (*prāmānya*), so far as knowledge of Brahman is concerned For there is the well-known dictum that the scriptures deal with matters lying beyond the reach of the other pramānas[14] Therefore, the author attempts, in this chapter, to refute these two doctrines which threaten to nullify the Upanisads

The Prābhākara View

The Prābhākara view is first taken up for examination In defence of the view that every proposition signifies something to be accomplished (*sādhya*) and that the Vedāntic texts also, of necessity, point to sādhya, tasks to be performed, it is urged that words would convey intelligible meaning only when their relation to their respective significations have already been grasped One who is ignorant of the relation of words to their meanings makes no sense out of them An examination of the way in which the meanings of words are learnt reveals, the Prābhākara points out, that children get to know the significance of words by comparing and contrasting commands like "fetch the cow" (*gām ānaya*), "fetch the horse" (*aśvam ānaya*), and "tie up the cow," (*gām badhāna*

14 Aprâpte śāstram arthavat.

and so forth, which elderly persons use in daily intercourse It is but natural that every word comes to be associated in the child's mind with some action or other Thus, he concludes that words have the power to signify action, but never the capacity to denote existing things The Upanisadic texts cannot be an exception to this, they too must teach what has to be done and not what exists as a fact, i e, Brahman It is possible to argue that an utterance need not always convey commands and that it may also state facts When, for example, a person's remarks produce in the listener a beaming countenance, the bystander may learn from the facial expression that the remarks only conveyed the news of the birth of a son and not an action But this contention, the Prābhākara replies, is untenable, for, as there are manifold causes of joy, all that the bystander could learn is that the utterance is the cause of joy, and he could not gather that it is an announcement of the birth of a son

Refutation of the Prābhākara View

Nārāyanārya declines to subscribe to the Prābhākara view for the following reasons:—(i) For one thing, the example adduced by the opponent does not prove his point It was suggested that as there is plurality of causes of joy, the messenger's utterance could only convey the news that something that could occasion joy has happened An effective reply to this suggestion is that, for an identical reason, even the sentence "tie up the cow" (*gām badhāna*) can only mean to the bystander that something has to be done What that task is he cannot easily guess For, on hearing the words of the teacher, "tie up the cow", the pupil is found to close his book, to get up from his seat, proceed to the garden and then, tie the cow Which of these activities was referred to by the master's command, the bystander has no means of understanding

(ii) Again, before entering upon any action, a person must have a knowledge of the action to be executed This, in its turn, presupposes acquaintance with the objects connected thereto The proper sequence is an insight into the meaning of the words uttered by the *guru*, the knowledge that a task has to be performed and then the actual performance, i e, the overt action. Words, then, must be taken to generate knowledge of objects, and not of what has to be effected

(iii) Further, it is not true that meanings of words are understood only from the commands given by elderly persons in daily intercourse The father, mother, teacher or other elderly person points with the finger to different objects in the environment and at the same time utters their respective names The observant child learns in course of time that these words of themselves denote the several objects in the environment and that the application of such and such names to such and such

objects is based upon the denotative power of words and that the meanings of words do not include a reference to actions. Later, at school, the teacher separates the words of a sentence and points to their meanings.

Nyāya Argument for God's Existence

Next, Nārāyanārya examines the Nyāya doctrine that God's existence is established through inference. The main argument advanced by the Naiyāyika to prove the existence of God may be stated as follows:— Being made up of parts, the earth, the mountain and other things composed of diverse parts and comprising this universe must be effects. And effects are everywhere found to point to efficient causes that are of the nature of agents who know the material (*upādāna*) and the auxiliary (*upakarana*) causes and who also know for whom and for what purpose these effects are intended. Clearly, this agent cannot be the finite souls themselves; for, prior to creation, these souls being devoid of senses, body and also of knowledge (*jñāna*) and power (*śakti*) are scarcely different from non-sentient objects (*acitkalpa*). It is futile to suggest that the countless souls, though devoid of creative power in themselves, yet produce the world by virtue of their past karma; for it makes the gratuitous assumption that the countless souls have performed diverse deeds, which share in common the responsibility for creating the world. The Naiyāyika brushes aside the objection that the argument can at best establish that the creator of the world, like the maker of jars, furniture and so forth, is a person subject to karma, and not an omnipotent Lord. He thinks that if all the characteristics found in the illustrative example (*drstānta*), whether they be relevant to the point at issue or not, must necessarily be inferred in the *paksa* (subject of the inference), there must be an end to all inference.

Examination of the Nyāya Argument

Subjecting this argument to a rigorous scrutiny, Nārāyanārya shows that, at best, it may establish only that the world needs a cause, but that the author of the universe is a Supreme Personality endowed with auspicious qualities can only be learnt from the scriptures. The Naiyāyika argued that the world with its wonderful shape points to a Supreme Person, even as towers, fortifications and the like point to competent agents, but that argument may as well prove, says Nārāyanārya, that, as in the examples cited, many persons are involved in creating the world. Considerations of economy of thought (*lāghava*), he continues, are wholly beside the point, and consistently with the nature of the effect, namely, its wonderous shapes, diversity of authorship must be inferred. He adds that if, on the analogy of jars, cloth and other objects in our environment, the existence of a maker of the world

is inferred, this maker must, like the potter, be subject to *karma*, and need not be omniscient It is unreasonable on the part of the Naiyāyika to suggest that the analogy should not be pressed beyond a certain point and that when all the features found in the illustrative example are inferred to exist in the *paksa*, there would be an end to all inference For on the strength of the reason (*hetu*), the argument will certainly prove all those features that have not been proved by other *pramānas* to be inconsistent with the case in question As God is beyond the reach of other pramānas, none of the pramānas has shown that certain features present in the illustrative example will be inconsistent here Hence the *hetu* must be taken to prove that the *pakṣa* does resemble the illustrative example (*drstānta*) in all respects

The Naiyāyika may still contend that the very distinction of the world from objects, like jars, must point to a creator who is an omniscient Lord, rather than a person who is subject to karma But this, says Nārāyanārya, is untenable; for he who is free from karma must be devoid of all contact with body, senses and the like, and cannot, therefore, enter upon creative activity And it is idle to contend that though devoid of body, senses and other faculties, he may create with the mere aid of his will (*saṁkalpa*), for there can be no *saṁkalpa* in the absence of the body Should the Naiyāyika contend that the creator of the world is eternally endowed with a body, it may be replied that this would contradict his belief that whatever is made up of parts is an effect and cannot be eternal At best the Nyāya argument proves the existence of a person more competent than any of the finite souls; but it would scarcely establish that he is at once the efficient and the material cause, and that he creates at one stroke this expansive world with the sole aid of his *samkalpa* That such a God exists can be gathered only from the scriptures

The Bhātta View

Assigning a distinctive position to verbal testimony (*śabda*), the Bhātta Mīmāṁsaka holds that while perception and other pramānas may acquaint us with facts useful or otherwise, the Veda must exclusively serve some useful practical purpose or other, and, must, therefore, point only to action Since all utterances are meant for the communication of ideas, none would listen to statements, if they did not serve useful ends Hence only such sentences as are relevant to our purposes can be treated as a source of true knowledge The securing of pleasure (*sukha-prāpti*) and the avoidance of pain (*duhkha-nivrtti*) are the sole ends which man strives after And these are to be attained only by performing certain actions and desisting from others The performance of the jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice, for example, leads to celestial

bliss, and the avoiding of injury (*himsā*) to living beings keeps away the terrors of hell (*naraka*). Those scriptural texts which neither initiate action nor inhibit it can never lead to pleasure or to the removal of suffering. Therefore, the Vedāntic texts are to be taken as prompting or inhibiting activity, if they are to be regarded as a *pramāna*.

To a superficial observer certain sentences which merely state facts, without initiating action (*pravṛtti*) or prohibiting it (*nivṛtti*), may appear to produce joy or to terminate pain. For example, the sentence "Here is a treasure-trove" causes happiness, and the proposition, "Here is no serpent", dispels fear. But the careful student will realise that it is the knowledge of the existence of the treasure, rather than its mere existence, that leads to joy. Hence, the sentence, "Here is a treasure-trove", must be construed as conveying the command (*vidhi*), "You ought to understand that there is a treasure-trove".

Refutation of the Bhāṭṭa View

Nārāyanārya disagrees with the Bhātta view and points out that even judgments which do not prompt action or inhibit it may yet serve useful ends. "Here is a treasure-trove" is useful in itself, in so far as it furnishes knowledge of the presence of hidden treasure. It is mere perversity to construe it as an injunction. Since knowledge is under the control of the *pramāṇas*, and not of the self, knowledge cannot be the subject of a command. Perhaps it may be suggested that all that the *vidhi* means is "Engage in such activities as will lead to this knowledge". But in preference to this roundabout explanation, it is more reasonable to hold that it reveals the existence of the treasure and, thereby, produces joy.

One may admit that this proposition occasions joy, but yet argue that there is no guarantee that it reveals the actual existence of treasure. Like the false promises deliberately used by elderly persons to create joy in children, the sentence in question may be false in fact and yet be the cause of joy. To this the author replies that this proposition, like the promises held out to children, produces pleasure only because it is accepted as true. The moment it is discovered to be false, it ceases to generate joy. But as regards the Upanisads, there being no subsequent contradiction (*bādha-jñāna*), no doubts concerning their *prāmānya* (truth-value) need be entertained at all. Consequently, Vedāntic texts teaching the existence of Brahman have *prāmānya*.

Certain Vedic passages enjoining duties, such as the performance of *viśvajit* sacrifice, do not contain any reference to the desirable results accruing from their performance. In such cases, the opponent is prepared to assume some comparatively trivial result and treat those passages as having logical value. When that is so, what difficulty could

he have in attributing *prāmānya* to Vedāntic texts which, at the very moment they are heard, deal directly with the supreme goal of life (*parama-prayojana*), namely, Brahman Himself

3. REFUTATION OF THE THEORY OF THE PHENOMENALITY OF THE WORLD

(*Vivartapaksa-pratiksepādhikāra*)

Vivarta-vāda in Outline

The Advaitic doctrine that the world is a phenomenal appearance of Brahman is refuted in this chapter The case for *vivarta-vāda* is stated by Advaitins as follows —The scriptures teach that Brahman, which is responsible for the creation, sustenance and dissolution of the world, is *sat* (reality), *cit* (consciousness) and *ānanda* (bliss) It is without distinction of any kind (*nirviśesa*), self-luminous (*svayam-prakāśa*) and without a second (*advitīya*) Being clouded by ignorance (*avidyā*) which has no beginning, Brahman becomes the basis of the illusory appearance of this world of plurality It is in this sense that Brahman is spoken of as the material cause (*upādāna-kārana*) of the world, and in no other

Refutation of Vivarta-vāda

Nārāyanārya points out that Brahman cannot be the cause of the world in this sense, by showing that the Advaitic theory that Brahman is pure being (*sat*), consciousness (*cit*) and bliss (*ānanda*) and is without distinction (*nirviśesa*), and without a second (*advitīya*) is unsustainable He proves also that there is no possibility of Brahman ever being clouded by avidyā

To take the first of these points :—*Sat* cannot be treated as a *jāti* (class characteristic), for, according to the Advaitin, there is only one object wherein it is met with Nor can *sat* denote 'what can be known' (*prameya*), for Brahman, on the Advaitic view, is not the object of knowledge Nor yet can it signify distinction from unreality (*asad-vyāvrtti*), for, if it did, the world which on that view is at once distinct from *sat* and *asat* (*sadasad-vilaksana*) would possess this character and would, therefore, have to be considered real (*sat*) It cannot also mean mere existence, for that would make Brahman a quality of some entity, since existence is a quality (*dharma*)

The term '*cit*' cannot be said to denote 'that which possesses consciousness (*caitanya*)'; for, on the Advaitic doctrine, Brahman does not possess consciousness, since it is consciousness itself Nor can it denote 'mere consciousness,' for, if so, knowledge obtained from the

pramānas must be termed Brahman Nor can Brahman be said to be *cit* in the sense of *ajada* (that which is other than non-sentience), denoting what does not depend upon anything else for its manifestation. For Brahman would then be something that possesses a *prakāśa* which depends exclusively upon itself But, as a *prakāśa* distinct from Brahman is not admitted by the Advaitin, this interpretation of 'cit' is opposed to his view

Again, on the Advaitic position the term *ānanda* cannot be assigned an intelligible meaning *Ānanda* cannot signify pleasure (*sukha*), for pleasure is well-known to be a quality of the soul, and Brahman is no quality *Ānanda* cannot denote 'being agreeble' (*anukūlatva*), as it would raise the inevitable question To whom is it agreeable ? Since there is no jīva (soul) besides Brahman, it cannot be said to be agreeable to the jīva And since *bhoktrtva* (the character being an enjoyer) is denied to Brahman, *ānanda* cannot be treated as an object of its own enjoyment Should it be said that it means 'cessation of pain' (*duhkhanivrtti*), it may be replied that Brahman would then become a negative principle

The expression '*advitīya*' cannot mean 'without a second' It cannot denote the absence of another Brahman like itself, for there would be need of such a description only if there prevailed the view that Brahman is either twofold or manifold But clearly, such a doctrine was at no time maintained by any one Again, '*advitīya*' cannot denote that in respect of the world which is only an effect of Brahman, the latter is non-dual, for the doubt that they are different is least likely to arise, since all Vedāntins are agreed that the cause and the effect are non-different (*ananya*).

The Advaitic Position.

According to the Advaitins, upaniṣadic passages like "In the beginning, my dear boy, all this was just Being, one only, and without a second"[15] teach that at the time of pralaya Brahman existed as a unitary principle, devoid of differences of any kind The text "There is no plurality here"[16] denies reality to multiplicity The text "Beginning with speech, a modification, a name"[17] asserts that effects are unreal So also the passage "All this is indeed Brahman"[18] equates the world with Brahman for the purpose of negativing distinctions and showing that what was erroneously perceived as the world is not really

15 *Chānd Up*, VI, 11 1
16 *Brh Up*, IV, iv 16
17. *Chānd Up* VI, i 4
18 *Chānd. Up*, III, xiv, 1

the world, but Brahman only The text "He who knows Brahman crosses sorrow"[19] teaches that by jñāna sorrow is terminated. And what is terminated by jñāna must be *avidyā* (ignorance).

All Pramānas Teach that Brahman is a Pure Unity.

All the pramānas, the Advaitin continues, teach that Brahman is a pure unity, devoid of differences To all appearance, perception (*pratyaksa*) acquaints us with plurality But in reality, it gives us knowledge only of unity Even granting that perception testifies to the aspect of manifoldness, its value as a pramāna is negligible, since it is infected by *bheda-vāsanās* (impressions of difference) As for scriptural testimony, the *abheda śrutis* must, in the opinion of the Advaitin, be reckoned more authoritative than the *bheda śrutis* Reasoning also supports the view that Brahman is nirguna and that the world is *mithyā* (phenomenal) The arguments adduced by the Advaitin are the following—(i) All reference to *bheda* must be based on a unitary object; wherever there is an appearance of duality, the basis is unitary, as in the case of the moon appearing double in certain circumstances (ii) Being perceptible (*drśya*) the world is unreal, for whatever is perceived is unreal, as for example the silver wrongly perceived in the shell.

The Scripture Does Not Teach a Nirviśesa-vastu

Nārāyanārya vigorously protests against the contention of the Advaitin explained so far and points out that no proposition can establish a *nirviśesa-vastu* (distinctionless object); for, in its very nature, any judgment is a combination of words conveying different meanings, and it expresses the relationship of the different meanings conveyed by its parts. Consequently, the scriptural texts cannot teach a *nirviśesa-vastu* Taking the text cited by the Advaitin—"In the beginning, my dear boy, all this was just Being, one only and without a second"—Nārāyanārya shows that far from teaching Brahman to be a distinctionless entity, it really draws attention to Brahman possessing infinite perfections. The word '*agre*' (in the beginning) points to a time; *āsīt*', to an act, '*idam sat*' to the fact of the world existing in the form of *sat*, '*ekam eva*' denotes that Brahman devoid of name and form is the material cause of the world '*Advitīya*' signifies that there was no other controller (*adhisthāna*) besides Brahman Himself.

Whether it is taken as teaching the true modes of meditation (*upāsana*) or the nature of reality (*tattva*), the text "There is no plurality here" (ne'ha nānā asti) necessarily presupposes a listener (*pramātā*).

19 *Chānd Up*, VII, i.

Its real intention is to deny a world that has not its being in Brahman (*abrahmātmaka*). This idea is echoed in the following verse of the Bhagavad Gītā "There is nothing moveable or immoveable wherein I am not present as an Inner controller "[20]

The " ne'ti, ne'ti " text far from denying attributes to Brahman asserts that the attributes referred to in the context do not exhaust Brahman's nature As Bādarāyana[21] pertinently remarks, immediately after the *ne'ti* text there follow passages attributing qualities to Brahman

The text " Vācārambanam vikāro " cannot, unless violence is done to it, teach that effects are unreal and that they are merely modifications Its aim is only to show that the cause and the effect are non-different The world, being an effect, is non-different from Brahman From this text it would not follow that Brahman is *nirviśesa* (without distinction) or that the world is phenomenal (*mithyā*)

The passage, " All this is, indeed, Brahman " (sarvam khalu idam Brahman) does not deny plurality, it only affirms that the world has Brahman for its self, that the world has its source and support in Brahman and that it is dissolved in Brahman To believe that the world has the same status as that of the silver perceived in the shell is to forget that, unlike silver, the world is not later perceived as false

The text, " The knower of Brahman crosses sorrow" asserts that knowledge dispels the travails of *samsāra* It is well to remember that this saving knowledge is of the nature of *upāsana* (meditation), and is not mere knowledge of the import of the śruti texts (*vākyajanya-jñāna*)

Abheda-śrutis are Not More Authoritative than Bheda-śrutis

It cannot be said that *abheda-śrutis* have greater authority, in so far as they came later and suppress the bheda-śrutis; for there is no warrant for maintaining that subsequent knowledge is more authoritative than the earlier If such a view were tenable, the preception of the double moon coming after the realisation that there is but a single moon must be valid

Perception Does Not acquaint us with a Nirviśesa-vastu.

The assertion that *pratyaksa* (perception), being infected by *dosa* (defect) in the shape of *bheda-vāsanā*, is of little value assumes without proof that *bheda-vāsanās* are a defect Any attempt to show that they

20 *Bhagavad Gītā,* X, 39 " Na tadasti vinā yat syān mayā bhūtam carācaram "

21 *Ved Sūtra,* III ii 21.

are a defect lands the Advaitin in the difficulty of mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*). If *bheda-jñāna* (knowledge of difference) is an illusion, then the impressions (*vāsanās*) generated by them would constitute a defect But, it is only when the *bheda-vāsanās* are considered a defect, that their cause, viz, the knowledge of multiplicity (*bheda-jñāna*), could be condemned as illusory To try to obviate the difficulty of *anyonyāśraya* by saying that knowledge of difference is illusory, since the upanisadic passages teach a *nirviśesa-vastu* is to commit the fallacy of *cakraka* (circular reasoning) If it can be shown that the pramānas which generate *bheda-jñāna* are defective, because they are beset with *bheda-vāsanās,* it would follow that the upanisads teach *nirviśesa-vastu* If it is proved that the upanisads teach a *nirviśesa-vastu,* then, it would follow that *bheda-jñāna* is erroneous If it is determined that *bheda-jñāna* is erroneous, *bheda-vāsanās* dependent thereon would be rooted in error and would consequently prove that all pramānas yielding *bheda-jñāna* would be weak

Inference (anumāna) Cannot Establish a Distinctionless Object

The arguments advanced by the Advaitin to prove the reality of a distinctionless Brahman and the phenomenality of the world turn out, on examination, to be fallacious It is quite easy to devise arguments in support of the opposite contention E g (i) Being unperceived, like the horns of a hare, Brahman is *asat* (ii) The world is *sat* (*real*), because, like the ātman, it is not falsified later

The Advaitic View that Brahman is Nirviśeṣa.

Countless passages such as " Satyam jñānam anantam " may appear to speak of Brahman as possessed of infinite perfections, like omniscience They really teach, says the Advaitin, that Brahman is nirviśeṣa. He seeks to explain his position as follows: "The text " Satyam jñānam anantam " does not speak of a *viśiṣṭa-vastu,* but only refers to a partless whole of reality (*akhanda-svarūpa*) If it referred to an object possessing qualities, it must denote the qualities and also convey the idea that the object possessing them is unitary In that case, there could be no unity in the judgment Again, as the function of each attribute is to mark off its possessor from those not owning it, the three *viśesanas* (qualifications) mentioned must point to three different objects. Hence the three words of the text cannot be taken to attribute qualities to a single object. A possible objection is that if these words did not refer to viśesanas but only pointed to an identical object, they would be idle repetitions But this objection is pointless, since the words in question refer to different aspects of Brahman, viz, asad-vyāvrtti (being opposed to unreality), and ajñāna-vyāvrtti (being opposed to ignorance)."

"It may be objected that this amounts to admitting that Brahman is *saviśesa*. But this is not an insuperable objection, for *asad-vyāvrtti*, *ajñāna-vyāvṛtti* and so forth are not the qualities of Brahman, but Brahman itself. There is nothing strange in identifying Brahman with vyāvrtti, because such a procedure is adopted in the case of *guna* (quality), *jāti* (generic feature) and *kriyā* (action). Whiteness, for example, is distinct from its substrate and from other colours. The character of being distinct from others (*svetaravyāvrtti*) is whiteness itself, and not a quality of whiteness, for the simple reason that a quality is not supposed to possess a quality. Hence it may be concluded, Brahman is *nirviśesa*."

Refutation of the Advaitic View that Brahman is Nirviśesa

Nārāyanārya says that the formula "satyam jñānam anantam" asserts that Brahman is a unitary principle endowed with viśesanas. Each word therein refers to a *viśiṣṭa-vastu* (an object possessing qualifications), and from the co-ordination of all the words it is learnt that the entities referred to by the words are identical. The opponent asked: Should there not be as many objects (*viśesya*) as there are viśesanas (qualifications) in the text? The reply is that so long as the different viśesanas are not contradictory and may well co-exist in a single entity they will not point to a plurality of bases. 'Being broken-horned,' 'long-horned' and 'hornless' are obviously contradictory features and, therefore, cannot be attributed to one and the same cow. But bigness, blueness and fragrance are not contradictory qualities in the same flower and may well co-exist. Even so, *satyam*, *jñānam* and *anantam* may well characterise the same reality, Brahman.

On the analogy of *guna*, *jāti* and *kriyā*, the Advaitin maintained that *ajñāna-vyāvrtti* and the like are not the attributes of Brahman, but Brahman itself, and that Brahman is nirviśesa. But his argument is unsound. For in the case of *guna*, *jāti* and *kriyā*, vyāvrtti is treated as the very essence of *guna*, *jāti* or *kriyā*, since a quality can have no quality. But the case of *dravya* (substance) is different. 'Being distinct from a cloth (*pata-vyāvrtti*)' is not the *svarūpa* of the jar, but its quality. Even so, *asad-vyavrtti* and the like are the qualities of Brahman. Thus it is clear that Brahman is *saviśesa*.

Pratyaksa Yields Knowledge of Manifoldness

Since pratyaksa (perception) acquaints us with a world of distinctions, it is unreasonable on the part of the Advaitin to maintain that Brahman is *advitīya*, in the sense of being devoid of *vijātīya-bheda* (distinction from dissimilar objects).

The Advaitic View that Pratyaksa Cannot Apprehend Difference.

The Advaitin replies that perception can never apprehend difference (*bheda*) For whether *bheda* signifies *anyonyābhāva* (mutual negation) or something else, in any case knowledge of difference presupposes knowledge of *āśraya* (substrate) and *pratiyogin* (the object from which it differs) Being momentary (*ksanika*), perception cannot apprehend both the substrate and the object from which it differs If bheda denotes anyonyābhāva, the perceptual judgment " This is not a cloth " points either to the 'this' or to " not a cloth " If the former, it cannot point to anything else, and if it points to 'not a cloth' it must presuppose the antecedent affirmation " This is a cloth " But it cannot point to both, as perception is momentary If *bheda* denotes something different from *anyonyābhāva*, even then *anyonyābhāva* must first have been grasped Take for example the judgment " This is a jar " It implies distinction from cloth and other objects Thus, even here anonyābhāva is presupposed Thus all the difficulties of the first alternative confront this also Hence, pratyaksa cannot generate *bheda-jñāna*

The Advaitin adds perception apprehends mere existence (*sanmātra*), not limited by space and time In cognitions such as " The jar exists," and " The cloth exists," the invariable element (*anuvartamāna*), viz, *sat* (existence), like the subject in the erroneous perception " This is silver," is rooted in perception, while the variable elements (*vyāvartamāna*), viz, jar and cloth, like the predicative element 'silver' in the illusion " This is silver," are born of illusion (*bhrānti-mūla*)

Anticipating the objection that when our normal perceptions, unlike the objects of illusory cognition, are not later contradicted, they cannot be condemned as illusory, the Advaitin replies that even in true cognitions there is *bādha* (contradiction, sublation), in so far as there is vyāvrtti, the fruit of *bādha* When a jar, for example, is perceived, its distinction from cloth (pata-vyāvrtti) is implied The cognition " This is cloth " likewise implies distinction from the jar (*ghata-vyāvrtti*)

Refutation of the Advaitic View

Subjecting the Advaitic view to a searching analysis, the author shows that none of the arguments of the opponent is tenable and concludes that *bheda* is vouched for by *pratyaksa* The Advaitin urged that since *bheda-jñāna* presupposes knowledge of *dharmin* (substrate) and of the *pratiyogin*, (that from which it differs), it cannot be furnished by perception, which is a momentary process But the fact is *bheda* is nothing more than *jāti*, (generic property) It does not signify either

anyonyābhāva or something else It is the *prakāra* (mode) of objects, and is always apprehended along with the *prakārin* At no time is the *prakārin* perceived in insolation from the *prakāra* It is impossible to perceive a cow, for instance, without noticing its colour, size, shape and other features To recognise that a given object is distinct from another, there need be no memory of the *pratiyogin*[22] It is because at the very outset an object is recognised as being distinct from others, the person who desires to secure that object acts in an appropriate manner even in the absence of a knowledge of the *pratiyogin*

The Advaitin may contend that since *bheda-jñāna,* taking the form "This is distinct from that", clearly presupposes a knowledge of the *dharmin* and of the *pratiyogin,* it is impossible to perceive an object, at the very outset as being distinct from another The reply is that the apprehension of difference (*bheda-grahana*), like the cognition of non-difference (*abheda-grahana*), is of two kinds Of two objects which are similar to each other in colour, size, shape and so forth, it may be said, "This is not non-different from that" A second variety of *abheda-grahana* takes the form, "This is the pen which I used yesterday." Similarly, the two varieties of *bheda-grahaṇa* are (i) "The motor car is different from a steam engine", and (ii) "This is a tree" For the first type, knowledge of the *pratiyogin* (that from which it differs) is needed Knowledge of the steam engine is essential, before a person can distinguish the motor car from the locomotive engine But for apprehending the second variety of difference *pratiyogi-jñāna* (the knowledge of what it differs from) is not necessary

When the Advaitin argues that *sat* alone is grasped in perception, as *sat* is the only persistent element therein, he is contradicting his theory that *sat* is not an object of perception It is admitted on all hands that the eye has the capacity to cognise not bare existence, but the colour, the object possessing that colour and also the other qualities inherent in that object.

There is no value in the suggestion made by the Advaitin that the variable elements in our perceptions are to be condemned as fictitious, even as the predicate element in the illusory cognition, "This is silver," is rejected as false For 'silver' is rejected as wholly imaginary (*kālpanika*), not because it is a variable factor, but because it is later contradicted (*bādhita*)

Vyāvrtti is not the result of *bādha,* as the Advaitin imagines Bādha (contradiction) consists in denying that the given object exists at

22 Vide Note 104 on p 69 of *Siddhitraya* (Annamalai University Philosophical Series).

the time, and place and in the context specified Vyāvrtti, on the other hand, signifies the distinction of one entity from another

The Advaitic Conception of Ajñāna is Indefensible

According to the Advaitin, unitary Brahman, becoming clouded by *ajñāna,* imagines a world of multiplicity What is the precise significance he attaches to the term *ajñāna* ?

Statement of the Advaitic Theory

Ajñāna, says the Advaitin, is not the negation of knowledge (*jñānābhāva*), for, in that case, it cannot cloud Brahman Nor can it account for *adhyāsa* (illusion) For an identical reason, ajñāna is not *anyathā-jñāna* (wrong knowledge) It is a positive entity (*bhāva-rūpa*), which is distinct from *jñāna-pāgabhāva* (antecedent non-existence of jñāna) It is termed Māyā or Tamas, and cannot be described as either *sat* or *asat* and it is dispelled by true knowledge of reality

Its existence is established by *śruti* (scriptural testimony), *śrutyarthāpatti,* (presumption), *anumāna* (inference) and *pratyaksa* (perception)

Śruti—A *Taittirīya* text commencing with the words, "Then it was neither Being nor non-Being"[23] proclaims "Tamas alone existed; and all things were clouded by Tamas" A Śvetāśvatara text makes it clear that ajñāna is referred to as Māyā or Prakrti "What is called Māyā is to be understood as prakrti"[24]

Śrutyarthāpatti—The famous *Chāndogya* text, "Tat tvam asi"[25] identifies the jīva with Brahman But as the two have sharply contrasted features, they cannot be identical To reconcile this contradiction, it has to be assumed that one of the two things equated must be unreal And the unreal entity must be the handiwork of ajñāna

Anumāna—That ajñāna is a positive entity (bhāva-rūpa) may be proved by inference also Take the argument—Knowledge arising from one or the other of the pramānas presupposes something else, which is different from the anterior non-existence of that knowledge This something else clouds the object of that knowledge, and is terminated by the knowledge resulting from the pramānas It also dwells in the same place as that knowledge, because knowledge illumines an object not hitherto illumined, just as the first flash of light proceeding from the lamp presupposes a darkness which is a positive entity and which

23 *Tait Up*, II, viii 9
24 *Śvet. Up.*, IV 10
25. *Chānd Up* VI, viii 7

the light is now able to dispel and which clouded the object now illumined.

Pratyaksa—Perception also establishes the existence of *ajñāna* Direct cognitions, such as "I am ignorant" and "I do not know myself, nor others besides myself", show that perception reveals the existence of *ajñāna* The ignorance referred to here is not the negation of knowledge (the antecedent non-existence of knowledge), for, if so, this negation of knowledge would have to be revealed by non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*) But, as a matter of fact, it is apprehended directly, and is, thus, akin to the perception of pleasure expressed in the judgment "I am experiencing pleasure" Even granting that the negation of knowledge can be the object of perception, the cognition in question does not denote the bare absence of knowledge (*jñānābhāva*) For at the very moment of this cognition there must be the knowledge of (i) the 'I', the substrate (*āśraya*) of this *abhāva,* (ii) of the *jñānābhāva* itself (*viṣaya*) and (iii) knowledge (the pratiyogin or counter-correlative) Therefore, this cognition has for its object something positive, and not the negation of knowledge The advantage in making *ajñāna* a positive something is that it can be perceived without a knowledge of the pratiyogin, even as darkness is directly perceived without the mediation of any other knowledge

It may be asked How can *Sākṣi-caitanya* (witness, the seer within the jīva), whose nature is to illumine the true nature of things, co-exist with bhāvarūpa *ajñāna* which veils reality? But the reply is the *Sākṣi-caitanya* does not illumine the true nature of the real, since reality is self-luminous On the other hand, *Sākṣi-caitanya* is a percipient of ajñāna The *Sākṣin* and *ajñāna* may well co-exist. There is no danger of the *Sākṣi-caitanya* terminating *ajñāna* When we make the perception, "This is silver", silver does not cease to exist When the seer perceives the ajñāna, ajñāna does not cease to exist Thus, *bhāvarūpa-ajñāna* is not without valid proof.

Refutation of the Advaitic Notion of Ajñāna.

Scripture Does Not Establish Ajñāna

Against this contention, Nārāyanārya points out that in the scriptural text cited by the Advaitin the term *Tamas* refers to darkness, or to *prakṛti* where tamoguna is preponderant It does not refer to *ajñāna* *Prakṛti* is referred to as *tamas*, because it clouds Brahman, even as darkness veils objects. *Śvetāśvatara upaniṣad* mentions māyā as an alternative name to prakṛti, because it creates wonderful objects. The term *māyā* denotes that which works wonders. Māyā is two-fold: (i) *māyā* that creates *bhrānti-jñāna* and (ii) *māyā* that creates wonders.

Since *prakrti* creates wonderful things, such as *mahat* (intellect) and *ahamkāra* (egoity), it is called *māyā*

Arthāpatti Does Not Teach Ajñāna.

It was suggested that unless the existence of *ajñāna* is assumed, no intelligible meaning can be assigned to the text "tat tvam asi", which equates the finite self with the Infinite Surely, it is possible to justify the text without postulating *ajñāna* The text in question teaches that Brahman which is the cause of the world and Brahman which has the jīva for His *prakāra* are identical, and not that the jīva is Brahman itself

Anumāna Does Not Establish Ajñāna

The argument advanced by the Advaitin only establishes that all knowledge arising from *pramānas* has *bhāvarūpa-ajñāna* for its antecedent This knowledge itself, resting as it does upon anumāna pramāna, must presuppose a *bhāvarūpa-ajñāna*—and that knowledge, another *ajñāna* and so on *ad infinitum* If, in order to obviate this infinite regress, it is suggested that this knowledge furnished by *anumāna* does not presuppose an *ajñāna*, then, the argument is liable to be charged with *anekānta dosa* For there is at least one instance where the *hetu* (reason) is present, while the *sādhya* is absent There is at least one case where knowledge arising from pramānas is not preceded by ajñāna Again, the illustrative example of the flash of light is defective in not possessing the *sādhana* or *hetu* (*sādhana-vikala*). For the light of the lamp does not illumine objects hitherto unknown The illumining power belongs to consciousness only There may be light, but if there is no consciousness, there wil be no lighting up of object The senses are the causes of the origination of knowledge. The light merely discharges an auxiliary function by dispelling the darkness which prevented the organs from giving rise to knowledge

Pratyaksa Does Not Prove Ajñāna

The claim that *ajñāna* as a positive entity is the object of perception is not justified For the perceptive judgment " I am ignorant ", (meaning " That I am ignorant is realised by me"), yields knowledge of (i) the " I " or the Ego which owns the ignorance (the *āśraya*), (ii) the ignorance itself (*visaya*) and (iii) knowledge (the *pratiyogin*, the counter correlative) When the cognition conveys knowledge of the *āśraya*, the *visaya* and the *pratiyogin*, it is wrong to assert that it makes us aware of ignorance.

Again, in accordance with the Advaitic principle that knowledge of the self terminates *ajñāna*, the knowledge of the Ego furnished by this perception must dissipate, and not cognise, *ajñāna*. To say that it is

only clear and distinct knowledge that could remove *ajñāna,* and that the vague knowledge of the Ego furnished by this perception can co-exist with *ajñāna* is as self-contradictory as the assertion that *jñāna* and the negation of *jñāna* can exist side by side

Further, there is no force in the contention that, like darkness, *bhāvarūpa-ajñāna* is apprehended directly, without the thought of anything else For, unlike ajñāna, darkness is regarded as a substance. That is why when darkness is seen its correlate (light) need not be thought of. When, however, darkness is conceived as the opposite of light, the thought of the *pratiyogin* (light) is required But *ajñāna,* whether understood as the negation of knowledge (*jñānābhāva*) or wrong knowledge (*anyathā-jñāna*) or *the opposite of knowledge,* necessarily presupposes the thought of its *pratiyogin* (*jñāna*) Thus, none of the *pramānas* mentioned by the Advaitin can really prove the existence of *ajñāna*

Ajñāna Which is said to Cloud Brahman Can Have No Āśraya (basis)

Since the jīva is himself the product of *ajñāna,* he cannot be its basis Nor can Brahman be its basis, for, on the Advaitic view, it is not the basis of knowledge, but knowledge itself, and what is not the basis of *jñāna* cannot be the basis of *ajñāna* That is why the jar, which is not the basis of *jñāna,* is never spoken of as the seat of *ajñāna*

Ajñāna Cannot Cloud Brahman.

To cloud an object is to prevent a knowledge of that entity from arising But as Brahman is not admitted by the Advaitins to be an object of knowledge, it cannot be clouded Again, as Brahman is consciousness itself (*prakāśa-svarūpa*), its clouding would amount to its own destruction (*svarūpa-nāśa*)

Is this *ajñāna* known either before or after it has veiled Brahman? Either alternative would lead to an unwelcome result If Brahman witnesses it before it has cast its spell, there would be no need to posit *ajñāna* or *tirodhāna* (clouding) in order to account for the perception of difference (*bheda*). For if Brahman could perceive *ajñāna* when it is not clouded, Brahman could as well perceive *bheda* which is the result of *ajñāna* If *ajñāna* clouds Brahman and is known subsequently, *ajñāna* obscures Brahman's nature by its very existence (sat) If so, it would follow that it is real; and cannot be dispelled by knowledge. And the world would be real, and not *mithyā* as the Advaitin thinks.

Ajñāna cannot be dispelled

The belief that ajnāna is dispelled by knowledge of the true nature of Brahman is without a foundation For this knowledge must be either

Brahman itself which is of the essence of consciousness or a knowledge apprehending this supreme consciousness On the former view, ajñāna cannot be said to dwell in Brahman, for, when knowledge of reality which is Brahman itself exists, *ajñāna* stands dispelled, and when *ajñāna* prevails, Brahman cannot exist The latter view is equally unacceptable, because Brahman is not, on the Advaitic view, the object (*visaya*) of knowledge.

The Advaitin may contend that what dispels *ajñāna* is the knowledge that Brahman is without a second (*advitīya*) But this contention is futile, for this knowledge must be either the very essence (*svarūpa*) of Brahman or a quality of Brahman It cannot be the first, since it would imply that, before that knowledge arose, Brahman must be deemed to have been non-existent Nor can it be the second, for it would amount to abandoning absolute monism and admitting that Brahman is endowed with distinctions

Slightly modifying his position the Advaitin may urge that the knowledge which dispels ignorance concerning Brahman is the knowledge that the world is *mithyā* (phenomenal) But this reasoning would fare no better, because such a knowledge may drive out the antithetical thought that the world is real, but it would be powerless to dispel ignorance of Brahman For this ignorance is not opposed to the thought of the unreality of the cosmos It is futile to argue that the illusoriness of the world is true knowledge of Brahman, since *prapañca-mithyātva* (the illusoriness of the world) and *Brahma-svarūpa* (the essence of Brahman) are not identical Thus it is abundantly clear that the Advaitic doctrine of an *avidyā*, which is positive in form (*bhāva-rūpa*), which veils Brahman and dwells therein, and which is terminated by knowledge of Brahman, is illogical

Brahman Under the Influence of Avidyā is Not the Material Cause.

To the question whether it is Brahman or *avidyā* or both that act as the material cause of the world, the Advaitin is unable to furnish a satisfactory answer Brahman cannot be the material cause, for, if so, on the well accepted principle that the cause and the effect should share the same features, the world would have to be considered real (*sat*). *Avidyā* cannot be the *upādāna-kārana*, since the scriptures speak of Brahman as the material cause Nor can Brahman and *avidyā* conjointly act as the material cause of the world, for, in that event, the world should exhibit the contradictory features of sentience and non-sentience (*jadatva* and *ajadatva*), and of reality and unreality.

The Advaitin may state that Brahman is the *upādāna-kārana* only in the sense that it is the basis of the illusory presentation of the

world, even as shell is the basis of the erroneous perception of silver. To clarify his position, he may elaborate the analogy and say that the erroneous perception, "This is silver," does not have real silver as its object (*visaya*), since silver is not present nearabout. It cannot be maintained that this cognition does not point to an object at all, since an objectless cognition is an impossibility. Nor can the cognition refer to itself, for the judgment always treats of an object outside. It does not point to a negative fact (*asat*), for it takes the positive form "This is silver." Nor is it representative cognition (*smrti*), for it is presentative cognition (*anubhava*). As the cognition takes the form "This is silver," and not "This is a shell," it cannot be said to point to the shell. The only way out of this impasse is to suppose, says the Advaitin, that, on account of certain defects (*dosa*), a mysterious silver arises for the time being in the shell and explains the cognition of silver. This mysterious silver is not *asat*, because it is perceived, nor is it *sat*, because it is later falsified. Therefore, it is *sadasadvilaksana* (distinct from reality and unreality). In a like manner, on account of *avidyā* this world which is *sad-asad-anirvacanīya* (incapable of being described either as *sat* or *asat*) arises and accounts for the perception of the manifold world. Since even an illusion must have a basis (*adhisthāna*), this illusion of the world must have Brahman for its basis. It is only in so far as Brahman is the basis of the appearance of the world, that Brahman is described as the material cause (*upādāna-kārana*) of the world.

In reply to this, Nārāyanārya points out that the analogy is unhelpful, because the perception of silver is due to the fact that the brightness-aspect of the shell is noticed, while the shell-aspect present therein is overlooked. But a similar explanation does not apply to the perception of the world of multiplicity, for, consistently with the Advaitic conception of Brahman as nirviśesa and nirākāra, it is impossible to maintain that certain aspects of Brahman are known, while others are not. Hence it is unreasonable to assert that the world of plurality is illegitimately superposed on unitary Brahman.

The Advaitic doctrine that silver of an inexplicable kind (*anirvacanīya rajata*) arises in the shell at the time of the illusion is unconvincing, for the selfsame object cannot possess the contradictory features of being at once distinct from *sat* and of being distinct from *asat*.

To account for the perception of silver (*khyāti*) and its later sublation (*bādha*), it is unnecessary to posit a mysterious silver which is at once distinct from *sat* and *asat*. A simpler hypothesis would be to

treat the erroneous cognition as a case of mistaking one thing for another (*anyasya anyathābhāvana*)

If an indescribable silver does not arise, and if error consists in mistaking one thing for another, what, the Advaitin might ask, is the object referred to in the illusory cognition "This is silver"? It must be replied, he continues, that it is the shell But how can, he might again ask, the shell be the object when silver is apprehended?

The author meets this query by saying that what appears need not be the object In fact, that object is to be considered the *visaya* which is marked off from others by the knowledge arising from the sense organ which is in contact with that particular object

Perhaps the Advaitin may ask: How can silver be cognised, when it is not in contact with the senses? The author replies that the same difficulty confronts the opponent also He must explain how the indescribable silver is cognised, when it is not in contact with the senses If he tries to meet it by saying that even in the absence of sensory contact, the indescribable silver may be presented on account of defects (*dosa*), it is open to the author to furnish a similar explanation that the silver is apprehended when only the shell is in contact with the senses owing to a sensory defect

Nārāyanārya further points out that the Advaitin too accepts *anyathā-khyāti* without being aware of it It is because the perceiver mistakes the indescribable silver for real silver that he proceeds to pick it. If, however, he recognises it as indescribable, such an activity would scarcely follow

Moreover, the Advaitin must explain how *anirvacanīya* silver is cognised and spoken of as silver If he says that it is due to the generic feature (*jāti*) of silver-ness (*rajatatva*) present therein, it may be asked whether this *jāti* is describable or indescribable On the former alternative, it cannot any longer be referred to as *anirvacanīya* silver. On the latter alternative, real silver cannot be perceived, or referred to, as silver Therefore, an indescribable something cannot be spoken of, or recognised, as silver. The upshot of the whole discussion is that since a distinctionless (*nirviśesa*) Brahman cannot be the basis of the illusory presentation of the world of plurality, the view that Brahman appears as the world and is the material cause thereof is untenable.

4 REFUTATION OF BRAHMA-PARINĀMA-VĀDA.

(*Parināma-pratiksepādhikāra*)

The Teaching of Bhāskara

Lest the parināma-vāda established in the preceding chapter should be confounded with the Brahma-parināma-vāda of the Bhedābheda-vādins, the author gives in this and the succeeding chapter a critical exposition of two of the leading schools of Bhedābheda philosophy and shows that they are far removed from his own doctrine The view that is first taken up for examination may be identified as that expounded by Bhāskara Expressed in bare outlines his teachings are as follows At the time of *pralaya* (cosmic rest) Brahman was a unitary reality devoid of differences, but possessed of omnipotence (*sarva-śakti*) , and at *srsti* (creation) it transformed itself into finite souls (*bhoktā*, literally 'enjoyer') and non-sentient objects (*bhogya*, literally 'objects of enjoyment') The objects of the world are, thus, constituted of Brahman (*Brahma-maya*), mere modifications of Brahman, even as jars, cups and so forth are the transformations of clay This view, it is claimed, is the logical outcome of scriptural teachings, such as "Brahman is the material cause (*upādāna-kārana*) of the world" and "All objects of the world are, in reality, Brahman" Taken in the light of these assertions the upanisadic description of Brahman as being unchanging (*aparināmi*) must be considered to teach that though Brahman is, in its essential nature, changeless, it undergoes modification when it is in association with *upādhi-śakti* This theory alone, it is further claimed by Bhāskara, renders possible a harmonious synthesis of the conflicting upanisadic texts—the *bheda-śrutis*, the *abheda-śrutis* and those speaking of an origin (*utpatti*) and dissolution (*pralaya*) for man (*purusa*) and matter (*prakrti*)

The Naiyāyika objects to this theory on the ground that it only proves that Brahman and the world are wholly disparate; for the cause and the effect are everywhere known to be different, in as much as they serve different purposes (*vyavahāra*), have different forms (*ākāra*) and are denoted by different names (*nāma*) If, however, they are said to be identical there would be no need to posit several factors conducive to the production of the effect The Bhedābheda-vādin easily meets this objection by pointing out that just as the jar is recognised to be no other than clay in a different shape, the world is Brahman in a new shape Though the two are non-different (*ananya*), causal factors would still be required to account for the different structures (*saṁsthāna*) that the cause assumes in becoming the effect Differences in state could easily account for differences in respect of name, form and purpose.

Refutation of Bhāskara's Teaching

Against the teachings of Bhāskara, Nārāyanārya has plenty of shots in his locker (1) He points out that what transforms itself into the world cannot be Brahman, nor can it be an Īśvara distinct from Brahman For the scriptures assert unequivocally that Brahman is changeless (*aparināmi*), and there is little warrant for posting a God different from the Absolute (2) Next he shows that it is quite possible to admit that Brahman is the material cause of the world and that all objects of the world are indeed Brahman without being forced to subscribe to Brahma-parināma-vāda (Vide Brahma-svarūpādhikāra for a detailed consideration of this point) (3) Then he draws attention to the manifest contradiction involved in asserting that matter (*acit*) is the modification of Brahman which is essentially consciousness (*cid-rūpa*) It is no escape to suggest that all objects really possess *caitanya-śakti*, but that, in the so-called material objects, consciousness (*caitanya*) has been obscured, for when *caitanya* is never met with in matter, it must reasonably be said to be bereft of conscious power

(4) Against the allegation made by the Bhedābhedavādin that śruti and smrti texts speak of men and material things as being subject to origination and destruction, Nārāyanārya replies that the scriptures really describe prakrti as *ajā* and characterise the purusa or ātman as *aja*, as having no destruction (*avināśī*) and as being eternal (*nitya*) He goes on to state that in the light of these texts, those referring to the destruction of men and things must reasonably be supposed to refer, not to their annihilation, but to their attaining oneness (*ekībhāva*) with Brahman at pralaya, that is, becoming inseparable from Brahman, and, therefore, incapable of being treated as different from Him

He also mentions some of the main difficulties in the way of accepting the view that souls are non-eternal For one thing, on this view, deeds performed already would have to go without fruition (*krtanāśa*), and the jīva would have to experience the fruits of actions not performed by himself (*akrtābhyāgama*) Besides, if at pralaya the souls are destroyed they would have to be freshly created at *srsti* and endowed with an equipment of body, senses and so forth, even though they have performed no karma

Again the *upāsanas* prescribed for the attainment of moksa would become pointless, for the jīva being non-eternal would not continue to exist to experience the blessed state

Should it be said that moksa signifies the destruction of the soul (*ātmanāśa*), and that the *upāsanas* are needed for bringing this about, it may be replied that they are quite unnecessary, since at pralaya the souls are sure to be destroyed. It may

be suggested that the *upāsanas* are intended for those who are impatient and do not wish to wait till pralaya But it is least likely that men will ever be in a hurry to secure this state In fact, if moksa meant *ātmanāśa,* men would run away at the very mention of it It is open to the objector to say that men will long for *ātmanāśa,* since it leads to the termination of miseries (*duhkha-nivrtti*) True, people long for *duhkha-nivṛtti,* but not at the cost of their very existence

Further, while all people strive for pleasure, only those who are at present experiencing sorrows will yearn for escape therefrom Therefore, moksa in the sense of *duhkha-nivrtti* cannot be treated as a purusārtha (object of human aspiration) Besides, there is no warrant for interpreting moksa to be a negative state of painlessness The scriptures describe it in positive terms, as denoting experience of bliss (*ānanda*)

(5) Nārāyanārya then urges that the positing of an *upādhi* whether in the shape of a substance or in the shape of a quality (*sāmarthya*) militates against belief in a unitary reality It is irrational to seek to get over the difficulty by suggesting that it is at once different and non-different from Brahman, for contradictory qualities cannot be ascribed to the self-same entity

At this stage, the discussion naturally turns on the question: Are *bheda* and *abheda* contradictory features, such as could not co-exist in an identical object Mention may now be made of some of the more important among the arguments advanced by the Bhedābhedavādin in defence of his main thesis, viz, that *bheda* and *abheda* are not contradictory features, and could well co-exist in the self-same reality

The first argument is an appeal to everyday cognition We are conscious, it is alleged, of objects as being at once different and non-different They are non-different in their causal (*kārana*) and universal (*jāti*) aspects, and different when viewed as effects (*kārya*) or as particulars (*vyakti*) E g in respect of the causal substances, jars, plates and so forth are non-different, but they are different when they are considered as effects Again, from the point of view of the universal (jāti), namely, cow-ness (*gotva*) all cows, whether they have long horns or short ones, broken horns or no horns at all, are non-different; but they are different the moment the particulars are taken into account

The second argument seeks to justify the co-existence of *bheda* and *abheda* on the analogy of the presence of the two aspects of universal (*jāti*) and particular (*vyakti*) in the self-same entity.

The third argument identifies *bheda* and *abheda* respectively with discontinuity (*vyāvṛtti*) and continuity (*anuvrtti*), and shows that they

may well co-exist in the cow with broken horns, where cow-ness (*gotva*) represents *anuvrtti,* and 'being broken-horned' (*khandatva*) represents *vyāvrtti* (distinction from cows of other description)

The last argument envisages the possibility of the co-existence of *bheda* and *abheda* by equating them respectively with the narrower universal (*apara-sāmānya*) and the wider universal (*para-sāmānya*), and showing that, in the cow with broken horns, there exists *khandatva,* the narrower universal which is found only in cows with broken horns, as also *gotva,* the wider universal which exists in all cows

None of these considerations, however, finds favour with Nārā-yanārya He dismisses the first of these as betraying superficial analysis , because from a given point of view (e g that of cause and universal or that of effect and particular) there can be only difference or non-difference, but not both

It may be said that after all *jāti* and *vyakti,* or cause and effect are identical and that, therefore, both difference and non-difference may dwell together Against this it is pointed out that if the identity of *jāti* and *vyakti* were a fact, there would no longer be two aspects to justify the simultaneous presence of difference and non-difference But, as a matter of fact, between the universal (*jāti*), which persists in all the particulars (*anuvartamāna*), and the particular (*vyakti*), which is discontinuous (*vyāvartamāna*), there can be no identity

The opponent may, however, urge that the identity of universal and particular has to be inferred from the apprehension of identity (*tādātmya*) expressed in judgments like 'This is a cow', where 'this' and 'cow' stand respectively for *vyakti* (particular) and *jāti* (universal). But there is little force in this contention, for, if the relation between 'this' and 'cow' were one of bare identity, the two words would convey the same meaning and the judgment would be guilty of repeating the same idea twice over In reality, the two parts of the judgment refer respectively to the *viśesya* (the thing qualified) and the *viśesana* (the qualification) Cowness is present in the object pointed to

The second argument is shown to be valueless, since it makes the gratuitous assumption that there is an entity distinct from, and serving as the basis of, *jāti* and *vyakti* , for, as a matter of fact, *jāti* is present in *vyakti*

The main defect of the next argument is that it treats *jāti* as though it were *anuvṛtti* (persistence), while it is really *anuvartamāna* (what persists in the several particulars). If, as the Bhedābhedavādin says,

jāti were persistence and not what persists, since the *jāti* (cowness) is present alike in the horned, the broken-horned and the hornless cows, these particulars would be *anuvartamāna* (what possess anuvrtti, namely 'cowness') And he would be contradicting his own statement that it is *vyāvartamāna*

In refutation of the last point Nārāyanārya states that there is little warrant for identifying *bheda* with *apara-sāmānya* (narrower generality) and *abheda* with *para-sāmānya* (higher generality) To use terms in this sense is to take liberties with language

5 REFUTATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF ŚAKTI-VIKṢEPA

(*Śakti-viksepa-pratiksepādhikāra*)

The Teaching of Yādava

The philosophical theory which comes in for criticism in this chapter is the teaching of Yādavaprakāśa According to Yādava, *sat*, or the Absolute is a self-luminous (*svaprakāsa*) substance (*dravya*) possessing manifold powers or potencies (*śakti*) Just as clay undergoes modification and exists in the form of pots, cups and so forth, this unitary reality modifies itself and exists in the shape of souls (*bhoktā*), matter (*bhogya*) and God (*niyantā*) The scriptures say 'trividham Brahma etat' (Brahman is threefold) Souls, matter and God are thus parts (*amśa*) of *sat* and therefore, eternal

The entirety of the souls (*bhoktā*) or all the souls taken together constitute a single self possessing the capacity for enjoyment which is termed *Bhoktr-samasti-purusa* (the soul which is of the nature of a collective personality) The souls associated with the respective bodies are its manifestations They are infinite in number and subtle (*anu*) Some of the qualities of Brahman are distinctly found in them while others are not open to view These souls can be classified under three heads—the souls in bondage (*baddha*), the liberated souls (*siddha*) and the ever-free (*nitya*) The bound souls are of three kinds—*prākrtika, vaikārika* and *dāksinātmaka*. Liberated souls are those persons who have obtained release from bondage to samsāra They possess qualities, such as freedom from evil (*apahatapāpmā*) The ever-free are the eternal associates of Brahman

Objects of enjoyment are no other than the ceaselessly changing *prakrti* If they are usually described as *acit*, it is because in them most of the qualities of Brahman remain obscured *Prakrti* is of three kinds—time (*kāla*), *paramākāśa* and *avyakta*. Of these, the first is responsible for change in other objects and is infinite Shorter durations, such as moment (*ksana*), month and year are the modifications of time.

Paramākāśa is the name given to *Prakrti* in its initial stage At *pralaya, prakrti* is known as *tamas* and is said to become one (*ekībhavati*) with *sat,* as it is then scarcely distinguishable from *sat* Such a state is described as *Śaktyavasthā* At the time of dissolution, finite souls also are in a state of indistinguishability It is this fact of souls and matter remaining, before creation, in a state of indistinguishability that is taught in the upanisadic text 'sadeva idam agra āsīt, ēkam evā'dvitīyam' The process whereby, at creation, matter is separated out from Brahman and rendered fit for separate treatment is known as *śakti-viksepa*

Paramākāśa or *aksara,* which is the first to separate from *sat,* is the abode of *Īśvara* and the liberated souls Since *śabda* is considered to be its modification, it is also called *vāk* *Sattva, rajas* and *tamas* in their collectivity go by the name *avyakta* At srsti, *prakrti* is transformed into *mahat* (intellect) and other elements

God (*niyantā, Īśvara*) possesses perfections, such as omniscience, infinite bliss, supreme lordship and infinite powers Along with liberated souls, He is asleep at the time of pralaya Gods, souls and matter are at once different and non-different from Brahman—non-different in respect of substance, and different in respect of their divergent states (*avasthā*) This furnishes, it is claimed by Yādava, a satisfactory basis for harmonising the *bheda* and the *abheda śrutis.*

Refutation of Yādava's Teaching

Against this school of Vedānta philosophy Nārāyanarya urges that sat is not a substance (*dravya*), but a quality belonging to objects, as is evident from the judgments such as "The pot exists", "The cloth exists" The term *sat* is used in a variety of senses, sometimes it denotes a wise man (*pandita*), and sometimes it refers to what is effective. But as applied to Brahman, it denotes unconditional existence (*nirupādhikasattā*) The text, "In the beginning *sat* alone existed", thus states that Brahman alone possesses unconditional existence, while everything else has only a dependent existence.

Next he shows that the doctrine that material objects are parts of Brahman would prove either that Brahman is, like them, non-intelligent (*jada*) or that they share the quality of being self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*). Yādava thinks that the latter alternative is not inherently absurd and that the so-called material objects are really sentient entities, which, on account of certain impediments, do not show off their sentient nature. It demands too much credulity to suppose that a quality never found to exist in an object still belongs to it If this is possible, any quality may be attributed to any thing

Nārāyanārya proceeds to say that there is little warrant for making a distinction between the Absolute (Brahman) and God (*niyantā*). The scriptures are clear on this point. Having described Brahman as the cause of the origin, sustenance and destruction of the universe they identify the universal cause with *sat* (Being). Lest *sat* should be conceived in materialistic terms, they take care to call it *Ātman,* thereby revealing that it is spirit rather than matter. This would still leave one wondering whether this *Ātman* is any of the finite souls or the God of religion or the Absolute itself. To allay all such doubts the *Śrutis* hasten to call it Nārāyana and identify Him with Brahman. That Nārāyana is referred to as Brahman, not in the restricted sense that He is a part (aṁśa) of Brahman; but that He is wholly and truly Brahman is the unambiguous teaching of the *Purusa-sūkta* (Hymn addressed to Purusa), where Nārāyana is variously called Supreme Brahman, Ātman, Supreme light (Parañjyoti) and Supreme Reality (Para-tattva). Coming to the *smrtis,* it is significant that in one place in the *Visnu-Purāna* the statement that the world consisting of both the organic and the inorganic beings proceeds from Visnu is promptly followed by the query "How can the spotlessly pure and qualityless Brahman be the agent in creation?" Clearly, this question presupposes identity between Visnu and Brahman.

He points out further that the upanisadic statement referring to Brahman becoming threefold far from suggesting that Brahman transforms Himself into God, souls and matter, really states that whoever meditates on Brahman as endowed with the twofold vibūtis—*cit* and *acit*—attains to similarity with Brahman (*Brahma-samānākāra*).

The doctrine that souls (*cit*) and matter (*acit*) and God (*niyantā*) are eternally the parts (*amśa*) of Brahman, that at pralaya *prakrti* is absorbed (*ekībhavati*) in Brahman, and that, at prakrti, it emerges therefrom even as lustre proceeds from a precious gem is next made the target of attack.

What exactly is meant, Nārāyanārya asks, by the statement that at pralaya *prakrti* remains inseparably bound up (*avibhakta*) with Brahman? The opponent must say that, at that stage, the two are either distinct (*vilaksana*) or non-distinct (*avilaksaṇa*) or both distinct and non-distinct. But none of these alternatives could be logically defended. For if they are distinct, there is no possibility of saying that they become one (*ekībhavati*) and inseparable (*avibhakta*); if they are non-distinct, Brahman would come to be identified with non-intelligent *prakrti* and it would be infected by the defects of matter, and if Brahman and *prakrti* are said to be distinct and non-distinct, it would amount to attributing to them contradictory features. Further,

souls, matter and God can never be said to attain oneness, since they share the character of being ever distinct from one another

Accepting the identity between Īśvara and Brahman, the opponent may still urge that, at least, purusa and prakrti could be treated as the parts (*amśa*) of Brahman, and quote in his favour upanisadic texts such as "All this is, indeed, Brahman" But Nārāyanārya replies that this would amount to the contradictory features of spirit and matter being attributed to Brahman In the next chapter he shows that the texts cited by the opponent bear an altogether different interpretation, and that, although prakrti and purusa are altogether different entities, they could still be equated with Brahman and could be treated as the *amśa* of Brahman

In the face of the scriptural teaching that the abode of Īśvara is a kind of immaterial (*aprākrta*) and changeless (*aparināmi*) entity, the opponent is not justified, says Nārāyanārya, in making *Paramākāśa* the first evolute of prakrti and the dwelling place of Īśvara

Nor is Yādava on firm ground when he says that Īśvara and the liberated souls (*mukta*) are in a state of sleep at pralaya; since the liberated purusas are, according to the scriptures, constantly visualising His essential nature and singing His praises Moreover, since God is subject to karma, the only cause that could occasion sleep in Him does not exist Time (*kāla*) cannot be held responsible for the sleep; because it is under God's control, and not God under its sway Consistently with His nature as a benevolent Person, it cannot be maintained that it is His will that the muktas and He himself should be in a state of suspended animation It is wholly unsatisfactory to suggest that the Lord sends the muktas to sleep, when it is conceded that they have realized God after having served a long probation on earth, and performed continual meditation (*upāsana*), and when the Lord Himself is said to have been anxiously waiting for the homecoming of the jīvas.

6 THE NATURE OF BRAHMAN

(*Brahma-svarūpa nirnayādhikāra.*)

According to the Viśistādvaitin, Brahman, the ultimate reality, is the supreme object of enjoyment; He is not limited by space or time or objects He is free from all evils, and is self-luminous consciousness or light He is endowed with innumerable qualities, such as knowledge (*jñāna*), power (*śakti*), strength (*bala*) and sovereignty (*aiśvarya*) All words denoting sentient and non-sentient entities ultimately signify Brahman, since He has them for His body and controls them from within He is responsible for the creation, sustenance and destruction of the world.

Brahman is the Supreme Object of Enjoyment and is Infinite

This description of Brahman has the sanction of the scriptures Upanisadic texts, such as 'Raso vai sah,' proclaim that Brahman is the supreme object of enjoyment (*sarvānukūla*) That Brahman is not limited by space, time or objects (deśa-kāla-vastu-pariccheda-rahita) is evident from texts, such as "He is eternal, infinite and all-pervasive, and extremely subtle". That Brahman is possessed of infinite perfections and is not, therefore, limited by objects follows from passages like "He from whom speech turned back, along with mind (*manas*) without reaching Him" *Visnu-purāna* declares that the Lord's qualities cannot be described even though all the divinities may gather together and attempt for years on end to describe them.

It may be contended that the description that Brahman is not limited by objects (vastu-pariccheda-rahita) really denies the existence of other objects besides Brahman, for, if objects existed apart from Brahman, they would be referred to as "This is a jar," "That is a cloth" and so forth, and Brahman would come to be marked off from these objects In other words, Brahman would be limited by them Further, as two or more objects cannot occupy the same space, Brahman cannot exist where other objects exist, and it would follow that Brahman is limited by space But Nārāyanārya dismisses this contention as being unsustainable He points out that the mere presence of other objects does not necessarily mean that Brahman is marked off from them The presence of a balance or touchstone, for example, does not necessarily mean that a given lump of gold must have been weighed or assessed There is little force in the argument that if objects existed apart from Brahman, He would be limited by space, for Brahman exists in those objects and also in the space occupied by them Thus, the statement that Brahman is not limited by objects does not mean that He does not preclude the existence of other objects.

Brahman is Free from Evil

Further, Brahman is free from all evils (*nirmala*), for the scriptures proclaim, "He is the Inner Ruler of all beings, is devoid of all evils, and is the one Supreme Deity, Nārāyana", "He is greater than the great; no sorrows of any kind touch Him, who is the lord of all beings, high and low" *Nirmalatva* (the character of being free from evil) signifies either that Brahman is pure in Himself or that He is not tainted even though He is in contact with imperfect objects Or it may mean that he is so holy that even the most impure purify themselves by listening to discourses on Him, by reflecting on His nature and singing His praises.

Brahman is Self-luminous Consciousness.

The ultimately real is a self-luminous consciousness; for the Upaniṣads describe Him as consciousness (*vijñāna*), and as the light of all

lights (*jyotiṣām jyotiḥ*) To say that He is self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*) is to assert that He possesses *ananyādhīna prakāśa* (i e, a *prakāśa* which does not depend upon anything other than itself) This *prakāśa* is not *prabhā* (rays of light), for, in that case, the lamp cannot be treated as self-luminous, since here the *prabhā* depends upon the lamp and not upon itself. *Prakāśa* cannot be treated as *prākatya*, for the Vedāntins do not admit the existence of *prākatya* [26]

Nor can *prakāśa* be identified with jñāna, since, in that case, Brahman would have to be at once the subject (*kartā*) and the object (*viṣaya*) of thought and discussion (*vyavahāra*) concerning Himself. Hence *prakāśa* must be defined as the quality of being conducive to thought and discussion For its own sake, Brahman becomes, by its very existence, conducive to thought and discussion concerning Himself In this sense, the *jīva* also is self-luminous. And knowledge may be described as self-luminous in the sense that it becomes, for the sake of its possessor (*āśraya*), and by its very existence, conducive to thought and discussion regarding itself.

Brahman Possesses Innumerable Auspicious Qualities

Brahman possesses an infinity of auspicious qualities, such as knowledge (*jñāna*), strength (*bala*) and sovereignty (*aiśvarya*). This is evident from scriptural passages, such as "His wonderful power (*śakti*) is described as being manifold, *jñāna, bala, kriyā* and the like are His essential nature" It has already been shown that the Upaniṣads do not teach that Brahman is without qualities (*nirguna*). If Brahman had no qualities, the scriptures would not take pains to enumerate His qualities Vedāntic texts declaring that He is free from evils (*apahata-pāpmā*) furnish the clue to the proper interpretation of the *nirguna* and *saguna* texts Passages denying qualities to Brahman teach the absence of evil qualities, while texts attributing qualities to Brahman emphasise the presence of auspicious qualities It is only on this basis that these two sets of texts could be satisfactorily harmonised.

The Cosmos is the Body of Brahman

All the sentient and non-sentient objects constitute the body of Brahman This doctrine that the world forms His body and that He

26 According to the Bhātta school of Mīmāmsā, when cognition of an object arises, the latter is affected in a particular way, it becomes illumined, manifested or is made known (prakāśa-viśiṣta) It is from this illumination or manifestedness (prākatya or jñātatā) that we infer that knowledge has prevoiusly arisen Thus, it is held that consciousness is not perceived, but is inferred from its results For a refutation of this view see Vedānta Deśika's *Tattva-muktā-kalāpa*, p 394 See also *Sarvārthasiddhi*.

is the Inner Ruler of the world is unambiguously set forth in the celebrated *Antaryāmi Brāhmana*, *Subāla Upanisad* and elsewhere The *smrtis* also support this view "O Lord! this entire world is your body"[27] "All these form His body"[28] "All form the body of the Lord Visnu"

The External World

The nature of sentient beings is explained at length in the next chapter Here the author examines non-sentient objects and classifies them under three heads—time (*kāla*), unmanifest matter (*avyakta*) and *paramākāśa* Though time is infinite, it is divided into shorter durations, such as night and day It is subject to modifications, and it is also responsible for the change of place and form found in all objects

Avyakta possesses the three *gunas—sattva, rajas* and *tamas* At the time of *pralaya,* it is in an extremely subtle state, devoid of names and forms and is inseparably bound up with Brahman At creation, on account of the will of the Lord, it becomes separate from Him and assumes diverse forms such as intellect (*mahat*) and egoity (*ahamkāra*), and thereby, acquires different names

Paramākāśa partakes exclusively of the *sattva* quality It is eternal and free from even the slightest trace of evil It is the abode of enjoyment (*bhoga-bhūmi*) for the Lord, the released souls (*mukta*) and those who have been ever free (*nitya*)

Objections to the View that the World is the Body of Brahman

Objection may be taken to the view that the world composed of sentient and non-sentient objects constitutes the body of Brahman on the following grounds For one thing Brahman is not subject to karma Again, the scriptures assert that He is devoid of a body (*apāni, apāda*) Further, the world consisting of men and matter does not answer to the definition of body, for the body is usually defined eiher as the place wherein the soul experiences pleasure and pain (*bhogāyatana*), or as the seat of the senses (*indriyāśraya*) Moreover, though certain material objects may answer to this definition of body, they cannot be regarded as the body of the Infinite Self, because they are the outcome of the past deeds of finite souls.

The objector may add that, on the view that Brahman has the world of matter and souls for this body, He would, like the jīva, be subject

27 *Rāmāyana, Yuddhakānda,* 120, 29
28 *Visnu-purāna*

to pleasurable and painful experiences which are the inevitable consequences of the possession of a body

Nārāyanārya's Reply

Nārāyanārya meets these objections by saying that the scriptural texts which describe the world as His body are so clear on this point that they do not bear any other interpretation. Passages which say that Brahman has no body really assert that, unlike the body of the jīva, His body is not born of karma Further, the definitions of the body as the place where the soul experiences pleasures and pains or as the seat of the senses are logically defective The first definition is too broad, for the house wherein the person experiences pleasures would have to be treated as the body The second is too narrow, since it excludes immovable objects which are described as the bodies of certain sinners A proper definition applying equally to the bodies of all beings, gods, men, beasts, and birds, runs as follows The body is that which a conscious entity controls, supports and uses for its own ends Since the Supreme Self controls and sustains the world and since the world exists for His sake, He is proclaimed to be the Soul of the Cosmos, and the Cosmos is described as His body Hence the scriptural statement, "He enters all beings and controls them from within, He is the self of All"

To the objection that if Brahman possessed a body, He would be subject to pleasures and pains, Nārāyanārya replies that Brahman is not afflicted by miseries, since He is free from karma The oft-quoted *Mundaka* text (III i 1) referring to the two birds sitting on the self-same tree declares that, while the jīva tastes the fruits of karma, the Lord merely looks on and shines as a resplendent being. Thus, it is subjection to karma, and not the mere association with a body, that accounts for miseries It is significant that this passage not only declares that Brahman is not entangled in sorrows, but goes on to assert that He shines as a resplendent being (*abhicākaśīti*), by distributing pleasures and pains to the jīvas in accordance with their past deeds Bhagavān Rāmānuja explains this point very clearly in his *Vedārthasamgraha* with the aid of a telling analogy Though contact with the whip is common to the individual holding it and the person beaten therewith, it is a source of pain only to the latter Even so, though contact with the body is common both to the Lord and to the finite self, it occasions misery only to the latter

Reality is Threefold

Since sentient and non-sentient objects constitute the body of Brahman, and since He is the embodied Self, it follows that men,

material objects and God are three distinct realities As indicated already, *bheda* (difference) is no other than special features, such as *jāti* (generality)

The Nature of Difference

The objector may ask If the difference (*bheda*) of one object from another is *jāti* itself (e g if ghata-bheda, distinction from pot, found in the cloth is clothness itself, patatva), how is the difference of one jāti (pot-ness) from another (cloth-ness) to be accounted for ? In other words, the objector thinks that this view would land one in an infinite regress, since the distinction of one jāti from another must be the jāti of that jāti

To this Nārāyanārya replies that, in regard to jāti, its very essence (*svarūpa*) constitutes *bheda* , for jāti, unlike its substrate, possesses no qualities In other words, cow-ness (*gotva*) noticed in the cow marks it off from the horse and other animals But what distinguishes 'cow-ness' (*gotva*) from 'horse-ness' (*aśvatva*) is not the presence of some feature in 'cow-ness' Just as colour renders visible the object possessing the colour and also makes itself visible without the aid of some other colour, even so jāti, by itself, is responsible for thought and reference (*vyavahāra*) concerning itself and other entities

Nārāyanārya proceeds to point out that *jāti* is nothing but configuration (*saṁsthāna*). There is little warrant for positing a separate entity called *jāti*, which is eternal and which is different from the several particulars, though present equally in each of them , for such an entity is never cognised. Further, there is little value in the contention that the cognition of a given feature (*ākāra*) persisting alike in several instances necessitates belief in *jāti* as a distinct entity For at no time do we meet with a feature persisting in the several particulars When the first instance of a class is met with, obviously, there cannot be cognition of a persistent feature, and when the second and subsequent instances are perceived, only the particular and a given shape are cognised. Moreover, as the particulars come and go, it is difficult to conceive of a jāti which is eternal, which is without parts and which resides in its fullness in each of the instances Hence, it follows that there is no *jāti* distinct from configuration (*samsthāna*)

It may be objected that *saṁsthāna* cannot be treated as jāti For the configuration (*saṁsthāna*) varies from instance to instance, and cannot, consequently, account for the identical cognition (*ekabuddhi*) and the use of the same term (*śabda*) Though no two cows agree in regard to their configuration, there arises the same cognition (*ekabuddhi*) . "This is a cow," "That is a cow," "That other is a cow"

and so forth, and the same term 'cow' is applied to the several instances The real explanation for the rise of this identical knowledge when several instances are observed must be sought in the nature of the instances themselves There can be no difficulty in maintaining that different instances generate an identical knowledge, for it is commonly admitted that divergent factors, such as the visual apparatus, colour, light and mind (*manas*) produce a single result, viz, jñāna Thus the nature of jāti is far from being clear When that is so, *bheda* cannot be identified with jāti "

Nārāyaṇārya's reply to this line of argument is as follows —Configuration (*saṁsthāna*) is itself *jāti* Though the configuration is different in each of the particulars, on perceiving the second and subsequent instances we cognise a *saṁsthāna* similar to that previously known It is this *saṁsthāna* which has been recognised to be similar to the one apprehended already that is responsible for the rise of identical knowledge (*ekabuddhi*) when the particulars possessing the *saṁsthāna* are met with The persistence (*anuvṛtti*) of the *saṁsthāna* in the several particulars is apprehended when the second and subsequent instances are perceived [29]

By persistence (*anuvṛtti*) of *saṁsthānas* is meant the presence of closely similar configuration Even those who accept *jāti* as different from *saṁsthāna* have to admit the similarity of *saṁsthānas* (i e, *anuvṛtti*) For in explaining why cow-ness is not present in the gavaya which bears a resemblance to the cow, they must say that the *jāti* of the *gavaya* is not altogether similar to that of the cow perceived already But it would be far simpler to say that there is no similarity of *saṁsthānas,* and hence no *gotva* Therefore, *saṁsthāna* is the same as *jāti,* which, again, is identical with *bheda* (difference). Once this identity is proved, it readily follows that Brahman which has the world for His body is really different from it

All Words Denoting Souls and Matter Refer to Brahman

Since Brahman has souls and matter for His body, all words denoting the several souls and material objects ultimately signify also the Supreme Brahman, the Inner Self of all things In the judgments— "The man knows," "The deva knows"—the words 'man' and 'deva' referring to the physical body ultimately refer to the soul; for the body cannot be a knower

The opponent may contend that the instances cited would scarcely prove that all words referring to bodies also denote, as a general rule, the souls residing therein If, in the present case, they are taken to

29 Śrī Bhāṣya, I, i 1

signify the soul it is only in a secondary sense, the primary meaning being unintelligible Nārāyanārya's reply is that, since the essential nature of a body is to be an inseparable mode of the soul, words denoting the body must, even in a primary sense, denote the soul, even as terms referring to *jāti* and *guna* refer to their substrate.

The opponent may again urge that, if the body is an invariable mode, it must be always apprehended along with the soul, and since it is not so apprehended, in interpreting these words to mean the soul we are taking the secondary sense

The reply is that if *jāti* and *vyakti*, *guna* (quality) and *gunin* (substrate) are apprehended together it is not because they are invariably connected, but because both of them are visible But in the case of the body and the soul, the former is perceptible while the latter is not That is why they are not known together Instances can be adduced in plenty to show that entities which are invariably connected need not be perceived together Take, for example, earth (*prthvī*) and odour Though they invariably go together, they need not be perceived together, for different sense organs are involved in their perception

Exception may be taken to the view that souls (*cit*) and matter (*acit*) are the modes (*prakāra*) of Brahman on the following ground — When a substance is the mode of another, the suffix *matup* must be employed to indicate the fact of the latter having the former as its mode For example, when Devadatta wields a stick, he is spoken of as *dandin* (the person wielding a stick) and not as *danda* Similarly, if Brahman has *cit* and *acit* for His modes (*prakāra*), the suffix *matup* must be used to indicate that they are His modes But scriptural statements like "Sarvam khalu idam Brahma" do not employ the suffix *matup* On the contrary, Brahman is equated with the world Therefore, it cannot be maintained that souls and matter are the modes of Brahman

This objection is not insuperable As Nārāyanārya pertinently points out substances like stick, ring and so on are perceived sometimes as modes of other objects, and sometimes independently Hence the need, in their case, for the suffix *matup* whenever it has to be shown that they are modes But in respect of *cit* and *acit* which are the inseparable modes of Brahman, there is no need of this suffix Since souls and matter constitute the body of the Supreme Self, and since their essential nature is to be His invariable modes, all words denoting them do ultimately signify Brahman also Hence the equation of all words denoting the several objects of the world with those signifying Brahman.

It is unreasonable to contend that while words have been learnt to denote several objects, this view rejected the primary sense of words and accepts the secondary meaning, for this view does not reject the significance of words It merely states that these words refer to Brahman also

Since non-sentient objects are said to acquire names and forms (*nāmarūpa*) on account of Brahman entering into them (*anupraveśa*) through the individual selves, words referring to material objects may well denote the Supreme Self who has entered into them The smrti passage—"Brahman is the ultimate meaning of all words"—clearly suggests that, while different words convey different meanings, their ultimate significance (*uttamam vācyam*) is Brahman Himself [30] Bādarāyana expresses the same idea in *Vedānta-Sūtra*, II ii 17 — *Carācaravyapāśrayas tu syāt tadvyapadeśo bhāktah tadbhāvabhāvitvāt* All terms referring to objects that move and those that do not move denote Brahman in a primary sense in so far as He has entered into all things and invested them with names and forms

Thus, even though souls, matter and God are distinct realities, souls and matter are equated with God Passages like "Tat tvam asi" and "Aham Brahma 'smi" equate souls with God, while the text · "Sarvam khalu idam Brahma"—identifies matter with Brahman Such an identification is wholly justified because Brahman has souls and matter for His body.

Brahman is Abinna-nimitta-upādāna-Kārana.

Souls and matter are sometimes in a subtle state (*sūksma-avasthā*), devoid of distinctions of names and forms Brahman, in association with *cit* and *acit* in a subtle state, is spoken of as the cause of the universe. Since the Upanisads declare that Brahman made the resolve "May I be many, and be born," it follows that Brahman is the efficient cause (*nimitta-kārana*) of the world Passages like, "He made Himself manifold" assert that He is also the material cause (*upādāna-kārana*) of the universe

The Nyāya View

The Naiyāyika may object to this view and argue as follows·— "Brahman associated with *cit* and *acit* cannot be the material cause of the cosmos, for what is considered as the material cause must be an entity subject to change; but souls and Īśvara are without change

30 "Vacasām vācyam uttamam," Compare also "Vedaiś ca sarvair aham eva vedyah" Bh. Gītā

Therefore, matter alone must be the material cause of the world The Viśistādvaitin cannot argue that, when Brahman is described as the material cause of the world, what is really meant is this —Matter which constitutes the body of the Lord is the material cause, for in that case his position would contradict the upanisadic texts describing Brahman as the *upādāna-kārana* Further, it would go against the Viśistādvaitic theory that the efficient and the material causes of the world are identical Hence, it has to be maintained that, while *cit, acit* and Īśvara are distinct realities, Brahman is the efficient cause of the world, while matter is its material cause. This view is in conformity with everyday observation, for everywhere the material and the efficient causes are noticed to be different entities (e g threads and the weaver, clay and the potter, and so on) Besides, it is observed that the effect is produced by several factors which are smaller than itself in magnitude (e g the cloth is composed of many threads which are individually smaller than the cloth in size) Therefore, there is nothing strange in maintaining that countless infinitesimal atoms (*paramānūs*) are the material cause of the world "

There are two great difficulties in the way of the Nyāya theory (i) So long as the infinitesimal atoms are not conjoined, no effect can be produced, and yet the *paramānus,* being partless, cannot come into contact (*samyoga*) with one another To obviate this difficulty, it has to be admitted that the atoms are composed of parts But such an admission leads to a fresh difficulty, for the parts, being themselves effects, must, in their turn, depend upon the combination of parts, and so on *ad infinitum*

(ii) Even if it is granted that partless atoms may combine together, they cannot account for this wide expanse of the world, for atoms which are indivisible and without dimensions cannot produce a world of vast dimensions

To the first of these objections, the Naiyāyika replies that, just as the soul and the mind (*manas*) which are recognised as being partless, enter into contact, even so partless atoms may combine with one another As for the second objection, the Naiyāyika thinks that the question · How can partless atoms produce a world which is of great magnitude ? is meaningless For it is directly perceived that the world which is the product of *paramānus* is of great magnitude

Refutation of the Nyāya View

Nārāyanārya dismisses the Nyāya theory as being wholly unsatisfactory For one thing, there is no warrant for positing the existence of infinitesimal atoms The Naiyāyika may urge that in-

finitesimal atoms have to be posited as the ultimate cause of all objects; for causal factors which are small in magnitude produce an effect which is fairly large (e g several threads which are individually small in size produce a cloth of large dimensions), and these causal factors are themselves traceable to still smaller factors, and so on, until the process stops at the stage of *paramānus* This argument, says Nārāyanārya, is unsound, because the effect is non-different from causal factors In fact, the causal conditions themselves go by the name of the effect, when they assume a certain state (*avasthā*) The cloth, for instance, is merely an arrangement of threads Popular judgments, such as "The cloth is merely the threads," and "The pot is only clay," establish that the cause and the effect are non-different

Next Nārāyanārya points out that partless atoms cannot combine together and produce the world, for, if there is to be conjunction (*samyoga*), there must be its cause, namely, *karma* Karma, in its turn, presupposes *adrsta* (unseen factor) residing either in souls or in the atoms Since *adrsta* is eternal, its effect, *viz*, *samyoga*, must be eternal, and not occasional In other words, there should be perpetual creation The Naiyāyika may urge that, although *adrsta* is not occasional, yet it could produce its result only when it attains fruition To this Nārāyanārya replies that it is too much to imagine that the countless *adrṣṭas* of souls (or for that matter, of *paramānus*) attain fruition (*paripāka*) simultaneously and thus account for the conjunction of atoms resulting in the creation of the universe

The Naiyāyika may again urge that, although *adrsta* is eternal, its result (*i e*, *samyoga*) is occasional, since it is dependent upon God's will (*saṁkalpa*) Such a contention, says Nārāyanārya, has no force; for the Nyāya conception of an Īśvara whose existence is proved by reason has already been refuted If the Naiyāyika could bring himself to accepting the view that God's existence is learnt from the scriptures, he ought also to accept the scriptural account of creation, and not root out the theory that material particles create the world

Nārāyaṇārya further points out that the Naiyāyika has not explained how infinitesimal atoms could produce the wide expanse of the world. To escape this difficulty it may be admitted that atoms possess parts, but this admission would only lead to a fresh difficulty. The parts of the atoms would, in their turn, possess parts; and the latter, their parts, and so on *ad infinitum* In that event, there would be no distinction between Mount Meru and the mustard seed, since all objects, big or small, would possess an unending series of parts

Besides, since Brahman is possessed of infinite and wonderful powers, He could well be at once the material and the efficient cause

of the world Just as the different objects of the world possess their specific characteristics, Brahman may possess a character, not met with in the objects of the world, viz, that of being at once the material and the efficient cause

The Sānkhya Doctrine

The Sānkhya contends that *prakrti* which is perpetually in motion and which is independent of conscious control is the material cause of the universe At creation (*srsti*), *prakṛti,* influenced by the presence of the *purusa* near by, enters upon a course of heterogeneous evolution (*visadrśa-parināma*) and produces *mahat* (the intellect) and the like Even at the time of dissolution (*pralaya*), prakrti is changing, but then, instead of assuming diverse forms such as *mahat* and *ahaṁkāra,* it reproduces itself (*sadrśa-parināma*).

Refutation of the Sānkhya Doctrine

Nārāyanārya considers the Sānkhya account as far from being satisfactory, because it does not show how creation and dissolution could alternate The belief that the contact of *purusa* with *prakṛti* suffices to set the latter on a career of creation is inadequate For, as the purusa is devoid of action, good or evil (*niskriyā*), he could never be in contact (*samyoga*) with prakrti

The Sānkhya may urge that the conjunction needed for starting the process of creation is merely the presence of the *purusa* near *prakrti* (sannidhānamātra) But this is no solution for the difficulty. Since the *puruṣa* is eternal and omnipresent, the condition necessary for evolution (*i e*, samyoga) is always present and *prakrti* must be always creative and dissolution would be impossible

The suggestion that the past *karma* (*adrsta*) of souls accounts for the nearness of purusa to prakrti is unacceptable For, on the Sānkhyan hypothesis, the *puruṣa* is not an agent (*kartā*) and could consequently, have no *adrsta* Even if it is admitted that the souls have *adrsta,* it requires extreme credulity to suppose that all souls have simultaneously engaged in similar actions which attain fruition at the same time and lead to a common result, viz , the creation of the universe Hence it is impossible to subscribe to the view that *prakrti* is the material cause of the universe The more reasonable view is that the Omnipotent Brahman is at once the material and the efficient cause of the world

Against this position it may be urged that, if the complex whole of reality (i e., Brahman along with souls and matter) is the material cause of the world, it would be the effect as well, since the Vēdāntin advocates *sat-kārya-vāda.* (the doctrine that the cause and the effect

are non-different) It would then follow that God and souls are both subject to modification This criticism does not touch the Viśistādvaitic position, for God and soul may be changeless, and yet be an effect, even as ākāśa which is without change is considered an effect, in so far as it is one of the five elements constituting the body To be an effect is merely to exist in a different state (*avasthā*) At creation, Brahman becomes the Inner Self of sentient and non-sentient entities existing in a gross state, and souls acquire knowledge that blossoms forth Hence God and souls could reasonably be described as effect But it must be noted that, when God and souls are said to pass from one state to another, it is only their form that changes, (*svabhāva-anyathābhāva*), and not their essential nature (*svarūpa*) Change of essential nature (*svarūpa-anyathābhāva*) is noticed only in the case of material things and not in souls or God

Thus, even though they are effects, God and souls do not cease to be eternal The mere fact of their passing from one state to another will not make them non-eternal There is no contradiction in maintaining that Brahman and souls are the material cause and that they are eternal.

Even though Brahman, souls and matter are the material cause and, as such, the effect also, there is no danger of their natures being mixed up (*svabhāva-samkara*) Just as, in a parti-coloured cloth made out of a mass of white, black and red threads, there is no mixing up of colours, the respective colours being noticed only in the corresponding parts, even so there is no mixing up of the several characteristics of God, souls and matter in the complex whole of reality Scriptural passages like the following bear out this view "From *prakṛti* which is termed māyā, the Supreme Self who directs māyā creates the world, while the other (i e. the finite self) is over-powered and deluded by māyā "[31]

It may be asked · Why should Brahman alone be spoken of as the material cause, when in truth Brahman, souls and matter function in that capacity? The explanation is that, even though all the three form the material cause, Brahman is frequently referred to as the material cause, since souls and matter are the inseparable modes of Brahman, are dependent upon Brahman and constitute His body

One merit of this theory is that it furnishes a satisfactory basis for reconciling conflicting upanisadic texts—those that speak of Brahman as being without any change, those that describe Him as the material

31 *Śvet Up.*, IV 9

cause of the universe and those that refer to the world as having Brahman for its Self Scriptural passages which regard ultimate reality as unitary and those which refer to it as being two-fold can be harmonised and shown to be appropriate only on this view Texts dealing with meditation (*dhyāna*) and those revealing the nature of reality (*tattva*) alike agree in stating that reality is single, because Brahman has souls and matter for His body Since the soul and the body are distinct from each other, Brahman, the Inner Self of all, is sometimes spoken of as distinct from souls and matter, which constitute His body

7 THE NATURE OF THE FINITE SELF

(Purusa-svarūpa-nirnayādhikāra)

In this chapter the author describes the jīva as a spiritual entity, distinct from the body, the senses and the like It is self-luminous (*svayamprakāśa*) and eternally in possession of knowledge Each *jīva* is a part (*amśa*) of the Supreme Self and an agent (*kartā*) The *jīvas* are many [32] Before establishing his own view, Nārāyanārya reviews rival doctrines regarding the self

The Cārvāka Doctrine

The Cārvāka denies the existence of a spiritual principle distinct from the body Stated briefly, the contention of the Cārvāka is as follows :—The ātman who is the knower shines forth as 'I' (*aham*) Judgments, such as "I am stout", "I am lean", equating 'stout' and 'lean', which are bodily features, with 'I' (*aham*), the soul, indicate that the body is itself the soul Knowledge, says he, is a property of the body, as is evident from the sentence "I know" There is appropriateness, he thinks, in considering the body to be the possessor of consciousness (*cetana*) ; for, unlike the jar which is admitted to be non-intelligent both by the materialist and by the believer in the self as an independent principle, the body functions as the seat of the senses (*indriyāśraya*)

The two objections that may be raised against this view are— (i) If consciousness (*caitanya*) is a special quality (*viśesa-guna*) of the body, it must be present in its cause, namely, the particles of matter But as the atoms are devoid of consciousness, the body constituted of

32 Compare—
Dehendriya-manah-prāna-dhībyo'nyoa'nanyasādhanah |
Nityo vā'pi pratiksetram ātmā binnas svatas sukhī ||
Siddhitraya, Ātmasiddhi, p 8 Annamalai University Philosophical Series

them cannot possess *caitanya* (ii) If the atoms were to possess consciousness, there must be as many conscious entities (*cetana*) as there are atoms in the body These objections are dismissed as being valueless, since they contradict perception (*pratyakṣa*) which is the only means of valid knowledge accepted by the materialist

Refutation of the Cārvāka Doctrine

Some of the counts in Nārāyanārya's indictment of the Cārvāka position may briefly be mentioned —(i) How, Nārāyanārya asks, can the body which is cognised as something external (*parāk*) and referred to as 'this' (*idam*) be identified with the soul which is an inner principle (*pratyak*) and which appears as 'I' (*aham*)? (ii) If the 'I' were to signify the body, its parts must necessarily be apprehended when there is self-consciousness. But, as a matter of fact, even when the senses are under control and when self-consciousness arises there is no awareness of the organs of the body (iii) Judgments such as "I am stout", "I am lean" refer not merely to the body, but also to a principle distinct therefrom And hence the usage "my body", and not "I am the body".

The Cārvāka may suggest that the expression "my body", like the phrase "the body of the doll", has to be understood in a secondary sense (*aupacārika*), and not literally But the Cārvāka forgets that the two cases are quite dissimilar In the case of the doll, there is no body over and above the doll, hence the need for interpreting the expression "the body of the doll" in a secondary sense The body is the doll itself But in regard to the body of a sentient being, there is no such need for adopting a secondary significance.

The Cārvāka might ask:—If the body and the self are wholly disparate, how do they come to be identified at all? A possible explanation of this confusion is that of these two entities one is perceptible, while the other is not. If both were perceptible, their different features such as number, size and colour would make any confusion between them impossible A second explanation is the self and the body resemble each other in one respect, viz, their activities are dependent upon desire The self resembles, wills and infers only at the instance of its desires; the body too has its activities such as lying down, sitting and standing, determined by desires. The wise, however, avoid this confusion and realise that the soul is a knower (*jñātā*), is without parts (*niravayava*) and is distinct from the body.

The Doctrine that the Self is the Senses.

In order to escape the difficulties met with by the Cārvāka school in identifying the soul with the body, some have preferred to equate

it with the senses (*indriya*) If the "I" refers to the senses, their parts need not be known when self-consciousness arises For they have neither qualities, such as visible colours, nor perceptible magnitude. And knowledge which is the result (*phala*) of the activity of the senses (*indriya-vyāpāra*) must, properly speaking, belong only to the senses, even as the results of sacrifice inhere in the person performing the sacrifice That is why Satyatapas speaks of the 'seeing eye' [33]

Refutation of this View.

The theory that the senses are the soul cannot stand scrutiny. Do the senses function as the self individually or collectively? They cannot function individually, for, in that event, what one organ had perceived cannot be recollected by another But such a recollection does exist We do say "I touch what I saw yesterday" Nor can the second alternative be true, for, in the case, every object would have to be perceived by all the senses Again, with the loss of any one of the organs, there would be no recollection of what has been cognised by that organ. Further, with the disappearance of any of the organs, the ātman would have to perish But none of these consequences is true Bearing in mind the fact that if he did not speak the truth, the person who interrogated would meet with death and that if he spoke the truth, it would be extreme cruelty to abandon one who had taken refuge, Satyatapas spoke like that Satyatapas's words should not be considered as lending support to this argument

The Doctrine that the Soul is Identical with Manas.

There is another school which identifies the soul with mind (*manas*), imagining that thereby it can get over the difficulties which beset the

33 See *Varāha-Purāna*, ch 98, verses 1-26 One day when Satyatapas was engaged in meditation, a boar which was chased by a huntsman took refuge in the vicinity of the sage's hermitage Presently the huntsman rushed in and inquired of the sage if he saw a boar nearby and said that if the animal could not be traced, he himself, his children and his dependant's would have to die of starvation The sage found himself in a dilemma—if he furnished the information regarding the animal's hiding place, he would be guilty of the heinous sin of betraying one who had taken refuge, if he withheld the information, he would be responsible for the death of the hunter and his dependents After a moments' reflection, Satyatapas replied, "Animals are endowed with eyes to see and tongue to speak The eye that sees has no tongue to report on what it perceives, the tongue that speaks has no eye to see Wherefore do you ask me?" Struck by the ingenuity of his speech, the boar and its pursuer appeared to the sage in their true form as Visnu and Indra respectively and blessed him

foregoing theories. But the stumbling-block in the way of this identification is that *manas* is really an instrument (*karana*) of knowledge, and cannot be treated as the agent (*kartā*) in acquiring knowledge

The View that Prāṇa is the Soul

Yet others treat the vital breath (*prāna*) as the soul This view is dismissed by Nārāyanārya with the remark that *prāna* cannot possess consciousness (*caitanya*), any more than the air outside (*vāyu*).

The Advaitic Theory that Consciousness (samvit) is the *Soul*

Instead of identifying the soul with material entities, such as the body (*deha*), senses (*indriya*), mind (*manas*) and vital breath (*prāna*), still others (the Advaitins) equate it with consciousness or knowledge (*samvit*), an immaterial principle (*ajada*) Being self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*), according to this view, consciousness shines by its mere being Consciousness, unlike the jar and other material objects, does not fail to shine and is eternal

The Advaitin anticipates a possible objection to his view that consciousness is self-luminous. Just as the senses reveal objects without presenting themselves, even so knowledge by its very existence illumines objects like the jar, but does not manifest itself. The fact of knowledge having arisen is inferred from the peculiar illumination or manifestedness (*prākaṭya*) produced in the objects known The Advaitin replies to this objection as follows There is no such thing as *prākaṭya,* and it is possible to account for all cognition of objects and their uses in daily intercourse (vyavahāra) without postulating this mysterious principle If the jar, for example, was not referred to or used before, it was because there was no previous knowledge of it and not because there was no *prākatya.* Again, consciousness (*samvit*), like the lamp, can never manifest objects without manifesting itself The cognition " This is a jar " includes awareness of *samvit* also That is why we say, " I know the jar ", " I know the cloth ", implying thereby that we are at once conscious of *samvit* and the object illumined by it Therefore, *saṁvit,* being an immaterial principle, may well be identified with the ātman

Refutation of the Advaitic Doctrine

This view does not find favour with Nārāyanārya. His objections to it may be stated as follows The judgment " I know the jar " clearly implies that *jñāna* is an attribute of, and not identical with, the inner principle "I" *Samvit, anubhūti* and *jñāna* are relative terms,

depending, for their full meaning, upon a reference to the knowing subject (*āśraya*) and the object known (*viṣaya*) Hence *saṁvit* in itself cannot be the *ātman* The *ātman* is distinct from the body, the senses, the mind (*manas*), the vital breath (*prāṇa*) and consciousness (*saṁvit*) It is the possessor of jñāna, as is evident from the statement "I know" All this is beautifully set forth in the Bālāki-Ajātaśatru episode in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.*

How, the Advaitin may ask, can knowledge (*saṁvit*), an inner principle (*pratyak*), be equated with the 'I' (*ahamartha*), an external entity (*parāk*)? That knowledge is an inner principle (*pratyak*) will be readily conceded, for, unlike external objects, it never appears as 'this' (*idam*), Though it is not so obvious that the 'I' is *parāk,* a moment's reflection will show that it must be reckoned among external entities, since it shines only when knowledge is manifest even as objects in the outer world are revealed only when consciousness shines forth The Advaitin may, thus, reiterate his conclusion that the soul is no other than knowledge itself, which is accepted as being self-luminous both by himself and the Viśiṣṭādvaitin

Questioning the correctness of the premises on which the Advaitin takes his stand, the author establishes that it is the "I" (*ahamartha*), and not knowledge, that is self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*) in the strict sense of the term, and also *pratyak* (*inner*) Since the "I" (*ahamartha*) shines for its own sake, whereas knowledge (*jñāna*) shines for the sake of the soul, the former is the truly inward principle (*pratyak*), while the latter is not Again *svaprakāśa* signifies 'shining forth for one's own sake'. Taken in this sense, the "I" (*ahamartha*) alone can be characterised as *svaprakāśa* Knowledge, on the contrary, is not *svaprakāśa* in the strict sense of the term For even though it shines without depending upon any extraneous factor, knowledge resembles external objects in shining for the sake of the self, and not for its own sake If knowledge is usually described as being self-luminous, it is only by a figure of speech ,Since it invariably appears as a quality of the "I", the truly inward principle (*pratyak*), *jñāna* is, in ordinary speech, said to be *svaprakāśa* and as being other than *parāk*

If the "I" (*ahamartha*) is described as *svaprakāśa* in the sense that it does not depend upon jñāna for its *prakāśa* (manifestation), why, the Advaitin may ask, is not the "I" manifest when no objects are cognised?

The Siddhāntin points out that the Advaitin, who identifies eternal self-luminous consciousness (*saṁvit*) with the soul, has to explain why *saṁvit* is not manifest when no object is known Perhaps his expla-

nation would be that *saṁvit* does manifest itself even then, but that its existence is not referred to, since at that time it is not in contact with the *ahamkāra* and external objects. A similar explanation, it is urged by Nārāyanārya, can be furnished by the Siddhāntin also.

Pursuing another line of argument, the Advaitin contends that the "I" (*ahamartha*) cannot be the *ātman*, which is universally accepted as being a changeless entity (*nirvikāra-vastu*). The character of being a knower (*jñātrtva*), that is, being an agent in the activity of *jñāna* (*jñāna-vyāpāra*), which is essentially a kind of change (*vikāra*), cannot be attributed to the *ātman*. If it were subject to this modification, the *ātman* would be degraded to the level of the non-sentient body. It follows, says the Advaitin, that *jñātrtva* is a quality illegitimately transferred (*adhyāsa*) to *jñāna*.

Characterising the opponent's argument as being unintelligible, the author says that *jñāna* is not an activity (*kriyā*) and that its possessor is not an agent (*kartā*). Like rays of light (*prabhā*), *jñāna* is a transparent substance, and it exists as an eternal attribute of *ātman*. Hence it is reasonable to regard *jñāna* as an attribute. It is ridiculous to maintain, he continues, that the *ātman* resembles the body in being devoid of *jñātrtva* and that *jñātrtva* is illegitimately transferred to *jñāna*. Being imperceptible (*adrśya*), *jñāna* cannot be the basis (*adhisthāna*) of this transference. Besides, this position involves the defect of mutual dependence (*parasparāśraya*). If *jñātrtva* is to be wrongly superposed, it must have been known before the *adhyāsa* is effected; and yet *jñātrtva* is realised only after *adhyāsa*. To escape this difficulty, the Advaitin may say that *jñātrtva* is not realised after *adhyāsa*, but that it already existed in the *antahkarana* and that it is superimposed on *jñāna* which is changeless. Nārāyanārya meets this by saying that he has already established that the self is not mere knowledge and that there is no warrant for believing in a *jñāna* whereon *jñātrtva* could be superimposed. He goes on to say that, on the view that the "I" (*ahamartha*) is wrongly transferred to *jñāna*, there must arise the cognition "I am knowledge", even as the shell is known as silver. But such a cognition never arises. Rejecting the Advaitic view as untenable, he concludes that the soul is the possessor of eternal *jñāna* and is the self-luminous entity known as "I".

Possible Objections to Nārāyanārya's View.

This conception of the soul possessing eternal knowledge as its attribute may be criticized in several ways. How can *jñāna*, it may be asked, be characterised as everlasting in the face of the familiar experience that it has an origin (*utpatti*) and a destruction (*nāśa*)? If knowledge is eternal, no useful function could be assigned to the

senses as instruments of knowledge Moreover, the scriptures assert that knowledge is absent in sleep (*susupti*).

The Author's Reply to Objections

Nārāyanārya states in answer that the scriptures teach that knowledge is eternal For example "The self is an eternal knower," "The knowledge of the knower is never lost". Knowledge is not newly acquired by the self, even as lustre is not freshly acquired by the gem when it is polished The removal of impurities merely helps to reveal the lustre which was already inherent in it Reference to the origin (*utpatti*) and the destruction (*nāśa*) of knowledge merely signifies the presence and the absence respectively of the contact of knowledge with objects Similarly, scriptural texts speaking of the absence of knowledge in sleep denote that at that time there is no contact with the objects of the world outside Though knowledge is eternal, it is obscured by karma during the period of mundane existence, hence, in the samsāric state, knowledge uses the senses (*indriya*) as its channel for proceeding outward and getting into contact with external objects The senses are not, therefore, unnecessary Since knowledge is said to proceed outward, it must necessarily be a substance, and not a quality

Once it is established that knowledge is eternal, the Buddhistic doctrine that the self is consciousness changing every moment (*ksanika-vijñāna*) stands condemned

The Souls Infinite in Number.

According to the Viśistādvaitic theory, the souls are many and each self is distinct from others "He who is unitary, supremely conscious and truly eternal among a host of eternal conscious entities "[34] Passages like these unequivocally declare that the released souls (*mukta*) and those in bondage (*samsārin*) are different and infinite in number The divergencies in the pleasures and sufferings of men also point to the plurality of souls

The Soul is Anu

Some scriptural passages[35] referring to the jīva's passing out (*utkrānti*) of the body, proceeding towards certain places (*gati*) and returning to the world (*āgati*) imply that it is atomic (*anu*) and not all-pervasive (*vibhu*) There are also passages which explicitly assert that

34 *Śvet Up*, VI 12

35 *Brh Up*, IV, iv 2, *Kaus Up*, I 9, and *Brh Up*, VI, iv 6.

the soul is atomic. For example "The self which is atomic and in which *prāna* exists in a fivefold form is to be understood by the mind which has been purified."[36] Though atomic, the soul has no difficulty in experiencing what happens in any part of the body. Just as a lamp placed in one part of the room sends out rays of light all round and illumines the entire room, the soul located in one part of the body becomes aware of what is happening in every part of the body with the aid of its knowledge.[37] On the view that the soul is all-pervasive (*vibhu*), all souls would be everywhere. But the fact that no one is ever found to declare another's body as his own is a clear testimony to the view that the soul is atomic.

The Soul an Aṁśa of Brahman

Upaniṣadic texts contrast the nature of Brahman and that of the *jīva*. The Lord is the controller (*niyantā*) ; the jīva, the controlled, the Lord is omniscient (*sarvajña*), the jīva is endowed only with fragmentary knowledge (*kiñcijña*). How then, it may be asked, can the soul be treated as the *aṁśa* of the Lord? The reply is by *amśa* is meant the part of a complex whole and not the part of the self-same object. The qualification (*viśesana*) is an *aṁśa* of the complex whole (*viśiṣta-dravya*). In a complex whole we do distinguish between the qualification (*viśesanāṁśa*) and the entity possessing the qualification (*viśeṣyāmśa*). On the basis of *viśesana-viśesya-bhāva* it is possible to justify all reference to the jīva as an *amśa* of the Lord. In other words, on the basis of the relation of the embodied soul and the embodiment, the jīva may quite well be treated as an *aṁśa* of Brahman. The *jīva* cannot be considered to be an *amśa* of the Lord in any other sense.

On the view that Brahman and the jīva are related as master and servant, there must be difficulty in treating the soul as a part of God, since the master and the servant are wholly distinct from each other.

Those who maintain that the jīva is a phenomenal appearance of Brahman are confronted with the same difficulty, for the jīva is phenomenal (*aparamārtha*) and cannot be a part of absolute Reality.

The Bhedābhedavādins too must find it hard to render intelligible the doctrine that the jīva is an *aṁśa* of Brahman. For, on the hypothesis that Brahman itself under the influence of *upādhi* becomes the jīva, the defects of the jīva would have to be attributed to Brahman.

36 *Mund. Up.*, III. i. 9.

37 Compare *Vedānta-Sūtra*, II, iii. 26 and IV. iv. 15.

The Bhedābhedavādin might urge that just as the impurities found in spaces limited by jars and the like do not infect cosmic space, the imperfections of the jīva, who is no other than Brahman limited by *upadhis*, do not afflict Brahman But this analogy is unhelpful, because formless Brahman cannot be said to be limited by *upadhis*. Further, in the analogy cited space is not limited by jars and the like, but is in contact with them And if Brahman is, likewise, in contact with *upadhi*, the imperfections flowing from them would certainly afflict Brahman Vedāntic texts teaching that Brahman is taintless would be contradicted. Thus on his philosophical presuppositions, the Bhedābhedavādin cannot show how the soul can be an *amśa* of Brahman

As the advocates of the doctrine of *śakti-vikṣepa* speak of Brahman as the *amśin* and the jīva as the *amśa* on the basis of soul-body relation, the author has no quarrel with them on this point Thus it has been shown that the jīva is an *amśa* of the Lord

The Soul is an Agent

The soul is an agent (*kartā*), otherwise scriptural injunctions prescribing sacrificial duties and meditation (*upāsanā*) for the attainment respectively of heaven and moksa would become pointless The Vedic mandates cannot be addressed to those who are devoid of agency According to a *Bṛhadāranyaka* text (IV iii 12) the self, in the state of sleep, " goes wherever he likes " The same upanisad in an earlier chapter, speaks of the soul as taking to himself, with the aid of his intelligence, the intelligence of the senses, and as moving about in his own body as he pleases (II i 17-18) Thus the self is explicitly declared to be the agent in activities such as taking and moving about

Certain *śruti* and *smṛti* passages seem to support the view that *prakṛti* is the source of all activity and that the purusa is only an enjoyer For example, the *Taittirīya* text—Vijñānam yajñam tanute karmāni tanute—speaks of *vijñāna* as the agent in sacred and secular duties Again, the *Bhagavad-Gītā* (Ch III, verse 27) declares that the self deluded by ahaṁkāra looks upon himself as the agent in all activities which are brought about by the gunas of prakṛti In the face of these, how, it may be asked, is the soul to be considered the agent ? The reply is that the term *vijñāna* occurring in the *Taittirīya* text refers to the soul and not to *buddhi*, for *buddhi*, which is non-intelligent, cannot be directed to do this or that Further, the Gītā verse cited only shows that the activity of the jīva depends upon five factors of which the self is but one, and he is specifically mentioned by the name *kartā* Hence, he who views the isolated self as an agent has no true insight

8. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF VIDHI

(*Vidhi-svarūpa-nirnayādhikāra*)

After a critical consideration of the Bhātta and the Prābhākara conceptions of *vidhi* (injunction), Nārāyanārya establishes the thesis that *vidhi* is the command of any trustworthy person (*āpta*) interested in our welfare (*hita-kāma*)

The View that Vidhi is Śabda-Bhāvanā

The Bhāttas maintain that *vidhi* is *śabda-bhāvanā* Their arguments may be stated as follows —*Vidhi* (literally what prompts a person to act) must be *śabdha-bhāvanā,* since the latter prompts actions directed to certain ends From the consciousness of meaning arising from words, every word must be inferred to have an activity (*vyāpāra*), called *abhidhā* In the case of mandatory suffixes—the Sanskrit *lin* and the like—the activity is signified by these suffixes themselves, and it is termed *bhāvanā* or *pravartanā,* since it brings into being or initiates activity (*pravrtti*).

Of the several objections that may be raised against this theory, the first is that this activity (*abhidhā*) cannot be attributed to *śabda*, for the latter is either a quality or a substance If *śabda* is a quality, it cannot have an activity, for activity cannot be attributed to a quality If *śabda* is a substance, it cannot enter upon activity, since it is all-pervasive

The Bhāttas meet this objection by pointing out that *śabda* may be a quality and yet possess an activity. Take for example, they say, the text "*Arunayā ekahāyanyā pingāksyā gavā somam krīnāti*" Here the activity of marking off a particular animal from the rest is attributed to redness (*ārunya*). Even on the view that *śabda* is an all-pervasive substance, *śabda* may, like the self, possess action Change of place (*parispanda*) may be impossible; but modal changes may be attributed to *śabda.*

Another objection to the Bhātta view is as follows —*Abhidhā* has to be defined as the knowledge of *śabda* (word), for it is only the word known that gives rise to awareness of meaning But the knowledge of a word cannot be considered its activity (*vyāpāra*)

In reply to this, the *Bhāttas* state that action (*vyāpāra*) is the occasional feature (*dharma*) with whose aid an object is able to produce its effect If this is admitted, it is easy to demonstrate, say the *Bhāttas,* that knowledge can be treated as an activity. The potential suffix *lin,* by being known, becomes responsible for human activity.

Yet another difficulty in the way of attributing to *śabda* an activity called *abhidhā* and conceived as a form of knowledge (*jñāna*) is as follows If this view were correct, *śabda* would have to be at once the agent (*kartā*) and the object (*karma*) in the self-same activity, namely, knowledge The statement Śabda reveals meaning" (śabdah artham abhidhatte) indicates that śabda is an agent in knowledge Again the proposition "I know *śabda*" (śabdam jānāmi) shows that śabda is the object (*karma*) of knowledge How can śabda be at once the agent (*kartā*) and the object (*karma*) in an identical activity ?

The Bhāttas brush aside this objection and argue as follows —"An identical act viewed from the stand-point of the different results achieved may have different objects (*karma*) What figures as *karma* in a given act considered as leading to one result may function as the agent (*kartā*) in the same act treated as accomplishing another result Take the proposition "He raises and lowers the axe" The axe is the object (*karma*) in the act of raising and lowering But consider the statement "The axe splits the firewood into two" The axe functions as the agent in the same act, now called *chinatti*, in the light of the result namely, cutting into two Similarly, in the self-same activity called *abhidhā* there may be different objects (*karma*) in connection with its diverse results In respect of the production of human activity, the same act is referred to as *bhāvanā*, and it has human activity for its *karma* *E g*, "*Śabda* gives rise to human activity" In respect of human activity, the self-same *abhidhā* is termed *pravartanā*, and it has *purusa* (man) for its object *E g*, "Śabda prompts the purusa to act" Thus, a given activity is called *jānāti*, when the result aimed at is the manifestation of objects (*visaya-prakāśa*) Here the *śabda* associated with manifestation is the object *E g* *śabdam jānāti* The same activity goes by the name of *abhidadhāti*, when the end in view is the awareness of meaning (*artha-pratīti*), in this case, the meaning (*artha*) constitutes the object *E g* śabdah artham abhidadhāti That very activity is referred to as *bhāvayati*, when the goal sought is initiation of activity, and it has activity (*pravrtti*) for its object *E g* pravrttim bhāvayati The self-same activity may also be designated *pravartayati* when the end in view is *pravrtti*, here the purusa associated with *pravrtti* is the object (*karma*) "

A further difficulty in the way of the Bhātta theory is this Even granting that *śabda* has *abhidhā* for its activity, the latter cannot generate action, for what leads to an action is the consciousness that it is the means to the realisation of desires (*samīhita-sādhanatā-jñāna*) Moreover, there is no need to distinguish *lin* from other words and maintain that *abhidā* is the very significance of *lin*

The Bhātta reply is True *iṣṭa-sādhanatā-jñāna* leads to activity, but it is wrong to suppose that the *abhidhā* of words does not prompt action For soon after listening to commands actions ensue indicating thereby that *lin* denotes an activity which is termed *abhidhā* and which is very different from the activity of other words As for the last objection, the *Bhāttas* reply that there is nothing to prevent the *vyāpāra* of a word from being the very significance of that word

Refutation of the Bhāṭṭa View

Nārāyanārya thinks that there is no warrant for the belief that *śabda* possesses an activity known as *abhidhā* It is unreasonable to contend, says Nārāyanārya, that the very significance of words expressing commands testifies to its existence, for *lin* is nowhere understood to have such a significance Nor is it convincing, says he, to maintain that the presence of such an activity is inferred from the fact that when commands are listened to, action follows, for all that this could prove is that *lin* leads to action From the fact that a person undertakes an action it could not be said that he must have listened to *lin* When the very existence of *lin* which has generated action cannot be inferred from the latter, it must be even more impossible to prove the existence of a mysterious *abhidhā* said to be possessed by words

The author next points out that activity is of two kinds—effort (*prayatna*) and movement (*parispanda*)—and that *śabda* can engage in neither of these Being non-sentient, *śabda* cannot put forth effort, and being a quality, it cannot move The Bhāttas cited the example of the text "Arunayā ekahāyanyā pingākṣyā " to show that a quality may enter upon activity. But this is unsatisfactory, because, in the example adduced, a *vyāpāra* has not been attributed to a quality [38]

The Bhātta contention that the activity called *abhidhā* is the knowledge of the word (*śabda*) is untenable, for *jñāna* is a quality of the self, and can never be an activity of *śabda*

The proposition—"Śabdah artham abhidhatte"—does not show that, in the *vyāpāra* known as *abhidhā, śabda* is the agent, for *abhidhā,* being identical with knowledge, can only reside in the self, and never in *śabda* By identifying *abhidhā* with *prākatya* one may attempt to show that *abhidhā* may well reside in *śabda.* But this attempt is foredoomed to failure, because there is no such thing as *prākatya*

Nārāyanārya further points out that, if *lin* can denote *abhidhā* directly, without the aid of some other *vyāpāra,* then *śabda* may well convey meanings directly, without the aid of *abhidhā.*

38 *Śrī-Bhāṣya,* I i 13

He also shows that just as knowledge manifests objects without the intervention of any *vyāpāra,* words also may convey meaning without the aid of any *vyāpāra* In commenting on the expression 'buddhijanma' occurring in *Pūrva-Mīmāmsā-sūtra,* Kumārila says that knowledge reveals objects by the mere fact of its origination and not with the aid of any other activity

Besides, even granting that there is *śabda-bhāvanā,* it cannot be *vidhi,* for it does not prompt action Though repeated often, *śabda* would not prompt action, so long as there is no *ista-sādhanatā-jñāna* Thus the conception of a *śabda-bhāvanā,* which has *purusa-pravrtti* for its *sādhya* (what is to be accomplished), *lin-jñāna* for its sādhana (means) and *prāśastya-jñāna* for its *itikartavyatā* (instrumental cause), stands condemned

The Prābhākāra View

According to the Prābhākara school, what prompts a person to act is the consciousness that it is something to be accomplished (*kārya*) by him All persons, whether they act at the instance of others or at their own instance prompted by love, anger or fear, enter upon activity when there arises the consciousness that it is their duty to do so (*kāryatā-jñāna*) Since *kārya* (what has to be accomplished) is the direct cause of activity, other factors being merely casual circumstances, *kārya,* which is the significance of *lin,* must be treated as *vidhi* In worldly affairs this *kārya,* which depends for its existence upon human effort (*krti*), is found to be no other than action (*kriyā*) But in the case of Vedic injunctions, like "He that desires heaven should sacrifice," the significance of the command cannot be *kārya,* which is of the nature of action For he who desires heaven finds it difficult to imagine how action, which is momentary, could be the means of heavenly bliss to be secured in the distant future Therefore, he concludes that the *kārya* which is the significance of Vedic commands must be very different from *kriyā* and that it must persist till the goal is reached For the reason that it is not something met with in everyday experience, it is called *apūrva* Since it directs the purusa towards itself, it is also termed *niyoga*

As vedic injunctions are thus proved to signify *kārya* of this unique kind, it is only in a secondary sense that injunctions to secular duty refer to *kārya* understood as *kriyā* Once it is demonstrated that *lin* signifies only *niyoga,* it follows that even in Vedic injunctions referring to actions, which bear no fruit and obligatory duties of an occasional character, *liṅ* denotes only *niyoga.*

Refutation of the Prābhākara View

The main counts in Nārāyanārya's indictment of the Prābhākara view are the following —(1) the *Prābhākara* notion of *kārya* is unintelligible For it must be either what is accomplished by effort (*krti-sādhya*) or the goal of effort (*krtyuddeśya*) or both these at once But it cannot be the first, since, on that alternative, sacrifice also would have to be treated as *kārya* Nor can it be the second, as, on that view, heaven would have to be considered *kārya* Nor yet can it be the third, for the *kārya* which the Prābhākara speaks of cannot be the goal of endeavour. 'Goal of endeavour' signifies the end to secure which a person starts on a course of action, and this end is either the attainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain But *kārya* is neither of these Hence it cannot be the goal of endeavour

Should the Prābhākara contend that, though heaven is the end aimed at, *niyoga* may be treated as the goal of endeavour in so far as it leads to heaven, Nārāyanārya replies that it only amounts to equating *kārya* or *niyoga* with *istasādhana* (the means for obtaining objects of desire).

(2) *Kārya* cannot be the meaning of *vidhi;* since knowledge of *kārya* is not responsible for activity Even when there is the knowledge that a certain thing ought to be done, action may not follow.

(3) The Prābhākara argued that after one hears the injunction "He who desires heaven should sacrifice" there arises the consciousness "This is to be performed by me (*mama idam kāryam*)," and that this consciousness, coming, as it does, soon after hearing the injunction, must be the import of that *vidhi* This argument is fallacious, for all that the *vidhi* conveys is that sacrifice is the means for the realisation of heaven The consciousness "This is something to be undertaken by me" is a desire; and it forms no part of the significance of *vidhi*

(4) There is no point in the contention that, since action is momentary, it cannot be the means for the realisation of heaven, and that, therefore, something other than *kriyā, viz, niyoga,* must be posited It will be shown presently that sacrifice itself is the means for heaven and that there is no need to posit *niyoga*

The Views of Nārāyanārya

Nārāyanārya's view may be stated as follows:—*Niyoga* (the command of the trustworthy person interested in our welfare), *vidhi* (injunction) and *pravartanā* are interchangeable terms The boy notices that commands issue from the teacher and are followed by

certain activities on the part of the pupils As a result of frequent experience of this kind, the utterance of certain words and some actions get associated in his mind So that, after some time, whenever he hears certain words some ideas are involuntarily recalled to mind It is only at a subsequent stage that he wishes to know why certain words are related to certain meanings and learns that words have the potency (*śakti*) to signify certain meanings Thus, even before a person understands the power of words to signify meanings, he learns their significance That is why the Buddhistic theory that śabda is a variety of inference stands condemned Only when the universal connection between two things has been grasped would it be possible to infer one from the other Since the meanings of words are understood even before the nature of the relation between words and meanings is ascertained, it would be impossible to maintain that the knowledge obtained from words is inferential knowledge

It may be asked whether the suffix *lin* and *pravartanā* have been experienced together to enable the mind to recall one from the other Nārāyanārya answers this question in the affirmative and says that, when the boy finds the pupil entering upon some activity on hearing the master's command, he learns that the master wished that the pupil should act in a specific way and, therefore, issued the command When the boy wishes to induce others to act, he adopts the same procedure and is directly aware of the *pravartanā* existing in himself From this he readily infers that all persons must be using commands to induce action of one sort or another in others Hence, it follows that *lin* signifies the command of the trustworthy person (*āpta*)

The objector may say that if the potential suffix *lin* signifies what induces a person to perform activities calculated to securing his well-being (*hita*), it would follow that scriptural texts are the composition of some purusa (*pauruseya*), for *hita-pravartanā* is understood, in every-day life, from the utterances of the trustworthy person himself or from those of his agent

Nārāyanārya replies as follows —Even when a king does not directly communicate his orders to his subjects and does not even cause his ministers to do so, the latter may understand his mind and tell the subjects that the king expects them to do certain things And the subjects may take them to be the king's orders and obey them. Similarly, the Vedic texts, without being the utterances of God or of his agents, may yet be taken to be the Lord's mandates

The objector may again urge that the foregoing only shows that Vedic duties are the injunctions of the Lord, and that it does not indicate that they have to be performed. To this Nārāyaṇārya replies

that there are texts describing these injunctions as the commands of the Lord, that they have to be obeyed, and that neglect of these duties entails punishment The following passages may be cited as examples —A *Taittirīya* text commencing with the words "After imparting instruction in the Veda, the preceptor enjoins the pupil to to practise certain virtues" ends by saying that these are the commands of the Lord, the advice of persons interested in our welfare and that they are the essence of the Vedic teaching [39] A text from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* Upaniṣad declares, "Verily, O Gārgi! men become subject to, and praise those who, realising that *dāna* and the like are the commands of the Imperishable, give gifts (*dāna*), the divinities praise the sacrificer, and the ancestral deities (*pitṛs*) praise those who perform the *darvī-homa*" [40]

The doctrine that Vedic injunctions are the commands of the Lord does not, in the least, contradict the view that the Vedas are eternal (*nitya*) Though the Vedic passage—"Agnīd agnīn vihara"—is the command of the *adhvaryu* to *Āgnīdhra,* the Veda does not cease to be eternal Likewise, vedic injunctions may be the command of the Lord, and yet be eternal

The Mīmāmsakas argue that, since the sacrifice is momentary, it cannot lead to heaven and that, therefore, an *apūrva* which could lead to the fruit of sacrifice has to be posited But this is needless, for the Lord Himself who is pleased at finding the sacrificer obeying His command as also the divinities, such as Agni and Indra, who receive the sacrificial offering, may grant the fruits So the sacrifice itself may lead to the fruits thereof It may be asked: How can the divinities be spoken of as receiving sacrificial offering and as distributing the fruits thereof in the face of scriptural statements to the effect that the Supreme Self Himself receives these offerings and rewards the sacrificer? The reply is that, since the divinities are after all His subordinates (*anga*) and constitute His body, what pleases them pleases the Supreme Self too Their enjoyment constitutes His enjoyment The scriptures declare that the Supreme Self who is worshipped by sacrifices and meditation (*upāsana*) distributes heavenly enjoyment (*bhoga*) and final release (*apavarga*) If the divinities are usually spoken of as dispensing rewards, it is because the Lord has conferred upon them the power of rewarding men for sacrificial duties. Hence, Nārāyanārya concludes that in ordinary life *vidhi* constitutes the

39 Tait Up I 11
40. Bṛh. Up, III viii, 8.

command of the person issuing the instruction, and that in the Veda, *vidhi* signifies the command of the Lord Nārāyanārya claims for his theory the support of *Śrī-Bhāsya*

9 ON THE NATURE OF THE MEANS TO MOKSA

(*Niśreyasa-sādhana-nirnayādhikāra*)

Introductory

Although there is concensus of opinion making *vedana* (knowledge) the means for the attainment of transcendental felicity (*moksa*), philosophers have held divergent views regarding the precise nature of *vedana* Some treat it as knowledge afforded by Upanisadic texts (*vākya-janya-jñāna*) Others think that it denotes the combination of *sānkhya* and *yoga* (*sānkhya-yoga-samuccaya*) But Nārāyanārya supports the view that *vedana* is *bhakti* resulting from the seven-fold factors of purity arising from partaking good food (*viveka*), non-attachment to objects of desire (*vimoka*) repeated meditation on the blessed form of the Lord (*abhyāsa*), the performance of the five-fold yajñas and the like (*kriyā*), virtues such as wishing well to all, straightforwardness, mercy, non-injury, gift, and not coveting another's property (*kalyāna*), not feeling depressed over the loss of things and persons held near and dear (*anavasāda*), and the absence of undue elation (*anuddharsa*)

The View that Vedana is Vākyajanyajñāna

Upanisadic texts, such as "The knower of Brahman crosses sorrow," proclaim that knowledge of the nature of ultimate reality obtained from the Vedānta is the means of moksa which is no other than cessation of *avidyā* (*avidyā-nivrtti*) In the mind purified by the performance of sacrificial duties, Vedāntic texts generate the knowledge that is capable of terminating ignorance concerning the nature of Brahman Till the undesirable activities of the senses, inner and outer, cease, this knowledge of Brahman does not bear fruit

Acquisition of right knowledge consists of three stages—*śravana, manana* and *nididhyāsana* *Śravana* refers to the first stage when the aspirant learns from a competent guru the meaning of the different Vedāntic texts *Manana* stands for the stages when the pupil reflects upon what he has been taught in order to rid the mind of the doubt (*asambhāvanā*) that the truth conveyed may not be right *Nididhyāsana* is meditation upon the identity between the jīva and Brahman designed to eradicate long established habits of thought (*viparīta-bhāvanā*) and to secure the conviction that the truth cannot

be anything else When this meditation is continued for long, the knowledge obtained from the upanisadic texts (*vākyajanya-jñāna*) becomes direct intuition of Brahman (*aparoksa-sāksātkāra*) competent to terminate *ajñāna* and its products, root and branch

A possible objection to the Advaitic view is that *śabda* (scriptural testimony) cannot generate intuitive perception (*sāksātkāra* or *aparoksa-jñāna*) The Advaitins meet this objection by pointing out that whether *śabda* generates *paroksa-jñāna* or *aparoksa-jñāna* would depend upon the nature of the object known (*prameya*) When *śabda* dispels *ajñāna* concerning the existence of material objects, such as jars, they are not manifested at once Not being self-luminous, they could shine only when some pramāna or other operates On the contrary, when the *avidyā* concerning the self-luminous Ātman is dispelled, the self shines without the aid of any of the pramānas Hence, in the case of the Self or Ātman, śabda generates direct, intuitive perception (*aparoksa-jñāna*)

Meditation (*dhyāna*) cannot, says the Advaitin, terminate avidya, for *samsāra* which is essentially unreal can be dispelled by knowledge arising from the pramāṇas, and not by meditation (*dhyāna*).

Refutation of the Advaitic View

Nārāyanārya rejects the Advaitic view on the following grounds (i) Since, scriptural texts, such as "The Self (Ātman) is to be seen" and "The Self (Ātman) is to be known," prescribe meditation (*dhyāna*) on the Self as the means to moksa, and since the knowledge born of scriptural texts cannot be enjoined (*vidheya*), knowledge arising from scriptures cannot be the means for attaining final release Cessation of *avidyā* can never result from mere acquaintance with the import of Vedāntic texts.

(ii) There is little force in the Advaitic contention that knowledge afforded by Vedāntic texts does not bear fruit immediately, and that it dispels *avidyā* only after all the obstacles have been removed with the aid of *śravana, manana* and *nididdhyāsana* For the obstacles preventing *vākya-janya-jñāna* from producing its result immediately are, on the Advaitic theory, illusory (*mithyā*), and must, therefore, disappear the moment knowledge of reality arises

The Advaitin may seek to defend his position by saying that the obstacles may persist even when *vākya-janya-jñāna* has arisen, just as the cognition of two moons persists even when the conviction has arisen that there is but a single moon.

But this line of defence, says Nārāyanārya, is weak The analogy is unhelpful, because the cognition of two moons is caused by some defect in the visual apparatus which is real and which is removable by an ointment So long as the defect is not rectified (*i e*, so long as the cause of the illusory perception of the double moon exists), the illusion is bound to persist, even after the conviction has arisen that the moon is single Unlike the defect in the eye, the obstacles preventing the removal of avidyā are illusory and are, therefore, bound to cease the moment *vākya-janya-jñāna* arises.

The Advaitin may suggest that the knowledge which is capable of terminating the obstacles arises only at the completion of the stages of *manana* and *nididdhyāsana* when the doubt (*asambhāvanā*) concerning the correctness of the teaching imparted by the *guru* is resolved, and when long-established habits of thought (*viparīta-bhāvanā*) which are opposed to this teaching are broken They might also add that when knowledge of Vedāntic texts dawns upon the mind, it does dispel *avidyā* forthwith But this suggestion has no value; because when the causal factors necessary for *vākya-janya-jñāna* are present, it must arise immediately, and cannot wait for *manana* and *nididdhyāsana*

(iii) The Advaitic view that *śabda* (Vedāntic text) generates intuitive apprehension (*aparoksa-jñāna*) runs counter to experience It is not open to the Advaitin to contend that *śabda* may produce *paroksa-jñāna* or *aparoksa-jñāna* according to the thing known; for, on his view, the Ātman is not an object of knowledge (*prameya*)

The Advaitin may urge that, although the Ātman is not really an object of knowledge, still it may be considered as such (i e., as a *prameya*) in a secondary sense, in so far as the knowledge furnished by the *pramānas* dispels ignorance concerning the Ātman To this Nārāyanārya replies that ignorance (*ajñāna*) concerning the Ātman must either be the Ātma-svarūpa itself or must have the Ātman for its basis (*āśraya*), and that it has already been shown that it cannot be either of these Hence the Ātman cannot be called a *prameya* even in a secondary sense

(iv) Since samsāra is real, and not phenomenal, the Advaitin cannot justly contend that knowledge arising from the *pramānas*, and not *dhyāna*, is competent to dispel samsāra

(v) The texts cited by the Advaitin in support of the view that *vākya-janya-jñāna* is the means to moksa bear a different interpretation Take, for example, the passage: "Those who practise *yāma* and the like, acquiring true knowledge of reality from the upanisadic texts, following the path of self-surrender (*nyāsa*), and

attaining mental purification, attain the Lord in the *Brahma-loka* and are freed from bondage to samsāra"[41] Since self-surrender which arises after the understanding of the Vedāntic texts is also regarded as the means, *vākya-janya-jñāna* is not, by itself, the direct means of liberation.

Sānkhya-Yoga Samuccaya Vāda

Some advocate the view that *Sānkhya* and *Yoga* are the conjoint means of release from bondage They interpret *Sānkhya* to mean 'the determination of the nature of reality' (tattvānām avadhāranam) It includes two phases—*śravana* and *manana* *Yoga*, too, is twofold—*jñāna-yoga* and *karma-yoga* Of these, *jñāna-yoga* is divisible into two forms—*sambhūti* and *vināśa* *Sambhūti* is meditation on reality conceived as possessing qualities (*saviśesa-dhyāna*). *Vināśa* is meditation on reality looked upon as having no qualities (*nirviśesa-dhyāna*) *Karma-yoga* is accomplished through speech (*vāk*), body (*kāya*) and external objects It entails the performance of duties which please the Lord, the avoidance of all other actions and the renunciation of the fruits of actions

The view that *Sānkhya* and *Yoga* are together the means of attaining moksa is said to be based on scriptural texts like the following—"The universal cause is attainable by Sānkhya and Yoga"[42] (tat kāranam sānkhya-yogādi gamyam) Of the two varieties of yoga—*jñāna-yoga* and *karma-yoga*—the ascetics (*parivrājakas*) follow the former alone, while the rest have to practise both. And in every case, *jñāna-yoga* includes both *sambhūti* and *vināśa* The following are some of the texts which seem to support this view—"He who knows *vidyā* (*jñāna*) and *avidyā* (karma) conjointly, after crossing samsāra with the aid of *avidyā*, acquires immortality (*amrta*) with the help of *vidyā*".

> Vidyāñca avidyāñca yas tad vedo' bhayam saha |
> Avidyayā mrtyum tīrtvā vidyayā 'mrtamaśnute ||[43]

"He who knows *sambhūti* and *vināśa* conjointly, after crossing samsāra (*mrtyu*) with the aid of *vināśa*, attains immortality (*amrta*) with the help of *sambhūti*"

> Sambhūtiñca vināśañca yas tad vedo'bhayam saha |
> Vināśena mrtyum tīrtvā sambhūtyā 'mrtamaśnute ||[44]

41 *Tait Up*, X, 22
42 *Śvet Up*, VI, 13
43 *Īśa Up*, 11
44 *Īśa Up*, 14.

Refutation of Sānkhya-yoga Samuccaya Vāda

Sānkhya and *yoga* cannot be considered the conjoint means of liberation, for, as Nārāyanārya points out, scriptural texts not only declare that *vedana* is the means for achieving moksa, but also deny that there are other means therefor Take, for example, the following text—" Knowing Him thus, he becomes immortal " [45]

Further, the text—'Tat kāranam sānkhya-yogādi gamyam'—does not mean that Brahman is attainable by *Sānkhya* and *Yoga* as understood by the advocate of Samuccaya-vāda, but really asserts that Brahman is to be intuited by *jñāna-yoga* and *karma-yoga*

Moreover, the passage—" Vidyāñca avidyāñca yas tad vedo'bhayam saha " does not bear out the view that *vidyā* and *avidyā* are conjointly the means for an identical goal, namely, moksa For it states explicitly that *vidyā* leads to immortality, while *avidyā*, meaning what is other than vidyā (*i e*, karma, prescribed duties), terminates the past deeds (karma) which prevent the rise of true knowledge It is thus clear that *vidyā* alone is the real means for moksa

Similarly, the text—" Sambhūti vināśañca yas tad vedo'bhayam saha . " does not declare that *sambhūti* and *vināśa* are the joint means of moksa, for they subserve different ends Besides, the terms *sambhūti* and *vināśa* do not refer, as the advocate of *samuccaya-vāda* thinks, to *saviśesa-dhyāna* and *nirviśesa-dhyāna* respectively *Sambhūti*, which literally denotes 'fullness' or 'perfection', here signifies, in a secondary sense, *vidyā*, in so far as *vidyā* is the means of attaining perfection Likewise, the word *vināśa* which literally signifies that which perishes, refers, in a secondary sense, to karma, since the results brought on by karma are perishable There is nothing in the text which could even remotely favour the interpretation that *sambhūti* and *vināśa* stand respectively for *saviśesa* and *nirviśesa dhyānas*

The Viśistādvaita Doctrine

On the strength of upanisadic passages like—" The knower of Brahman attains the Supreme "[46] —the Viśistādvaitin maintains that *vedana* is the means of release *Vedana*, otherwise known as *bhakti* (loving devotion), is different from, and is the result of, the knowledge afforded by Vedāntic texts (*vākya-janya-jñāna*) It originates only in the mind (*manas*) which has been cleansed of its impurities by *viveka*, *vimoka abhyāsa*, *kriyā*, *kalyāna anavasāda* and *anuddharsa*. *Vedana* is referred to by terms, such as *dhyāna*, *upāsana* and *dhruvānusmrti*, and it

45. *Purusa-Sūkta.* 46 *Tait Up*, II.1.1

is akin to intuitive perception (*sākṣātkāra*) It is in itself exceedingly blissful, because the object of devotion is the very embodiment of bliss

This interpretation of the meaning of *vedana* has the full support of the scriptures That *vedana* is not to be confounded with *vākya-janya-jñāna* (knowledge born of scriptural texts) is taught in passages, such as "Having understood (the import of the upanisadic texts), he meditates on it"[47] (anuvidya vijānāti), and " Having known it, let him practise meditation"[48] (vijñāya prajñām kurvīta) Here the expression 'having understood' and 'having known' (*anuvidya, vijñāya*) merely refer to *vākya-janya-jñāna*, while the statements 'he meditates on it' and 'let him practise meditation' (*vijānāti, prajñām kurvīta*) enjoin meditation

Brahmanandī has shown that *vedana* is gained only with the aid of *viveka*, *vimoka*. *abhyāsa*, *kriyā*, *kalyāna*, *anavasāda* and *anuddharsa* The scripture is explicit on the point that it is only the mind that has been rendered pure that intuitively apprehends the Real E g "With the mind purified " and "It is seen by the mind ennobled " *Viveka* is mental purity obtained by excluding from the body impure food *Vimoka* is non-attachment to objects of desire *Abhyāsa* denotes repeated meditation on God *Kriyā* signifies the performance of the duties appropriate to a person's station in life *Kalyāna* means the practice of virtues like straightforwardness, truthfulness, non-injury and charity *Anavasāda* is freedom from despondency even in the presence of the most trying and gloomy situations *Anuddharsa* is the opposite character, it signifies freedom from elation in the presence of situations productive of joy

Since *dhyāna* (meditation), *upāsana* (worship) and *dhruvānusmrti* (steady remembrance) are spoken of in different places in the upanisads as the means of liberation, and since the scriptures refuse to recognise anything except *vedana* as the path of release, it necessarily follows that *dhyāna*, *upāsana* and *dhruvānusmrti* are synonymous with the term *vedana*

The fact that *vedana*, which is akin to intuitive apprehension, becomes direct and immediate perception (*sākṣātkāra*) of Reality is learnt from texts such as the following --"When he directly perceives Him who is of the golden hue " and "When He is seen. . "

Passages like the following —"He is attained only by him whom He chooses; and he reveals His form only to him (whom he chooses) "[49]— teach that *vedana* is of the nature of loving devotion (*bhakti*) Thus it is evident that *vedana* which is the means of moksa is knowledge which partakes of the nature of loving devotion (*bhakti*).

47. *Chānd. Up*, VIII xii 6
48 *Bṛh Up* , VI.iv.21.
49 *Kaṭh. Up.*, II 23.

Exception may be taken to the view that *bhakti* is the means of release on the ground that, in the *Bhagavad-Gītā* and elsewhere, *karma* is held out as the means therefor In one place, the *Bhagavad-Gītā* declares that persons like Janaka attained the perfected state only by traversing the path of karma Elsewhere it is stated that the Lord Visnu is worshipped only by him who performs the duties appropriate to his caste and station in life, and that no other form of worship pleases the Lord.

But this objection is lacking in force, for the verse quoted from the *Bhagavad-Gītā* does not state that karma is the means of transcendental felicity (*niśreyas*), but it only asserts that persons like King Janaka attained *siddhi* by following *karma-yoga* This *siddhi* really denotes *jñāna-yoga,* for there are passages declaring that *karma* is the means of *jñāna-yoga* and that *moksa,* which is of the nature of the realisation of Brahman, is attained by supreme devotion (*para-bhakti*) Again, the statement that the performance of caste duties alone pleases the Lord and that nothing else moves Him contains not even the faintest suggestion that the performance of duties procures release directly

The objector may say that since *upāsana* is said to be responsible for rooting out demerits (*pāpa-ksaya*), it cannot be considered the means of liberation He may add that *upāsana* cannot be the means at once for the removal of demerits and the realisation of moksa, for it is a well-known dictum that each *karma* has but a single result He may go on to state that *upāsana,* unlike *jyotistoma* and so forth which can be performed several times and which may, on each performance, bear a different fruit, cannot be performed more than once For *upāsana* is of the nature of steady and uninterrupted meditation continued till the hour when the soul parts once and for all from the body

In reply to this objection, Nārāyanārya cites the authority of Āpastamba for saying that even action performed but once may bear more fruits than one Moreover, since the meditation has the Supreme Lord Himself for its object there is nothing of value which it cannot secure Several passages may be cited to prove that the loving contemplation of the Lord leads to diverse results, such as the destruction of demerits (*pāpaksaya*), the access to *arcirādi-mārga* and the attainment of Brahman

Prapatti-mārga

In addition to *bhakti* the Viśistādvaitin accepts another path to liberation known as *prapatti* *Nivedana, niksepa, nyāsa* and *prapadana* are alternative names for *prapatti.*

What leads to the supreme goal of life (*apavarga*) or to lesser benefits like heaven (*abhyudaya*) is termed *dharma* It is of two kinds—(i) *siddha* (what exists as a fact, *i e* God) and (ii) *sādhya* (what has to be accomplished, *i e*, sacrifice, gift and the like) There is nothing novel in speaking of God as an ever present means (*siddhopāya*) of release, for *śruti* and *smrti* texts actually describe Him as *Dharma* *E g* " Krishna, the ancient *Dharma* (*sanātana dharma*)," "Desirous of attaining moksa, I take refuge in Him who created the four-faced Brahmā and passed the Vedas on to him " Thus, the Lord Himself may be adopted as the means to moksa To adopt Him as the means is to surrender oneself to Him with the fervent prayer that as one is ignorant, sinful and unable to save oneself, the Lord Himself must, from out of His unbounded mercy, be one's saviour

While *bhakti-mārga* is to be followed only by persons who are qualified to study the Veda and who are mentally and spiritually fitted for undertaking the long and arduous process of training which *bhakti* involves, salvation along the path of self-surrender is open to all without distinction of caste or rank Persons who cannot enter upon the path of bhakti either because they lack the necessary qualification (*adhikāra*) or because they do not possess the requisite mental and spiritual development and those who are unable to bear even for a minute longer the suffering of samsāra and are therefore intensely desirous of attaining Brahman immediately fling themselves on God's compassion with the firm faith (*mahāviśvāsa*) that He will save The Lord overlooks the faults of the devotee and saves him from the distress of samsāra.

10 THE NATURE OF MOKSA

(*Niśreyasa-svarūpa-nirnayādhikāra*)

Introductory

The nature of the ultimate goal of life, *moksa*, has been differently conceived by the different systems of Indian thought Nārāyānārya passes in review the Mādhyamika, Yogācāra, Jaina, Nyāya-Vaiśesika, Prābhākara, Bhātta, Advaita and Bhedā-bheda views on this question and finally expounds the Viśistādvaitic conception of moksa

The Buddhistic View

Of the two types of Buddhistic idealism, the school known as Mādhyamika thinks that liberation consists in becoming vacuity (*śūnya*) by continual meditation on reality as vacuity (*śūnya*) The other type designated as the Yogācāra school considers moksa to be the state when the stream of consciousness or succession of ideas (*vijñāna-santāna*) is

no longer artificially sundered into subject and object This state is to be won by meditation on reality as momentary and as constituted of *sva-laksanas,* each of which is unique and describable only as itself

Refutation of the Buddhistic View

The gravaman of charge against these conceptions of liberation is they are inconsistent with the Buddhistic denial of a self persisting through the states of samsāra and release, for the notion of release implies previous bondage of the self as a distinct entity

The Jaina Doctrine

According to Jainism, salvation consists in reaching the top of the universe, known as *lokākāśa* It is attained by the person, who, by right knowledge (*samyag-darśana*) and right conduct (*samyak-cāritra*), becomes free from bondage to karma and shines in his pristine purity

Refutation of the Jaina Doctrine

The Jaina account of liberation is unintelligible, because it implies that the soul proceeds and reaches the heights called *lokākāśa* But the self, which is in its essential nature unchanging cannot proceed anywhere Nor is it said by them that there is some other conscious entity ordaining its movement.

The Nyāya-Vaiśesika View

The ideal of life as represented by the *Nyāya-Vaiśesika* is one wherein the soul is divested of all its specific qualities (*viśesa-guna*), such as jñāna, pain and pleasure

Refutation of the Nyāya View

The main defect of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika view is that it virtually amounts to stating that the self is destroyed at release, for then it is bereft of all experience No one would ever care for a moksa of this barren sort The Nyāya-Vaiśesika may perhaps argue that, as mokṣa denotes complete absence of miseries, it may become an object of human aspiration But this argument has no value, for so long as it is held that the released soul does not realise its freedom from the travails of samsāra, a goal of that nature will never be sought by man Does any one, asks Nārāyanārya, treat the absence of miseries on the part of a block of stone or wood as a purusārtha ?

The Mīmāmsā Doctrine

Since the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṁsā defines moksa in a manner very similar to that of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika, the criticisms levelled

against the latter apply with equal force to the former The Bhātta school, however, maintains that moksa is a state of bliss (*ānanda*)[50] brought on by knowledge born of *manas*

Criticism of the Bhāṭta View

Lacking the necessary equipment of senses and the like and being unconnected with objects, the released soul must be denied knowledge and pleasure which depend respectively on the possession of instruments, such as the senses, and on contact with objects How, then, can the Bhāttas treat moksa as the experience of bliss resulting from jñāna when they deny the necessary instruments and objects ?

Bhāttas may suggest in reply that the self is, in itself, pleasurable (*anukūla*) and that *manas* is eternally present and that consequently, the self may well experience pleasure in the state of liberation But this suggestion, says *Nārāyanārya*, is valueless, because, even though *manas* is eternal, there can be no conjunction between the self and *manas*, for conjunction presupposes activity in one or both the relata and there could be no activity in either of these all-pervasive substances (*manas* being vibhu in their view) And even granting that knowledge and pleasure can arise in moksa, the Bhātta position is not free from defects. Since what originates must perish sooner or later, moksa would be impermanent

Examination of the Advaitic View

According to the Advaitins, moksa is the cessation of *avidyā* (*avidyā-nivṛtti*) Nārāyanārya subjects this view to severe scrutiny and raises several objections to it For one thing, if *avidyā-nivrtti* signifies the destruction or negation of *avidyā*, then *avidyā* will always persist alongside of Brahman in one form or another thereby militating against the absolute monism of the Advaitins For negation whether it be anterior negation (*prāg-abhāva*) or subsequent negation (*dhvamśābhāva*), denotes existence of the object in question in a different form The anterior negation of the jar, for example, refers to its existence as clay; while the subsequent negation of the jar signifies its existence as potsherd

To obviate this difficulty, the Advaitin may urge that *avidyā* is no substance (*dravya*) and that, therefore, its negation cannot mean its existence in some form or other. But this is no escape, because, if *avidyā*

50. The interpreters of Kumārila are not agreed on this point. While some Mīmāmsakas, like the authors of *Māna-meyodaya*, maintain that mokṣa is a state of bliss, others like Pārthasārathi have questioned this interpretation and described moksa negatively as involving neither pleasure nor pain See *Śāstra-Dīpikā*, pp 126-8.

is not a substance, the world (*prapañca*) which is its handiwork cannot be a substance

Again, if the Advaitin argues that *avidyā-nivrtti* is Brahman itself, and not something distinct therefrom, Nārāyanārya replies that, as Brahman is eternal, knowledge of reality would be unnecessary for attaining Brahman Moreover, since, on this view *avidyā-nivrtti* is eternal, bondage which is the product of *avidyā* would for ever be impossible

Nārāyanārya next points out that, if moksa were to signify the cessation of avidyā, it would be a negative result (*abhāva*) and, as such, it could not be an object of human endeavour (*purusārtha*), for none ever seeks a purely negative goal If the Advaitin says that moksa means the removal of pain (*duhkha-nivrtti*) and that it may well be a *purusārtha,* Nārāyanārya replies that he has already shown that *duhkha-nivrtti* cannot be a *purusārtha*

Recognising the difficulty involved in conceiving moksa in a purely negative manner, the Advaitin may seek to give it positive content by urging that *avidyā-nivrtti* is not, in itself, the goal, but that moksa consists in the appearance of Brahman in its true form as bliss consequent upon the removal of *avidyā* This contention is unhelpful, because the manifestation of Brahman in its true form presupposes earlier obscuration (*tirodhāna*) And Brahman which is without distinctions of any kind and which is self-luminous can, at no time, be clouded

And it has already been shown that, consistently with his philosophical position, the Advaitin cannot maintain that Brahman is of the nature of bliss Even if it is conceded that Brahman is of the nature of bliss and that it manifests itself in this form when *avidyā* terminates, it would not follow that this could be a *purusārtha* For it is most natural for a man to entertain the desire for happiness He would scarcely say "let me manifest myself, let me be myself"

The Advaitin may urge that it is the direct experience of bliss that is sought To this Nārāyanārya replies that experience necessarily presupposes an experiencer and that the admission of an agent amounts to abandoning the rigorous monism of the Advaitin

Refutation of the Bhedābheda Doctrine

Those who believe that the jīva is no other than Brahman under limiting conditions (*upādhi*) maintain that moksa is the state when Brahman is freed from these limiting adjuncts In other words, moksa consists in the jīva becoming Brahman

Nārāyanārya rejects this view as unsatisfactory for various reasons. What, he asks, does 'becoming Brahman' mean? If it signifies the dis-

appearance of limiting adjuncts (*upādhi*), it would, he says, be a purely negative result, and could not, for reasons already assigned, be considered the goal of life. If, however, it is interpreted positively to refer to the jīva who is associated with *upādhi* being identical with Brahman who is not so associated with *upādhis*, Nārāyanārya replies that he has already refuted the theory that the jīva is Brahman limited by *upādhis*.

Nārāyanārya further asks: Is the identity of the jīva with Brahman an ever-present fact? Or, is it acquired after the *upādhis* have been removed with the aid of knowledge of Reality? If it is the former, there would be no need to adopt any means for securing moksa. If it is the latter, the jīva must be either similar to Brahman, or must be distinct therefrom in the state of samsāra but later, at mukti, it must become identical with Brahman. The first alternative would militate against the monistic hypothesis of the Bhedābheda-vādin. The second alternative is equally unacceptable because an entity distinct from Brahman could never become identical with it.

Moreover, śruti and smrti texts may be adduced in plenty to show that, at release, the jīva does not become one with Brahman. In view of this, the scriptural text—"The knower of Brahman becomes Brahman Himself"—must be interpreted to mean that the released soul attains to such similarity with Brahman as would justify his being called Brahman Himself.

The Viśistādvaitic View

According to the Viśistādvaitin, moksa consists in the eternal, illimitable and direct experience of Brahman who holds absolute sovereignty over the natural and the supernatural domains. This experience is obtained only by the person who, by constant worship, pleases the Lord, and gets rid, with the aid of the Lord's grace (*prasāda*), of all his merits and demerits (*punya* and *pāpa*). Even as straw and the like cannot stand before fire and are forthwith consumed by the flames, the good and bad deeds of the devotee melt away before the grace of the Lord. Just as water particles standing over the lotus leaf have no contact therewith, the past karma of the true devotee does not touch him any longer. With the load of karma thus lifted, he traverses the path of the gods (*devayāna*) wherein angels, such as Arcis, conduct the pilgrim on his onward march, and on reaching the Supreme Light (*Param Jyotis*), he shines in his true nature. Qualities, such as freedom from evil, which have so long been obscured by *avidyā* in the shape of karma, now shine forth. Except in the matter of the creation and sustenance of the world, which are the exclusive prerogatives of Brahman, the released soul becomes similar (*parama-sāmya*) to Brahman.

Unlike heavenly enjoyment which is impermanent, the experience of Brahman is everlasting He who attains release never again returns to mundane existence Since the soul exists for the sake of the Lord (*i e*, since he is the *śesa,* and the Lord, the *śesin*), consistently with his true nature, he places himself at the disposal of the Lord, bows his will to that of the Lord and finds service (*kainkarya*) to Him a source of infinite joy (*rasāvaha*)

Several charges have been levelled against this view. For one thing, it has been said that, while the worship (*upāsana*) of *Saguna-Brahman* enables the self to attain similarity with Brahman, meditation upon Brahman in its true nature as a qualityless entity (*nirguna*) leads to a more ultimate goal, namely, oneness with Brahman itself. Nārāyanārya's reply to this charge is that worship of a qualityless Brahman (*nirgunopāsana*) is impossible The descriptions of the several *vidyās* (forms of worship) set forth in the scriptures uniformly end by stating that Brahman possesses qualities, such as bliss (*ānanda*). Further, he has already shown that Brahman is *saguna* and not *nirguna*

A second charge is that if liberation is a state of enjoyment, the released soul must be characterised by love or attachment (*rāga*), and must necessarily reap its consequence, namely, pain (*duhkha*) This criticism, says Nārāyanārya, goes wide of the mark, for it supposes that every kind of love is the harbinger of pain The fact is that it is only the love that arises from subjection to karma that brings pain in its train Far from causing misery, love of God enhances our joy

A third objection takes the following form—"The jīva, caught up in the wildfire of samsāric life, longs for escape from miseries and for the securing of happiness For this purpose, he undertakes a long and arduous life of self-discipline only to find himself confronted with a life of eternal service and dependence. Is this not a case of labour wholly lost? All service is necessarily taxing and painful in its consequence Further, in worldly life independence is praised as a thing of value, and dependence condemned The scriptures too denounce in strong terms the life of servitude and dependence A moksa of this kind must, therefore, be scarcely different from samsāra"

Nārāyanārya's reply is that the jīva is not baulked of his hopes of attaining bliss in moksa On the contrary, he does attain what he has striven for It is an error to imagine that in every case service is painful When the scriptures condemn service they really decry only the service that brings trivial results (*alpa phala*) and misery, and service rendered to undesirable persons If the scriptures made a

sweeping condemnation of all service, there would be no room for laudable forms of service, such as helpfulness to the *guru* Likewise dependence (*pāratantrya*) is not an evil in every case Thus it is to be concluded that service to, and dependence on, the Lord are certainly a source of joy.

श्रीः

॥ श्रीमते रामानुजाय नमः ॥

भूमिका.

श्रीमन्नारायणार्यप्रतिभाद्रविणनिक्षेपायमाणं नीतिमालाभिधानं प्रबन्धरत्नमिदं जीवितमिव जागर्ति श्रीमद्विशिष्टाद्वैतसिद्धान्तस्य। आदर्शविमलोऽयं प्रबन्धः नातिसंक्षेपविस्तररमणीयैः प्रस्फुटार्थैः वाक्यजालैः न केवलं कुशाग्रधिषणानाम्, अपि तु मृदुप्रज्ञानामपि हृदयमावर्जयतीति नेदमनुभवापेतं वचनम्। तदेतत्प्रबन्धरत्नमियता कालेन केवलं श्रवणपथगोचरं भूत्वा, दिष्ट्येदानीं दृष्टिपथमवतीर्णं विद्वज्जनानुभाव्यं भवतीति महदिदं पण्डितमण्डलीभागधेयम्। एतत्प्रबन्धप्रणेतारो नारायणार्याः कदा कतमं देशमलमकुर्वन्निति अदसीयैः अन्यदीयैर्वा वचनैर्नेदन्तया निर्णेतुं शक्यते; अथापि श्रीभाष्यकारसिद्धान्तस्यैव तत्र तत्र श्रीभाष्यवाक्यान्युदाहृत्य व्यवस्थापनात्, श्रीमद्वेदान्तदेशिकगुरुवर्यैः स्वप्रबन्धेष्वेतन्नीतिमालावाक्यानां भूयिष्ठमुदाहरणाच्चेमे आचार्याः श्रीभाष्यकाराणामर्वाचीनाः श्रीमन्निगमान्तमहागुरूणां प्राचीनाश्चेति सामान्यतो निर्णये मन्यामहे न विमर्शका विप्रतिपद्येरन्निति। तथा हि—श्रीमन्न्यायसिद्धाञ्जने जडद्रव्यपरिच्छेदे[1] 'यत्तु नीतिमालायां नारायणार्यैरुक्तं "ज्ञानस्य तु परोक्त्वाभावमात्रमेव न तु प्रत्यक्त्वम्" इति।' तथा तत्रैव परिच्छेदे[2] 'नारायणार्यैस्तु सम्भूतिविनाशशब्दौ फलद्वारा लक्षणया विद्याकर्मविषयावुक्तौ "विदुषो विद्यासाध्यस्यापवर्गस्य सम्यगभिवृद्धिरूपत्वात्" इत्यादिना' इति। एवमीश्वरपरिच्छेदे[3] 'अयमेवार्थः नारायणार्यैरप्युक्तः "गुणैरियत्ताराहित्याद्वस्तुना अपरिच्छिन्नत्वञ्चावगम्यते" इति' इति।

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1 न्याय सिद्धा Śrī Vaishnava Siddhānta Grantha Ratnamālā Edition, Madras पुट 16.

2 न्याय सिद्धा (Madras edition) पुट 162, 163.

3. न्याय सिद्धा (Madras edition) पुट 212.

तत्रैवाद्रव्यपरिच्छेदे[4] ‘यत्तु नारायणार्यैरुक्तं “संस्थानमेव जातिः तत्प्रतिपिण्डं भिन्नत्वेऽपि द्वितीयादिपिण्डेषु सौसादृश्यात्प्रतिसन्धीयमानं स्वाश्रयेषु वस्तुषु एकबुद्धिशब्दनिबन्धनं भवति। . इति’ एवं ‘देवप्रीत्यादिकं वा’ इति[5] तत्त्वमुक्ताकलापश्लोकस्य व्याख्यानावसरे ‘आप्तस्य हितकामस्य नियोगं केचिदूचिरे’ इति नारायणार्याणामुक्तिः सर्वार्थसिद्धौ प्रस्तूयते। तथा तत्रैव ‘आप्तस्याहुर्नियोग हितमभिलषितं केऽपि भाष्याशयस्थम्’ इत्यत्र सर्वार्थसिद्धौ[6] ‘स्वपक्षनिष्ठानामेव केषाञ्चिदीश्वरनियोगरूपविधिपक्षं विविच्य दर्शयति’ इत्यवतरणदर्शनात् श्लोके केचित्पदेन नारायणार्या अभिप्रेता इति स्पष्टमवगम्यते। एवं न्याय परिशुद्धावपि[7] ‘नारायणार्यैस्त्वेवमुक्तम्’ इत्यारभ्य ‘आप्तस्य हितकामस्य नियोगं केचिदूचिरे। भाष्यकारोऽपि भगवानेतदेवान्वमन्यत’ इति नीतिमालावचनमनूद्यते। तथा ‘विध्युक्त्याधीत्य वेदान्’ इति सारावलीश्लोकस्य[8] व्याख्याने चिन्तामणौ कुमारवरददेशिकः वचनमिदमुदाहरति।

एवं मीमांसापादुकायां[9] ‘सूत्रोक्तं नूनमन्यत्’ इति श्लोके नारायणार्यास्सबहुमानं निर्दिश्यन्ते वेदान्तगुरुभिः। अतो निश्चप्रचमिदं वक्तुं शक्यते श्रीभाष्यकारसिद्धान्तनिष्ठा

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4 न्याय सिद्धा (Madras edition) पुट 375

5 देवप्रीत्यादिक वा विदितमिह विधिप्रत्ययस्यास्तु वाच्य
नात्रान्योन्याश्रयो न श्रुतपरिहरण नापि क्लृप्तिर्गरिष्ठा ।
प्राधान्य स्याच्च किञ्चिन्नृपभजननयात्सिद्धमेतच्च शास्त्रे-
ष्वित्थ त्वर्थाविरोधेऽप्यतिगरिमभयान्नेष्यते शब्दशक्तिः ॥
Tatva-Muktā-Kalāpa पुट 680, Prof Ramamiśra Śāstri, edition, Benares

6 Tatva-Muktā-Kalāpa पुट 684

7. न्याय परि (Memorial edition, Madras) पुट 283.

8 अधिकरणसारावली श्लो. २०.

9 सूत्रोक्त नूनमन्यद्विदुरथ च मिथो व्याहतं वृत्तिकारा.
प्राज्ञैर्नारायणार्यैस्तदिह विदधिरे सम्मतास्सूत्रभेदाः ।
सामाचार्योक्तिरेषा समरमुखगता तत्र सत्सङ्गृहीतेः
नत्वा नुत्वैनमाह द्रमिडगुरुरपि ब्रह्मविद्वाक्यभाष्यम् ॥ मी. पा. श्लो. ११.

नारायणार्याः श्रीमन्निगमान्तगुरूणां प्राचीनाश्चेति । क्वचिदेतेषां नारायणार्याणां सिद्धान्तमननुमन्यमाना अपि निगमान्तगुरवः तत्र तत्र सबहुमानमेतानाचार्यान्निर्दिशन्तः स्वीयमादरातिशयमाविष्कुर्वन्ति ।

एते च नारायणार्याः जैमिनीयानि मीमांसासूत्राणि पौनरुक्त्यादिदोषदूषितानि मन्वानाः सङ्गृह्य सूत्राण्यन्यानि प्राचीकशन्निति पादुकापरित्राणे कुमारवरददेशिकाः प्रतिपादयन्ति। तथा हि—'सूत्रोक्तं नूनमन्यत्' इति पादुकाश्लोके इमानि परित्राणवाक्यानि[10] 'अत एव प्राज्ञा नारायणार्याः परिमितगभीराणि परस्परविरोधादिरहितानि सूत्राणि प्रणीय, अधिकरणानां पञ्चशतीमेव मीमांसाशास्त्रमाचक्षते। अन्यानि पुनरधिकरणानि पौनरुक्त्यादिदोषदूषितान्यकथयन् .... . यत्तु प्राज्ञैर्नारायणार्यैस्सङ्गृह्य कथन न तज्जैमिनीयवचनदूषणायते। जैमिनिर्हि मन्दामन्दसकलशिष्यसंवित्तिसौकर्यार्थं मन्दप्रयोजनान्यधिकरणानि पृथगनुकथयाञ्चकार। नारायणार्यास्तु प्रौढविद्वज्जनपरिग्रहाभिसन्धिना प्रधानार्थप्रकाशनेन तुल्यन्यायतया सर्वमप्यर्थजातं परिमितेन ग्रन्थसन्दर्भेण प्राचीकशन्निति द्वयोरप्यैकरस्यसिद्धिरिति न विरोधगन्धः' इति। अतश्चेदमवगम्यते यदेते नारायणार्या न केवलमुत्तरमीमांसायां पूर्वमीमांसायामप्यनितरसाधारणेन पाण्डित्यविमर्शयोः प्रकर्षेण व्यराजन्त इति। परन्तु एतेषां मीमांसासङ्ग्रहः प्रौढविद्वज्जनहृदयङ्गमः नाद्य यावदस्माकं चक्षुर्विषयमवतरति। हन्त! श्रीभगवद्रामानुजसिद्धान्तस्य अथवा सर्वस्य सिद्धान्तस्य इदमेकं शोचनीय वैशसं यद्बहूनां प्राचामाचार्यवर्याणां प्रबन्धाः भाग्यवैषम्यादस्माकं श्रोतुमपि दुर्लभतां गमिता इति।

नारायणार्यनामकः कश्चिद्गीताभाष्यकर्ता श्रीमन्निगमान्तगुरुभिः तात्पर्यचन्द्रिकायां न्यायपरिशुद्धौ चोदाह्रियते। यथा तात्पर्यचन्द्रिकायां[11] 'अनियतधर्मपरित्यागोऽत्र विवक्षित इति नारायणार्यव्याख्यायामपि नानुष्ठानविरोधः' इति। यथा वा न्यायपरिशुद्धौ[12]

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10 मी पा. (edited by Navanītam Krishnamachariar), grantha script पुट 16

11. गी. भा. Ananda Press, पुट 947

12 न्याय परि. (Memorial edition) पुट 101.

‘उक्तञ्च नारायणार्यैः भगवद्गीताभाष्ये ‘प्रसिद्धमपि विज्ञानं वादे यो नाम निह्नुते। स सद्स्यैर्नियन्तव्यो व्यवस्था नान्यथा यतः’ इति। नीतिमालाकर्तारस्तु नारायणार्याः नूनमेतस्मादन्य एव भवितुमर्हन्ति ; यत एते सर्वार्थसिद्धौ निगमान्तगुरुभिः स्वपक्षनिष्ठत्वेन व्यपदिश्यन्ते[13]। गीताभाष्यप्रणेतारस्तु नारायणार्याः सिद्धान्ततीर्थकरेभ्यः पृथक्कृत्य पिशाच-रन्तिदेवशङ्करयादवादिमध्ये गीताभाष्यतात्पर्यचन्द्रिकायां[14] तैरेव निगमान्तगुरुभिः परि-गण्यन्ते। यथा ‘पिशाचरन्तिदेवगुप्तशङ्करयादवप्रकाशभास्करनारायणार्ययज्ञस्वामिप्रभृतिभिः स्वं स्वं मतमास्थितैः परश्शतैः भाष्यकृद्भिः असत्सिद्धान्ततीर्थकरैश्च भगवद्यामुनाचार्यभाष्य-कारादिभिरविगीतपरिगृहीतोऽयमत्र सारार्थः’ इति।

श्रीपाञ्चरात्ररक्षायां नित्यानुष्ठानस्थापनाधिकारे ‘भाष्यकाराव्यवहितशिष्यैः वङ्कि-वंशेश्वरैः श्रीरङ्गनारायणाचार्यैः’ इत्यारभ्य काश्चन कारिका उदाहृताः[15]। एतेऽपि श्रीरङ्ग-नारायणाचार्याः नीतिमालाप्रणेतृभ्यो नारायणार्येभ्यो व्यतिरिच्यन्त एव ; यत एते ‘वङ्कि-वंशेश्वराः श्रीरङ्गनारायणाचार्याः’ इति सोपपदं निर्दिश्यन्ते। नीतिमालाकर्तारस्तु निरुपपदं नारायणार्या इत्येव तत्र तत्र व्यपदिश्यन्ते। अत एव नीतिमालाकर्तुः नारायणार्याद्व्यावर्तयितुं ‘श्रीभाष्यकाराव्यवहितशिष्यैः वङ्किवंशेश्वरैः श्रीरङ्गनारायणाचार्यैः’ इति निर्दिशन्ति निगमान्तगुरवः। வங்கிபுரத்து நம்பி इति भाषायां प्रसिद्धाः श्रीरङ्गनारायणाचार्याः पाञ्चरात्ररक्षायामसकृदुदाहृतानां नारायणमुनीनां गुरव इति सुस्पष्टमवगम्यते ; यतस्तत्रैव नित्यव्याख्यानाधिकारे नारायणमुनीन्प्रकृत्य ‘तद्गुरुभिः वङ्किवंशेश्वरैः’ इति प्रतिपादितमस्ति।

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13 cf स्वपक्षनिष्ठानामेव केषाञ्चित् ईश्वरनियोगरूपविधिपक्ष विविच्य दर्शयति। सर्वार्थसिद्धिः पुट ६८४. Page 684

ईश्वरनियोग एव विधिरिति पक्षः नारायणार्याणामेवेति तैरेवान्यत्र सर्वार्थसिद्धौ न्यायपरिशुद्धौ च प्रतिपाद्यते। Cf. भूमिका पुट २.

14 गी. भा. पुट 952

15. श्रीपाञ्च-रक्षा (edited by Raghavachariar, Madras, Grantha Script) पुट ३०.

॥ वादार्थसंग्रहः ॥



अथेदानीं एतद्ग्रन्थस्थानां दशानां वादानामर्थास्सङ्गृह्यन्ते । ते चैवमुद्देशतो निरूपिता ग्रन्थकर्तृभिरेव निबन्धोपक्रमे—

१. "पौर्वापर्यस्य नियमः कर्मब्रह्मविचारयोः ।
तथा वेदान्तवाक्यानामप्रामाण्यनिराक्रिया ॥

२. विवर्त्तपक्षक्षपणं परिणामनिराकृतिः ।
शक्तिविक्षेपभङ्गश्च ब्रह्मणो निर्णयस्तथा ॥

३. निर्णयः पुरुषस्यापि विधिरूपविनिर्णयः ।
दशार्थानधिकृत्येय नीतिमाला प्रवर्तते" ॥ इति ।

(१) तत्र प्रथमे ब्रह्मविचारस्य कर्मविचारानन्तर्यनिर्णयाधिकारे 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा' इति सूत्रसिद्धः कर्मब्रह्मविचारयोः पौर्वापर्यनियमस्समर्थ्यते । अद्वैतिनोऽत्र पूर्वपक्षिणः । ते ह्येवमाहुः—अनधीतवेदस्य विचारानुपपत्तेः यथा कर्मविचारः कर्मभागाध्ययनपूर्वकः, एवं ब्रह्मविचारोऽपि ब्रह्मभागाध्ययनपूर्वक एव ; न तत्र कर्मविचारापेक्षा ; बुभुक्षुर्मुमुक्षुश्चेति कर्म-ब्रह्मभागयोरधिकारिभेदात् । अध्ययनविधिर्यद्यर्थज्ञानपर्यन्तस्स्यात्, तदा विधिबलादध्य-यनक्रमेण प्रथमं कर्मविचारः पश्चाद्ब्रह्मविचार इत्यापद्येत। स ह्यक्षरग्रहणमात्रपर्यवसायी। अर्थविचारस्तु रागप्राप्तः, न स वैधः । व्यापकत्वादव्यवहितत्वाच्चाक्षरग्रहणमेव फलम-ध्ययनस्य । अत एव गृहीतस्वाध्यायमश्रुतमीमांसमपि श्रोत्रिय इति व्यपदिशन्ति । अपि च 'तरति शोकमात्मवित्' इत्यादिभिः अद्वितीयात्मविज्ञानमपवर्गसाधनं श्रुतम् । तदेतद्विज्ञानं प्रति च 'शान्तो दान्त' इति श्रुत्या शमादीनां साधनत्वं प्रतिपाद्यते । अतश्च शमदमाद्यानन्तर्यमेव युक्तं ब्रह्मविचारस्य ; न तु कर्मविचारानन्तर्यमिति

अत्र सिद्धान्तः—'यज्ञेन दानेन तपसानाशकेन' इति श्रुत्या यज्ञादीनां विद्योत्पत्ति-साधनत्वं प्रतिपाद्यते। 'तत्र विविदिषन्ति' इति व्यपदेशः 'अश्वेन जिगमिषति' इतिवत् धात्वर्थप्रधानः प्रतिपत्तव्यः; विविदिषायाः साध्यत्वासम्भवात्। पुरुषार्थः तत्साधनं वा साध्यं भवितुमर्हति। न तावद्विविदिषा पुरुषार्थः, नापि तत्साधनम्; विद्याया एव तत्साधनत्वस्य 'ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति' इति श्रुतिप्रतिपन्नत्वात्। तच्च वेदनमुपासनात्मकं वाक्यजन्यज्ञानादतिरिक्तं विधेयभूतम्। इत्थञ्च विद्यायाः यज्ञादिसाध्यत्वात् अनिर्णीते साधने साध्यनिर्णयायोगात् यज्ञादिस्वरूपनिर्णयाय कर्मविचारः प्रथममपेक्षितः। एवं नित्यनैमित्तिककर्मणां अकरणे प्रत्यवायश्रवणात् अनर्थं परिहृत्यैवाभ्युदये यतितव्यमिति न्यायादपि स एवादौ कर्तव्यः। अत एव सद्विद्यादहरविद्यादीनां भेदाभेदनिर्णयः कर्मभेदाभेदनिर्णयहेतुभिः न्यायैः शारीरके क्रियमाण उपपद्यते; अनधिगतकर्मणस्तदसम्भवात्। अद्वितीयात्मविज्ञानमपवर्ग-साधनं इत्यत्राप्यद्वितीयत्वं नाम अनेकगुणविभूतिविशिष्टस्य एकत्वमेव; न तु निर्विशेषत्वम्; तस्य सर्वप्रमाणविरुद्धत्वात्। गुणविभूत्यादिविशिष्टब्रह्मवेदनस्यैवापवर्गसाधनत्वं 'पृथगात्मानं प्रेरितारं च मत्वा जुष्टस्ततस्तेनामृतत्वमेति' इत्यादिभिः प्रतिपाद्यते। एवंभूतवेदनं प्रति 'यज्ञेन दानेन' इत्यादि श्रुत्या यज्ञादेरेव साधनत्वमुच्यते। 'शान्तो दान्त' इत्यादि शमादीनामनुग्राहकत्वाभिप्रायम्। न च विरोधः; व्यापारोपरमरूपाश्शमादयोऽविहिता प्रतिषिद्ध निषिद्धकाम्यकर्मविषयाः; व्यापाराश्च विद्यासाधनभूतकर्मविषया इति व्यवस्थाङ्गीकारात्। तदेवं ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य कर्मसापेक्षत्वात् कर्मविचारानन्तरमेव ब्रह्मविचारः कर्तव्य इति।

इति ब्रह्मविचारस्य कर्मविचारानन्तर्यनिर्णयाधिकारः प्रथमः॥



(२) अथ द्वितीये वेदान्तप्रामाण्यनिर्णयाधिकारे वेदान्तवाक्यानां ब्रह्मणि प्रामाण्यं समर्थ्यते।

अत्र पूर्वपक्षिणः प्राभाकराः तार्किकाश्च। तत्र पूर्वेषामयमाशयः—सिद्धार्थे ब्रह्मणि न वेदान्तवाक्यानां प्रामाण्यम्। तथाहि—शब्दार्थयोस्सम्बन्धमजानतः पुंसश्शब्दो नार्थ-प्रत्यायकः। सम्बन्धश्च वृद्धव्यवहारत एव ग्राह्यः। स व्यवहारः प्रयोजकवृद्धस्य गामानयेत्यादिः, प्रयोज्यवृद्धस्य च गवानयनादिः। प्रयोजकवृद्धवाक्यश्रवणानन्तरं प्रयोज्यवृद्धस्य

कार्यं दृष्ट्वा व्युत्पित्सुः पार्श्वस्थः एवमनुमिनोति—इदं वाक्यं अस्य कार्यबुद्ध्युत्पादकम् , स्वश्रवणसमनन्तरकालिकैतत्प्रवृत्तिप्रयोजकत्वात् । यद्वाक्यं स्वश्रवणसमनन्तरकालिकयत्प्रवृत्तिप्रयोजकम् , तत्तस्य कार्यबुद्ध्युत्पादकम्, यथा मदीयकार्यावगतिसमनन्तरप्रवृत्तिप्रयोजकं वाक्यम् इति । एवं सामान्यतोऽनुमाय पुनर्गवानयनादिदर्शनात् कार्यविशेषं निश्चिनोति । एवं वाक्यार्थे निश्चिते, पुनः 'गां बधान' इत्यादिप्रयोगे पदानामावापोद्वापाभ्यां तत्तत्पदार्थमवगच्छति। 'पुत्रस्ते जातः' इत्यादिसिद्धवस्तुपरवाक्यस्थले च मुखविकासादिलिङ्गेनापि पुत्रजन्माद्यर्थविशेषनिर्णयो न सम्भवति ; सुखप्रसवादीनां हर्षहेतूनां बहूनां सम्भवात् इति ।

अत्र समाधिः—'पुत्रस्ते जातः' इत्यादिसिद्धार्थपरवाक्येष्वपि सम्बन्धग्रहणं दृश्यते । तत्र तद्वाक्यश्रवणानन्तरं पुत्रजन्मसाक्षात्कारेण वा, पुत्रजन्मासाधारणोत्सवलिङ्गेन वा पुत्रजन्मविशेषनिश्चयस्सम्भवति । अतो न विशेषाप्रतिपत्तिः ।

गामानयेत्यादिकार्यपरवाक्यस्थलेऽपि प्रयोज्यवृद्धस्यानुषङ्गिकानेकव्यापारसम्भवात् तत्रापि कार्यविशेषावधारणं दुश्शकमेव । हेत्वन्तरेण तदवधारणञ्च तुल्यमुभयत्र ।

वस्तुतस्तु व्युत्पित्सुः स्वस्य कार्यावगतेः पदार्थज्ञानपूर्वकत्वदर्शनात् प्रयोज्यवृद्धकार्यावगतिरपि पदार्थज्ञानपूर्विकेत्येवानुमिनुयात् । तच्च ज्ञानं प्रयोजकवाक्यादिति वृद्धव्यवहारेऽपि सिद्धार्थे शब्दस्याभिधानमस्ति । एवं पित्रादिभिश्शशिपक्ष्यादीनङ्गुल्या निर्दिश्य तत्तच्छब्दै स्तेषु तेष्वर्थेषु प्रयुज्यमानै र्बाला व्युत्पाद्यन्ते। क्रमेण च व्युत्पन्नास्ते तत्तच्छब्दश्रवण समनन्तरम् तत्तदर्थेषु स्वात्मनां बुद्ध्युत्पत्तिं पश्यन्तश्शब्दार्थयोस्सम्बन्धान्तरादर्शनाद्बोध्यबोधकभाव एव सम्बन्ध इति निश्चिन्वन्ति । अतस्सिद्धार्थेऽपि शब्दस्य प्रामाण्यं सम्भवतीति प्रतिपद्यन्त एव प्रामाण्यं ब्रह्मणि वेदान्तवाक्यानीति ।

तार्किकास्तु—सिद्धार्थे शब्दस्य प्रामाण्येऽपि जगत्कर्तुरनुमानसिद्धत्वान्न वेदान्तप्रमाणकं ब्रह्म ; शास्त्रस्य प्रमाणान्तराप्राप्तार्थविषयत्वात् । प्रकृते तु भूभूधरादिकं कार्यम् , सावयवत्वात् , घटादिवत् ; भूभूधरादिकं स्वोपादानोपकरणसम्प्रदानप्रयोजनाभिज्ञकर्तृकम् , कार्यत्वात् , घटादिवत् , इत्येवमनुमानं सम्भवति । अनेन कर्तृकल्पनायां अनेककर्तृ-

कल्पनापेक्षया एककर्तृकल्पनं न्याय्यमिति जीवासंभावितज्ञानादिः जगन्निर्माता ईश्वरस्सिद्ध्यतीति ।

सिद्धान्तस्तु—उक्तानुमानात् जगतः कर्तृमात्रसिद्धावपि, अकर्मवश्यत्वसर्वज्ञत्वादिविशिष्टैककर्तृकत्वं शास्त्रादेवावगन्तव्यम् । विचित्रसन्निवेशस्य रथगोपुरप्रासादादेः बहुकर्तृकत्वस्यैव दर्शनादत्रापि विचित्ररचनस्य जगतो बहुकर्तृकत्वमेवानुमानतः प्रसज्येत । अपि च लोके कर्तुः कर्मवश्यत्वादिदर्शनात् आनुमानिकेश्वरस्यापि व्याप्तिबलेन तदवर्जनीयम् । अकर्मवश्यत्वे शरीरेन्द्रियाद्युपकरणायोगः । तेषां नित्यत्वे 'सावयवत्वात् कार्यम्' इत्यनुमानस्य तेषु व्यभिचारः । अतश्शास्त्रैकप्रमाणकं ब्रह्मेति ।

॥ इति वेदान्तप्रामाण्यनिर्णयाधिकारो द्वितीयः ॥

(३) अथ तृतीये विवर्तपक्षप्रतिक्षेपाधिकारे निर्विशेषब्रह्मवादिनः अद्वैतिनः प्रतिक्षिप्यन्ते । ते ह्येवं मन्यन्ते—'यतो वा इमानि' इत्यादिश्रुत्या जगत्कारणं ब्रह्मेति प्रतिपादितम् । तच्च 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' इत्यादिश्रुतिभिः सच्चिदद्वितीयानन्दस्वरूपं प्रतिपन्नम् । तस्य चानाद्यज्ञानतिरोहितस्वरूपतया अहं सुखी, अहं दुःखी, देवोऽयं, मनुष्योऽयं, घटोऽयं, पटोऽयं, इत्याद्यान्तरबाह्यविविधाध्यासोपादानतया जगत्कारणत्वमुपपद्यत इति ।

अत्र सिद्धान्तः—सच्चित्सुखाद्वितीयस्वरूपं ब्रह्मेति वदद्भिः सदादिशब्दप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तानि सत्तादीनि दुर्निरूपाणि । तथाहि—सत्ता न जातिः ; आश्रयस्य सतः एकत्वात् । न च प्रमासम्बन्धयोग्यत्वम् ; ब्रह्मणः प्रमेयत्वानङ्गीकारात् । नाप्यसद्व्यावृत्तिः; सदसद्विलक्षणस्य प्रपञ्चस्याप्यसद्व्यावृत्तिमत्वेन सत्त्वप्रसङ्गात् । यदि सच्छब्दार्थ एव सत्ता, तर्हि सत्तायाः धर्मत्वेन ब्रह्मणोऽपि सच्छब्दार्थस्य सत्तारूपत्वेन कञ्चन धर्मिणं प्रति धर्मत्वप्रसङ्गात् ।

एवं चित्त्वमपि दुर्निरूपम् । तच्च यदि चैतन्यम्, तदा ब्रह्मणः चैतन्यगुणकत्वप्रसङ्गः। यदि चिच्छब्दस्यैव चैतन्यमर्थः, तदा प्रमाणज्ञानानामपि चैतन्यरूपाणां ब्रह्मत्वं प्रसज्यते । स्वाधीनस्वप्रकाशत्वं चित्त्वमित्यपि दुर्वचम्, स्वव्यतिरिक्तप्रकाशस्यैवानभ्युपगमात् ।

एवं सुखरूपत्वमपि दुर्वचम् ; 'सुखं मे स्यात्' इत्यादिभिः सुखादीनां आत्मगुणत्वं ह्यनुभूयते। पदार्थविदोऽपि सुखादीनामात्मगुणत्वमाचक्षते । न च ब्रह्मणो गुणत्वमिति न तस्य सुखरूपत्वम् । अनुकूलत्वं सुखत्वमिति चेत्, ब्रह्म कस्यानुकूलम् ?—जीवानाम् ? उत स्वस्यैव ? नाद्यः; ब्रह्मभिन्नजीवानभ्युपगमात् । नान्त्यः, तत्रानुकूलत्वं भोग्यत्वं चेत् , स्वस्य भोक्तृत्वाभावेन स्वभोग्यत्वस्याप्यसम्भवः। दुःखनिवृत्तिश्चेत् , ब्रह्मणः निवृत्तिरूपत्वेनाभावात्मकत्वप्रसङ्गः । तस्मान्न सुखरूपत्वं ब्रह्मणः ॥

अद्वितीयत्वञ्च न सदृशद्वितीयरहितत्वम् ; ब्रह्मद्वित्वाभावेन सदृशद्वितीयस्यैवाप्रसिद्धेः। 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्' इत्यादिश्रुतिभिः अद्वितीयं प्रतिपादितं इत्यपि न युज्यते तत्र 'अग्रे' इति कालविशेषस्य, 'आसीत्' इति क्रियाविशेषस्य 'इदं सत्' इति जगतस्सदात्मकत्वस्य, 'एकमेव' इति नामरूपविभागाभाववचनेन ब्रह्मण उपादानताया, 'अद्वितीयम्' इत्यधिष्ठानान्तरनिवारणेन निमित्तत्वस्य, अत एव अनन्तशक्तियोगस्य च प्रतिपादनात् । 'नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन' इत्यत्रापि अब्रह्मात्मकनानावस्तुनिषेध एव । अतो न निर्विशेषब्रह्मसिद्धिः ।

एवं अनाद्यविद्यातिरोहितं ब्रह्मेत्यपि तिरोधानासम्भवादनुपपन्नम् । तत्र अज्ञानं ज्ञानाभावः, अन्यथाज्ञानं वा ? उभयथापि वस्तुस्वरूपतिरोधायकत्वासम्भव. । अपि चाज्ञानेन ब्रह्मस्वरूपतिरोधानं दुर्निरूपम् ; आच्छाद्यविषयकज्ञानोत्पत्तिनिरोधो ह्याच्छादनशब्दार्थः । अत्र त्वाच्छाद्यस्य ब्रह्मणः ज्ञानविषयत्वानङ्गीकारात्तदुत्पत्तिनिरोधरूपमाच्छादनं न सम्भवति ।

एवं ज्ञानरूपं ब्रह्म अनाद्यविद्याशबलितं सत् जगदुपादानकारणमित्यप्यनुपपन्नम्। तत्र किं ब्रह्म जगदुपादानम् ? उताविद्या ? यद्वा तदुभयम् ? । नाद्यः, कारणानुरूपत्वात् कार्यस्य ब्रह्मवज्जगतस्सत्यत्वप्रसङ्गात् । न द्वितीयः; ब्रह्मणः उपादानत्वपरश्रुतिविरोधात् । नापि तृतीयः; जगतः जडाजडात्मकत्वसत्यासत्यात्मकत्वादिविरूद्धस्वभावत्वप्रसङ्गात् ।

अविद्यारूपदोषवशात् ज्ञानरूपे ब्रह्मणि जगदध्यस्तम् , अध्यासाधिष्ठानत्वमेवोपादानत्वमित्यप्ययुक्तम् ; ब्रह्मणो भ्रमाधिष्ठानत्वानुपपत्तेः । शुक्तिकादौ अधिष्ठाने

केनचिद् भास्वरत्वाकारेण प्रतिपन्ने शुक्तित्वाद्याकारेण तिरोहिते हि रजतादिभ्रमो दृष्टः । ब्रह्मणश्च निर्विशेषतया प्रतिपन्नाप्रतिपन्नाकारभेदाभावात् न तस्मिन् जगदध्यासस्सम्भवति । तस्मात् जगद्रूपेण विवर्त्तमानं जगदुपादानमिति च नोपपत्तिमत् ॥

॥ इति विवर्त्तपक्षप्रतिक्षेपाधिकारस्तृतीयः ॥

(४) चतुर्थे परिणामपक्षप्रतिक्षेपाधिकारे ब्रह्मपरिणामरूपं जगदिति यादवभास्करपक्षः प्रतिक्षिप्यते ।

अत्र पूर्वपक्षः—' सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत् ' इत्यादिश्रुतिभिः प्रलयावस्थायां प्रलीननिखिलभेदं ब्रह्मावगतम् । तदेव सर्वशक्ततया सर्गसमये विचित्रचिदचिन्मिश्रप्रपञ्चरूपेण परिणतमिति 'तदैक्षत बहु स्याम् ' इत्यादिभिः प्रतिपाद्यते। तस्मान्निरस्तसमस्तविषयस्य ब्रह्मणः परिणामभूतं जगदिति ।

अत्र सिद्धान्तः—ब्रह्मण एव जगदाकारेण परिणामे जगद्गतस्थूलत्वह्रस्वत्वादिकं ब्रह्मणि प्रसज्येत । तथा च ' अस्थूलमनण्वह्रस्वम् ' इत्यादि श्रुतयो विरुद्ध्यन्ते । नहि चिद्रूप एवेश्वरोऽचिद्रूपेण परिणमत इति संभवति । न च ब्रह्मोपादनत्वश्रुतेरेव जगत श्चैतन्यशक्तियोगोऽस्तीति वाच्यम्; चैतन्यस्य जगति नित्यानुपलब्धत्वात् तच्छत्त्यभावस्यैव तत्र निर्णयात् । प्रलयावस्थायां प्रलीननिखिलभेदं ब्रह्मेत्यप्यनुपपन्नम्; ' नित्यो नित्यानां चेतनश्चेतनानाम् ' ' अजामेकाम् ' इत्यादिश्रुत्या जीवानां प्रकृतेश्च नित्यत्वश्रवणात् । अतः प्रकृतिपुरुषयोरुपसंहारदशायां विनाश इति न सुवचम् ।

किञ्च जीवानामनित्यत्वे कृतहानमकृताभ्यागमश्चेति दोषद्वयं प्रसज्यते। पूर्वकल्पावसाने नष्टैर्जीवैः प्रागनुष्ठितानामभुक्तफलानां कर्मणां निष्फलत्वात्कृतनाशः । उत्तरकल्पादावुत्पद्यमानानां तेषां जीवानामसत्स्वपि पूर्वकर्मसु तत्तत्कर्मफलभूतदेहेन्द्रियादिपरिग्रहादकृताभ्यागम इति । किञ्च तेषामनित्यत्वे आत्मनाश एव निश्श्रेयसमिति वक्तव्यम् । तथा च प्रलयदशायां तादृशनिश्श्रेयससिद्धेरवर्जनीयत्वेन निश्श्रेयससाधनभूतोपासनविधीनामानर्थक्यं प्रसज्यते ।

अपि च यद्युपासकाः स्वनाश एव मोक्ष इत्यध्यवस्येयुः, तदा स्वनाशस्यापुरुषार्थत्वेन मोक्षकथाप्रस्तावगन्धादपसर्पेयुः । 'रसं ह्येवायं लब्ध्वानन्दी भवति' इति मुक्तस्यानन्द प्राप्तिश्च श्रूयते । तस्मात्परिणामवादोऽपि न समञ्जस इति ।

इति परिणामप्रतिक्षेपाधिकारश्चतुर्थः ।



(५) अथ पञ्चमेऽधिकारे यादवप्रकाशाभिमतः शक्तिविक्षेपपक्षः प्रतिक्षिप्यते ।

तत्रायं पूर्वपक्षः—सन् घटः, सन् पट इति सर्वेषु पदार्थेषु सदिति बुद्धेरनुवर्तमानत्वात् सत् द्रव्यम् ; घटादयस्तु तदवस्थाविशेषाः । तच्च सद्द्रव्यं ब्रह्म । स्वव्यवहारे स्वसत्तातिरेकेणान्यानपेक्षत्वात्स्वयम्प्रकाशं तत् । भोक्तृभोग्यनियन्तारश्च ब्रह्मणोंऽशाः ते च नित्याः । तत्र भोक्तृसमष्टिपुरुष एकः । तस्य व्यूहाः प्रतिशरीरं भिन्ना जीवाः । अणवोऽनन्ता नित्याश्च ते । बद्धमुक्तनित्यभेदेन ते त्रिविधाः । सततपरिणामि प्रकृतिद्रव्यं भोग्यमित्युच्यते । तस्मिन्ब्रह्मगुणास्तिरोहिताः । अत एवाचेतनमेतत् । सैषा प्रकृतिः कालपरमाकाशाव्यक्तभेदात् त्रिधा । तत्र कालो मुहूर्तादिविभागयुक्तः अजस्रक्षणपरिणामी च । परमाकाशो नाम प्रकृतेराद्यावस्था । प्रलयकाले तमश्शब्दवाच्या तप्तलोहसमावर्जितजलवत्परेणात्मना संसृज्यमाना पृथग्व्यवहारायोग्या तिष्ठति । तादृश्यवस्था शक्त्यवस्थेत्युच्यते । एतामवस्थामधिकृत्य 'सदेव' इत्यादिश्रुतयः । सेयं तमोवस्थापन्ना प्रकृतिः परमात्मनो विभागरूपं विकारं प्रतिपद्यते । स विभागः शक्तिविक्षेप इत्युच्यते । स परमाकाशो मुक्तानामीश्वरस्य च स्थानम् ।

अव्यक्तं नाम मिलितानि सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि । तत्सर्गकाले महदादित्रयोविंशतिविभागभाग्भवति । नियन्ता नाम ईश्वरः ब्रह्मांशः निरतिशयज्ञानानन्दादिगुणकस्सर्वशक्तश्च । स ईश्वरो मुक्ताश्च प्रळयकाले संसारिजीववत् सुप्तकल्पा अवतिष्ठन्ते । इत्थं सर्वं जगद्ब्रह्मद्रव्यत्वात्तदभिन्नम् ; अवस्थारूपेण भिन्नञ्च । अत एव भेदपराणि अभेदपराणि च समञ्जसानि वेदान्तवाक्यानीति ।

अत्र सिद्धान्तः—घटस्सन्, पटस्सन्निति सत्ताया द्रव्यधर्मत्वेनैवोपलभ्यमानत्वात्सतो द्रव्यत्वमित्यनुपपन्नम् । सद्द्रव्यं स्वयम्प्रकाशमित्यपि न युक्तम् ; घटादीनामपि सद्द्रव्यत्वेन

स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वप्रसङ्गात् । भोक्तृभोग्यनियन्तारश्च न ब्रह्मणोंऽशाः; नियन्तुरेव ब्रह्मत्वेन तत्रांशांशिभावस्य प्रमाणविरुद्धत्वात् । 'यतो वा इमानि' इति श्रुत्या ब्रह्मणो जगत्कारणत्वमुच्यते । किं तत्कारणमित्यपेक्षायां 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्' 'आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्' 'एको ह वै नारायण आसीत्' इत्यादिभिस्सामान्यविशेषन्यायेन नियन्तुः नारायणस्यैव हि ब्रह्मत्वं प्रतिपाद्यते । एवं नियन्तृवत् भोक्ता भोग्यश्च न ब्रह्मांशौ, 'पतिं विश्वस्य' 'प्रधानक्षेत्रज्ञपतिः' इत्यादिभिः भोक्तृभोग्ययोः ब्रह्मणश्च विरुद्धस्वभावत्वप्रतिपादनात् । 'परमाकाशः प्रकृतेराद्यावस्था' इत्यपि 'ऋचो अक्षरे परमे व्योमन्' 'दिव्यं स्थानमजरञ्चाप्रमेयम्' इत्यादिप्रमाणविरुद्धम् । ईश्वरो मुक्ताश्च प्रळयकाले सुप्तकल्पा इत्यपि 'तद्विष्णोः परमं पदं सदा पश्यन्ति सूरयः' 'सर्गेऽपि नोपजायन्ते प्रळये न व्यथन्ति च' इत्यादिप्रमाणप्रतिहतम् । तदेवमनेकदोषदुष्टमिदं मतमसङ्गतमिति ।

इति शक्तिविक्षेपाधिकारः पञ्चमः ।



(६) अथ ब्रह्मस्वरूपनिर्णयाधिकारे षष्ठे ब्रह्मस्वरूपमुपवर्ण्य सर्वशरीरकं तन्निमित्तमुपादानं चेति प्रसाध्यते । तथा तार्किकाभिमतपरमाणुकारणवादः साङ्ख्याभिमतप्रकृतिकारणवादश्चात्र प्रतिक्षिप्यते ।

तत्र ब्रह्मस्वरूपं 'एतदमृतमभयमेतद्ब्रह्म' । 'नित्यं विभुं सर्वगतम्' इत्यादिभिः प्रमाणैस्सर्वानुकूलं देशकालवस्तुपरिच्छेदरहितञ्च प्रतीयते । गुणैरियत्ताराहित्याद्वस्त्वपरिच्छेदः । 'अपहतपाप्मा' इत्यादिभिः निर्मलत्वञ्चावगम्यते ब्रह्मणः। निर्मलत्वञ्च त्रिविधम्—स्वतश्शुद्धत्वम्, हेयवस्तुसंसर्गेऽपि तद्दोषासंस्पृष्टत्वम्, श्रवणस्मरणादिभिरपवित्राणां पवित्रताहेतुत्वञ्चेति । 'विज्ञानं ब्रह्म' 'परं ज्योतिरुपसम्पद्य' इत्यादिभिः स्वयम्प्रकाशं तेजोरूपञ्च तदवगम्यते। ज्ञानबलैश्वर्याद्यसङ्ख्येयमङ्गळगुणकञ्च तत्; 'परास्य शक्तिः' इति प्रमाणात्। 'यस्य पृथिवी शरीरं' 'यस्यात्मा शरीरम्' इत्यादिश्रुत्या सर्वशरीरकञ्च ॥ यस्य यत् आधेयम्, यत् विधेयम्, यत् शेषभूतम्, तत्तस्य शरीरमिति शरीरलक्षणम्। ईश्वरस्याशरीरित्वश्रुतयः कर्मनिमित्तशरीरविरहपराः । एवं सर्वशरीरकत्वाद्ब्रह्मणः तत्तद्वस्तुवाचिनश्शब्दाः तदात्म-

भूतपरमात्मपर्यन्ताः, यथा मनुष्यादिशब्दास्तच्छरीरकजीवपर्यन्ताः । अत एव 'वचसां वाच्यमुत्तमम्' इत्यादि सङ्गच्छते । एवं शरीरभूतचिदचिद्वस्तूनि कदाचिन्नामरूपविभागानर्हसूक्ष्मदशापन्नानि भवन्ति । तदा तद्विशिष्टं ब्रह्म कारणम् । 'तदैक्षत बहु स्याम्' 'तदात्मानं स्वयमकुरुत' इत्यादिभिरीक्षणपूर्वकबहुत्वश्रवणान्निमित्तमुपादानञ्च ब्रह्म भवति ।

अत्र तार्किकाः—चिदचिद्विशिष्टं ब्रह्म नोपादानम् परिणामाश्रयस्यैवोपादानत्वात् । चेतनानां परमात्मनश्चापरिणामित्वेनोपादानत्वायोगात् । नाप्यचिद्वस्तु उपादानम् ; ब्रह्मोपादानत्वश्रुतिविरोधात् , निमित्तोपादानयोर्भेदप्रसङ्गाच्च । अतः परमाणव उपादानम् , ब्रह्म निमित्तमिति ।

तन्न, परमाणुसद्भावे प्रमाणाभावात् । निरवयवानां परमाणूनां संयोगे संयुक्तप्रदेशातिरिक्तप्रदेशाभावात्प्रथिमानुपपत्तिश्चापरिहार्या । सावयवत्वे तु तदवयवानामपि सावयवत्वादनन्तावयवयवत्वप्रसङ्गेन मेरुसर्षपयोस्साम्य प्रसज्येतः; अवयवतारतम्याभावात् । लोके निमित्तोपादानभेदेऽपि ब्रह्मणस्सर्वशक्तत्वादुभयविधकारणत्वमुपपद्यते । तस्मान्न परमाणव उपादानमिति ।

साङ्ख्यास्तु सततपरिणामिनी स्वतन्त्रा प्रकृतिः पुरुषसंयोगात् महदादिविसदृश—परिणामं भजते । प्रलये तु सूक्ष्मसदृशपरिणामवती । अतः प्रकृतिरेवोपादानमित्याहुः ।

तन्न ; पुरुषस्य निष्क्रियत्वेन तेन सयोगाभावात् । तत्सन्निधानमात्रस्य तत्संयोगरूपत्वे तत्सन्निधानस्य नित्यत्वेन सर्वदा सृष्टिप्रसङ्गः । अतस्स्वतन्त्रायाः प्रकृतेरुपादानत्वमयुक्तम् । चिदचिद्विशिष्टब्रह्मण उपादानत्वेऽपि चेतनानां ब्रह्मणश्च न परिणामित्वप्रसक्तिः, अचिद्वस्तुवत् स्वरूपान्यथाभावस्याभावात् । अवस्थान्तरापत्तिरूपकार्यता तु तयोरपि स्वीक्रियते । सर्गावस्थायां ज्ञानविकास एव चेतनानामवस्थान्तरापत्तिः । ब्रह्मणस्तु स्थूलचिदचिद्वस्तुनोरन्तरात्मतया अवस्थानम् । चिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरकस्य ब्रह्मण एकत्वादद्वैतश्रुतयः शरीरभूतचिदचितोश्शरीरिभूतब्रह्मणश्च भेदाद् द्वैतश्रुतयश्च सुसङ्गता भवन्ति ॥

इति ब्रह्मस्वरूपनिर्णयाधिकारः ।

(७) सप्तमे पुरुषस्वरूपनिर्णयाधिकारे चार्वाकाद्यभिमतदेहात्मवादादिकं निरस्य पुरुषस्वरूपं व्यवस्थाप्यते।

तत्र पूर्वपक्षः—देह एवात्मा ; स्थूलोऽहं, कृशोऽहमिति स्थौल्यादिविशिष्टदेहस्याहमर्थसामानाधिकरण्यात्। अहमर्थो ह्यात्मा। अतस्तत्समानाधिकरणतया देहः प्रतीयमान आत्मा भवितुमर्हति। अह जानामीति प्रतीतेर्देहस्य ज्ञानवत्त्वमपि स्वीकार्यमिति।

अथवा इन्द्रियाण्येवात्मा, अहं जानामीति प्रतीतेः। ज्ञानं हि इन्द्रियव्यापारभूतसन्निकर्षफलमिन्द्रियगामीत्येव युक्तम्। यथा तत्तत्पुरुषव्यापारभूतस्नानाध्ययनादिफलं तत्तत्पुरुषगामि।

यद्वा इन्द्रियाणां प्रतिशरीरमनेकत्वान्मनस एकत्वात्तदेवात्मा।

अथवा संविदेवात्मा ; अजडत्वात्। विद्यमानदशायां सर्वदा प्रकाशमानत्वादजडत्वं तस्या इति।

सिद्धान्तस्तु—चार्वाकभिमतदेहात्मवादो नोपपद्यते; अहमिदं जानामीति प्रतीतौ इदमिति शरीरस्य पराक्त्वेन, अहमित्यात्मनः प्रत्यक्त्वेन च भानात्। स्थूलोऽहमिति देहेऽहंप्रत्ययो लाक्षणिको भ्रान्तिमूलको वा स्यात्; ममेदमिति व्यतिरेकप्रत्ययात्। तथा च प्रयोगः—शरीरं अहम्प्रत्ययागोचरः इदमितिगृह्यमाणत्वात्, घटादिवत्। एवं जानामीति प्रत्ययः शरीराविषयकः, अप्रकाशमानतदवयवप्रतिभासत्वात्। उभयसम्प्रतिपन्नशरीरप्रत्ययः व्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तः। अवयविनः प्रतिभासे हि तदवयवप्रतिभासोऽप्यवश्यम्भावी। अतः अहं जानामीत्यत्र शरीररूपावयविनः प्रतिभासेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने करचरणाद्यवयवप्रतिभासोऽपि स्यात्। न हि ते प्रतीयन्ते। अतश्शरीराविषयकः 'अहं जानामि' इति प्रत्यय इति॥

इन्द्रियात्मवादेऽपि प्रत्येकमिन्द्रियाणां आत्मत्वे इन्द्रियान्तरानुभूतस्येन्द्रियान्तरेण प्रतिसन्धानाभावप्रसङ्गः। 'यमहमद्राक्षं तं स्पृशामि' इति इन्द्रियान्तरेण प्रतिसन्धानं तु दृश्यते। सम्भूतानां तेषामात्मत्वे एकैकेन्द्रियापाये तत्तदनुभूतार्थस्मरणं न स्यात्। एकेन्द्रियापगमे आत्मनः प्रायण प्रसङ्गश्च।

एवं मनआत्मवादोऽपि न युक्तः । आत्मा हि कर्ता ; मनस्तु चक्षुरादिवत्करणम् । एवं प्राणोऽपि न चेतनः, वायुत्वात् बाह्यवायुवत् ।

अद्वैतिनां संविदात्मवादोऽपि न युक्तः ; घटमहं वेद्मीति संविदः आत्मधर्मतया प्रतीयमानत्वात् । संविदोऽहमर्थत्वे ' संविदहम् ' इति प्रतीतिश्च स्यात् । अहमर्थो हि प्रत्यक् । न हि संविदः प्रत्यक्त्वम् ।

तस्मात् ' जानात्येवायं पुरुषः' ' न विज्ञातुर्विज्ञातेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यते ' इत्यादिभिः स्वयम्प्रकाशो नित्यज्ञानश्चायमात्मा । ' नित्यो नित्यानां चेतनश्चेतनानाम् ' इति श्रुत्या असङ्ख्यश्च। सुखदुःखव्यवस्थायाः प्रतिशरीरमनुभूयमानत्वात् प्रतिशरीरं स भिन्नः। 'एषोऽणुरात्मा' इति श्रुत्या अणुश्च । परमात्मशरीरत्वेन विशिष्टवस्त्वेकदेशभूतोऽयं परमात्मांशः । कर्ता चायम् ; ' ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत ' इत्यादि स्वर्गापवर्गसाधनानुष्ठानविधायकशास्त्रप्रामाण्यात् ।

इति पुरुषस्वरूपनिर्णयाधिकारः सप्तमः ।



(८) अष्टमे विधिस्वरूपनिर्णयाधिकारे शब्दभावनादेर्विध्यर्थत्वं निरस्य पुरुषनियोगस्य तथात्वं व्यवस्थाप्यते । अत्र पूर्वपक्षी कुमारिलः, प्राभाकरश्च ।

कुमारिलस्यायमाशयः—प्रवर्तको हि विधिर्भवति । स च शब्दभावना । सैव पुरुषप्रवृत्तिहेतुः शब्दव्यापारश्च । यमागन्तुकं धर्मं प्राप्य यः कार्याय प्रभवति स तस्य व्यापार इति मर्यादा । ईदृशव्यापारत्वमभिधापरपर्यायशब्दभावनाया उपपन्नम् । स च व्यापारश्शब्दज्ञानमेवेष्यते ; यतश्शब्दः स्वज्ञानरूपमागन्तुकं धर्मं प्राप्यार्थप्रतीतिं प्रवृत्तिं च जनयतीति ।

तदयुक्तम् ; अभिधासद्भावे प्रमाणाभावात् । न तावल्लिङादिशब्दः प्रमाणम् ; तत्र तस्य व्युत्पत्त्यभावात् । नापि शब्दस्य व्यापारस्सम्भवति । द्विधा हि व्यापारः प्रयत्नः परिस्पन्दश्चेति । अचेतनत्वाच्छब्दस्य न प्रयत्नो व्यापारो भवति । गुणत्वान्न परिस्पन्दोऽपि।

नापि शब्दविषयकज्ञानमेव शब्दस्य व्यापारः; ज्ञानस्यात्मगुणत्वेन शब्दव्यापारत्वायोगात्। तस्मान्न शब्दभावना नाम काचित्सिद्ध्यति।

प्राभाकरस्तु—कार्यबुद्धिरेव प्रवृत्तिहेतुः। तथाहि—यः पुरुषः पुरुषान्तरेण प्रवर्तितः स्वयं कामादिना वा प्रवर्तते, स सर्वोऽपि ममेदं कृतिसाध्यमिति मत्वैव प्रवर्तते। अतः कार्यमेव विध्यर्थः। तच्च लोके क्रियैव। वेदे तु यागादिक्रियायाः क्षणध्वंसिन्याः कालान्तरभाविस्वर्गसाधनत्वासम्भवात्क्रियाव्यतिरिक्तः कश्चिदपूर्वनामा विध्यर्थः। तज्ज्ञानं प्रवृत्तिकारणम्। तदेवं नियोगापरपर्यायस्यापूर्वस्य लिङ्वाच्यत्वाल्लौकिकलिङादयः क्रियायां लाक्षणिकाः इति युक्तम्; अनेकार्थकल्पनायोगादिति।

तदपि न; कार्यस्य दुर्निरूपत्वात्। तथाहि—कृतिसाध्यञ्चेत्कार्यम्, यागादेः कार्यत्वप्रसङ्गः। कृत्युद्देश्यञ्चेत्, स्वर्गादेस्तथात्वं स्यात्। किञ्च कृत्युद्देश्यं सुखं दुःखनिवृत्तिर्वा? अपूर्वस्य एतदन्यतररूपत्वाभावान्न कृत्युद्देश्यत्वमिति।

अतः आप्ताभिप्रायो विध्यर्थः; तज्ज्ञानादेव प्रवृत्तेः। तथाहि—परवचनात् परस्य प्रवृत्तिं पश्यन् बालस्स्वयमन्यान्प्रवर्तयितुं यदा वाक्यं प्रयुङ्क्ते, तदा स्वस्मिन् परप्रवृत्तिहेतुभूतामिच्छां दृष्ट्वा एवमवगच्छति—नूनं सर्वेऽपि पुरुषाः, परोऽस्मिन् प्रवर्ततामिति आज्ञानुज्ञारूपां प्रवर्तनां कृत्वैव लिङादि प्रयुक्तवन्त इति। अतः प्रवर्तनाया विध्यर्थत्वमनुपपन्नम्।

वैदिकानि वाक्यानि पुरुषस्येश्वरस्याज्ञां तदुक्तिं विना परिबोधयितुमर्हन्ति। यथा लोके राजभृत्याः केनापि कारणेन राजाज्ञां जानन्तः तेनाबोधिता अपि परेभ्यः कथयन्ति 'एवं युष्मानाज्ञापयति राजा' इति। एवं वैदिकानि वाक्यानि पुरुषाज्ञां नूनं प्रतिपादयन्त्येवेति वेदस्यापौरुषेयत्वं सुस्थमिति।

इति विधिस्वरूपनिर्णयाधिकारोऽष्टमः।



(९) अथ निश्श्रेयससाधननिर्णयाधिकारे नवमे निश्श्रेयससाधनभूतं वेदनं निर्णीयते।

अत्र पूर्वपक्षिणः शाङ्कराः भास्करादयश्च। तत्र पूर्वेषामयमाशयः—'तरति शोकमात्मवित्' इत्यादिभिर्वेदान्तवाक्यजन्यज्ञानमेव मोक्षसाधनमाम्नातम्। तज्ज्ञानं प्रथमं प्रतिबद्ध-

फलम् । श्रवणादिभिः प्रतिबन्धे निरस्ते तदेवापरोक्षरूपमविद्यानिवर्तकम् । संसारस्य मिथ्यात्वेन प्रमाणज्ञानैकनिवर्त्यत्वाद्ध्यानस्य प्रमाणज्ञानरूपत्वाभावेन नाविद्यानिवर्तकत्व-मिति ।

तन्न । 'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः' इत्यादिभिर्विधेयभूतस्य ध्यानस्यैवाविद्यानिवर्तकत्वं प्रतिपाद्यते । वाक्यार्थज्ञानं त्वविधेयं न तन्निवर्तकम्; उक्तज्ञानवतामप्यविद्यानिवृत्त्यदर्शनात् । भेदवासनादिरूपप्रतिबन्धकहेतूनामपि मिथ्यात्वेन वाक्यार्थज्ञानेन बाधावश्यम्भावात् वाक्यार्थ-ज्ञानस्य प्रतिबद्धफलत्वमप्यनुपपन्नम् ।

शब्दादपरोक्षज्ञानञ्च न क्वचिद्दृष्टम्; तस्य परोक्षधीमात्रहेतुत्वात् । संसारस्य सत्यतायास्समर्थितत्वेन तस्य ध्याननिवर्त्यत्वमप्युपपद्यते । तस्मान्न वाक्यार्थज्ञानं निश्श्रेय-सहेतुरिति ॥

अन्ये तु साङ्ख्ययोगावपवर्गसाधनम् । तत्त्वानामवधारणं साङ्ख्यं श्रवणादिरूपम् । योगस्य तु त्रिविधमनुष्ठानम् । ईश्वरार्थानां कर्मणां करणम्, इतरेषां त्यागः सर्वकर्मफल-त्यागश्चेति । 'तत्कारणं सांख्ययोगाधिगम्यम्' इति श्रुतेरुक्तार्थोऽवसीयते । परिव्राजकानां तु ज्ञानयोगमात्रम्, न कर्मेति ।

तन्न—'नान्यः पन्थाः' इति श्रुत्या वेदनेतरस्यापवर्गोपायत्वप्रतिषेधात् । 'तत्कारणम्' इत्युदाहृतश्रुत्या ज्ञानकर्मयोगाभ्यां परमात्मसाक्षात्कारो भवतीत्येतावन्मात्रमुच्यते, न पुनरप-वर्गफले समुच्चयो विधीयते । 'अविद्यया मृत्युं तीर्त्वा विद्ययामृतमश्नुते' इति कर्मज्ञानयोः फलभेदाभिधानान्नापवर्गफले तयोस्समुच्चयः। अत्र विद्याविद्याशब्दाभ्यां ज्ञानकर्मणी अभिधीयेते।

त्रय्यन्तनिष्णातास्त्वेवमभिदधति—'ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्' इत्यादिभिर्वाक्या-र्थज्ञानविलक्षणं ध्यानोपासनादिशब्दवाच्यं साक्षात्कारसदृशं प्रीतिरूपापन्नं वेदनमपवर्गो-पायतया विधीयते । तस्य च वेदनस्य विवेकविमोकाभ्यासक्रियाकल्याणानवसादानुद्धर्ष-

रूपसाधनसप्तकात् प्राप्तिरिति ब्रह्मनन्दिना प्रतिपादितम् ‘ तल्लब्धिर्विवेकविमोकाभ्यास-क्रियाकल्याणानवसादानुद्धर्षेभ्यः ’ इति। अत उक्तलक्षणं वेदनमेव निश्श्रेयससाधनम्।

एवं प्रपत्तिरप्युक्तध्यानासमर्थानामुपायः ; ‘ मुमुक्षुर्वै शरणमहं प्रपद्ये ; ‘ शरणं त्वां प्रपन्ना ये ध्यानयोगविवर्जिताः। तेऽपि मृत्युमतिक्रम्य यान्ति तद्वैष्णवं पदम् ’ इत्यादि-प्रमाणात्। सा च भगवदेकोपायत्वप्रार्थनात्मिका। तस्माद्यथाधिकारं भक्तिः प्रपत्तिर्वा उपाय इति।

॥ इति निश्श्रेयससाधननिर्णयाधिकारो नवमः ॥



अथ दशमे निश्श्रेयसनिर्णयाधिकारे निश्श्रेयसस्वरूपं निर्णीयते। अत्र पूर्वपक्षिणो बौद्धार्हतवैशेषिकप्राभाकरभाट्टशाङ्करभास्करादयः। तत्र बौद्धैकदेशिनो माध्यमिकाः प्रकृष्टशून्यभावनया शून्यभावापत्तिं मोक्षमाचक्षते। योगाचारादयस्तु क्षणिकत्वभावनया विषयोपरागरहितज्ञानसन्तानम्।

एतेषां पक्षे बन्धमोक्षभागिनस्स्थिरस्य भोक्तुरभावान्मोक्षो दुर्घटः।

आर्हतास्तु—सम्यग्दर्शनचारित्रैः प्रक्षीणाशेषमलस्याविर्भूतसकलगुणस्य लोकान्तरेऽवस्थितिर्मोक्ष इत्याहुः। तन्न, स्वयं परिणामरहितस्य भोक्तुर्गमनानुपपत्तेर्गमनपूर्वकलोकान्त-रावस्थानलक्षणमोक्षस्य दुर्वचत्वात्।

वैशेषिकाः प्राभाकराश्च निश्शेषात्मगुणोच्छेदं मोक्षमातिष्ठन्ते। इदमपि न; सुखानुभवाभावात्। दुःखाभावस्याप्यननुभाव्यत्वेनापुरुषार्थत्वात्। न हि पाषाणादेर्दुःखाभावः पुरुषार्थतया प्रसिद्धः।

भाट्टास्तु मनस्करणकेन ज्ञानेन आनन्दानुभवं कैवल्यं मन्यन्ते। एतदपि न; मोक्षदशायां करणाधीनज्ञानाभावेन शब्दादिविषयाभावेन च ज्ञानसुखयोरसम्भवात् आनन्दानुभवस्य दुर्घटत्वात्।

अद्वैतिनस्तु—अविद्यानिवृत्तिं मोक्षं सङ्गिरन्ते। तत्र यद्यविद्याप्रध्वंसोऽविद्यानिवृत्तिः, तदा ध्वंसस्य द्रव्यावस्थाविशेषरूपत्वेन, तेनावस्थाविशेषापन्नद्रव्येण सद्वितीयत्वापत्तिः। अविद्याया द्रव्यत्वाभावे तत्कार्यप्रपञ्चस्यापि द्रव्यत्वं न स्यात्। अविद्यानिवृत्तेर्ब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वे नित्यत्वेन तस्य तत्त्वज्ञानसाध्यत्वन्न स्यात्'। बन्धाभावश्च प्रसज्यत इति।

भास्करादयस्तु उपाधिनिवृत्तौ जीवस्य ब्रह्मभावो मोक्ष इति ब्रुवते। तन्न, विलक्षणस्य द्रव्यस्य कदापि द्रव्यान्तराभेदासम्भवात्। जीवपरमात्मनोश्च मुक्तिदशायामपि भेदश्श्रूयते 'ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्' 'परात्परं पुरुषमुपैति दिव्यम्' इत्यादिभिः। अतोऽयमपि पक्षो नोपपद्यते।

किन्तु निश्शेषप्रक्षीणकर्मणः विदुषः मूर्धन्यनाड्या उत्क्रान्तस्य ब्रह्मोपसम्पन्नस्य 'परं ज्योतिरुपसम्पद्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यते' इति श्रुत्या स्वाभाविकापहतपाप्मत्वादिगुणाविर्भावोऽवगम्यते। एवं रूपस्य तस्य 'सोऽश्नुते सर्वान्कामान्सह ब्रह्मणा' इति श्रुत्या अनन्तकल्याणगुणविशिष्टब्रह्मानुभव एव मोक्ष इति प्रतिपाद्यते। एवं मुक्तस्य जगद्व्यापारवर्जं भगवदैश्वर्यं समानम्। 'एतेन प्रतिपद्यमाना इमम्मानवमावर्तं नावर्तन्ते' इति श्रुत्या निश्श्रेयसस्य नित्यत्वमवगम्यते। तदेवमसङ्कुचितो ब्रह्मानुभवो मोक्ष. इति सर्वं समञ्जसम्॥

॥ इति निश्श्रेयसनिर्णयाधिकरो दशमः॥

वादार्थसग्रहस्सम्पूर्णः॥

प्रीयता वासुदेव.



श्रीः

नीतिमालाविषयानुक्रमणी.



पु.

प्रथमो वादः

पृ.

द्वितीयो वादः

तृतीयो वादः

चतुर्थो वादः

पञ्चमो वादः

सप्तमो वादः

नवमो वादः

दशमो वादः



॥ श्रीः ॥

॥ नीतिमाला ॥

नारायणार्यविरचिता

श्रीः

॥ श्रीमते रामानुजाय नमः ॥

॥ नारायणार्यैः अनुगृहीता नीतिमाला ॥

॥ प्रथमो वादः ॥



वस्त्वाविरस्तु पद्माक्षं मम श्रीधरमच्युतम् ।
अबुद्ध्यधीनसन्दर्भभारतीमूर्धभूषणम् ॥

उन्मीलयन्ति चैतन्यचक्षुर्येऽहेतुकं मम ।
हृदि [1]सन्निदधीरंस्ते गुरवः करुणाश्रयाः ॥

वेलां लीलाविभूतिं प्रबलमितिशिलाराशिभिः पूर्वक्लृप्तां
ब्रह्माम्भोधेर्विषाणैः कुनयकुलमयैर्भेत्तुमुद्युञ्जते ये ।
तान्वादीभान्सुतीक्ष्णैर्नयकुलकरजैः पाटयल्लक्ष्मणार्यः[2]
पद्मास्यो रङ्गधामक्षितिधरनिलयो मङ्गळं मे विधत्ताम् ॥

मुनीन्द्रपारिजातोत्थसुनीतिकुसुमैरहम् ।
मालां ग्रथ्नामि रङ्गेशवरिवस्या[3]विधित्सया ॥

पौर्वापर्यस्य नियमः कर्मब्रह्मविचारयोः ।
तथा वेदान्तवाक्यानामप्रामाण्यनिराक्रिया ॥

१. सन्निदधुस्ते मे—पा०.

२. लक्ष्मणाख्यः—पा०.

३. परिचर्या—पा०.

विवर्तपक्षक्षपणं परिणामनिराकृतिः ।
शक्तिविक्षेपभङ्गश्च ब्रह्मणो निर्णयस्तथा ॥

निर्णयः पुरुषस्यापि विधिरूपविनिर्णयः ।
मोक्षसाधननिर्णीतिर्मोक्षस्य च विनिर्णयः ॥

[१]दशार्थानधिकृत्येयं **नीतिमाला** प्रवर्तते ।
दोषानत्र तिरस्कृत्य गृह्यन्तां सूरिभिर्गुणाः ॥

ब्रह्मभागविचारस्य कर्मभागविचारानन्तर्यं सूत्रितम्—'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा' इति। तत्र केचिदाहुः—

त्रय्यन्तार्थविचारस्तु तदध्ययनपूर्वकः ।
तदधीनात्मलाभत्वात्त्रयीवाक्यविचारवत् ।

अनधीतवेदस्य विचारानुपपत्तेर्धर्मजिज्ञासाया वेदाध्ययनपूर्वकत्वं यथा, तथा ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाया अपि वेदान्ताध्ययनपूर्वकत्वमेव युक्तम् । अथाध्ययनक्रमानुरोधेन कर्मभागविचारानन्तर्यं ब्रह्मभागविचारस्योच्यते, तदयुक्तम् ; भिन्नाधिकारत्वात्कर्मब्रह्मभागयोः । स्वर्गादिसाधनभूतयागादिकर्मप्रतिपाद्य(द?)कस्त्रयीभागो बुभुक्षाधिकारः। परब्रह्मतत्प्रासितदुपायभूततदुपासनविषयो वेदान्तभागो मुमुक्षाधिकारः । अतो मुमुक्षुभिर्वेदान्ताध्ययनानन्तरं ब्रह्मविचारः कर्तव्यः ।

यद्यप्युद्गीथादीनां कर्माङ्गित्वादिविचाराय[२] (कर्माङ्गत्वादिविचाराय?) उपासनचिन्तायाः शारीरके क्रियमाणायाः कर्मविचारोऽपेक्षितः, तथापि तेषामुपासनानां वीर्यवत्तरत्वादिफलत्वाद्ब्रह्मविचारं कृत्वापि क्रियमाणः कर्मविचारो न विरोधमावहेत् ।

ननु चार्थज्ञानपर्यन्तमध्ययनं विदधतो विधेर्बलेन मुमुक्षुणापि प्रथमं कर्मविचारस्य कर्तव्यत्वात्तदानन्तर्यं ब्रह्मविचारस्यावर्जनीयमापतेत् । नैवम्; अक्षरग्रहणमात्रपर्यवसानादध्ययन-

१. दर्शनार्थानिमान्वक्तुम्—पा०.
२. कर्माङ्गित्वाद्विचाराय—पा०.

विधेः । तथाहि—अध्ययनानन्तरभावित्वादक्षरग्रहणस्य तदेव तस्य फलं भवितुमर्हति, न त्वनेन व्यवहितमर्थज्ञानम् । अक्षरग्रहणस्याप्यपुरुषार्थत्वादनुद्देश्यत्वमुच्यमानमर्थज्ञानस्यापि समानम् । नन्वर्थज्ञानस्य स्वरूपेणापुरुषार्थत्वेऽपि स्वर्गादिपुरुषार्थसाधनत्वेनोद्देश्यत्वं सम्भवतीति चेन्न ; अनुष्ठानसाध्यत्वात्स्वर्गादेः । अथानुष्ठानमर्थज्ञानस्यावान्तरव्यापार इति मतम् , तथासत्यध्ययनानन्तरभाविनोऽक्षरग्रहणस्य स्वर्गादिसाधनतयोद्देश्यत्वमुपपन्नमिति तदुत्तरकालभाविनी [१]अर्थज्ञानानुष्ठाने[२] तस्यावान्तरव्यापारतामनुभवत इति सन्तोष्टव्यम् ।

गृहीतस्वाध्याये पुरुषेऽधीतवेदत्वप्रसिद्धेश्चाक्षरग्रहणफलमध्ययनम् । अधीतवेदो हि श्रोत्रियः। न हि गृहीतस्वाध्यायमश्रुतमीमांसं श्रोत्रिय इति न वदन्ति । व्यापकत्वाच्चाक्षरग्रहणमेव फलमध्ययनस्य । नह्यध्ययनसंस्कृतानि वेदवाक्यानि न ग्रहणगोचरतां भजन्ते । अध्ययनकर्मत्वमपि स्वाध्यायस्येप्सिततमत्वात् स्वशक्त्या धर्मार्थकामादिपुरुषार्थतत्साधनावबोधित्वात् स्वरूपेण जपपारायणादिनाभीष्टसाधनत्वाच्च । एवमाकारभेदेनोभयार्थत्वाद्विनियुक्तविनियोगदोषो न स्यात् ; यथाग्नेर्दाहभासमानत्वयोः ।

ननु अर्थज्ञानस्यावैधत्वे स्वाध्यायाध्ययनानन्तर्यं मीमांसाया न स्यात्; 'अधीत्य स्नायात्' इति स्मृतिप्राप्तेन स्नानेन प्रस्तावसरत्वात् । अतोऽर्थविचारस्याध्ययनानन्तर्यसिद्धये तत्कालोपनिपातिस्नानबाधार्थमनिच्छतोऽपि वैधत्वमङ्गीकरणीयमापद्येत ।

नैवम् ; अर्थविचारस्य रागप्राप्तत्वादेव न तावद्वैधत्वम् । स्नानस्मृतिस्तु न विचारं बाधितुं क्षमते; रागबलाद् गुरुगृहान्निवृत्तेन कर्तुं शक्यत्वात् । अतः प्राक्तनीं स्थितिमुपजीव्य [३]विचारः प्रवर्तिष्यते । अध्ययनस्य समाप्तत्वात्सकलब्रह्मचारिवृत्तिनिवृत्तिः स्नातकस्य भवति । उत्तरक्रतुविधयोऽप्यविद्वत्त्वत्तया नैनमास्कन्दन्ति ।

अथवा अधीत्येत्यत्र क्त्वाप्रत्ययस्य पूर्वकालतामात्रविहितत्वात् स्नानस्मृतिविचारयोर्न विरोधः। अथवा अध्ययनार्थविचारयोरानन्तर्यनियमो नास्माकमवश्यम्भावी । अधीतवेदत्वमेव हि

१—२. द्विवचनान्ते इमे—पदे.

३. विचारे—पा०.

विचारस्यापेक्षितम् । तदध्ययनस्य पूर्वभावित्वमात्रेणापि सिद्ध्यतीति स्मृत्यनुसारेण स्नात्वापि विचारयिष्यति ।

ननु च 'स्नातकस्सदृशी भार्यां विन्देत' इति स्नानोत्तरकालस्य दारसङ्ग्रहणावरुद्धत्वात्तत्रापि न विचारः कर्तुं शक्यते । तर्हि कृतदारो विचारयिष्यति, तदा ह्यर्थार्जनवदर्थविचारोऽप्यहरहः क्रियमाणो न विरोधमावहेत् । अनर्थकानां हुम्फडित्यादिवाक्यानामध्ययनस्यार्थज्ञानप्रयोजनत्वाभावाददृष्टफलत्वमक्षरग्रहणफलत्वं वाभ्युपेयं स्यात् । तदा विधिवैरूप्यं भवति । किञ्च सत्रबृहस्पतिसवादिषु क्षत्रियवैश्ययोरनधिकारात्तत्प्रतिपादकस्य वेदभागस्याध्ययनं वाक्षरग्रहणादिफलत्वं (ध्ययनमदृष्टफलमक्षरग्रहणादिफलं ?) वा स्यात् । न चाविधेयत्वेऽर्थविचारो निर्निबन्धनस्स्यादिति वक्तुं शक्यम् ; अन्यनिबन्धनत्वादर्थविचारस्य । विधिरपि पुरुषार्थमविरोधयन्नेव[१] प्रवृत्तिहेतुर्भवति । इहापि साङ्गाध्ययनेन वेदवाक्येभ्यः प्रयोजनवदर्थानामापाततः प्रतीतेस्तन्निर्णयफले विचारे पुरुषः स्वयमेव प्रवर्तते । अतः साङ्गाध्ययनादेवाक्षरग्रहणफलात्प्रयोजनवदर्थावबोधकामनाद्वारेणार्थविचारे प्रवृत्तेर्नार्थविचारो निर्निबन्धनः । अर्थज्ञानस्याविधेयत्वेऽपि स्वाध्यायस्यार्थपरत्वं स्वतःप्रामाण्यन्यायसिद्धम् । अतो मुमुक्षोर्ब्रह्मविचारेऽध्ययनविधेरप्रतिबन्धकत्वेन मुमुक्षुणा अध्ययनानन्तरं ब्रह्मविचारः कर्तव्य इति कर्मविचारानन्तर्यं ब्रह्मविचारस्य न युक्तमिति ॥

अत्राभिधीयते—

> यज्ञादीनां तु विद्याया उत्पत्तौ विनियोगतः ।
> तेषामकरणे दोषबाहुल्यश्रवणादपि ॥
>
> पूर्वकाण्डोदितन्यायसापेक्षत्वस्य दर्शनात् ।
> विचारः कर्मणां हेतुर्ब्रह्मभागविचारणे ॥

यदुक्तमध्ययनविधेरक्षरग्रहणपर्यवसानान्न तन्निबन्धनोऽर्थविचारः, साङ्गाध्ययनादेव प्रयोजनवदर्थानामापातप्रतीतेस्तन्निबन्धनोऽर्थविचार इति ; तत्सुष्ठूक्तम् ।

१. मवबोधयन्नेव—पा०.

यत्तु कर्मज्ञानभागयोर्भिन्नाधिकारत्वान्मुमुक्षोर्न कर्मविचारापेक्षेति ; तदपेशलम्; 'यज्ञेन दानेन तपसा अनाशकेन' इत्यादिभिर्यज्ञादीनां साधनत्वेन विद्योत्पत्तौ विनियोगात्। विविदिषन्तीति वचनाद्विविदिषायां यज्ञादीनामुपयोगः न विद्योत्पत्ताविति चेन्न ; विविदिषायास्साध्यत्वस्यैवासम्भवात्। पुरुषार्थस्तत्साधनं वा साध्यम्। न तावद्विविदिषा पुरुषार्थः; नापि तत्साधनम् ; 'ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति' इति विद्याया एव पुरुषार्थसाधनत्वश्रवणात्। अत एव विविदिषा अर्थसिद्धेति न सा पुरुषव्यापारेण साध्या। विविदिषन्तीति व्यपदेशस्तु अश्वेन जिगमिषतीतिवत् द्रष्टव्यः ॥

ननु वेदनस्य वा कथं कर्मसाध्यत्वम्? तदपि [१]प्रमाणाधीनम्। तत् स्वसामग्रीभूताद्वेदान्तवाक्याज्जायत इति किमिति कर्माण्यपेक्षते। तेषां वा कथं प्रमाणसामग्रीत्वम्? उच्यते—नास्माभिर्वाक्यजन्यं ज्ञानं यज्ञादिसाध्यमुच्यते। अपि तु उपासनात्मकं ज्ञानम्। तत्तु फलाभिसन्धिरहितैः परमपुरुषाराधनभूतैः कर्मभिः परिशुद्धान्तःकरणस्य जायत इति युक्तं तस्य यज्ञादिसाध्यत्वम्।

ननु अस्तूपासनस्य यज्ञादिसाध्यत्वात्तस्य तदपेक्षितत्वम् ; कर्मब्रह्मविचारयोः कथं पौर्वापर्यनियमः? उच्यते—ब्रह्मस्वरूपतदुपासनतत्फलानि त्रीण्यपि शारीरके चिन्त्यन्ते। तत्रोपसानविचारवत्तदुपायभूतकर्मविचारोऽप्यपेक्षितत्वात्कर्तव्य एव। कर्मविचारस्य कर्तव्यतायां सत्यां कर्मणां साधनत्वात्तद्विचारस्यैव प्राथम्यमुचितम्। [२]अनिर्णीते साधने साध्यनिर्णयानुपपत्तेः। अत एव पूर्वकाण्डे स्वर्गादिफलचिन्तायाः प्रागेव साधनभूतयागादिचिन्ता क्रियते। अतः कर्मब्रह्मभागविचारयोः पौर्वापर्यमुपपन्नम्।

किञ्च नित्यनैमित्तिकानां कर्मणामकरणे प्रत्यवायबाहुल्यं श्रुतिभिरुद्घुष्यते। अतो मुमुक्षुरपि कर्मविचारे प्रथमं प्रयतते। अनर्थं परिहृत्यैव ह्यभ्युदये यतितव्यम्।

अपि च सद्विद्यादहरविद्यादीनां भेदाभेदनिर्णयः कर्मभेदाभेदनिर्णयहेतुभिर्न्यायैः शारीरके क्रियते। उक्तञ्च भगवता **बादरायणेन**—'हानौ तूपायनशब्दशेषत्वात्कुशाच्छन्द-

१. तदपि प्रमाणज्ञानम्—पा०.
२. अननुष्ठिते—पा०.

स्तुत्युपगानवत्तदुक्तम्[१]' 'प्रदानवदेव तदुक्तम्[२]' इत्यादि। अतः कर्मविचारस्यैव पूर्ववृत्तत्वं युक्तम्।

केचिदाहुः—

अद्वितीयात्मविज्ञानमविद्याविनिवर्तकम्।
श्रूयते तस्य चोत्पत्तौ समाधिः कारणं श्रुतौ॥

औचित्याच्च विरुद्धत्वाच्छमादेः कर्मणामपि।
शमाद्यनन्तरं कर्तुं युक्तं ब्रह्मविचारणम्॥

'एकधैवानुद्रष्टव्यम्' 'तरति शोकमात्मवित्' इत्यादिभिरद्वितीयात्मविज्ञानमपवर्गसाधनतया श्रुतम्। तस्य 'शान्तो दान्त उपरतस्तितिक्षुस्समाहितो भूत्वात्मन्येवात्मानं पश्येत्' इति शमादीनां साधनत्वं च श्रुतम्। यज्ञादिकर्मणां साधनत्वश्रवणेऽपि करणेतिकर्तव्यताद्यनेकभेदगर्भत्वेनाद्वितीयत्वज्ञानं प्रति तेषां साधनभावो नोपपद्यते। शमादीनां तु सर्वेन्द्रियव्यापारोपरतिरूपाणां साधनत्वमुपपन्नम्। तस्माच्छमाद्यानन्तर्यं ब्रह्मविचारस्यौचित्याद(यु?)क्तम्।

उच्यते—

दिव्यदेहविभूत्यादिविशिष्टब्रह्मवेदनम्।
साधनं त्वपवर्गस्य बह्वीषु श्रुतिषु श्रुतम्॥

तृतीयाश्रुतिसामर्थ्यात्तस्य कर्मादि साधनम्।
शमादयः परिकरा विरोधो न च विद्यते॥

यदुक्तम्—अद्वितीयात्मविज्ञानमपवर्गस्य साधनमिति। तत्राद्वितीयत्वं विवेचनीयम्। यदि निर्विशेषत्वमद्वितीयत्वम्, तत्सर्वप्रमाणविरूद्धम्। अथ अनेकगुणविभूतिविशिष्टस्य ब्रह्मण एकत्वम्, तदभिमतमेव। तथाविधस्य ब्रह्मणो वेदनमपवर्गसाधनतया अम्नायते च—'य एषो-

१. ब्र. सू. ३. ३. २६.
२. ब्र. सू. ३. ३. ४२.

ऽन्तरादित्ये हिरण्मयः पुरुषः दृश्यते हिरण्यश्मश्रुर्हिरण्यकेश आप्रणखात्सर्व एव सुवर्णस्तस्य यथा कप्यासं पुण्डरीकमेवमक्षिणी तस्योदिति नाम स एष सर्वेभ्यः पाप्मभ्य उदितः। उदेति ह वै सर्वेभ्यः पाप्मभ्यो य एवं वेद', 'भोक्ता भोग्यं प्रेरितारञ्च मत्वा', 'पृथगात्मानं प्रेरितारञ्च मत्वा जुष्टस्ततस्तेनामृतत्वमेति' इत्यादिभिः। स्मर्यते च—

प्रशासितारं सर्वेषामणीयांसमणीयसाम्।
रुक्माभं स्वप्नधीगम्यं विद्यात्तु पुरुषं परम्॥

इति। एवं तर्हि 'एकधैवानुद्रष्टव्यम्' इत्यादिश्रुतेरर्थो वर्णनीयः। न वयं व्याख्यातारः। व्याख्यातञ्च भगवता **भाष्यकारेण।** तत्रैवानुसन्धध्वम्। एवंविधं ब्रह्मणो वेदनं कर्मानुष्ठानसाध्यमुक्तम्।

यत्तु शमादीनां वेदनसाधनत्वं 'शान्तो दान्तः' इत्यादि श्रुतिसिद्धमिति; तदपि न। 'यज्ञेन दानेन' इति तृतीयया श्रुत्या यज्ञादेः साधनत्वेन विनियोगात् 'शान्तो दान्तः' इत्यादिवचनं शमादीनामनुग्राहकत्वाभिप्रायम्। व्यापारसाध्यानां कर्मणां तदुपरतिरूपाणां शमादीनाञ्च विरोधादेककार्यान्वयो न सम्भवतीत्येतदपि नास्ति; विषयभेदात्। विद्यासाधनभूतकर्मविषयो व्यापारः। अविहिताप्रतिषिद्धकाम्यनिषिद्धकर्मविषयाः शमादय इति। तदेवं कर्मसापेक्षत्वाद्ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य कर्मविचारानन्तरं ब्रह्मविचारः कर्तव्य इति सूत्रितम्॥

इति नीतिमालायां ब्रह्मविचारस्य
कर्मविचारानन्तर्यनिर्णयाधिकारः प्रथमः॥

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श्रीः

नीतिमालायां

द्वितीयाधिकार आरभ्यते.

वेदान्तवाक्यानां ब्रह्मणि प्रामाण्यमसहमानाः केचिदाहुः—

सम्बन्धग्रहणापेक्षं शब्दादर्थावबोधनम् ।
तच्च कार्यार्थ एवेति न शास्त्रं ब्रह्मगोचरम् ॥

शब्दार्थयोस्सम्बन्धमजानतः पुरुषस्य शब्दो नार्थप्रत्ययहेतुर्भवति। सम्बन्धश्च वृद्धव्यवहारत एव ग्रहीतव्यः। व्यवहारश्च कार्यैकगोचरः। तथा हि—गामानयेत्यादि-प्रयोजकवाक्यश्रवणसमनन्तरं प्रवर्तमानं प्रयोज्यमुपलभ्य पार्श्वस्थो व्युत्पित्सुरेवमवधारयति, अहं कार्यावगतिसमनन्तरं सर्वथा(दा?) प्रवर्ते । अस्याप्येतद्वाक्यश्रवणसमनन्तरं प्रवर्तमान-त्वादिह(दिदं?) वाक्यमस्य कार्यज्ञानबुद्धिमुत्पादयतीति। पुनर्गवानयनदर्शनात्कार्यविशेषं निश्चि-नोति। पुनरपि गां बधानेत्यादिप्रयोगभेदात्पदानामावापोद्वापवशेनावयवार्थमवगच्छति। एव कार्यार्थ एव व्युत्पत्तेर्न सिद्धार्थे शब्दस्य प्रामाण्यम् ।

न च 'पुत्रस्ते जातः' इत्यादि वाक्यश्रवणसमनन्तरं मुखविकासादिलिङ्गेन पुत्रजन्मा-द्यर्थनिश्चयसम्भवात्कार्यार्थ एव सम्बन्धग्रहणमिति नियमो नास्तीति वाच्यम्; तत्रापि सुखप्रसवाद्यर्थानां हर्षहेतूनां बहूनां सम्भवाद्धर्षहेतुविशेषनिश्चयहेतुत्वायोगान्मुखविकासादेः। एवं कार्यार्थ एव व्युत्पत्तेस्सर्वशब्दानां कार्य एव प्रामाण्यमिति सिद्धरूपे ब्रह्मणि न वेदान्त-वाक्यानां प्रामाण्यमिति ।

अत्राभिधीयते—

सिद्धार्थेष्वपि वाक्येषु सम्बन्धग्रहणं भवेत् ।
तस्मात्कार्यार्थ एवेति निर्बन्धो निर्निबन्धनः ॥

'पुत्रस्ते जातः' इत्यादि सिद्धार्थेष्वपि वाक्येषु सम्बन्धग्रहणं दृश्यत एव। यदुक्तं मुखविकासादिलिङ्गस्य हर्षहेतुविशेषनिश्चयहेतुत्वं न सम्भवतीति। तन्न; एतद्वाक्यश्रवणानन्तरं पुत्रजन्मसाक्षात्कारेण तदसाधारणोत्सवत्व(त्सव ?)लिङ्गेन वा पुत्रजन्मविशेषनिश्चयसम्भवात्। साधारणतयावगतस्य हर्षहेतुविकासस्य पुत्रजन्मविशेषपर्यवसानसम्भवे सति अनिर्धारितहेत्वन्तरविषयत्वशङ्कानुपपत्तेश्च।

किञ्च गामानयेत्यादिवाक्यसमनन्तरं प्रयोज्यस्यानुषङ्गिकानेकव्यापारसम्भवात्कार्यविज्ञानमपि सामान्येनावगतमिति तत्र विशेषावधारणं दुश्शकमेव। अपि चायं व्युत्पित्सुः स्वस्य प्रवृत्तिहेतुभूतायाः कार्यावगतेः पदार्थविज्ञानपूर्वकत्वावगमात्प्रयोज्यवृद्धस्यापि प्रयोजकवाक्यं पदार्थज्ञानमुत्पादयतीति निश्चिनोति। तस्माद् वृद्धव्यवहारेऽपि सिद्धार्थेष्वेव शब्दस्याभिधानमिति निश्चयः।

किञ्च प्रकारान्तरेणापि शब्दार्थसम्बन्धग्रहणं प्रचुरमुपलभ्यते। तथाहि—बालाः पितृमातुलादिभिः शशिपशुपक्षिप्रभृतीनर्थानुद्दिश्य [१]'एनमवेहि, [२]इममवगच्छ' इत्यभिप्रायेणाङ्गुल्या निर्दिश्य तत्तच्छब्दैस्तेषु तेष्वर्थेषु प्रयुज्यमानैर्बहुशः शिक्षिताः, पुनश्च काव्यनाटकाभिज्ञपुरुषसकाशमुपगम्य पदविच्छेदं कृत्वा अस्य शब्दस्यायमर्थ इति शिक्षिताः, सर्वशब्दानामर्थमवगम्य तत्तच्छब्दश्रवणसमनन्तरं तेषु तेष्वर्थेषु स्वात्मनां बुद्ध्युत्पत्तिं दृष्ट्वा सम्बन्धान्तरादर्शनात्सङ्केतयितृपुरुषाज्ञानाच्च तेषु तेषु तेषां (तेषां तेषां?) शब्दानां प्रयोगोबोधकत्वनिबन्धन इति निश्चिन्वन्ति। अतः सिद्धार्थे व्युत्पत्तेस्तस्मिन् शब्दस्य प्रामाण्यं सम्भवतीति वेदान्तवाक्यानि ब्रह्मणि प्रामाण्यं प्रतिपद्यन्त एव।

अपर आहुः—

> जगत्सावयवं कार्यं तच्च स्वोचितकर्तृकम्।
> कर्ता च कल्प्य एकोऽतो नासौ शास्त्रप्रमाणकः॥

१. एन शब्दम्—पा०.

२. इममर्थम्—पा०.

अस्तु सिद्धार्थेऽपि शब्दस्य प्रामाण्यम्, तथापि जगत्कारणभूत ईश्वरो न शास्त्रप्रमाणकः; शास्त्रस्य प्रमाणान्तराप्राप्तार्थविषयत्वात्। अनुमानेन जगत्कर्तृसिद्धेश्च। तथाहि—विचित्र-सन्निवेशं भूभूधरादिकं कृत्स्नं जगत् सावयवत्वात् कार्यं भवितुमर्हति। कार्यञ्च स्वोपादानोपकरणसम्प्रदानप्रयोजनाद्यभिज्ञकर्तृकं दृष्टम्। न चेदमशक्यक्रियमशक्योपादानादिविज्ञानम्; कर्तृस्वरूपवज्ज्ञानशक्त्योरपि कार्यानुमेयत्वात्। न च जीवानां कर्तृत्वकल्पनं युक्तम्; तेषां [१]प्रतिसर्गावस्थायां प्रलीनकरणकळेबरतया अचित्कल्पानां ज्ञानशक्तिवैकल्येन विचित्र-जगन्निर्मातृत्वानुपपत्तेः।

यदपि तेषामेव कर्मद्वारेण कर्तृत्वमुपपद्यत इति, तदपि न; युगपदुत्पद्यमान-[२] जगन्निर्माणप्रयोजनतया अनन्तैर्जीवैरेकदानुष्ठितानामनन्तानामेकरूपाणां कर्मणां सम्भवे प्रमाणाभावात्ततो विलक्षणज्ञानशक्तियुक्त एकः कर्ता भवितुमर्हति।

अथ विचित्रसन्निवेशगोपुरप्राकारादेर्विलक्षणज्ञानशक्तियुक्तानेककर्तृकत्वदर्शनादत्यन्त-विचित्ररचनस्य जगतो निरतिशयज्ञानशक्तियुक्तबहुकर्तृकत्वकल्पनं युक्तमिति चेत्, तच्चा-युक्तम्; कर्तृकल्पनायामनेककल्पनादेककल्पनस्यैव युक्तत्वात्। न च जगत्कर्तुरनुमेयत्वे व्याप्तिबलेन कर्मवश्यत्वादिप्रसङ्गः; तेषां कर्मवश्यत्वादीनां जगत्करणेऽनुपयोगात्। अनुप-योगा(गि?)नामपि व्याप्तिमात्रेण पक्षप्राप्तौ सर्वानुमानोच्छेदप्रसङ्गाच्च। अतो जगत्कर्तुरनु-मानसिद्धत्वान्न वेदान्तप्रमाणकं ब्रह्मेति।

अत्रोच्यते—

> जगतः कर्तृमत्त्वञ्च सिद्ध्यत्येवानुमानतः।
> विशिष्टकर्तृकत्वन्तु शास्त्रादेवावगम्यते॥

यदुक्तं विचित्ररचनस्य जगत्कार्यस्य विचित्रलक्षणैककर्तृकत्वं सिद्ध्यतीति, तदयुक्तम्; विचित्र-रचनस्य रथगोपुरप्रासादादेर्बहुकर्तृकत्वदर्शनात्। तत्र यदुक्तमनेककर्तृकल्पनादेककल्पनं लघीय

१. प्रतिसर्गः—प्रळयः.

२. युगपदुपपद्यमान—पा०.

इति, तदप्यसाधु ; पूर्वोक्तादेव च हेतोर्बहुकर्तृकल्पनस्यैव युक्तत्वात्। कार्यसिद्धये हि कर्तृमत्त्वं कल्प्यते तद्यथोपपद्यते तथैव हि कल्पनीयम् ।

किञ्च अनुमानेन जगत्कर्तारं साधयतो यत्कर्तुरकर्मवश्यत्वसर्वज्ञत्वादिकं सिषाधयिषितम्, तदपि विरुद्धमापतेत्; व्याप्तिबलेन तस्य कर्तुः कर्मवश्यत्वाल्पज्ञानत्वादेः साधकत्वाद्धेतोः। तत्र यदुक्तं सपक्षे सहदृष्टानां धर्माणां दर्शनमात्रेण पक्षे प्राप्तौ सर्वानुमानोच्छेदप्रसङ्ग इति ; नैतदस्ति। व्याप्तिबलेन पक्षे प्रसज्यमानानां येषां प्रमाणान्तरेण न प्रतिहतिर्भवति, तेषामेवानुमापकत्वाल्लिङ्गस्य ।

अथ कर्मवश्यस्य अल्पज्ञस्य सकलजगन्निर्माणानुपपत्तेः पक्षधर्मत्वबलादेवाकर्मवश्यः सर्वज्ञ एव जगत्कर्ता सेत्स्यतीति मतम्, तदप्ययुक्तम् ; अकर्मवश्यस्य शरीरेन्द्रियाद्युपकरणाभावेन जगत्कर्तृत्वानुपपत्तेः। शरीरेन्द्रियाद्युपकरणरहितस्यापि सङ्कल्पमात्रेण कर्तृत्वमुपपद्यत इति चायुक्तम् ; अशरीरस्य सङ्कल्पायोगात्। अत एवेच्छानिमित्तशरीराद्युपकरणवान् जगत्करोतीत्युत्प्रेक्षितुमपि न शक्यम् ।

अथ नित्यानि जगत्कर्तुः शरीरेन्द्रियाद्युपकरणानि ; अतस्तस्य जगत्करणं सुशकमिति मन्वीत, तदपि न साधीयः ; नित्यत्वेन तस्य शरीरादीनां सावयवत्वहेतोरनैकान्तिकत्वात्। अतोऽनुमानेन जगत्कर्ता न सेत्स्यति। जगतो विलक्षणैककर्तृमत्त्वे सिद्धेऽपि निमित्तोपादानशक्तियुक्तेनैकेन पुरुषेणैकदैव सङ्कल्पपूर्वकं निखिलजगत्करणं शास्त्रैकप्रमाणकमिति वेदान्तवेद्यं ब्रह्म ।

अन्ये पुनराहुः—

प्रयोजनपरं वाक्यं प्रमाणं नेतरद्भवेत् ।
तत्प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिभ्यामेव साध्यं प्रयोजनम् ॥

त्रय्यन्तस्याक्रियार्थत्वान्न स्यात्तस्य प्रमाणता।

सर्वं हि वाक्यजातं प्रयोजनपर्यवसाय्येव प्रमाणं भवति ; लोके प्रयोजनशून्यानां प्रमाणतया क्वचिदप्यनुपलब्धेः ।

ननु प्रत्यक्षादीनि हि हेयोपादेयापेक्ष(योपेक्ष?)णीयस्य(यस्व?)विषयावबोधनं कुर्वन्ति प्रमाणानि दृश्यन्ते। शब्दस्य को विशेषः, येन प्रयोजनवदर्थावबोधकत्वमाश्रीयेत। उच्यते— परप्रत्यायनार्थं हि वाक्यं प्रयुज्यते। परश्च न निष्प्रयोजनानि वाक्यानि श्रावयितुं शक्यः। तस्मात्प्रयोजनशून्यानामुदय एव दुर्लभः। अतः शास्त्रं प्रयोजनपर्यवसाय्येव। प्रमाणप्रयोजनञ्च द्विविधम्। सुखं दुःखनिवृत्तिश्चेति। तद् द्विविधं प्रयोजनं प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिभ्यामेव लभ्यते; यथा कामिनीपरिष्वङ्गेन कामावाप्तिः, अपथ्यसेवानिवृत्तेरग्निमान्द्यनिवृत्तिः; यथा(तथा?)ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गावाप्तिः, अपगोरणनिवृत्त्या शतयातनानिवृत्तिः। अतः प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिसाध्यं प्रयोजनम्।

न च वाच्यं 'स्ववेश्मनि निधिरस्ति' 'नायं सर्पः' इत्यादिवस्तुस्वरूपोपदेशपरवाक्यश्रवणसमनन्तरं निधिसद्भावसर्पनिवृत्तिभ्यां हर्षभयनिवृत्तिदर्शनात्तेषामपि वाक्यानां प्रयोजनपर्यवसानमस्तीति। तत्राप्यज्ञातस्य निधिसद्भावादेः पुरुषार्थहेतुत्वाभावाज्ज्ञानविधिपरत्वस्यैवाश्रयणीयत्वात्। तस्मात्प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिभ्यामेव पुरुषार्थ इति प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्यन्वयविरहिणां वेदान्तवाक्यानां प्रामाण्यं दुर्लभमिति, न वेदान्तप्रमाणं ब्रह्मेति।

अत्र ब्रूमः—

निध्याद्यवगतेश्चापि सिद्धयत्येव प्रयोजनम्।
तस्माद्वेदान्तवाक्यानां प्रामाण्यमनपोदितम्॥

यत्तावदुक्तं प्रयोजनपर्यवसाय्येव शब्दः प्रामाणमिति, (तत् ?) तथैव। यत्पुनरुक्तं प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिभ्यामेव प्रयोजनावाप्तिरिति, नैतन्नियतम्; निधिसद्भावादिप्रतिपादनपराणामपि वाक्यानां पुरुषार्थावाप्तिहेतुत्वदर्शनात्।

तत्र यदुक्त अज्ञातस्य निधिसद्भावादेः पुरुषार्थहेतुत्वाभावेन ज्ञानविधिपरत्वमेवाश्रयणीयमिति, तदयुक्तम्; ज्ञानस्यापुरुषतन्त्रत्वेन विधेयत्वासम्भवात्। न च ज्ञानार्थव्यापारस्य विधेयत्वेन तेषां ज्ञानविधिपरत्वं युक्तं वक्तुम्; तत्तद्वाक्यजन्येन निधिसद्भावादिज्ञानेन हर्षभयनिवृत्त्योर्दर्शनात्। बालातुराद्युपच्छन्दनवाक्यवदसत्येऽप्यर्थे निधिसद्भावादिज्ञानमात्रेण हर्षादीनां सम्भवान्नार्थपरत्वं सिद्धयतीति च न शङ्कनीयम्; उपच्छन्दनवाक्येऽप्यर्थसद्भावभ्रान्त्या

पुरुषार्थावाप्तिः। अत एव ह्यर्थस्याभावे निश्चिते सति तदानीमेव हर्षादयो निवर्तन्ते। अतो निध्यादिसद्भावप्रतिपादनपराणां वाक्यानां पुरुषार्थहेतुत्वं सम्भवत्येव।

किञ्च 'विश्वजिता यजेत' 'न कळञ्जं भक्षयेत्' इत्यादीनां प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिपराणां वाक्यानां क्रियाफलसम्बन्धाश्रवणात्प्रथमं प्रयोजनान्वयो न ज्ञायते। यदा विज्ञायते, तथा-(दा?) पि प्रयोजनं मन्दतरञ्च। वेदान्तवाक्योक्तं तु निरतिशयानन्दं ब्रह्म श्रवणवेळायामेव प्रतिपन्नमिति तेषां वाक्यानामेव साक्षात्प्रयोजनपर्यवसानमिति वेदान्तवाक्यानां ब्रह्मणि प्रामाण्यमुपपन्नम्।

इति नीतिमालायां वेदान्तप्रामाण्यनिर्णयाधिकारो द्वितीयः॥

श्रीः

नीतिमालायां
तृतीयाधिकार आरभ्यते.

इदानीं ब्रह्मस्वरूपं निरूप्यते ॥ अत्र केचिदाहुः—

जगज्जन्मस्थितिध्वंसकारणं ब्रह्मशब्दितम् ।
तच्च सच्चित्सुखाद्वैतस्वरूपं श्रुतिषूदितम् ॥

"यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते, येन जातानि जीवन्ति, यत्प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति, तद्वि-जिज्ञासस्व तद्ब्रह्म' इति इति श्रुत्या जगत्कारणं ब्रह्मेति प्रतिपादितम्। तच्च 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म', 'विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म' 'आनन्दो ब्रह्म' इति श्रुतिभिः सच्चिदद्वितीयानन्दस्वरूपं प्रतिपादितम्। एवं निर्विशेषस्वयम्प्रकाशसुखस्वरूपस्य सन्मात्रस्य ब्रह्मण एव अनाद्यज्ञानतिरोहि-तस्वरूपतया सुख्यहं, दुःख्यहं, देहोऽयं, मनुष्योऽयं, घटोऽयं, पटोऽयम्, इत्याद्यान्तरबाह्यवि-विधाध्यासोपादानतया जगत्कारणत्वमुपपद्यत इति। ते प्रतिक्षिप्यन्ते।

सत्तादेर्दुर्निरूपत्वात्तिरोधेरप्यसम्भवात् ।
कारणत्वस्य वा सिद्धेः पक्षोऽयं नोपपद्यते ॥

सच्चित्सुखाद्वितीयस्वरूपं ब्रह्मेति वदद्भिः सदादिशब्दानां ब्रह्मणि प्रवृत्तौ निमित्तानि वक्तव्यानि। न तानि वक्तुं शक्यन्ते; सत्तादीनां दुर्निरूपत्वात्। तथाहि—न तावत्सत्ता जातिः सद्व्यक्तिभेदाभावात्। न च प्रमायाः सम्बन्धयोग्यत्वं सत्त्वम्; ब्रह्मणः प्रमेयत्वानङ्गीकारात्। अथासद्व्यावृत्तिः सत्त्वमिति चेत्, तदपि न। सदसद्विलक्षणस्य प्रपञ्च-स्याप्यसद्व्यावृत्तत्वेन सत्त्वप्रसङ्गात्। अथ सत्तैव सच्छब्दस्यार्थो वर्ण्यते, तदप्यसाधु; लोके सत्ताया धर्मत्वेन प्रसिद्धत्वात् ब्रह्मणः कञ्चन धर्मिणं प्रति धर्मत्वप्रसङ्गात्। तस्मात्सुदुर्नि-रूपम्।

एवं चैतन्यगुणयोगिनि वस्तुनि चिच्छब्दस्य प्रसिद्धेः ब्रह्मणश्चैतन्यगुणानङ्गीकारात्तस्य चित्त्वमपि न निरूपणमर्हति। यदि तु चैतन्यमेव चिच्छब्दवाच्यं स्यात्, तदा प्रमाणज्ञानानामपि ब्रह्मत्वं भवेत्। अथ प्रमाणज्ञानं न चैतन्यम्, अपि त्वन्तःकरणवृत्तिरूपत्वाज्जडरूपमिति चेत्, तर्ह्यन्तःकरणवत्तस्मादपि विषयोपलब्धिर्न स्यात्। अथ जडव्यावृत्तत्वं चित्त्वम्, तच्च स्वाधीनस्वप्रकाशत्वमिति मतम्; तच्च नैवम्; स्वव्यतिरिक्तप्रकाशानभ्युपगमेन स्वाधीनप्रकाशत्वाभावात्। तस्माच्चित्स्वरूपत्वं ब्रह्मणो दुर्विवेचम्।

एवं सुखरूपत्वमपि ब्रह्मणो न निरूपयितुं शक्यम्। सुखं मे स्यात्, सुखी भूयासमिति ह्यात्मगुणत्वेन तदनुभूयते। तथा पदार्थविदोऽपि बुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छादीनामात्मगुणत्वमाचक्षते। तस्मात्तस्य गुणत्वप्रसिद्धेर्न सुखरूपं ब्रह्म भवितुमर्हति।

अथ अनुकूलत्वं सुखरूपत्वमिति मतम्, तदा (था?) पि वक्तव्यं, ब्रह्म कस्यानुकूलं भवतीति। न तावज्जीवानाम्; ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तानां तेषामनभ्युपगमात्। स्वस्यैवेति चेत्, तत्रापि वक्तव्यम्, किमिदमानुकूल्यन्नाम? भोग्यत्वमिति चेत्, तदपि न सिद्ध्येत्; स्वस्य भोक्तृत्वाभावेन भोग्यत्वानुपपत्तेः। दुःखनिवृत्तिरूपत्वमिति च न वाच्यम्; ब्रह्मणो निवृत्तिरूपत्वेनाभावात्मकत्वप्रसङ्गात्। निरपेक्षत्वं सुखरूपत्वमिति चायुक्तम्; काष्ठलोष्टादीनामपि निरपेक्षत्वेन सुखरूपत्वप्रसङ्गात्। तस्मात्सुखरूपत्वमपि ब्रह्मणो दुरुपपादम्।

यदिदमद्वितीयत्वं ब्रह्मण उक्तं, तदपि चिन्त्यम्। किं सदृशद्वितीयरहितत्वं तद्युक्तम्; ब्रह्मद्वित्वासम्भवात्। स्वकार्येण प्रपञ्चेन सद्वितीयं न भवतीत्यद्वितीयं ब्रह्मेति चेत्, तदपि न विरुद्धम्; कार्यकारणयोरेकत्वात्।

अथ 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्, एकमेवाद्वितीयम्' इति प्रतिसर्गावस्थायां सन्मात्रस्य ब्रह्मणः सजातीयविजातीयस्वगतभेदरहिततयाभिधानात् 'नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन' 'अथात आदेशो नेति नेति' ब्रह्मणि नानात्वनिषेधात् 'वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्' इति घटादिकार्यस्यासत्यताप्रतिपादनमुखेन ब्रह्मकार्यस्य प्रपञ्चस्य मिथ्यात्वप्रतिपादनात् 'सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म' इति बाधितार्थसामानाधिकरण्यात्, 'तरति शोकमात्मवित्' इति प्रमात्रादिलक्षणस्य संसारस्य ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वोपदेशेन मिथ्यात्वावगमाच्च निर्धूतनिखिलविशेषमद्वि-

तीयं ब्रह्मेत्यभिधीयते। न च भेदावलम्बिभिः शास्त्रैः प्रत्यक्षादिभिश्चासां श्रुतीनां विरोधः शङ्कनीयः; भेदवासनादोषमूलत्वेन तासां दौर्बल्यात्। प्रत्युताद्वैतश्रुतीनां द्वैतनिषेधपरत्वेन परत्वात्ताभिर्भेदावलम्बिनां शास्त्राणामेव बाध्यत्वं भवति।

अनुमानादप्यद्वितीयत्वं प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वञ्च साधयितुं शक्यम्। तथाहि—विगीतो भेदव्यवहारोऽद्वैतवस्त्ववलम्बनः, भेदव्यवहारत्वात्, चन्द्रभेदव्यवहारवत्; विप्रतिपन्नः प्रपञ्चो मिथ्या, दृश्यत्वाच्छुक्तिरूप्यतादात्म्यवत् इति। तस्मान्निरस्तविशेषमद्वितीयं ब्रह्मेति।

तदसाम्प्रतम्; प्रकृतिप्रत्ययात्मकपदसङ्घातरूपवाक्यस्यानेकपदार्थसंसर्गावबोधकत्वेन कस्यचिदपि वाक्यस्य निर्विशेषवस्तुप्रतिपादनासामञ्जस्यात्। शास्त्रं तावन्नाद्वैतवस्तुनि प्रमाणम्। 'सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीत्' 'एकमेवाद्वितीयम्' इति वाक्यमपि सविशेषमेव वस्तु प्रतिपादयति। तथाहि—अग्र इति कालविशेषः प्रतीयते। आसीदिति क्रियाविशेषः। इदं सदिति जगतः सदात्मकत्वम्। एकमेवेति नामरूपविभागाभाववचनेन सच्छब्दवाच्यस्य ब्रह्मण उपादानत्वम्। अद्वितीयमित्यधिष्ठात्रन्तरनिराकरणेन निमित्तत्वम्। अत एवानन्तशक्तियोगश्च। अतो नानेन निर्विशेषवस्तुसिद्धिः।

'नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन' इति वाक्यमपि तत्त्वोपदेशपरमुपासनोपदेशपरं वा। उभयथापि सर्वभेदनिषेधो नानेन शक्यते वक्तुम्। प्रमात्राद्यभावेनोपदेशानुपपत्तेः। अत इदं वाक्यमब्रह्मात्मकनानावस्तुनिषेधपरम्। उपबृंहितञ्चैतद्भगवता

'न तदस्ति विना यत्स्यान्मया भूतञ्चराचरम्[१]' इति।

'अथात आदेशो नेति' इति वाक्यमपि ब्रह्मणः पूर्वं प्रस्तुतमाहात्म्येयत्तानिषेधपरम्; उत्तरत्रापि तन्माहात्म्यकथनाय (नात्।?) निरणैषीच्च भगवान्**बादरायणः** 'प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं हि प्रतिषेधति ततो ब्रवीति च भूयः[२]' इत्यत्र। अत इदमपि वाक्यं न निर्विशेषपरम्।

१. गी. X. ३९.

२. ब्र. सू. ३. २. २१.

'वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्' इति वाक्यमपि न कार्यघटादेर्मिथ्यात्वं ब्रूते, किन्तु तस्य कारणभूतमृद्द्रव्यादनन्यत्वं वक्ति। अतस्तेनापि प्रपञ्चस्य ब्रह्मकार्यतया ब्रह्मात्मकत्वमवगतमिति न ब्रह्मणो निर्विशेषत्वमवगम्यते। नापि प्रपञ्चस्य मिथ्यात्वम्। अन्येषामप्येवंजातीयानामियमेव गतिः।

यदुक्तं भेदावलम्बिनां शास्त्रप्रत्यक्षाणां भेदवासनादोषमूलत्वेन दौर्बल्यात्तेषां तैर्बाध्यत्वमिति, तदयुक्तम्; भेदवासनाया दोषत्वे प्रमाणाभावात्। भेदज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वेन तज्जन्यवासनाया दोषत्वं निश्चीयत इति चेन्न; अन्योन्याश्रयणात्। भेदज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वे निर्णीते तद्वासनाया दोषत्वनिर्णयः, तद्वासनाया दोषत्वे निर्णीते भेदज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वनिर्णय इति॥

अथ वेदान्तवाक्यानां निरस्तसमस्तभेदवस्तुपरत्वनिश्चयेन भेदज्ञानस्य भ्रमरूपत्वनिर्णय इति नान्योन्याश्रयणमिति मतम्, तदा चक्रकाश्रयापत्तिः। भेदावलम्बिनां भेदवासनामूलत्वेन दौर्बल्ये निर्णीते वेदान्तवाक्यानां निरस्तसमस्तभेदवस्तुपरत्वनिश्चयः; तेषां निरस्तसमस्तभेदवस्तुपरत्वनिश्चये भेदज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वनिश्चयः; भेदज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वनिर्णये तद्वासनाया दोषमूलत्वेन भेदावलम्बिनां प्रमाणानां दौर्बल्यमिति।

यत्पुनरुक्तमद्वैतवस्तुपराणां शास्त्राणां द्वैतनिषेधपरत्वेन बलीयस्त्वमिति, तदप्यसङ्गतम्; निषेधात्मकस्य परस्यैवाप्रामाण्यदर्शनात्। चन्द्रैकत्वे ज्ञाते सत्येवावष्टम्भादिना अनेकचन्द्र इति मनीषा समुन्मिषति। न च सा प्रमाणम्। तस्माद्भेदावलम्बिनां प्रमाणानां न दौर्बल्यम्॥

यदुक्तं 'सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म' इति बाधितार्थसामानाधिकरण्याद्विलक्षणस्य प्रपञ्चस्य मिथ्यात्वं सिद्ध्यति इति, तदपि न सिद्ध्येत्; तज्जलानीति तज्जत्वतल्लत्वतदनत्वैः प्रपञ्चस्य ब्रह्मात्मकत्वोपदेशपरत्वात्; नेदं रजतमितिवद्बाधस्याप्रतिसन्धानाच्च।

यत्तु प्रपञ्चस्य ब्रह्मज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वोपदेशान्यथानुपपत्त्या मिथ्यात्वमवगम्यत इति, तदपि मनोरथमात्रम्; वाक्यजन्यज्ञानस्य संसारनिवर्तकत्वाभावात्। उपासनोपदेशपरत्वात्तेषां वाक्यानाम्। तस्माच्छ्रुतिभिर्वा श्रुत्यन्यथानुपपत्त्या वा न निर्विशेषवस्तुसिद्धिः।

यच्चेदमद्वितीयत्वे प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वे चानुमानद्वयमुपन्यस्तम्; तत्सर्वप्रमाणबाधितत्वात्कालात्ययापदिष्टम्। किञ्चैवमप्यनुमानं शक्यम्—असद्ब्रह्म, अदृश्यत्वाच्छशविषाणवत्; विप्रतिपन्नः प्रपञ्चस्सत्यः, अबाधितत्वादात्मवदिति।

किञ्च ‘ सर्वज्ञस्सर्ववित् ’ ‘ सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म ’ इत्यादिभिर्वस्तुस्वरूपोपदेश-परैश्शास्त्रैः ज्ञानादिगुणविशिष्टतया ब्रह्मणोऽवगतस्य निर्विशेषत्वमनुपपन्नम् । न चैते गुणाः काल्पनिकास्सत्यवचनाः ; प्रमाणान्तरात् (राद [?])प्राप्तानां तेषामुपदेशानुपपत्तेः ।

अथ स्यात् ‘ सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म ’ इति न विशिष्टं ब्रह्म प्रतिपादयति ; अख-ण्डैकरसब्रह्मस्वरूपप्रतिपादनपरत्वात्तस्य । तात्पर्ये हि शब्दः प्रमाणं भवति । समानाधि-करणपदसमूहात्मकस्य वाक्यस्यार्थैकत्वे तात्पर्यमिति सर्वसम्मतम् । न च विशिष्टवस्त्वैक्यस्य प्रतिपादनं सामानाधिकरण्यस्य युक्तम् ; विशेषणसम्बन्धे प्रमाणाभावात् । इदमेव विशेषण-सम्बन्धं विशिष्टैक्यञ्च प्रतिपादयतीति न युक्तम् ; वाक्यभेदप्रसङ्गेनोभयविधानस्या-शक्यत्वात् । विशिष्टैक्यप्रतिपादने विशेषणानां व्यावर्तकत्वस्वाभाव्याद्विशेषणभेदेन विशेष्य-भेदप्रसङ्गः । नीलमुत्पलमित्यादिषु नीलिमादिसम्बन्धस्य प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वाद्विशिष्टैक्यप्रति-पादनमविरुद्धम् । सत्यादिपदानां स्वार्थप्रहाणेन वस्तुस्वरूपोपस्थापनपरत्वे लक्षणादोषो भवतीत्युत्प्रेक्षा चायुक्ता ; प्रामाण्यानुगुणत्वाल्लक्षणायाः । न च पदानां पर्यायता ; सत्य-त्वादिविरोध्यसत्यत्वादिव्यावृत्तिरूपब्रह्मस्वरूपोपस्थापनेन तेषामर्थवत्त्वात् । अत एव तेषां प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभेदोऽप्युपपन्नः ; न च व्यावृत्तीनां धर्मत्वेन ब्रह्मणः सविशेषणत्वप्रसङ्गः ; सकलेतरव्यावृत्तिरूपत्वाद्ब्रह्मणः ; यथा गुणजातिक्रियादिविशेषाणां स्वेतरविशेषव्यावृत्तिः स्वरूपमेव भवति । तस्मादेतद्वाक्यं निर्विशेषं वस्तु प्रतिपादयतीति न सगुणब्रह्मप्रतिपादन-परत्वमस्य वाक्यस्येति ॥

तदेतदसाम्प्रतम् ; विशिष्टवस्त्वैक्यपरत्वादेव समानाधिकरणपदसङ्घातरूपवाक्यस्य प्रामाण्योपपत्तेः । न च वाक्यस्योभयविधानम् , येन वाक्यभेदो भवेत् । व्युत्पत्तिवशेन पदा-नामेव विशिष्टार्थाभिधायित्वात् । न हि नीलमित्युक्ते नीलिमगुण एव प्रतीयते, किन्तु तद्विशिष्टं द्रव्यम् । सत्यमुभयोरपि प्रतीतिरस्ति । गुण एव शब्दात्प्रतीयते । अर्थस्य [द्रव्य-स्य [?]] प्रतीतिस्तु तत्सामर्थ्यसिद्धेति न युक्तं वक्तुम् ; नियमहेत्वभावात् । तस्मात्पदैरेव विशिष्टार्थाभिधानाद्विशिष्टैक्यमेव सामानाधिकरण्यावसेयम् ।

न च विशेषणभेदेन विशेष्यभेदप्रसङ्गः ; विरुद्धविशेषणानामेव विशेष्यभेदकत्वात् । अत एव खण्डो मुण्डः पूर्णश‍ृङ्गो गौरित्यत्र व्यक्तिभेदप्रतीतिः । नीलं सुगन्धि महदुत्पल-

मित्यत्र विशिष्टैक्यप्रतिपत्तिश्च । अखण्डवस्तुस्वरूपे तु (स्वरूपपरत्वे तु ?) वाक्यस्य, पदानां स्वार्थपरित्यागेन लक्षणादोषोऽवर्जनीयः । प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभेदाभावेन सामानाधिकरण्यानुपपत्तिश्च । पदानां पर्यायता च । अभिधेयविरोधिव्यावृत्तिपरत्वेऽप्यभावरूपैर्धर्मैः ब्रह्मणः सविशेषत्वं प्रसज्येत ।

तत्र यदुक्तं जात्यादिविशेषाणामे[मि ?]व व्यावृत्तीनां ब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वान्न ब्रह्मणस्सविशेषत्वमिति ; तदपि न शोभनम् ; जात्यादीनां धर्मस्वरूपत्वात् धर्माणां धर्मान्तरासम्बन्धाच्च तेषामितरव्यावृत्तिस्वरूपत्वं युक्तम् ; न द्रव्याणाम् । न हि घटस्य पटाद्यावृत्तिः स्वरूपम्[1] । घटत्वजातिर्हि तस्य पटाद्यावृत्तिः । ब्रह्मणो द्रव्यत्वादसत्यादिव्यावृत्तयो धर्मा भवेयुरिति तैस्सविशेषमेव ब्रह्म भवेत् । तस्मात् 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' इति वाक्यं सत्यत्वादिगुणविशिष्टं ब्रह्म प्रतिपादयतीति निर्विशषत्वं विरुद्धमेव ॥

किञ्च प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धमिदमद्वितीयत्वम् ; घटपटादिभेदानां प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात् । अथ मतं न प्रत्यक्षं भेदग्रहणसमर्थम् । तथा हि—इतरेतराभावो वार्थान्तरं वा भेदः । उभयथापि तत्स्मरणस्य धर्मिप्रतियोगिस्मरणसव्यपेक्षत्वात् प्रत्यक्षज्ञानस्य क्षणिकत्वेन विळम्बासहत्वाच्च अनेन न भेदो ग्रहीतुं शक्यते । 'इदं तत्र सम्भवति' इत्येवं रूपो हीतरेतराभावः । तत्र प्रत्यक्षमिदमिति किं विदधाति ? एतन्न भवतीति व्यवच्छिनत्ति वा ? विदधदिदं प्रत्यक्षं तत्रैव क्षीणशक्तिकत्वान्न व्यवच्छेदसमर्थम् । नापि व्यवच्छिनत्ति ; विधिपूर्वकत्वाद्व्यवच्छेदस्य ॥

नापि युगपदेव विधिव्यवच्छेदौ करोति; क्षणिकत्वादेव तस्य क्रमभाव्युभयहेतुत्वासम्भवात् । अर्थान्तरत्वेऽपि भेदस्येतरेतराभावग्रहणपूर्वकत्वात्तद्ग्रहणस्योक्तदोषस्समानः । तस्मान्न प्रत्यक्षं भेदग्रहणसमर्थम् । प्रत्युत देशकालानवच्छिन्नस्य सन्मात्रस्य ग्राहकम् । तथा हि—चाक्षुषज्ञानसमनन्तरं सन्घटस्सन्पट इत्यादयो व्यवहाराः प्रतीयमाना दृश्यन्ते । तत्र सर्वत्र सदर्था घटादयश्च व्यवह्रियन्ते । तत्र क्रमभाविनोरुभयोरपि व्यवहारयोर्न प्रत्यक्षमूलत्वं सम्भवति ; तयोर्भिन्नकालज्ञानफलत्वात् । प्रत्यक्षज्ञानस्य क्षणिकत्वाच्च । तस्मात्तयोरेकः प्रत्यक्षमूल., इतरो भ्रान्तिमूल इत्यवश्याश्रयणीयः । इदं रजतमित्यनुवर्तमानस्येदमर्थ-

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1. त्तिरूपत्वम् —पा .

स्यावभासोऽक्षमूलः । व्यावर्तमानरजतादेरवभासो भ्रान्तिमूल इत्यवगतम् । एवमत्राप्यनुवर्तमानं सदेव प्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यते । व्यावर्तमाना घटादयो भ्रान्त्या अवभासन्त इति निश्चीयते । न च रजतादीनामिव बाधो न दृश्यत इति तत्तदवभासानां कथं भ्रान्तित्वमिति शङ्का युक्ता ; बाधफलभूतानां व्यावृत्तीनामितरेतरबुद्धयोर्दृष्टत्वाद्बाधस्यापि विद्यमानत्वात् । अयं घट इति हि बुद्धौ पटव्यावृत्तिर्भवति । तथा अयं पट इति बुद्धौ घटव्यावृत्तिः । तस्मात्सन्मात्रग्राहि प्रत्यक्षमिति न प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धमद्वैतमिति ॥

नैतदुपपद्यते ; भेदस्य प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वादबाधितत्वाच्च । तत्र यदुक्तं भेदग्रहणस्य धर्मिप्रतियोगिग्रहणस्मरणसापेक्षत्वात्प्रत्यक्षज्ञानस्य क्षणिकत्वेन विधिव्यवच्छेदव्यवहारहेतुत्वासम्भवान्न भेदः प्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यत इति ; तद्भेदस्वरूपापरिज्ञानविजृम्भितम् । न ह्यस्माकमितरेतर-(रा ?)भावः तद्ग्रहणपूर्वकं इतरेतराभावो वा [कं अर्थान्तरं वा ?] भेदः । किन्तु वस्तुनः प्रकारभूता जात्यादयः । ते प्रकारत्वादेव प्रकारिणा सह प्रथन्ते । प्रकारि वस्त्वपि तैर्विना न प्रथते ; अनुपलब्धेरनुपपत्तेश्च । गौरयं शुक्लोऽयं गच्छत्ययमिति हि सर्वे प्रतियन्ति । नन्विदमर्थमात्रविषया कस्यचिदपि कदाचिदपि प्रतीतिरस्ति । नापि संस्थानेन विना गवाद्यर्थः प्रतीतिगोचरतामासादयति । किञ्च प्रथमत एव सकलेतरव्यावृत्ततयावभासनादेव हि प्रतियोगिस्मरणनिरपेक्षं पुरोवर्तिवस्तुनि तदर्थी प्रवर्तते । तस्मात्प्रत्यक्षं भेदग्रहणसमर्थमेव ।

ननु अयमस्माद्भिन्न इति धर्मिप्रतियोगिग्रहणस्मरणसव्यपेक्षं भेदग्रहणं दृश्यते । तत्कथं प्रथममेव भेदो गृह्यत इति । उच्यते—नेदं भेदग्रहणम् ; तस्य प्रतियोग्यपेक्षाभावात् । किन्तु अयमस्मादभिन्न इत्यभेदव्यवहारवत् कश्चिद्भेदव्यवहारः । किमुक्तं भवति ? यथा अयमिति स्वरूपाभेदव्यवहारादृते रूपतः परिणामतः संस्थानतश्च सौसादृश्याभिप्रायेणायमस्मादभिन्न इत्यभेदव्यवहारः प्रवर्तते ; तथायं गौरित्यादि भेदव्यवहारादन्यो द्वयोर्वस्तुनोः परिणामादिनिमित्तवैसादृश्यनिबन्धनोऽयमस्माद्भिन्न इति भेदव्यवहारो भवतीत्युक्तंभवति । तस्माद[द् ?]भेदग्रहणं धर्मिप्रतियोगिग्रहणस्मरणानपेक्षमिति न किञ्चिदेतत् ।

यत्पुनरुक्तं सन्मात्रविषयं प्रत्यक्षमिति ; तदपि स्ववीयः ; तस्य प्रमेयत्वानङ्गीकारात्, चक्षुरिन्द्रियस्य रूपरूपितदेकार्थसमवायिषु क्लृप्तशक्तिकत्वाच्च । यदुक्तं सन्घट इति सद्द्रव्यं प्रतीयत इति ; तत्र यद्वक्तव्यं, तच्छक्तिविक्षेपप्रतिक्षेपाधिकारे वक्ष्यते ।

यत्तु व्यावर्तमानत्वाद्घटादीनां रजतादेरिव काल्पनिकत्वमुक्तम्, तदप्ययुक्तम्; अप्रयोजकत्वाद्धेतोः। बाधितत्वादेव हि रजतादेः काल्पनिकत्वम्; न व्यावर्तमानत्वात्। न च व्यावृत्तिमात्रं बाधफलम्, अपि तु यद्देशकालयोर्यद्वस्तु भासते तद्देशकालव्यावृत्तता बाधफलभूता दृष्टा; तस्माद्भेदस्य प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वादबाधितत्वादद्वैतं प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धमेव ॥

यदुक्तं अद्वितीयं ब्रह्म अनाद्यज्ञानतिरोहितस्वरूपं विविधाध्यासोपादानमिति; तत्र अज्ञानं नाम किमिति वक्तव्यम्? न तावज्ज्ञानाभावः; तस्य वस्तुस्वरूपतिरोधायकत्वासम्भवादध्यासहेतुत्वासम्भवाच्च। न अन्यथा ज्ञानमज्ञानम्; तत एव।

अथ स्यात् ज्ञानप्रागभावातिरिक्तं सदसदनिर्वचनीयं तमोमायादिशब्दवाच्यं वस्तुयाथात्म्यज्ञाननिवर्त्यं भावरूपं किञ्चिद्वस्त्वज्ञानम्। तच्च श्रुतितदर्थापत्त्यनुमानप्रत्यक्षैरवसीयते। तथाहि—'नासदासीन्नोसदासीत्तदानीम्' इत्युपक्रम्य 'तम आसीत्तमसा गूढमग्रे' इत्युक्तलक्षणमज्ञानमभिधीयते। श्वेताश्वतराणामुपनिषदि 'मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यात्' इति मायाशब्देनाज्ञानमभिधीयते।

'तत्त्वमसि' इति सामानाधिकरण्यावगतजीवैक्यान्यथानुपपत्त्या तदवगम्यते। विरुद्धयोर्जीवब्रह्मणोरैक्यमज्ञानरूपदोषमूलमन्यतरमिथ्यात्वमन्तरेण नोपपद्यते।

प्रमाणज्ञानं स्वप्रागभावव्यतिरिक्तस्वविषयावरणस्वनिवर्त्यस्वदेशगतवस्त्वन्तरपूर्वकम्, अप्रकाशितार्थप्रकाशकत्वात्, अन्धकारे प्रथमोत्पन्नप्रदीपप्रभावदित्यनुमानेनाज्ञानं सिद्ध्यति।

तथा 'अहमज्ञो मामन्यञ्च न जानामि' इति प्रत्यक्षेणाज्ञानं प्रतीयते। न चेदं ज्ञानप्रागभावविषयम्; तस्याभावप्रमाणगोचरत्वात्। अस्य ज्ञानस्याहं सुखीतिवदपरोक्षाकारत्वाच्च। अस्त्वभावः प्रत्यक्षः, तथापीदं न ज्ञानाभावविषयम्; ज्ञानाभावानुभववेलायामहमर्थस्याश्रयतयाभावस्य विषयतया ज्ञानस्य प्रतियोगितया चानुभवस्यावश्यम्भावात्। अनुभवेन सह तदभावस्यावस्थानासम्भवाच्च। अथ आश्रयप्रतियोगिनोरनुभवो नाभ्युपगम्येत, तदा तत्सम्बन्धिज्ञानाभावस्वा[स्या ?]नुभवो न सम्भवतीति सुतरां न ज्ञानाभावविषयं प्रत्यक्षम्। अज्ञानस्य भावरूपत्वे तु न धर्मिप्रतियोग्यनुभवापेक्षा तदनुभवस्य। न हि तमःप्रतिपत्तौ वस्त्वन्तरानुभवोऽपेक्षितः। अथ भावरूपमप्यज्ञानं वस्तुयाथात्म्यावभासरूपेण साक्षिचैतन्येन

विरुद्धमित्यस्य प्रत्यक्षस्य तद्विषयत्वमप्ययुक्तमिति चेत्, तन्न; वस्तुनः स्वयंप्रकाशत्वेन साक्षिचैतन्याविषयत्वात्। अतो न निष्प्रमाणकमज्ञानमिति ॥

अत्रोच्यते। यदुक्तं 'तम आसीत्तमसा गूढमग्रे' इति श्रुतिसिद्धमज्ञानमिति, तदसत्; तमश्शब्दस्यान्धकारे चोद्भूततमोगुणे प्रकृतितत्त्वे च लोकशास्त्रयोः प्रसिद्धत्वात्; अज्ञाने प्रसिद्ध्यभावाच्च। आच्छादकत्वगुणयोगात्तमश्शब्दोऽज्ञाने वर्तत इत्युत्प्रेक्षामात्रम्; आच्छादकत्वासम्भवस्य वक्ष्यमाणत्वात् ॥

'मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यात्' इत्यत्रापि नाज्ञानसम्भव उच्यते; अपि तु प्रकृतेर्विचित्रार्थसर्गकरत्वं प्रतिपाद्यते। विचित्रसर्गकरवस्तु मायाशब्दवाच्यम्। तच्च द्विविधम्—किञ्चिद्विचित्रं भ्रान्तिज्ञानकरम्, यथा ऐन्द्रजालिकानां मणिमन्त्रौषधादि, किञ्चिद्विचित्रार्थसर्गकरम्, यथा असुरराक्षसास्त्रादि। तस्मात्प्रकृतिरपि महदादिविचित्रार्थसर्गकरत्वान्मायेत्युच्यते।

यच्चोक्तं तत्त्वमसीत्यैक्योपदेशान्यथानुपपत्त्या अज्ञानं कल्प्यत इति; तदपि जगत्कारणत्वविशिष्टस्य जीवप्रकारविशिष्टस्य च ब्रह्मण ऐक्योपदेशपरत्वेनान्यथैवोपपन्नत्वादयुक्तम्। किञ्च सर्वज्ञे ब्रह्मणि विरुद्धाज्ञानपरिकल्पनहेतुभूता न काचिदनुपपत्तिर्दृश्यते, येनाज्ञानं कल्प्येत ॥

यच्च भावरूपाज्ञानसाधनतया अनुमानमुपन्यस्तम्; तदपि न शोभनम्; तेनैवानुमानेनानैकान्तिकत्वाद्धेतोः। न हि तस्यानुमानप्रमेयस्याज्ञानस्यावारकं भावरूपमज्ञानान्तरमस्ति; अनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात्। ब्रह्मणस्तिरोधानासम्भवेन जगत्प्रतिभासानुपपत्तेश्च। प्रदीपप्रभायाः प्रकाशकत्वाभावात्साधनविकलश्च दृष्टान्तः। ज्ञानं हि प्रकाशकम्; तदुत्पत्तिहेतुभूतानामिन्द्रियाणां विरोधिसन्तमसनिरसनमात्रेणोपकारकत्वमेव हि प्रदीपप्रभायाः। तस्मादनुमानमपि नाज्ञानसाधनम्।

यच्चोक्तं [1]अहमज्ञ इति प्रत्यक्षेणाभावरूपमज्ञानं प्रतीयत इति, तच्च नैवम्; अज्ञानानुभवस्याश्रयविषयभूतप्रत्यगर्थानुभवपुरस्सरत्वात्। मम मद्विषयमज्ञानमस्तीति

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१. यदपि चोक्तम्—पा.

ह्यज्ञानमनुभूयते । तच्च तत्स्वरूपज्ञाननिवर्त्यमज्ञानं तस्मिन् प्रतिपन्ने कथमिव सम्भवति? अथ विशदस्वरूपावभासोऽज्ञानविरोधी । अविशदस्वरूपेणास्मदर्थस्य प्रतिपन्नतया अज्ञानानुभवो न विरोत्स्यत इति मतम् , तत्ज्ञानप्रागभावेऽपि समानम् । यच्च भावस्वरूपस्यानुभवे तमःप्रतिपत्ताविवान्यापेक्षा नास्तीति, तदापातरमणीयम् ; दृष्टान्तस्य विषमत्वात् । तमसः स्वरूपेणोपलम्भसम्भवात् । अज्ञानस्य तथाभावाभावात् । अज्ञानस्य तदन्यतद्विरोधितदभावानामन्यतमत्वात्सर्वथापि ज्ञानोपलब्धिपूर्वकस्तदुपलम्भः । तमसश्चालोकविरोधीत्यनेनाकारेण प्रतिपत्तौ आलोकप्रतिपत्त्यपेक्षत्वमस्त्येव । तस्मान्न केनापि प्रमाणेन भावरूपाज्ञानसिद्धिः ॥

किञ्च आश्रयोऽस्याज्ञानस्य निरूपणीयः । न तावज्जीवाश्रयत्वं तस्य सम्भवति ; अज्ञानकल्पितत्वाज्जीवानाम् । नापि ब्रह्माश्रयत्वम् ; तस्य ज्ञानसमानाश्रयत्वात् ; ब्रह्मणो ज्ञानाश्रयत्वानभ्युपगमात् । ज्ञानाश्रयत्वविरहिणां घटादीनां हि नाज्ञानाश्रयत्वं दृष्टम् ।

अपि चाज्ञानेन ब्रह्मणस्तिरोधानञ्च अशक्यप्रतिपादनम् । आच्छाद्यविषयज्ञानोत्पत्तिनिरोधो ह्याच्छादनशब्दार्थः । अत्र त्वाच्छाद्यस्य ब्रह्मणो ज्ञानविषयत्वानङ्गीकारात्तदुत्पत्तिनिरोधरूपमाच्छादनन्न सम्भवति । एवमपि प्रकाशस्वरूपस्य ब्रह्मणोऽज्ञानेन तिरोधानं वक्तव्यं चेत् , स्वरूपनाश एव तिरोधानशब्देनोक्तस्स्यात् ॥

किञ्चेदमज्ञानमननुभूतं सद्ब्रह्म तिरस्करोति, किं वा तिरस्कृत्य (स्कृत्य ब्रह्म?) अनुभवविषयं भवति । न प्रथमः कल्पः , अज्ञानतत्तिरोधानकल्पनयोर्वैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गात् । प्रपञ्चप्रतिभासार्थमज्ञानतिरोधाने कल्प्येते । अतिरोहितस्य ब्रह्मणोऽज्ञानसाक्षित्ववदज्ञानतिरोधानाभ्यां विनाप्यज्ञानकार्याभिमतप्रपञ्चदर्शनसम्भवात् । नापि द्वितीयः ; काचादिवत्स्वसत्तया तिरस्कृतिकरस्याज्ञानस्य ज्ञानबाध्यत्वाभावप्रसङ्गात् । को दोष इति चेत् , अज्ञानकार्यस्य प्रपञ्चस्य सत्यत्वमेव दोषः ॥

किञ्चेदमज्ञानं केन निवर्त्यते? ब्रह्मयाथात्म्यानुभवेनेति चेत् , ब्रह्मयाथात्म्यानुभवः किं ज्ञानस्वरूपं ब्रह्मैव? उत तद्विषयं ज्ञानान्तरं वा? ब्रह्मस्वरूपमेवेति चेन्न ; स्वरूपनिवृत्त्या ज्ञानस्य [अज्ञानस्य?] स्वस्मिन्नसम्भवात् । अथ ज्ञानान्तरमिति चेत्तदपि न ; निर्वि-

शेषस्य ब्रह्मणः स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वेन ज्ञानविषयत्वासम्भवात् । अनभ्युपगमाच्च ।

अथ ब्रह्मणोऽद्वितीयत्वज्ञानमज्ञानस्य निवर्तकमिति मतम्, तदपि विकल्पनीयम् । अद्वितीयत्वं किं ब्रह्मणः स्वरूपम्? उत धर्मः? प्रथमे कल्पे पूर्वोक्तदोषानतिवृत्तिः । उत्तरस्मिन् कल्पे ब्रह्मणस्सद्वितीयत्वप्रसङ्गः ॥

स्यान्मतं, प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वज्ञानं तन्निवर्तकमिति ; तदप्यसङ्गतम् ; ब्रह्मविषयेणाज्ञानेन तस्य विरोधाभावात् । प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वज्ञानस्य तत्सत्यत्वाज्ञानेन विरोधः, न ब्रह्मविषयेणाज्ञानेन ।

यदि मन्वीत प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वज्ञानमेव ब्रह्मयाथात्म्यज्ञानम्, तस्मात्तेन तदज्ञानस्य विरोधो युक्त इति प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वज्ञानेन ब्रह्माज्ञानं निवर्तत इति, तदपि हास्यम् ; प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वस्य ब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वासम्भवात् । तस्माद्ब्रह्मतिरोधायकं तदाश्रयं तज्ज्ञाननिवर्त्यं भावरूपमज्ञानं न सिद्ध्यति ।

यच्चोक्तं ज्ञानस्वरूपं ब्रह्म अविद्याशबलं सज्जगदुपादानकारणमिति, तद्विवेचनीयम् । तत्र किं ब्रह्मोपादानं जगदुत अविद्योपादानमथोभयोपादानम्? न तावत्प्रथमः कल्पः ; कारणानुरूपत्वात्कार्यस्य जगतो ज्ञानस्वरूपत्वे सत्यत्वप्रसङ्गात् । नापि द्वितीयः ; ब्रह्मोपादानत्वश्रुतिव्याकोपप्रसङ्गात् । नापि तृतीयः ; जगतो जडाजडात्मकत्वसत्यत्वासत्यत्वादिविरुद्धस्वभावत्वप्रसङ्गात् ।

अथ स्यात् ज्ञानस्वरूपे ब्रह्मण्यविद्यादोषवशाज्जगदध्यस्तम् । अध्यासाधिष्ठानत्वमेव ब्रह्मण उपादानत्वम् । उपपन्नञ्चैतत् । दृश्यते हि शुक्तिकाशकले रजतमित्यपरोक्षावभासः । नायं सम्यग्रजतविषयः ; असन्निहितत्वात्तस्य । न च निर्विषयः ; विषयशून्यज्ञानस्य कचिदप्यनुपपत्तेः। नापि स्वविषयम्(यः?); परत्वा[त्वेना?]वभासात् । न चासद्विषयः; रजतावभासात् । न चेदं स्मरणम् ; अनुभवरूपत्वात् । न च शुक्तिकाविषयः ; अतद्रूपत्वात्प्रतिपत्तेः । भासमानं हि विषयो भवति । तस्मादपूर्वं रजतं दोषवशाच्छुक्तिकायामुत्पन्नमवभासते । नेदमसत् ; भासमानत्वात् । न च सत् ; बाधितत्वात् । अतस्सदसद्विलक्षणं तदभ्युपगमनीयम् । एवं सदसदनिर्वचनीयं जगदविद्ययोत्पन्नमवभासते । निरधिष्ठानभ्रमानुपपत्तेस्तस्य ब्रह्माधिष्ठानमवगम्यते । अधिष्ठानत्वमेव तस्योपादानत्वमिति ॥

नैतद्युक्तम् ; ब्रह्मणो भ्रमाधिष्ठानत्वानुपपत्तेः । शुक्तिकादावधिष्ठाने केनचिद्-भास्वरत्वाकारेण प्रतिपन्ने शुक्तित्वाद्याकारेण तिरोहिते सति हि रजतादिभ्रमो दृष्टः । ब्रह्म तु निर्विशेषतया निराकारं स्वयम्प्रकाशञ्च । अतोऽधिष्ठानभूतस्य प्रतिपन्नत्वादप्रति-पन्नाकारांशासम्भवाच्च न तस्मिन् जगदध्यासः सम्भवति । अध्यासहेतुभूताया अविद्याया असम्भवश्च पूर्वमेवोक्तः ।

यदुक्तं शुक्तिकायां दोषवशात्सदसद्विलक्षणं रजतमुत्पन्नमवभासत इति ; तदपि साहसम् ; सदसद्विलक्षणस्यानुपपत्तेः । एकस्य हि वस्तुनः सद्वैलक्षण्यमसद्वैलक्षण्यञ्च विरुद्धत्वान्न सम्भवति ।

निष्प्रमाणकं चैतत् सदसदनिर्वचनीयत्वम् । यत् ख्यातिबाधान्यथानुपपत्तिः प्रमा-णमित्युक्तम् ; तदपि न ; ख्यातिबाधयोरन्यस्यान्यथाभानादेवोपपत्तेः । दृश्यते हि सम्य-ग्रजतवदिदं रजतमिति पुरोवर्तिनो रजतात्मकत्वम् ।

ननु कथं रजतेऽवभासमाने तज्ज्ञानस्य शुक्तिका विषयो भवति ? न भासमानत्वं विषयत्वम् । किन्तर्हि ? तत्संप्रयुक्तचक्षुरिन्द्रिय(यज ?) ज्ञानव्यावर्त्यत्वम् । कथं तर्हि इन्द्रिय-सम्बन्धरहितस्य रजतस्य भानं सम्भवति । भवत्पक्षे वा कथमिन्द्रियसम्बन्धरहितस्यानिर्वच-नीयरजतस्यावभासः ? दोषवशादिति चेत् , समानमेतदस्माकमपि । अत एव हि तस्य भ्रम-त्वम् । तस्मादेवान्यथाभानान्नेदं रजतमिति प्रसक्तताद्रूप्याकारबाधोऽप्युपपन्नः ।

किञ्च रजतार्थिनः पुरोवर्तिनि प्रवृत्तेरन्यथाख्यातिरेवाङ्गीकरणीया । यदि शुक्तिकैव रजतात्मना नावभासते, किमिति रजतार्थी तत्र प्रवर्तते ? त्वयाप्यनिर्वचनीयरजतस्य सम्यग्रजततयावभासादेव प्रतीति (प्रवृत्ति ?) र्भवतीति वक्तव्यमित्यन्यथाख्यातिरङ्गीकरणीया ।

किञ्च शुक्तिकायामनिर्वचनीयं वस्तु किञ्चिज्जातमिति वदता तस्य रजतबुद्धिशब्द-योर्निबन्धनं वक्तव्यम् । यदि रजतत्वादिजातियोगः, सा किमनिर्वचनीया ? अनिर्व-चनीया चेत् , सम्यग्रजतेषु रजतत्वबुद्धिशब्दौ न स्याताम् । सत्या चेदनिर्वचनीयवस्तुनि न स्याताम् । तस्मात्सदसद्विलक्षणस्य वस्तुनोऽसम्भवान्निर्विशेषस्य ब्रह्मणो जगद्भ्रमाधिष्ठा-नत्वासम्भवाच्च ब्रह्म जगद्रूपेण विवर्तमानं जगदुपादानं भवतीति नैतदुपपत्तिमत् ॥

इति नीतिमालायां विवर्तपक्षप्रतिक्षेपाधिकारस्तृतीयः ।

श्रीः

नीतिमालायां

चतुर्थाधिकार आरभ्यते.



अपर आहुः—

> सम्भृ(संहृ ?)तौ ब्रह्म निर्भेदं सर्वशक्तिसमन्वितम् ।
> भोक्तृभोग्यादिरूपेण सर्गे परिणतं भवेत् ॥
>
> मृदादिपरिणामत्वं घटादेरिव दृश्यते ।
> तथा सत्येव वेदान्तवाक्यं सर्वं समञ्जसम् ॥

'सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीत्' 'एकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्म' इत्यादिभिः प्रतिसर्गावस्थायां प्रलीननिखिलविकल्पं सन्मात्रं ब्रह्मावगतम्। तत्सर्वशक्तितया सर्गसमये विचित्रचिदचिन्मिश्रप्रपञ्चरूपेण परिणतमिति 'तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेय' इत्यादिभिर्वाक्यैरवगतम्। तस्माद्ब्रह्मपरिणामतया ब्रह्ममयं जगत् ।

ननु जगतो ब्रह्मकार्यत्वाभ्युपगमे तेन तदन्येन भवितव्यम्। तथाहि—कार्यकारणयो रूपभेदो नामभेदोऽपि दृश्यते। तथा उदकाहरणकुड्यनिर्माणादिव्यवहारभेदश्च दृश्यते। तस्मात्कारणभूतादन्यत्कार्यं भवितुमर्हति। अपि च कारणादनन्यत्कार्यं चेत्, कारकव्यापारवैयर्थ्यञ्च स्यात्। एवं कारणात्कार्यस्यान्यत्त्वाज्जगतो ब्रह्मपरिणामत्वं नोपपद्यते ॥

उच्यते। कारणात्कार्यमनन्यत्; मृदयं घट इति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात, संस्थानविशेषभाजो मृद्द्रव्यादृते द्रव्यान्तरानुपलब्धेश्च। रूपभेदादयः संस्थानान्तरयोगादेवोपपद्यन्ते। पृथुबुध्नोदराद्याकारस्य कुलालादिव्यापारभावभावित्वात्कारकव्यापारस्यार्थवत्त्वम्। तस्मात्कारणादनन्य-

त्कार्यमिति ब्रह्मणोऽनन्यज्जगत्। एवं जगतो ब्रह्मपरिणामत्वाभ्युपगमे सत्येव 'सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीत्' 'एकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्म' 'सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म' 'आत्मैवेदं सर्वं' इत्यादीनामद्वैतपराणां 'प्रधानक्षेत्रज्ञपतिर्गुणेशः' 'पतिं विश्वस्य' इत्यादिद्वैतपराणां च वेदान्तवाक्यानां सामञ्जस्यं भवति। 'यथा अग्नेः क्षुद्रा विस्फुलिङ्गा व्युच्चरन्ति, एवमेवात्मनस्सर्वाणि भूतानि व्युच्चरन्ति। तेभ्यो भूतेभ्यस्समुत्थाय तान्येवानु विनश्यति' 'अव्यक्तमक्षरे लीयते, अक्षरं तमसि लीयते, तमः परे देव एकीभवति'

'तस्मादव्यक्तमुत्पन्नं त्रिगुणं द्विजसत्तम।
अव्यक्तं पुरुषे ब्रह्मन्निष्क्रिये सम्प्रलीयते ॥'

इत्यादीनि प्रकृतिपुरुषोत्पत्तिप्रळयवादीनि श्रौतानि स्मार्तानि वाक्यानि समञ्जसानि भवन्ति। तस्मान्निरस्तसमस्तविषयस्य ब्रह्मणः परिणामभूतं जगदिति।

अत्रोच्यते—

ब्रह्मणोऽपरिणामित्वश्रुतेश्चानुपपत्तितः।
जीवस्य नित्यतायाश्च कृतनाशादिदोषतः ॥

मोक्षसाधनवैयर्थ्यान्मुक्तेरत्यर्थहानितः।
ब्रह्मणः परिणामित्ववादोऽयं नोपपद्यते ॥

ब्रह्म जगद्रूपेण परिणमत इति वदन्तः किमीश्वरादि(द्वि?)भिन्नं ब्रह्म वदन्ति? उत तमेव? तत्र प्रथमः कल्पो न सम्भवतीत्युपरितनाधिकारे वक्ष्यते। द्वितीयः कल्पोऽप्यनुपपन्नः; 'अस्थूलमनण्वह्रस्वम्' इत्याद्यनेकश्रुतिभिस्तस्यापरिणामित्वावगमात्। अनुपपत्तेश्च; न हि चिद्रूप एवेश्वरोऽचिद्रूपेण परिणमत इति सम्भवति ॥

अथ ईश्वरे उपादानत्वं सर्वात्मकत्वं च सर्वोपनिषत्प्रसिद्धम्। अतस्तस्य जगदाकारेण परिणामोऽङ्गीकरणीयः। अपरिणामित्वश्रुतिरन्यथा नेया। उपादानत्वसर्वात्मकत्वश्रुतेरेव जगतश्चैतन्यशक्तियोगोऽस्तीत्यवगम्यते। तस्याचित्त्वव्यपदेशश्चैतन्यस्य नित्यतिरोहिततया

वेदितव्य इति मतम्; तदप्ययुक्तम्; सर्ववस्तुविरोधात्। अपरिणामित्वश्रुतेरनन्यथासिद्धत्वाच्च। यदुक्तं जगतश्चैतन्यशक्तिरस्तीति न विरोध इति, तन्न, चैतन्यस्य नित्यानुपलब्धेस्तच्छक्तेरसद्भावस्यैव[१] निर्णीतत्वात्। तस्योपादानत्वं सर्वात्मकत्वञ्चापरिणामित्वाविरुद्धमिति ब्रह्मस्वरूपाधिकारे वक्ष्यते।

अथ स्यात्—उपाधिशक्तियुक्तं ब्रह्म। अतो जगत्परिणाम उपपन्नः। उपादानत्वसर्वात्मकत्वोपदेशोऽप्युपपन्न इति। तत्र वक्तव्यम्—उपाधिशक्तिरिति कोऽर्थः? किं सूक्ष्मरूपमुपाधिद्रव्यम्? किं वोपादानरूपेण ब्रह्मणः परिणामसामर्थ्यम्? प्रथमे कल्पे द्रव्यद्वयाङ्गीकारात्सन्मात्रमद्वितीयं ब्रह्मेति विरुद्ध्यते। उत्तरस्मिन्पूर्वोक्तदोषानतिवृत्तिः। अथ मतं उपाधिद्रव्यं ब्रह्मणो भिन्नमभिन्नञ्च भवति। तस्मादनैकान्त्यादुभयपक्षोक्तदोषाः परिहृता भवन्तीति; तदनुपपन्नम्; भेदाभेदयोर्विरुद्धस्वभावत्वेनैकस्मिन्वस्तुन्यसम्भवात्।

अथोच्येत सर्वं वस्तु प्रतीत्यैव व्यवस्थाप्यम्। सर्वं च कारणात्मना जात्यात्मना चाभिन्नम्। कार्यात्मना व्यक्त्यात्मना च भिन्नं प्रतीयते; मृदयं घटः, खण्डो मुण्डो गौरिति। न चानयोर्विरोधः। सहानवस्थानभिन्नाधारत्वयोरभावात्। अभेदशब्दावयवस्य ....(?)त्वाभिधायित्वाच्च। तस्मात्कस्यचिदपि वस्तुनः भिन्नत्वमभिन्नत्वञ्च नैकान्तिकमिति; तदप्ययुक्तम्; एकस्मिन्विलक्षणत्वतद्विपरीतयोरसम्भवात्। आकारभेदादविरोधं वदन् यदि कारणजात्याकारयोरभेदाश्रयत्वं कार्यव्यक्त्योर्भेदाश्रयत्वञ्च वदति, तदा नैकस्य द्व्यात्मकत्वसिद्धिः। अथ कार्यकारणयोर्जातिव्यक्त्योश्चैकत्वादेकस्य द्व्यात्मकता सिद्ध्येत्, तथा सत्याकारभेदादविरोधो न सिद्ध्येत्। जातिव्यक्त्योरेकत्वं चानुपपन्नम्; अनुवर्तमानव्यावर्तमानाकारतया तयोर्विरुद्धस्वभावत्वात्।

स्यादेतत्। अयं गौरिति तादात्म्यप्रतीतेस्तयोरैक्यं प्रतीयते। न चानुवृत्तिव्यावृत्तिप्रतीतिः। तत्कथमनयोर्विरुद्धस्वभावत्वम्? इति। तत्र वक्तव्यम्—किं तादात्म्यमिति? न तावत्सम्बन्धविशेषः। तस्य सम्बन्धिद्वयाधारत्वेनैकत्वासिद्धेः। नाप्यैक्यम्; अनुपलब्धेः। तथा

१. नित्यानुपलब्धेस्तदभावस्यैव—पा०.

सत्ययं गौरित्येकस्य द्विरवभासः स्यात्। न च तद्युक्तम्; न ह्ययमिति वा गौरिति वा अवभासः। किन्तु अयं गौरिति तयोर्विशेषणविशेष्यतया ह्यवभासः। किञ्च व्यक्त्यन्तरे जातिप्रत्यभिज्ञया जातेरनुवर्तमानत्वं व्यक्तेर्व्यावर्तमानत्वञ्च प्रतीयत इति तयोर्विरुद्धस्वभावत्वम्। तस्माज्जातिव्यक्त्योरेकत्वनिबन्धनमेकस्य द्व्यात्मकत्वं न सिद्ध्यति।

यदुच्यते आकारद्वययोगिवस्त्वाश्रयत्वाद्भेदाभेदयोरेकस्य द्व्यात्मकता सिद्ध्यतीति; तदपि न सिद्ध्येत्; भेदाभेदनिर्वाहकाकारद्वयातिरिक्ततदाश्रयवस्तुसद्भावे प्रमाणाभावात्।

यदुच्यते—खण्डस्य मुण्डाद्व्यावृत्तिरूपं खण्डत्वं मुण्डात्खण्डस्य भेदः, अनुवृत्तिरूपं गोत्वमभेद इत्येकस्य भिन्नाभिन्नत्वमविरुद्धमिति। तदप्यचारु; गोत्वस्यानुवृत्तिरूपत्वाभावात्। खण्डो गौर्मुण्डो गौरिति खण्डमुण्डयोरनुवर्तमानतया हि गोत्वमवभासते। न त्वनुवृत्तिरूपतया। गोत्वस्यानुवृत्तिरूपत्वे तद्वत्तया खण्डमुण्डव्यक्त्योरनुवृत्तत्वमभ्युपेतव्यम्। अनुवृत्तिर्हि कस्यचित्केषुचिद्भवति। न हि खण्डवृ(व्य ?)त्तिर्मुण्डव्यक्त्यनुवृत्ता भवति। मुण्डवृ(व्य ?) त्तिः खण्डव्यक्त्यनुवृत्ता वा। गोत्वं ह्युभयोरनुवर्तते। तथानुवृत्तिव्यावृत्त्योर्भिन्नाश्रयत्वान्नैकस्य द्व्यात्मकता।

अथ खण्डताद्यपरसामान्यं भेदः; गोत्वादिपरसामान्यमभेदः। उभयोरेकनिष्ठत्वेन भिन्नाभिन्नत्वं सम्भवतीति। तदप्यसाधु; भेदाभेदशब्दयोः पारिभाषिकत्वप्रसङ्गात्। अस्त्विति चेत्, नास्माकमपि काचित्क्षतिः। कस्यचित्कस्माच्चिद्वैलक्षण्यं भवति। तद्विपरीतं च न भवतीत्येतदेव भिन्नाभिन्नप्रतिपाद्यम्। तस्मादुपाधिब्रह्मणोर्भेदाभेदासम्भवादुक्तदोषोऽवसीयते।

यच्चोक्तं प्रकृतिपुरुषयोरागन्तुकत्वादुपसंहारभेदवेळायां तयोर्विनाश इति; तदप्यनुपपन्नम्। 'अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां बह्वीं प्रजां जनयन्तीं सरूपाम्। अजो ह्येको जुषमाणोऽनुशेते जहात्येनां भुक्तभोगामजोऽन्यः' 'गौरनाद्यन्तवती' 'अविनाशी वा अरे अयमात्मा' 'नित्यो नित्यानां चेतनश्चेतनानाम्' इत्यादिभिस्तयोरजत्वाविनाशित्वनित्यत्वश्रवणात्तयोरुत्पत्तिप्रळयवादीनि पूर्वोक्तानि वचनानि ब्रह्मणा विभागप्रतिपादनपराणि वेदित-

व्यानि। अत एव 'तम एकीभवति' इत्येकभावमात्रमुच्यते। न तु लयः। स्मर्यते च तयोर्ब्रह्मणो विभागः। 'विष्णोस्स्वकाशात्परतोदिते द्वे रूपे प्रधानं पुरुषश्च विप्र' इति। दिते खण्डिते इत्यर्थः।

किञ्च जीवानामनित्यत्वे कृतनाशाकृताभ्यागमदोषौ प्रसज्येयाताम्। पूर्वकल्पावसानेऽपि नष्टैर्जीवैः प्रागनुष्ठितानामभुक्तफलानां कर्मणां निष्फलत्वादुत्तरकल्पादावुत्पद्यमानानामसत्स्वपि कर्मसु तत्फलभूतदेहेन्द्रियादिपरिग्रहाच्च। अपि च तेषामनित्यत्वे मोक्षसाधनभूतोपासनविधयश्च निष्फलाः स्युः। आत्मनाशस्य निःश्रेयसत्वात्तत्साधनभूतोपासनविध्यानर्थक्यं न भवतीति न वाच्यम्; प्रतिसंहारवेळायामात्मनाशरूपनिःश्रेयससिद्धेरवर्जनीयत्वात्॥

अथ उपासनविधयस्त्वरमाणविषया इति चेत्, तन्न; त्वराया असम्भवात्। यद्युपासकाः स्वनाशो मोक्ष इत्यवसेयुः, तदा मोक्षकथामपि परिहरेयुः। तस्मादुपासनविध्यानर्थक्यं भवत्येव। आत्मविनाशस्य दुःखनिवृत्तिफलत्वेन पुरुषार्थत्वं सम्भवतीति च हास्यम्; स्वसत्ताया अनुपमर्देन दुःखनिवृत्तेरर्थ(र्थ्य?)त्वात्। न च सर्वे दुःखनिवृत्तिमर्थयन्ते। वर्तमानदुःखानामेव तन्निवृत्तेरपेक्षितत्वात्। सर्वे सुखमेव प्रार्थयन्ते किञ्च 'रसं ह्येवायं लब्ध्वा नन्दी भवति' इति मुक्तस्यानन्दप्राप्तिवर्णनात्, 'एतेन प्रतिपद्यमाना इमं मानवमावर्तं नावर्तन्त' इत्यपुनरावृत्तिश्रुतेश्च मुक्तस्य सद्भावो मुक्तेः सुखस्वरूपत्वञ्च ज्ञायते। तस्मात्परिणामवादोऽपि न समञ्जसः॥

इति नीतिमालायां परिणामप्रतिक्षेपाधिकारश्चतुर्थः॥

श्रीः

नीतिमालायां

पञ्चमाधिकार आरभ्यते.



अन्ये पुनराहुः—

> सद्द्रव्यं स्वप्रभं ब्रह्म सर्वशक्तिसमन्वितम् ।
> भोक्तृभोग्यनियन्त्राख्यनित्यव्यूहसमन्वितम् ॥
>
> प्रळये सुप्तकल्पाः स्युर्नियन्ता(न्त्रा?)पापवर्गिणः ।
> सर्गे तत्त्रिविधं ब्रह्म नानाव्यूहव्यवस्थितम् ॥

सन् घटः सन् पट इति सर्वेषु पदार्थेषु सद्बुद्ध्यनुवृत्तेस्सदत् द्रव्यम्; घटादयस्तस्यावस्थाविशेषाः—'यथा मृदयं घटः शरावः' इति घटशरावादिषु मृद्बुद्ध्यनुवृत्तेस्तत्र मृदेव द्रव्यम्। घटशरावादयो मृदवस्थाविशेषाः। न चेदं सत्त्वं घटत्वादिजातिवद्धर्ममात्रम्; घटादीनामुपमर्देऽपि कपालादिषु सद्बुद्ध्यनुवृत्तेः। तस्मात्सर्वात्मकं सद्द्रव्यं ब्रह्म। स्वव्यवहारेऽपि स्वसत्तातिरेकेणान्यानपेक्षत्वात्स्वयम्प्रकाशश्च। अस्यैव विविधविचित्रचिदचिदात्मकत्वाद्विचित्रशक्तित्वं चावगम्यते।

भोक्तृभोग्यनियन्तारश्च व्यवस्थिताः ब्रह्मणोऽशविशेषाः। अत एव च नित्याः। तत्र भोक्तृत्वशक्तियुक्तो भोक्तृसमष्टिपुरुष एकः। तस्य व्यूहाः प्रतिशरीरमवस्थिता जीवाः। ते चाणवोऽनन्ता नित्याः; ब्रह्मांशत्वेन स्वप्रकाशाश्च। तेषु च ब्रह्मगुणाः केचिदाविर्भूताः; केचित्तिरोहिताः॥

ते जीवास्त्रिविधाः। बद्धा मुक्ता नित्यसिद्धाश्च। प्रकृतिवैकारिकदक्षिणात्मकत्रिविधबन्धयुक्ता बद्धाः। मुक्तास्तु त एव तैर्बन्धैर्विमुक्ता आविर्भूतापहतपाप्मत्वादिब्रह्मगुणा

ईश्वरेण समानाः। सिद्धास्तु योगसिद्धाः अणिमाद्यैश्वर्ययुक्ताः। नित्यसिद्धा ईश्वरोपकरणभूताः।

सततपरिणामि प्रकृतिद्रव्यं भोग्यम्, तस्मिन्ब्रह्मगुणाः प्रायेण तिरोहिताः। अत एवाचेतनमित्युच्यते। एषा प्रकृतिः कालः परमाकाशोऽव्यक्तमिति त्रिधा भवति। कालो नामानाद्यन्ताजस्रक्षणपरिणामी मुहूर्ताहोरात्रादिविभागयुक्तः सर्वेषां परिणामपरिस्पन्दहेतुर्भवति।

परमाकाशो नाम प्रकृतेराद्यावस्था; प्रळयकाले तमश्शब्दवाच्या, परेणात्मना विभागं गता, तस्मात् पृथग्व्यवहारायोग्या, तप्तलोहसमावर्जितजलवत्संसृज्यमाना तिष्ठति। तादृश्यवस्था शक्त्यवस्थोच्यते। पुरुषस्य च प्रळयकाले तादृगवस्थानम्। एतामवस्थामधिकृत्य 'सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीत्' 'एकमेवाद्वितीयम्' इत्यादिश्रुतयः। सा च तमोवस्थापन्ना प्रकृतिः परस्मादात्मनो विभागरूपं विकारं प्रतिपद्यते। स विभागः शक्तिविक्षेप इत्युच्यते। स च परमात्मनो विभक्तस्य शक्तिलक्षणस्याचिद्द्रव्यस्य नित्यमेकरूपात्परमात्मद्रव्याद्विसर्पणमिव मणेः प्रभायाः। तद्विक्षिप्तं द्रव्यं परमाकाशः। स मुक्तानामीश्वरस्य च स्थानं भवति। तत्स्थानं शब्दपरिणामशक्तियुक्तत्वाद्वाक् अक्षरं चेत्युच्यते।

सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि मिळितानि अव्यक्तम्। तत्सर्गकाले महदादित्रयोविंशतिविभागभाग्भवति।

नियन्ता नामेश्वरः। स निरतिशयज्ञानानन्दैश्वर्यगुणः ब्रह्मांशत्वात्सर्वशक्तिः स्वयम्प्रकाशश्च। स च मुक्तसनाथः प्रळयकाले संसारिजीववत्सुप्तकल्पोऽवतिष्ठते। एवं सर्वजगद्ब्रह्मद्रव्यत्वाद(व्याद?)भिन्नं भवति। अवस्थारूपेण भिन्नञ्च भवति। अत एव द्वैताद्वैतपराणि वेदान्तवाक्यानि सर्वाणि समञ्जसानि भवन्तीति।

अत्राभिधीयते—

घटाः सन्तीति सत्ताया घटधर्मत्वदर्शनात्।
अस्तीति द्रव्यभावस्य घटादेश्च जडत्वतः॥

भोगभूमेश्च नित्यत्वान्मुक्तानामीश्वरस्य च ।
भोगस्य सार्वकालत्वान्मतमेतदसङ्गतम् ॥

यत्तावदुक्तं मृदयं घटः मृदयं शरावः इति वत् सन् घटः सन् पट इति प्रतीतेः सतो द्रव्यत्वं घटादीनामवस्थात्वं चावगम्यत इति; तद्विपरीतम् ; घटः सन् पटस्सन् इति घटादिद्रव्यधर्मत्वेन सत्ताया उपलब्धेः। न च घटशरावादयो मृद्द्रव्यस्यावस्थाविशेषाः। अपि तर्हि घटत्वशरावत्वाद्यवस्थाविशिष्टमृद्द्रव्यांशाः ; घटादीनामुपमर्देऽपि कपालादिषु सन्ति कपालानि इति सद्बुद्ध्यनुवृत्तेः। सत्त्वस्य धर्मत्वमनुपपन्नमित्यसङ्गतम् ; तत्रापि कपालानि सन्तीति कपालद्रव्यधर्मतया सत्त्वस्यावगतेः ।

अस्तु सत्त्वं धर्मः तत्किमिति वक्तव्यम्। उच्यते—सच्छब्दोऽनेकार्थवचनः। क्वचिदसच्छब्दाभिधेयाविद्यमानत्वविरोधिविद्यमानत्ववचनः ; यथा घटो नास्ति पटो नास्ति घटोऽस्ति सन् घट इत्यत्र। अस्ति सच्छब्दौ पर्यायौ; भवनक्रियाकर्तृवाचित्वात्। क्वचित्पण्डितवचनः ; यथा 'अस्ति ब्रह्मेति चेद्वेद सन्तमेनं ततो विदुः' इति ।

'इह सन्तो न वा सन्ति सतो वा नानुवर्तसे'

'सर्वदाभिगतस्सद्भिः' इत्यादिषु। क्वचिच्छक्तिमद्वचनः ; यथा औषधविशेषेष्विदमौषधम् सदिति। तत्र निरुपाधिकास्तित्वयोगेन सच्छब्दो ब्रह्मवचनः। यथा 'सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीत्' इति। उपबृंहितञ्चैतत्

'ओं तत्सदिति निर्देशो ब्रह्मणस्त्रिविधस्स्मृतः ।'

इति। तस्मात्सतो द्रव्यत्वमनुपपन्नम् ।

यच्च सद्द्रव्यस्य स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वमुक्तम्, तदप्यनुपपन्नम् ; घटादीनामपि सद्द्रव्यत्वेन स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वप्रसङ्गात् । अस्ति च तेषामपि स्वसत्तयैव स्वव्यवहारहेतुत्वं नाम स्वयंप्रकाशत्वमिति चेन्न; अनुपलब्धेः। सामग्र्यभावात्तस्यानुपलब्धे(ब्धि?): नासद्भावादिति चेत्, तदपि न ; नित्यानुपलब्धेरसद्भावसाधकत्वात्। अथ तेषु नित्यानुपलब्धस्यापि तस्य सद्भाव उच्येत,

तदा भोग्यभोक्तृनियन्तृष्वन्योन्यस्मिन्नित्यानुपलब्धानां भोग्यत्वभोक्तृत्वनियन्तृत्वशक्तीनामन्योन्यस्मिन् सद्भावः प्रसज्येत। तथा सति तेषां भेदकाकाराभावाद्वैलक्षण्यं न स्यात्। तस्मात्सदेकदेशस्य घटादेर्जडत्वेन सतोपि स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वन्न सिद्ध्यति।

भोक्तृभोग्यनियन्त्रंशं ब्रह्मेति यदुक्तं तदप्यनुपपन्नम्; नियन्तृव्यतिरिक्ते ब्रह्मणि प्रमाणाभावात्। तथाहि—'यतो वा इमानि' इति वाक्यं यज्जगत्कारणं तद्ब्रह्मेत्यवगमयति। किं तज्जगत्कारणमित्यपेक्षायां 'सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीत्' 'एकमेव' इत्यादिवाक्यं सतः कारणत्वमवगमयति। सच्छब्दस्य चेतनाचेतनसाधारणवाचित्वेन विशेषाकाङ्क्षायां 'आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्' इत्यादिवाक्यं चेतनस्य कारणत्वमवगमयति। आत्मशब्दस्यापि सर्वसाधारणत्वेन चेतनविशेषाकाङ्क्षायां 'एको ह वै नारायण' इत्यादिवाक्यं नारायणमेव जगत्कारणमवगमयति। तस्मान्नारायण एव जगत्कारणभूतं ब्रह्म।

किञ्च सृष्टिपरेषु तत्तद्ध्यानपरेषु वेदान्तवाक्येषु यद्वस्तु कारणत्वेन परत्वेन ध्येयत्वेन च यैश्शब्दैर्निर्दिश्यते, तैश्शब्दैः तद्वस्त्वनूद्य तस्य नारायणत्वं विदधता नारायणानुवाकेन नारायणस्य परब्रशब्दवाच्यत्वं स्वरूपप्रयुक्तम्, न ब्रह्मांशप्रयुक्तमित्यवगम्यते। अपि च 'विष्णोस्सकाशादुद्भूतं जग'दिति कारणत्वेन प्रस्तुतं परमात्मानं ब्रह्मशब्देनानूद्य तस्य लोकदृष्टप्रक्रियया कारणत्वानुपपत्तिश्च(त्तिः?) लोकेऽपि पदार्थानां विचित्रशक्तित्वप्रदर्शनेन तत्परिहारश्चाभिहितः।

निर्गुणस्याप्रमेयस्य शुद्धस्याप्यमलात्मनः।
कथं सर्गादिकर्तृत्वं ब्रह्मणोऽभ्युपगम्यते॥

शक्तयस्सर्वभावानामचिन्त्यज्ञानगोचराः।
यतोऽतो ब्रह्मणस्तास्तु सर्गाद्या भावशक्तयः॥

भवन्ति तपतां श्रेष्ठ पावकस्य यथोष्णता॥ इति।

तदिदं परमात्मन एव ब्रह्मत्वे सङ्गच्छते। तस्मात् तदतिरिक्तं तदंशि ब्रह्म न संभवति।

यत्त्विदं श्वेताश्वतराणां च वचनं 'एतज्ज्ञेयं नित्यमेवात्मसंस्थं नातः परं वेदितव्यं हि किञ्चित्' 'भोक्ता भोग्यं प्रेरितारं च मत्वा सर्वं प्रोक्तं त्रिविधं ब्रह्ममेतत्' इति, न तद्ब्रह्मणः त्रिविधत्वं ब्रूते। अपि तु चिदचिद्विभूतिविशिष्टं परमात्मानमुपासीनस्य ब्रह्मभूयं ब्रूते। अस्यार्थः-प्रेरितारमिति विभक्तिव्यत्ययश्छान्दसः। ब्रह्ममेतदिति लिङ्गव्यत्ययश्च। तथैव 'काल स्वभावो नियतिः' इत्यारभ्य 'भोक्ता भोग्यं प्रेरितारं चे'ति यदेतत्त्रिविधं जगत्प्रोक्तं विभूति-विभूतिमद्रूपेणावस्थितं, एतत्त्रितयं यथा आत्मसंस्थं मनसि प्रतिष्ठितं भवति, तथा नित्य-महर्निशं ज्ञेयमुपासितव्यम्। इतः परमपवर्गार्थे वेदितव्यमुपासितव्यम् किञ्चिदपि नास्ति। एतत्सर्वमविकलं मत्वा साक्षात्कारपर्यन्तमुपास्य ब्रह्म भवति; ब्रह्मसमानाकारो भवतीति। 'पृथ-गमात्मानं प्रेरितारंच मत्वा जुष्टस्ततस्तेनामृतत्वमेति' 'प्रशासितारं सर्वेषामणीयांसमणीयसां' 'रुक्माभं स्वप्नधीगम्यं विद्यात्तु पुरुषं परम्' इत्यादिभिरैकार्थ्यादयमेवार्थः। तस्मात्परमात्मव्यति-रिक्तं ब्रह्म निष्प्रमाणकम्।

यदपीदमुक्तं—चिदचिदीश्वरा ब्रह्मणो नित्यांशाः। तत्राचिद्रूपतमोवस्था प्रळयकाले तप्त-लोहसमावर्जितजलवत्परमात्मनोऽविभक्ता सर्गकाले मणेरिव प्रभा विसर्पतीति; तत्र वक्त-व्यम्—अयमविभक्तः नित्योऽचिदंशः परमात्मनः किं विलक्षणोऽविलक्षणो वा किं वोभय-स्वभावः? अविलक्षणत्वे परमात्मनोऽचित्त्वं तत्प्रयुक्ताश्च दोषाः प्रसज्येरन्। विलक्षणत्वे तु तयोरेकद्रव्यत्वं न सम्भवति; विलक्षणानां नित्यानामेकद्रव्यत्वानुपलब्धेः। सुवर्णरचितपारश-दानामनित्यतया सत्वादिगुणवैषम्यहेतुकपरिणामविशेषायत्तवैलक्षण्यानामुपपन्नमेकद्रव्यत्वम्।

प्रयोगश्च—प्रकृतिपुरुषेश्वराणां नैकद्रव्यत्वम्, नित्यविलक्षणस्वभावत्त्वात्; येषामेक-द्रव्यत्वं भवति तेषां नित्यवैलक्षण्यं न भवति; यथा पूर्वनिर्दिष्टानाम्। उभयस्वभावत्वं तु पूर्वस्मिन्नधिकारे निरस्तम्। तस्मात्प्रकृतिपुरुषेश्वराणां नैकद्रव्यत्वम्।

ननु सन्तु प्रकृतिपुरुषेश्वरा न ब्रह्मद्रव्यांशाः; ईश्वरस्यैव ब्रह्मत्वात्। प्रकृतिपुरुषा-वीश्वरब्रह्मांशाविति किमिति नाभ्युपगम्यते। 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्' 'सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म' 'वासुदेवः सर्वं' इत्यादिशास्त्रैः प्रकृतिपुरुषयोरीश्वरद्रव्यत्वं परिदृश्यते। उच्यते—'पतिं विश्वस्य' 'स कारणंकरणाधिपाधिपः' 'प्रधानक्षेत्रज्ञपतिर्गुणेशः' इत्याद्यनेक

श्रुतिभिस्तयोः तस्य च विरुद्धस्वभावत्वावगमात् न तयोरीश्वरद्रव्यांशत्वमुपपद्यते। भिन्नद्रव्यत्वेऽपि तयोस्तेन तादात्म्यं तयोस्तं प्रत्यंशत्वं चाविरुद्धमित्युपरितनाधिकारे वक्ष्यते।

यदुक्तं ईश्वरभोगभूमिः परमाकाशः प्रकृतेराद्यवस्थेति, तदपि प्रमाणविरुद्धम्; ऋचो अक्षरे परमे व्योमन्, 'दिव्यं स्थानमजरं चाप्रमेयं' 'कलामुहूर्तादिमयश्च कालो न यद्विभूतेः परिणामहेतुः' इत्यादि श्रुतिस्मृतिभिस्तस्याप्राकृतत्वापरिणामित्वादिभिर्नित्यत्वावगमात्।

यत्पुनरुक्तं प्रतिसर्गवेळायामीश्वरस्य मुक्तानां च संसारिवत्स्वापो भवतीति, तदपि साहसम्। 'तद्विष्णोः परमं पदम्' 'सर्गेऽपि नोपजायन्ते प्रळये न व्यथन्ति च' इत्यादिश्रुतिस्मृतिभिस्तस्य तेषां च सर्वदा द्रष्टृत्वद्रष्टृत्वस्तोतृत्वनिद्राक्षयाद्यवगमन्न तेषां स्वापस्सम्भवति; हेत्वभावात्। न तावत्कर्माणि हेतुः, अकर्मवश्यत्वात्। नापि कालः; अकालतन्त्रत्वादीश्वरस्य। प्रत्युत काल एवेश्वरतन्त्रः।

'कालं स पचते तत्र न कालस्तत्र वै प्रभुः।
कालस्य हि च मृत्योश्च जङ्गमस्थावरस्य च॥
ईश्वरो भगवानेकस्सत्यमेतद्ब्रवीमि वः।'

इत्यादिशास्त्रात्॥

नापि ईश्वरसङ्कल्पो हेतुः; असम्भवात्। न हि परमकारुणिक ईश्वरः चिरकालमाध्यात्मिकादिदुःखदुःखितान् स्वानुबुभूषया स्वोपासनं कुर्वाणान् 'वासुदेवस्सर्वमिति स महात्मा सुदुर्लभः' इत्यादिप्रक्रियया स्वेनापि चिरकालप्रार्थितान् संसारिणः कथमपि लब्ध्वा स्वात्मानं प्रापय्य द्विपरार्धकालं निद्रितान् करोति, स्वयमपि तावन्तं निद्रायत इति संभवति। तदेवमनेकदोषगर्भत्वादिदमपि मतं न मनोहरम्॥

इति नीतिमालायां शक्तिविक्षेपप्रतिक्षेपाधिकारः पञ्चमः॥

श्रीः

नीतिमालायां

षष्ठाधिकार आरभ्यते.



तत्त्वविद एवं वर्णयन्ति—

> अनुकूलापरिच्छिन्नतेजोद्रव्यं स्वयंप्रभम् ।
> ज्ञानशक्तिबलैश्वर्याद्यनन्तगुणभाजनम् ॥
>
> चिदचिद्वस्तुरूपत्वात्तत्तच्छब्दैरुदीरितम् ।
> जगज्जन्मस्थितिध्वंसकारणं ब्रह्मशब्दितम् ॥

सर्वानुकूलं देशकालवस्तुभिरपरिच्छिन्नं हेयप्रत्यनीकं स्वयंप्रकाशं तेजोद्रव्यं ब्रह्म; श्रुत्यादिभिस्तथावगमात्। 'एतदमृतमभयमेतद्ब्रह्म' 'रसो वै सः' इत्यादिभिर्भोग्यत्वावगमात् सर्वानुकूलमवगम्यते। 'नित्यं विभुं सर्वगतं सुसूक्ष्मम्' 'यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते' 'अप्राप्य मनसा सह'

> 'वर्षायुतैर्यस्य गुणा न शक्या वक्तुं समेतैरपि सर्वदेवैः'

इत्यादिभिः श्रुतिस्मृतिभिर्देशकालाभ्यामपरिच्छिन्नत्वं गुणैरियत्ताराहित्याद्वस्तुतोऽपरिच्छिन्नत्वञ्चावगम्यते।

ननु वस्तुनो वस्तुतोऽपरिच्छेदो नाम वस्त्वन्तरासहत्वम्। तद्यदि वस्त्वन्तरं सहेत, तदा तच्च इदञ्चेति तेन परिगणितत्वात्तेन तस्य परिच्छिन्नत्वं स्यात्। किञ्च वस्त्वन्तरसद्भावे तद्व्याप्तस्य देशस्य ब्रह्मणा व्याप्तत्वासम्भवेन देशतोऽपरिच्छिन्नत्वञ्च सिद्ध्येत्। तस्माद्वस्त्वन्तरसद्भावोऽङ्गीकृतश्चेद्ब्रह्मणस्त्रिविधपरिच्छेदराहित्यं (न?)सम्भवतीति। उच्यते—न वस्त्वन्तरसद्भावो

वस्तुतः परिच्छेदः; येन तदसद्भावस्तदपरिच्छिन्नत्वं स्यात्। सत्यपि तस्मिन् वस्तुतोऽपरिच्छिन्नत्वव्यवहारदर्शनात्। सुवर्णशकलस्य रूपमानविशेषेण यावत्तन्निकषशिलातुलाभ्यां न परिच्छिद्येत तावन्तं कालं तस्यापरिच्छिन्नत्वव्यवहारो दृश्यते। अतो वस्तुनो वस्त्वन्तरेण सह परिगणितत्वमात्रेण तेन तस्य परिच्छिन्नत्वं न सम्भवति। तस्माद्वस्त्वन्तरसहत्वं न वस्तुपरिच्छेद इति न तद्विपरीतत्वं वस्तुनोऽपरिच्छिन्नत्वम्।

यदुक्तं वस्त्वन्तरसद्भावे ब्रह्मणो देशपरिच्छेदो न सम्भवतीति; तन्न ; वस्त्वन्तरदेशयोरपि व्यापकत्वाद्ब्रह्मणः। तस्मात्त्रिविधपरिच्छेदरहितं ब्रह्म। 'अपहतपाप्मा विजरो विमृत्युर्विशोको विजिघत्सोऽपिपासस्सत्यकामः सत्यसङ्कल्पः' 'एष सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा अपहतपाप्मा दिव्यो देव एको नारायणः' 'परः पराणां सकला न यत्र क्लेशादयः सन्ति परावरेशे।' 'शुद्धे महाविभूत्याख्ये' इत्यादिश्रुतिस्मृतिभिर्निर्मलत्वञ्च तस्यावगम्यते। नैर्मल्यं च त्रिविधम्—स्वतःशुद्धत्वं, हेयवस्तुना संसर्गेऽपि तद्दोषैरस्पृष्टत्वं, श्रवणस्मरणसङ्कीर्तनादिभिरपवित्राणां पवित्रताहेतुत्वं चेति। 'विज्ञानं ब्रह्म' इत्यादिश्रुतिभिस्तस्य स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वं चावगम्यते। 'यदिदमस्मिन्नन्तः पुरुषे ज्योतिः परं ज्योतिरुपसम्पद्य' 'तं देवा ज्योतिषां ज्योतिः' इत्यादि श्रुतिभिस्तस्य तेजस्स्वरूपत्वञ्चावगम्यते।

ननु किमिदं ब्रह्मणः स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वम्? यद(यद्य?)नन्याधीनप्रकाशत्वं, तदापि प्रकाशशब्दार्थो वक्तव्यः। यदि प्रभा ; प्रदीपादिषु अव्याप्तम् ; प्रभायाः प्रदीपाधीनत्वात्। न च प्राकट्यम् ; अनभ्युपगमात्। न च स्वयं संज्ञानम् ; एकस्य कर्तृत्वकर्मत्वविरोधात्स्वकर्तृकस्वविषयज्ञानानुपपत्तेः। तस्माद्वक्तव्यं स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वम्।

उच्यते—व्यवहारानुगुण्यं प्रकाशशब्दार्थः। ब्रह्म स्वसत्तया स्वस्मै स्वव्यवहारहेतुर्भवतीत्यर्थः। प्रत्यगात्मनोऽपि समानमेतत्स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वम्। ज्ञानस्य तु स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वं स्वाश्रयं प्रति स्वसत्तयैव स्वव्यवहारानुगुण्यम्।

एवंविधं ब्रह्म ज्ञानबलैश्वर्यवीर्यतेजःप्रभृत्यसंख्येयमङ्गळगुणसङ्गतञ्च। 'परास्यशक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च' 'तस्य नाम महद्यशः' 'तेजोबलैश्वर्यमहाविभूतिस्सुवीर्यशक्त्यादिगुणैकराशिः' इत्यादिश्रुतिस्मृतिभिः तथात्वावगमात्। न च तासां श्रुतीनां निर्गुण-

श्रुतिविरोधः ; सर्वदा नैर्गुण्यप्रतिपादनासम्भवस्योक्तत्वात् । एतेषां गुणानामुपदेशवैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गाच्च। अपि च 'अपहतपाप्मा' इत्यादि श्रुतिर्गुणनिर्गुणवाक्ययोः विषयव्यवस्थापनं कुर्वन्ती तयोर्विरोधं शमयति।

एवं विधं ब्रह्म समस्तचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरकम्। काण्वमाध्यन्दिनशाखयोरन्तर्यामिब्राह्मणे सुबालोपनिषदि च सर्ववस्तूनां परमात्मशरीरत्वश्रवणात्। 'जगत्सर्वं शरीरं ते' 'तानि सर्वाणि तद्वपुः' 'तत्सर्वं वै हरेस्तनुः' इत्यादिस्मरणाच्च। तत्र चित्स्वरूपमुपरितनाधिकारे वक्ष्यते।

अचिद्वस्तु त्रिविधम्—कालोऽव्यक्तं परमकाशश्चेति। कालोऽनाद्यन्ताजस्रक्षणपरिणामी मुहूर्ताहोरात्रादिविभागवान् परिणामपरिस्पन्दहेतुः।

अव्यक्तं त्रिगुणात्मकम्—तत् प्रळयकाले नामरूपविभागानर्हसूक्ष्मदशापन्नं परमात्मना अविभक्तं भवति। सर्गकाले परमात्मसङ्कल्पेन विभक्तं महदादिरूपेण परिणतं नानानामभाग्भवति।

परमाकाशो नाम शुद्धसत्त्वमयोऽस्पृष्टदोषगन्धः शाश्वतः परमपुरुषस्य मुक्तानां नित्य सूरिणां भोगभूमिर्भवति। एवंविधचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरकं ब्रह्म।

ननु शरीरसम्बन्धस्य कर्मनिमित्तत्वात् 'यत्तदद्रेश्यमग्राह्यमगोत्रमवर्णमचक्षुश्श्रोत्रं तदपाणिपादम्' इत्यादिभिः श्रुतिभिः परमात्मनोऽशरीरत्वावगमादकर्मवश्यत्वोच्च न तावत्तस्य शरीरत्वमुपपद्यते। चेतनाचेतनयोस्तच्छरीरत्वमनुपपन्नञ्च। इन्द्रियाश्रयत्वं भोगायतनत्वं वा हि शरीरत्वम्। न तदुभयमपि तयोस्सम्भवति। अचेतनेषु केषाञ्चित् उभयस्वभावत्त्वेऽपि न तेषां परमात्मशरीरत्वम् ; जीवकर्मनिमित्तत्वेन तेषां तच्छरीरत्वात्। तत्कथं तच्छरीरित्वं ब्रह्मणः ?

उच्यते—श्रुतयस्तावत्सर्वस्य वस्तुनः परमात्मशरीरत्वमुद्घोषयन्ति। प्रमाणान्तराप्राप्तार्थविषयाणां तासां नान्यपरत्वम् ; प्रमाणाभावात्। न चाशरीरत्वश्रुतिविरोधः ; कर्मनिमित्तशरीरनिषेधपरत्वात्तासाम्।

यदुक्तं चेतनानामचेतनानाञ्च केषाञ्चिदिन्द्रियाश्रयत्वाद्यभावाच्छरीरत्वमनुपपन्नमिति; तदसत्; इन्द्रियाश्रयत्वभोगायतनत्वयोः स्थावरादिषु वेश्मादिषु चाव्याप्तत्वादतिव्याप्तत्वाच्च शरीरलक्षणत्वानुपपत्तेः। न चान्यदपि विविधविचित्रदेवतिर्यङ्मनुष्यस्थावरशरीरेष्वनुगतं शरीरशब्दप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तमेकरूपं किञ्चिदुपपद्यते। तस्मात् यस्य यदाधेयम्, यद्विधेयम्, यच्छेषभूतम्, तत्तस्य शरीरभूतमित्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम्। एवमभ्युपगमे परमात्मनस्सर्वाधारतया सर्वनियन्तृतया सर्वशेषितया च सर्वशरीरत्वमुपपन्नम्। अत एव 'अन्तः प्रविष्टश्शास्ता जनानां सर्वात्मा' इत्युच्यते।

ननु च परमात्मनस्सर्वशरीरत्वे तस्याकर्मवश्यत्वेऽपि संसारिवत्प्रकृतिपरिणामविशेषरूपदेहसम्बन्धादपुरुषार्थान्वयो भवत्येव। नैवम्; 'अनश्नन्नन्यः' इति तस्य कर्मफलोपभोगाभावश्रुतेः; सम्बन्धमात्रस्य भोगहेतुत्वाभावाच्च। न केवलं तस्यापुरुषार्थान्वयाभावः, भोक्तृभूतजीवभोगनिर्वर्तकतया निरतिशयदीप्तियोगश्च। तदुच्यते 'अभिचाकशीति' इति। एतच्च **भगवता भाष्यकारेण** स्पष्टमभिहितं वेदार्थसङ्ग्रहे; यथा शिष्यशास्त्रोरविशिष्टेऽपि सम्बन्धे शिष्य एव कशया पीड्यते, न शासितेति। तस्मादुपपन्नं हि ब्रह्मणश्चिदचिच्छरीरकत्वम्। एवं चिदचिद्वस्तुनोः शरीरत्वात्परमात्मवस्तुनश्शरीरित्वाच्च भिन्नान्येतानि त्रीणि वस्तूनि।

ननु कोऽयं भेदो नाम? ननु उक्तं जात्यादिर्भेद इति। अस्तु धर्मिणो धर्म्यन्तराज्जात्यादिर्भेदः। जात्यादीनां तु परस्परधर्मिणां च भेदः कीदृशः? तेषां न स्वरूपमेव भेदः धर्मान्तरादर्शनात्। न च धर्मान्तरं कल्प्यम्; रूपादिवत्परत्र व्यवहारहेतुभूतानामेतेषां स्वस्मिन्नपि तथाविधव्यवहारहेतुत्वसम्भवात्। रूपिणश्चाक्षुषत्वमापादयद्रूपं स्वस्य चाक्षुषत्वं स्वयमेवापादयति। तस्मान्न धर्मान्तरं कल्प्यम्।

ननु जातिमेव न विद्मः। न तावत्सास्नादिमद्व्यक्तिभ्यो विलक्षणमनेकव्यक्तिकृत्स्नपरिसमाप्तं नित्यं किञ्चिद्वस्तु जातिशब्दवाच्यतया अभ्युपगममर्हतीति; अनुपलम्भादनुपपत्तेश्च। अनुवृत्ताकारावभासिनी बुद्धिर्हि तदभ्युपगमे निबन्धनम्। न हि सूक्ष्ममपि निरीक्षमाणानां सास्नादिसंस्थानतद्वद्वस्तुषु प्रथमपिण्डग्रहणवेळायां तावदनुवृत्तत्वावभासः। नापि द्विती-

यादिपिण्डग्रहणेऽपि तथाविधस्य वस्तुनोऽवभासः; तत्रापि संस्थानस्य वस्तुन एवोपलम्भात्। आश्रयभूतेषु वस्तुषूत्पत्तिनाशभाक्ष्वपि नित्यनिरंशगमनागमनशक्तं प्रत्येकं कृत्स्नपरिसमाप्तं जातितत्त्वमस्तित्वशङ्कामपि नाधिरोहति। तस्मान्न संस्थानातिरिक्तजातितत्त्वं नाम किञ्चिदस्ति।

संस्थानमपि न जातिर्भवितुमर्हति; प्रतिपिण्डं भिन्नत्वेन तस्यैकबुद्धिशब्दयोर्निर्वाहकत्वायोगात्। अनेकत्रैकबुद्धिशब्दौ तु तत्तद्व्यक्तिमाहात्म्यकृतौ। दृश्यते हि भिन्नानामपि चक्षूरूपालोकमनसां ज्ञानाख्यैककार्यजननम्। तस्माज्जातेर्दुर्निरूपत्वात्तस्या भेदत्वोपपादनं दूरनिरस्तम्॥

अत्राभिधीयते—संस्थानमेव जातिः तत्प्रतिपिण्डं भिन्नत्वेऽपि(न्नमपि?) द्वितीयादिपिण्डेषु सौसादृश्यात्प्रतिसन्धीयमानं स्वाश्रयेषु वस्तुष्वेकबुद्धिशब्दनिबन्धनं भवति। तदेव प्रतिसन्धीयमानसंस्थानसौसादृश्यमनुवृत्तिरिति चोच्यते। अत एव **भगवता भाष्यकारेण** संस्थानस्यानुवृत्तिधर्मविशिष्टत्व द्वितीयादिपिण्डग्रहणावसेयमित्यभिहितम्। संस्थानातिरिक्तजातिवादिभिरप्येतत्संस्थानसौसादृश्यमनुवृत्तिपर्यायमङ्गीकर्तव्यम्; येन सा जातिर्गोसदृशान् गवयपिण्डान् परिहृत्य सर्वेष्वपि गोपिण्डेषु समवैति। तद्वरमनुपपत्तिशतैकवेषाया अनुवृत्तिधर्मविशिष्टाया निष्प्रमाणिकाया जातेस्तद्बुद्धिशब्दनिर्वाहकत्वाङ्गीकारादुभयवाद्यभ्युपगतसुसदृशसंस्थानस्यैकबुद्धिशब्दनिबन्धनत्वाश्रयणम्। गोसदृशेषु गवयेषु सौसादृश्याभावादतद्बुद्धिरप्युपपन्ना। तदेवं संस्थानस्यैव जातित्वाज्जात्यादिर्भेद इति सुष्ठूक्तम्। तस्मादत्यन्तभिन्नं चिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरकं ब्रह्म।

एवं चिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरकत्वात्परमात्मनस्तत्तद्वस्तुवाचिनः सर्वे शब्दाः तदात्मभूतपरमात्मपर्यन्ततत्तद्वस्तुवाचकाः। यथा देवो जानाति, मनुष्यो जानाति, ब्राह्मणो यजेत, इत्यादिषु देवादिशरीरवाचकाश्शब्दास्तत्तच्छरीरविशिष्टजीवात्मनो वाचकाः।

न चास्य देहात्मसामानाधिकरण्यस्य लाक्षणिकत्वं युक्तम्; देवादिशरीराणामपि जातिगुणयोरिव प्रकारतैकस्वभावत्वाद्विरोधाभावेन लक्षणासमाश्रयणस्यायुक्तत्वाच्च। यदि जातिगुणवच्छरीरस्य प्रकारतैकस्वभावत्वमिष्येत, तद्वदेव प्रकारप्रकारिणोः शरीरात्मनोरपि सहोपलम्भनियमो भवेत्। न च तथोपलम्भः। तस्मात्तयोस्समानाधिकरणप्रयोगो लाक्षणिक

इति न वाच्यम्; प्रमाणवैकल्यादेव तद्ग्रहणसिद्धेः। जातितद्वतोर्गुणगुणिनोश्च सहोपलम्भनियमस्तयोश्चाक्षुषत्वाद्भवति। आत्मनस्तु शरीरवदचाक्षुषत्वान्न सहोपलम्भनियमो भवति। न पुनः प्रकारैकस्वभावत्वाभावात्। यथा गन्धादिगुणः प्रकारैकस्वभावोऽपि तदाश्रयभूतपृथिव्यादिग्राहकप्रमाणेन न गृह्यते, तथा शरीरात्मनोरिव(रपि?)जातितद्वतारिव प्रकारप्रकारित्वे समानेऽपि सहोपलम्भाभावोऽपि नानुपपन्नः।

ननु च द्रव्याणां द्रव्यान्तरप्रकारत्वे दण्डी कुण्डली इति वन्मत्वर्थीयप्रत्ययेन भवितव्यमित्यपि न वाच्यम्; पृथक्स्थितिप्रतिपत्तियोग्यतया दण्डकुण्डलादीनां प्रकारैकस्वभावत्वाभावाच्छरीरस्य तद्विपरीतत्वाच्च। तस्मात्प्रकारैकस्वभावस्य द्रव्यस्य प्रकारत्वं सामानाधिकरण्यावसेयम्। एवं शरीरात्मनोरपि। चिदचिद्वस्तुनोः परमात्मशरीरत्वेन तत्प्रकारैकस्वभावत्वात्तद्वाचिनां शब्दानां परमात्मनि पर्यवसानात्तेषां शब्दानां परमात्मवाचिना शब्देन सामानाधिकरण्यं मुख्यमेव।

ननु सर्वशब्दानां लोके वस्त्वन्तरवाचितया व्युत्पन्नानां परमात्मवाचित्वे मुख्यार्थपरित्यागो लक्षणा च प्रसज्येत। नैवम्; तेषां वस्तूनामभिधेयत्वापरित्यागात्। वेदान्तव्युत्पत्त्या तेषामेव शब्दानां परमात्मन्यपि शक्त्यवधारणाच्च। 'हन्ताहमिमास्तिस्रो देवता अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि' इति जीवात्मपरमात्मानुप्रवेशात्सर्वेषामचिद्वस्तूनां नामरूपभाक्त्वं ह्यवगतम्। स्मर्यते च—परमात्मनस्सर्वशब्दवाच्यत्वम्। 'वचसां वाच्यमुत्तमम्' 'वेदैश्च सर्वैरहमेव वेद्यः' इति। तच्च **भगवता बादरायणेन** 'चराचरव्यपाश्रयस्तु स्यात्तद्व्यपदेशो भाक्तः तद्भावभावित्वात्' इत्यत्र निरणायि। तस्माच्च चिदचिदीश्वराणां भिन्नत्वेपि ईश्वरस्य चिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरतया 'सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म' 'तत्त्वमसि' इति समानाधिकरण्यं तस्य सर्वात्मत्वं चोपपन्नम्।

एवं शरीरभूते चिदचिद्वस्तुनी कदाचिन्नामरूपविभागानर्हसूक्ष्मदशे भवतः। तदा तद्विशिष्टं ब्रह्म कारणं भवति। तच्च 'तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेय' इति 'तदात्मानं स्वयमकुरुत' इत्यादिभिरीक्षणपूर्वकबहुत्वकरणश्रवणान्निमित्तमुपादानञ्च भवति।

अत्र केचित्प्रत्यवतिष्ठन्ते—न तावच्चिदचिन्मिश्रितं ब्रह्मोपादानं भवति; परिणामाश्रयस्यैवोपादानत्वात्, प्रत्यक्परमात्मनोरपरिणामित्वेनोपादानत्वासम्भवाच्च। नापि शरीरभूतस्याचिद्वस्तुन उपादानत्वं वक्तुं शक्यम्; ब्रह्मोपादानश्रुतिविरोधात्, निमित्तोपादानयोर्भेदप्रसङ्गाच्च। तस्माच्चिदचिदीश्वरभेदमङ्गीकृत्य ब्रह्मणो जगत्कारणत्वं वदद्भिरचिद्रूपाः परमाणव उपादानकारणं, ब्रह्म निमित्तकारणमिति वक्तव्यम्। उपपन्नञ्चैतत्; पटादिकार्यस्य स्वस्मादल्पपरिमाणैस्तन्त्वाद्यनेकद्रव्यैरारब्धत्वदर्शनात्, तन्त्वाद्युपादानानां कुविन्दादिनिमित्तानां भेददर्शनाच्च।

स्यान्मतं—एकसुवर्णपिण्डादल्पपरिमाणादङ्गुलीयाद्यनेककार्यारम्भदर्शनादल्पपरिमाणैरनेकद्रव्यैः स्थूलैककार्यारम्भोऽनेकान्त इति; तन्न; तत्रापि सुवर्णपिण्डावयवैरल्पपरिमाणैः स्थूलकार्यारम्भदर्शनात्।

अथ स्यात्—असंयुक्तानां परमाणूनां कार्यानारम्भकत्वान्निरवयवानां तेषां संयोगानुपपत्तेस्सावयवत्वमाश्रयणीयम्। तदा तेषामपि तत एव कार्यत्वात्कारणान्तरापेक्षत्वेनानवस्थाप्रसङ्गान्न परमाणूनां कारणत्वं सम्भवतीति; तदपि न; निरवयवयोरात्ममनसोरिव तेषां संयोगोपपत्तेः। न च निरवयवानां संयोगेऽपि संयुक्तप्रदेशातिरिक्तप्रदेशान्तराभावात्प्रथिमा नोपपद्यत इति वाच्यम्; अनन्यथासिद्धकार्यस्य प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात्। तस्मात्परमाणवो जगदुपादानमीश्वरो निमित्तकारणं भवतीति।

तदयुक्तम्; परमाणुसद्भावे प्रमाणाभावात्। यदुक्तमल्पपरिमाणैस्तन्त्वाद्यनेकद्रव्यैः स्थूलद्रव्यारम्भदर्शनात्परमकारणभूताः परमाणवस्सिद्ध्यन्तीति; तन्न; अवस्थान्तरापन्नतन्त्वादिकारणद्रव्यातिरेकेण कार्यद्रव्यान्तरानुपलब्धेः। प्रत्युत तन्तवः पटः, मृदयं घटः, हिरण्यमिदं कुण्डलमिति प्रत्ययेन कार्यकारणयोरेकद्रव्यत्वमेव प्रतीयते।

यदुक्तं निरवयवानां परमाणूनां आत्ममनसोरिव संयोग उपपन्न इति; तदपि नास्ति; हेत्वभावात्संयोगानुपपत्तेः। कर्मजो हि संयोगः। कर्म चादृष्टकारितम्। तच्चादृष्टं परमाणुगतं क्षेत्रज्ञगतं वा? उभयथापि तत्कर्मद्वारेण संयोगहेतुर्न भवति; तस्याकादाचित्कत्वेन संयोगस्या-

प्यकादाचित्कत्वप्रसङ्गात्। विपाकापेक्षत्वेऽपि नानाविधादृष्टानामेकदैव विपाकश्च निष्प्रमाणकः। ईश्वरेच्छयापि नियमो न सम्भवति ; आनुमानिकेश्वरस्य निराकृतत्वात्। शास्त्रसिद्धस्येश्वरस्याङ्गीकारे जगदुत्पत्तिरपि यथाशास्त्रमङ्गीकरणीया स्यात्। निरवयवानां तेषां संयोगेऽपि संयुक्तप्रदेशातिरिक्तप्रदेशान्तराभावात्प्रथिमानुपपत्तिश्चापरिहार्या। तेषां सावयवत्वे तदवयवानाञ्च सावयवत्वादनन्तावयवत्वप्रसङ्गेन मेरुसर्षपयोर्वैषम्यासिद्धिः। न च कार्यस्यानन्यथासिद्धिः ; ब्रह्मोपादानत्वेनाप्युपपत्तेः॥

यत्तु लोके निमित्तोपादानयोः भेदनियमस्य दृष्टत्वाद्ब्रह्मण उभयकारणत्वन्न सम्भवतीति; तदपि ब्रह्मणः सर्वशक्तित्वाल्लौकिकपदार्थानां व्यवस्थितशक्तित्वाच्च समाधेयम्। तस्मान्न परमाणव उपादानकारणम्।

यदपि कैश्चिदुक्तं सततपरिणामिनी स्वतन्त्रा प्रकृतिः पुरुषसंयोगवशान्महदादिविसदृशपरिणामवती भवति। प्रतिसर्गावस्थायां सूक्ष्मसदृशपरिणामवती भवति। तस्मात्प्रकृतिरेव जगदुपादानमिति ; तदप्ययुक्तम् ; सर्गप्रतिसर्गव्यवस्थानुपपत्तेः। पुरुषसंयोगश्च न सर्गहेतुर्भवति ; निष्क्रियत्वेन तयोस्संयोगासम्भवात्। सन्निधिमात्रं संयोग इति च न वाच्यम् ; तयोर्नित्यत्वेन सन्निधेरपि त(स?)दातनत्वात्। न चादृष्टहेतुकः स्पर्श (सः?); नित्यनिर्विकाराणां पुरुषाणां कर्तृत्वानभ्युपगमेनादृष्टासम्भवात्। सम्भवेऽपि अनन्तैर्जीवैः नियतकालमनुष्ठितानां युगपदुपपद्यमानजगत्सदृशफलानां कर्मणां सद्भावे प्रमाणाभावात्। अतः स्वतन्त्रायाः प्रकृतेरुपादानत्वमपि न युक्तमिति। तस्माच्छ्रुत्यनुसारेण ब्रह्मैव सर्वशक्तियोगाज्जगदुपादानकारणं निमित्तकारणञ्चेत्यास्थेयम्।

तत्र यदुक्तं मिळितस्योपादानत्वे प्रत्यक्परमात्मनोरपि कार्यत्वेन परिणामित्वं प्रसज्येतेति; नैतदस्ति ; परिणामरहितस्यापि कार्यत्वसम्भवात्। यथा शरीरस्य पाञ्चभौतिकत्वेनापरिणामिनोऽप्याकाशस्य कार्यत्वमङ्गीक्रियते। अवस्थान्तरापत्तिरेव हि कार्यता। सा प्रत्यक्परमात्मनोरपि विद्यते। सर्गावस्थायां विकसितज्ञानत्त्वात्प्रत्यगात्मनः; परमात्मनः स्थूलचिदचिद्वस्तुनोरन्तरात्मतयावस्थानाच्च। अचिद्वस्तुवत्स्वरूपान्यथाभावस्तु न विद्यते। अत एव तयोः कार्यत्वेऽपि नानित्यत्वम्। न हि विकारभात्त्वमात्रमनित्यतां सम्पादयति; यथा

करणाधीनज्ञानस्य जीवस्य ज्ञानरूपविकारभाक्त्वेऽपि नित्यत्वं न निरुध्यते। तस्मात्तयोरप्युपादानत्वं कार्यत्वं नित्यत्वं चोपपन्नम् ॥

एवं त्रयाणामुपादानत्वेन कार्यत्वेऽपि शुक्लकृष्णरक्ततन्तूपादानवत्स्वभावासङ्करोऽप्युपपन्नः। ननु च त्रयाणामुपादानत्वे परमात्मन उपादानत्वश्रवणं जगतस्तदात्मकत्वश्रवणञ्च कथमुपपद्यते? उच्यते—चिदचिद्वस्तुनोर्द्रव्ययोरपि जातिगुणवत्परमात्मप्रकारतैकस्वभावत्वेन शक्तिमत्परमात्मपरतन्त्रत्वात्तद्वतः परमात्मन उपादानत्वव्यपदेशः तादात्म्यवर्णनञ्चाविरुद्धम्। न च तावतोपादानत्वव्यपदेशो गौणः; देवदत्तो गच्छति, देवदत्तो जानातीतिवन्मुख्यत्वोपपत्तेः। अत्र शरीरात्मनोर्गमनज्ञानाश्रयत्वेऽपि एतौ व्यपदेशौ मुख्यावेव भवतः।

एवं त्रयाणामुपादानत्वेन कार्यत्वेऽपि स्वभावासाङ्कर्यं ज्ञापयितुं 'अस्मान्मायी सृजते विश्वमेतत्तस्मिंश्चान्यो मायया सन्निरुद्धः' 'मयाध्यक्षेण प्रकृतिस्सूयते सचराचरम्' इत्यादि श्रुतिस्मृतयः प्रवृत्ता वेदितव्याः। एवं सति हि 'सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयं' 'तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेय' 'सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म तज्जलानिति' 'यथोर्णनाभिस्सृजते गृह्णते च यथा पृथिव्यामोषधयस्सम्भवन्ति। यथा सतः पुरुषात्केशलोमानि तथाक्षरात्सम्भवतीह विश्वम्' 'ब्रह्म वनं ब्रह्म स वृक्ष आसीत् यतो द्यावापृथिवी निष्टतक्षुः। मनीषिणो मनसा विब्रवीमि व. ब्रह्माध्यतिष्ठद् भुवनानि धारयन्' इत्यादीनां बह्वीनां श्रुतीनां ऐकार्थ्यं भवति।

एवं ब्रह्मणोऽपरिणामित्ववादिनीनां उपादानत्ववादिनीनां जगतो ब्रह्मात्मकत्ववादिनीनाञ्च श्रुतीनां परिष्वङ्गस्सुखोदर्को भवति। तत्त्वपरेषु ध्यानपरेषु च प्रदेशेषु चिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरस्य ब्रह्मण एकत्वात्तस्यैव कार्यकारणोभयावस्थत्वाच्छरीरभूतयोश्चिदचिद्वस्तुनोश्शरीरिण. परमात्मनश्च विलक्षणत्वाच्च द्वैताद्वैतवादा स्सुसङ्गता भवन्ति इति सर्वमवदातम् ॥

इति नीतिमालायां ब्रह्मस्वरूपनिर्णयाधिकारः षष्ठः ॥

श्रीः

नीतिमालायां

सप्तमाधिकार आरभ्यते.



अथ पुरुषस्वरूपं निरूप्यते। तस्मिन्नानाविधा वादाः। आत्मयाथात्म्यविद एवं वर्णयन्ति—

देहेन्द्रियादिव्यावृत्तो नित्यज्ञानः स्वयम्प्रभः।
असङ्ख्येयः परस्यांशः पुंसः कर्ता च पूरुषः॥

ननु देह एवात्मा भवितुमर्हति, अहम्प्रत्ययवेद्यत्वादात्मनः, स्थूलोऽहं कृशोऽहमित्यादौ स्थौल्यादिविशिष्टस्य देहस्याहमर्थसामानाधिकरण्याच्च। अहं जानामीति प्रतीतेर्देहस्य ज्ञानाश्रयत्वमप्याश्रयणीयम्। न च वाच्यं चेतनस्यात्मनो विशेषगुणवत्वात्कार्यद्रव्यवर्तिनो विशेषगुणस्य कारण(कारणगुण?)पूर्वकत्वनियमात्प्रत्येकं परमाणुषु चैतन्यस्याविद्यमानत्वात्तस्य परमाण्वारब्धशरिरविशेषगुणत्वमनुपपन्नम्। परमाणुषु प्रत्येकं चैतन्याभ्युपगमेऽप्येकस्मिन् शरीरे चेतनानन्त्यमापतेदिति। प्रत्यक्षबाधितत्वेन कालात्ययापदिष्टत्वाद्धेतोः। अथ चेन्द्रियाश्रयत्वं शरीरे दृश्यमानं सम्प्रतिपन्नादचेतनाद्धटादेरत्यन्तं व्यावर्तमानं शरीरमेव चेतनमवगमयति। तस्माद्देह एवात्मा भवितुमर्हति॥

नैवम्; अहं जानामीत्यात्मनः प्रत्यक्त्वेनावभासात्, इदमिति शरीरस्य पराक्त्वेनावभासाच्च। किञ्च अहम्प्रत्ययस्य शरीरगोचरत्वेऽभ्युपगम्यमानेऽवश्यमवयवप्रतिभासेनाप्यविनाभवितव्यम्। न ह्यस्ति सम्भवः अवयवी स्थूलः प्रकाशते अवयवास्तु न केचन प्रथन्त इति। न च नियमितबहिरिन्द्रियवृत्तेरवहितमानसस्याहमिति स्वात्मानमनुभवतः करचरणाद्यवयवा भासन्ते। तस्मान्न देहोऽहम्प्रत्ययगोचरः॥

यत्तु स्थूलोऽहं कृशोऽहमिति शरीरेऽहम्प्रत्ययो दृश्यत इति; नैवम्; तत्राप्यहम्प्रत्ययस्य चाक्षुषस्य देहप्रत्ययस्य च स्थौल्यकार्श्यादियोगे(गेन ?)देहमात्रानवभासकत्वात्। तस्मात्तत्राहम्प्रत्यययोऽन्तरशरीरं प्रत्यग्रूपं किमपि वस्तु गोचरयति। अत एव ममेदं शरीरमिति भेदव्यवहारः। न ह्यसौ व्यवहारस्साक्षात्प्रतीतिनिमित्तः प्रतीयमानः शिलापुत्रकशरीरव्यवहारवदौपचारिको भवितुमर्हति । तस्माद्देहव्यतिरेकेण चेतनस्य प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात्सम्बन्धिनि देहेऽहंशब्दप्रयोगो लाक्षणिकः ॥

अथवा बाह्यविषयेषु परस्परविरुद्धरूपपरिमाणसङ्ख्यासङ्ग्रहणेन व्यतिरेकस्य स्फुटत्वादात्मनि तादृशरूपान्तराग्रहणेन देहप्रतिभासभ्रमोऽविवेकिनाम् ॥

किञ्च आत्मन इच्छानुविधायिसङ्कल्पाध्यवसायादिव्यापारत्वाच्छरीरस्य च तदिच्छानुविधायिशयनासनोत्थानादिचेष्टत्वाच्च शुक्तिरजतादिवदभेदभ्रमो भवत्येव । प्रणिहितमनसस्तु ज्ञातृतया सिद्ध्यन्तमनवयवमहमर्थमिदमिति परिस्फुरतः स्थूलावयविनः शरीरात्पृथगपरोक्षयन्त्येव ॥

भवति च प्रयोगः—शरीरमहम्प्रत्ययगोचरो न भवति, इदमिति गृह्यमाणत्वात्। घटादिवत्। तथा जानामीति प्रत्ययः शरीरविषयो न भवति, अप्रकाशमानतदवयवप्रतिभासत्वात् । यो नैवंविधः न स शरीरविषयो न भवति, यथा उभयवादिसम्मतः शरीरप्रत्यय इति। तस्माद्देहो नात्मा भवितुमर्हति ॥

मा भूच्छरीरमात्मा, इन्द्रियाण्यात्मा सन्तु। न हि तानि इदन्तया प्रथन्ते, येन देहवदात्मत्वं न स्यात्। न च देहवत्तान्युद्भूतरूपादिगुणानि स्थूलानि, येन तत्प्रतिभासे रूपावयवादिप्रतीतिः प्रसज्येत। तद्व्यापारफलञ्च ज्ञानं तद्गामि भवितुं युक्तम्, स्नानाध्ययनयागादिफलवत। अत एव **सत्यतपसा** द्रष्टुं चक्षुषा युक्तत्वात्। (द्रष्टुश्चक्षुष इत्युक्तम् ?)

नैवं भवितुमर्हति। न तावत्प्रत्येकमिन्द्रियाण्यात्मा, इन्द्रियान्तरदृष्टस्य इन्द्रियान्तरेण प्रतिसन्धानाभावप्रसङ्गात्। अस्ति च यमहमद्राक्षं, तमहं स्पृशामीति। अत एव न सम्भूयापि। न हि पञ्चेन्द्रियैरेकं वस्त्वनुभूयते। तथा एकैकेन्द्रियापाये तत्तदिन्द्रियानुभूतार्थ-

स्मरणमपि न भवेत्। एकेन्द्रियविगम एवात्मनः प्रायणप्रसङ्गश्च। तस्मान्नेन्द्रियाण्यात्मा। शरणागतपरित्यागस्य नृशंसतामालोच्य सत्यतपसस्तथा वचनम् ॥

अस्तु तर्हि मनश्चेतनः। तथा सति सर्वेन्द्रियानुभवेषु मनसो विद्यमानत्वात्पूर्वोक्त-दोषा न सम्भवन्ति। तदप्ययुक्तम्; तस्य चक्षुरादिवत्करणत्वेनात्मत्वासम्भवात्। स हि कर्ता। प्राणस्याप्यात्मत्वं न सम्भवति; बाह्यवायुवद्वायुत्वादेव तस्य चैतन्यानुपपत्तेः ॥

अस्तु तर्हि संविदात्मा। अजडत्वात्तस्यात्मत्वमुपपन्नञ्च। अजडत्वञ्च सत्तयैव प्रकाशमानत्वादुपपद्यते। न हि संवित्सती घटादिवदप्रकाशमाना दृश्यते, येन परायत्त-प्रकाशा अभ्युपगम्येत ॥

अथ मतम्-उत्पन्नायामपि संविदि विषयमात्रं ह्यवभासते नीलमिदमिति; न संवित्प्र-तीतिः। तस्मादिन्द्रियवत्संविदप्यर्थप्रकाशे सत्तयैव करणं भवति। ततोऽर्थगतागन्तुक-प्रकाशाख्यधर्मदर्शनेन संविदनुमान्य(स्य?)त इति, नैतद्युक्तम्; ज्ञानव्यतिरेकेणार्थधर्मस्य प्रका-शस्य रूपादिवदनुपलब्धेः। न च व्यवहारान्यथानुपपत्त्या स धर्मः कल्प्यः; उभयाभ्यु-पेतया संविदैव व्यवहारोपपत्तेः ॥

अपि चानवभासमानायां संविदि विषयावभासश्च नोपपद्यते; अवभासकत्वात्प्र-दीपवत्। तस्मान्नीलमिति प्रतीतौ संवित्प्रतीतिश्च विद्यत एव। अत एव हि घटमहं जानामि, नीलमिदं संवेद्मीति प्रतीतिव्यवहारौ सम्भवतः। अतोऽजडत्वात्संवि-दात्मेति ॥

नैतदेवम्; घटमहं वेद्मीति प्रत्यगर्थस्यात्मनो धर्मतया संविदः प्रतीतेः। संविदनुभूति-ज्ञानादिशब्दास्सम्बन्धिशब्दा इति हि शब्दार्थविदो वदन्ति। अतश्च संविदात्मा न भवति। तस्माद्देहेन्द्रियमनःप्राणसंविद्भ्यो व्यावृत्तोऽहं जानामीति ज्ञातृतया प्रतीयमा-नोऽहमर्थ एवात्मा ॥

किञ्चायमात्मनो देहेन्द्रियादिव्यतिरेकः श्रुतिसिद्धः। **बृहदारण्यके** बालाक्यजातशत्रु-संवादे 'तौ ह सुप्तं पुरुषमाजग्मतुः' इत्यादिना सुप्तपुरुषगमनयष्टिघातोत्थापनादिभिः देहादि-व्यतिरिक्तजीवप्रतिबोधनात् ॥

अथ स्यात्—ज्ञानस्य स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वमुभयवादिसिद्धम् । तस्य नीलादिवदिद-मित्यनवभासात्पराक्त्वाभावेन प्रत्यक्त्वञ्च विद्यते । अहमर्थस्य त्विदन्तयावभासाभावेऽपि विषयवज्ज्ञानोपलब्धिवेलायामेवोपलब्धेरर्थतः पराक्त्वं भवति । तस्माज्ज्ञानमेवात्मा, नाहमर्थ इति ॥

तद्विपरीतम् ; अहमर्थस्यैव स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वात्प्रत्यक्त्वाच्च । स्वस्मै प्रकाशमानत्वं हि साक्षात्स्वयम्प्रकाशमानत्वम् । तदहमर्थस्यैव । ज्ञानस्य तु स्वेन प्रकाशमानत्वेऽपि स्वस्मै स्वयम्प्रकाशमानत्वाभावान्न मुख्यम् । तदपि हि विषयवदात्मन एवावभासते । प्रत्यक्त्व-ञ्चाहमर्थस्यैव ; ज्ञानस्य तु पराक्त्वाभावमात्रमेव, न तु प्रत्यक्त्वम् । तस्य पराक्त्वाभावः स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वञ्चाहं जानामीत्यात्मधर्मतयावभासादेव भवति । अहमर्थस्य ज्ञानोपलब्धिवेला-यामेवोपलम्भादर्थतः परात्त्वसिद्धिश्चात एव परास्ता ॥

नन्वहमर्थो यदि(दि न) ज्ञानाधीनप्रकाशः स विषयाननुभववेलायां किमिति न प्रकाशते? भवत्पक्षे वा तदानीं ज्ञानं किमिति न चकास्ति? तदपि हि नित्यं स्वयम्प्रकाशं चाभ्युपगम्यते । अथ तदानीमपि विज्ञानं प्रकाशत एव । अहङ्कारविषयाभ्यामनुषङ्गाभावान्न व्यवह्रियत इति चेत्समानमिदमितरस्यापि ॥

अथ मतम्—अविक्रियः खल्वात्मा । ज्ञातृत्वं हि ज्ञानक्रियाकर्तृत्वम् । तद्विकार-भूतत्वादात्मनो न सम्भवति । तदभ्युपगमे देहस्येव जडत्वं प्रसज्येत । तस्माज्ज्ञातृत्वं ज्ञानेऽध्यस्तम् । किञ्च देहात्माभिमानवत एव ज्ञातृत्वोपलम्भादाध्यासिकं ज्ञातृत्वम् । तस्मान्नाहमर्थ आत्मा भवितुमर्हतीति ।

एतत्परीक्षकाणां धियं नाधिरोहति । ज्ञानस्य क्रियात्वाभावेन तदाश्रयस्य कर्तृत्वा-भावात् । तत्प्रभावदच्छद्रव्यं यावदात्मभाविधर्मत्वेन तस्य गुण इत्युच्यते । तस्मादात्मनो देह-तुल्यत्वं ज्ञातृत्वञ्च ज्ञानेऽध्यस्तमिति च(?) हास्यम् , अदृश्यमानस्याधिष्ठानानुपपत्तेः आत्मा-श्रयदोषप्रसङ्गात् । अन्तःकरणवृत्तिरूपज्ञानक्रियाकर्तृत्वं अविक्रिये ज्ञानेऽध्यस्तमिति नात्माश्रय-दोष इति चेत् , तदपि न ; तथाविधस्य ज्ञानस्यासिद्धत्वात् , ज्ञानमात्रस्यात्मत्वनिषेधाच्च ।

देहात्माभिमानवतो ज्ञातृत्वोपलम्भात् ज्ञातृत्वस्याध्यस्तत्वमुक्तं ज्ञानस्यापि समानम् । तदपि तद्वत एव ह्यवभासते ॥

किञ्च ज्ञातुरहमर्थस्य ज्ञानेऽध्यासं वदता(दतो ?) ज्ञानमहमित्यध्यासो भवेत् ; अधिष्ठानभूतायां हि शुक्तिकायां रजताध्यासः । तस्मान्नित्यज्ञानाश्रयः स्वयम्प्रकाशोऽहमर्थ एवात्मा ॥

ननु च ज्ञानं मे जातम्, ज्ञानं मे नष्टमिति तस्य जन्मनाशौ प्रतीयेते । नित्यत्वे चक्षुरादिकरणानां वैयर्थ्यं भवेत् । स्वापादिषु संज्ञालोपः श्रुतिसिद्धः । तत्कथं ज्ञानं नित्यमुच्यते ?

उच्यते—'जानात्येवायं पुरुषः न विज्ञातुर्विज्ञातेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यते—'

'यथा न क्रियते ज्योत्स्ना मलप्रक्षाळनान्मणेः ।
दोषप्रहाणान्न ज्ञानमात्मनः क्रियते तथा ॥

यथोदपानकरणात्क्रियते न जलाम्बरम् ।
सदेव नीयते व्यक्तिमसतस्सम्भवः कुतः? ॥

तथा हेयगुणध्वंसादवबोधादयो गुणाः ।
प्रकाश्यन्ते न जन्यन्ते नित्या एवात्मनो हि ते' ॥

इत्यादिश्रुतिस्मृतिभिरात्मनो ज्ञातृत्वं ज्ञानस्य नित्यत्वञ्चावगम्यते । तस्मात्तस्य जन्मनाशव्यपदेशौ विषयानुषङ्गाननुषङ्गाभिप्रायेण । स्वापादिषु तस्य विलोपश्रुतिश्च तदभिप्राया । न च करणानां वैयर्थ्यम् ; नित्यस्यैव संसारि(सार ?)दशायां कर्मणा सङ्कुचितस्य निष्क्रमणद्वारतया क्लृप्तत्वात्तेषाम् । निष्क्रमणञ्च स्मृतिसिद्धम् ।

'इन्द्रियाणां हि चरतां यद्येकं क्षरतीन्द्रियम् ।
तेनास्य क्षरति प्रज्ञा दृतेः पादादिवोदकम्' ॥

इति हि मानवं वचः । अस्या निष्क्रमणश्रुतेः ज्ञानस्य द्रव्यत्वं सिद्धम् । तदेवमात्मा नित्यज्ञानः स्वयम्प्रकाशश्च । उक्तैरेव हेतुभिः क्षणिकविज्ञानात्मवादोऽपि निरस्तः ॥

अयं प्रतिशरीरं भिन्नोऽसङ्ख्यश्च । 'नित्यो नित्यानां चेतनश्चेतनानाम्' इत्यादिश्रुतेः । अजामन्त्रोऽप्यात्मनोऽसङ्ख्यातत्वमनुजानाति । 'अजो ह्येको जुषमाणोऽनुशेते जहात्येनां भुक्तभोगामजोऽन्यः' इति मुक्तसंसारिणोर्भेदप्रतिपादनात् । एवं श्रुत्यनुमतौ सत्यां सुखदुःखव्यवस्थाश्च नानात्वमवगमयन्ति । तस्मादसङ्ख्यो जीवः ॥

अणुश्चायमात्मा । 'तेन प्रद्योतेनैव आत्मा निष्क्रामयति ये वेके चास्माल्लोकात्प्रयन्ति चन्द्रमसमेव ते सर्वे गच्छन्ति तस्माल्लोकात्पुनरेत्यस्मै लोकाय कर्मणे' इत्युत्क्रान्तिगत्यागतिश्रुतेः । 'एषोऽणुरात्मा चेतसा वेदितव्यः यस्मिन्प्राणः पञ्चधा संविवेश' इति साक्षादणुत्वश्रुतेश्च ।

न चाणुत्वे सकलशरीरव्यापिनी वेदना नोपपद्यत इति वाच्यम्; दीपस्येव प्रभारूपेण ज्ञानेन युगपत्सकलशरीरव्याप्तिसम्भवाद्वेदनोपपत्तेः । अपि च विभुत्वे सर्वशरीरेषु सर्वेषां विद्यमानत्वादुपलब्धिः प्रसज्येत । न सा कस्यचिदपि । न च शरीराणां स्वकीयपरकीयत्वाभ्यां व्यवस्थासिद्धिः; तेषामपि साधारण्यात् । न च तत्रादृष्टवशेन व्यवस्थोत्प्रेक्ष्या; तत्रापि च साधारण्यस्याविशिष्टत्वात् । तस्मादणुपरिमाणोऽयमात्मा ॥

अंशभूतश्चायमात्मा परमात्मनः । ननु नियन्तृत्वनियम्यत्वसर्वज्ञत्वकिञ्चिज्ज्ञत्वादिभिर्विरुद्धस्वभावत्वात्तयोरेकद्रव्यत्वाभावेन नांशांशित्वमुपपन्नम् ॥

उच्यते—न केवलमेकद्रव्यैकदेशत्वमेवांशत्वम्, किन्तु विशिष्टवस्त्वेकदेशत्वमप्यंशत्वम् । विशिष्टस्यापि हि वस्तुनो विशेषणमंश एव । दृश्यते हि विशेषणांशोऽयम्, विशेष्यांशोऽयमिति प्रतीतिव्यवहारौ । वर्णित एव प्रत्यक्परमात्मनोर्विशेषणविशेष्यभावः तयोश्शरीरशरीरित्वोपपादनेन । प्रकारान्तरेणांशत्वं च दुरुपपादम् । तथाहि—प्रथमं तावद्राजभृत्ययोरिव पृथग्द्रव्यत्वे अंशत्वं दुर्भणमेव । विवर्तपक्षेऽपि जीवस्यापारमार्थिकत्वादेवांशत्वं ब्रह्मणोऽशित्वं च नोपपद्यते ।

औपाधिकजीववादेऽप्यंशत्वं न शक्यवचनम्; ब्रह्मण एवोपाधिप्रयुक्तदोषानुषङ्ग-प्रसङ्गात्। न च घटाकाशादिवदवच्छिन्नप्रदेशानुषक्ता दोषा अनवच्छिन्ने ब्रह्मणि न प्रसज्येरन्निति युक्तम्; उपाधिना अमूर्तब्रह्मणोऽवच्छेदासम्भवात्। आकाशस्येव सम्भवतीति चेन्न; तत्रापि तदभावात्। आकाशस्यापि घटादिसंयोगमात्रमेव; नावच्छेदः, तदनर्हत्वात्तस्य। तस्माद्ब्रह्मण एवोपाधिसंयोगात्तत्प्रयुक्तदोषास्तस्यैव स्युः। ततश्च सर्वं वेदान्तवाक्यं व्याकुलं स्यात्। अतस्तस्मिन्नपि पक्षे जीवपरमात्मनोरंशांशिभावो नोपपद्यते॥

शक्तिविक्षेपपक्षेऽपि पूर्वोक्तप्रक्रियया शरीरशरीरिभावेनांशांशित्वमुच्यते। तदस्मा-कमविरुद्धमेव। नो चेदनन्तरोक्तप्रक्रियया परमात्मनस्सर्वदोषानुषङ्गः। तदेवं परमात्मनोंऽशः प्रत्यगात्मा॥

अयं कर्ता चाभ्युपगन्तव्यः। 'ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत' 'आत्मानमेव लोकमु-पासीत' इति स्वर्गापवर्गसाधनानुष्ठानविधानशास्त्राणामवैयर्थ्याद्धेतोः। अपि च 'एवमेवैष एतान्प्राणान्गृहीत्वा स्वे शरीरे यथाकाम परिवर्तते' इत्युपकरणोपादानविहारयोः कर्तृत्वमु-पदिशति। अतश्चायं कर्ता॥

अथ स्यात्—'विज्ञानं यज्ञं तनुते कर्माणि तनुतेऽपि च' इति ज्ञानपर्यायाया बुद्धेर्यज्ञादिकर्तृत्वमवगम्यते।

> 'प्रकृतेः क्रियमाणानि गुणैः कर्माणि सर्वशः।
> अहङ्कारविमूढात्मा कर्ताहमिति मन्यते॥'

इत्यात्मनः कर्तृत्वं निन्ध्यते च। तस्माद् बुद्धेरेव कर्तृत्वं युक्तमिति॥

नैतदेवम्; बुद्धेर्नियोज्यत्वासम्भवात् कर्तृत्वानुपपत्तेः। स्वर्गादिफलोपभोगसमर्थं चेतनमेव हि शास्त्राणि तत्साधके(धने?)नियुञ्जते। न ह्यचेतना बुद्धिर्नियोक्तुं शक्यते। प्रकृतेः क्रियमाणानीत्यत्रापि नात्मनः कर्तृत्वं निन्ध्यते। किन्तर्हि [2] अधिष्ठानाद्यनेकहेतुनिर्वर्त्यायां

यदस्य निरपेक्षकर्तृत्वाभिमानादि तदनर्थकमित्युच्यते। 'अधिष्ठानं तथा कर्ते'त्यस्य कर्तृशब्देन व्यपदेशात्। अत एव हि—

'तत्रैवं सति कर्तारमात्मानं केवलं तु यः।
पश्यत्यकृतबुद्धित्वान्न स पश्यति दुर्मतिः॥'

इत्युच्यते। अतो देहेन्द्रियादिविलक्षण उक्तलक्षण एव पुरुषः॥

इति नीतिमालायां

पुरुषस्वरूपनिर्णयाधिकारस्सप्तमः॥



श्रीः

नीतिमालायां

अष्टमाधिकार आरभ्यते.



अथ विधिस्वरूपं निर्णीयते—

> तं शब्दभावनां प्राहुरेके कार्यं तु केचन ।
> आप्तस्य हितकामस्य नियोगं केचिदूचिरे ॥
> भाष्यकारोऽपि भगवानेवमेवान्वमन्यत ॥

शब्दभावना विधिः ; तस्याः फलभावनायां पुरुषप्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वात् । प्रवर्तको हि विधिर्भवति । ननु केयं शब्दभावना? उच्यते—सर्वशब्दानामर्थप्रतीत्युन्नेयोऽभिधाव्यापारः ; समस्तलिङादीनां त्वसौ व्यापारः तैरेवाभिधीयते । स पुरुषप्रवृत्तिभवनफलत्वाद्भावनेति प्रवर्तनेति च गीयते । न च वाच्यं न शब्दस्य व्यापारत्वं सम्भवति; गुणत्वाद्रूपवत् । अथ स द्रव्यमिष्यते, तथापि न सम्भवति ; विभुत्वादिति । अरुणिमादेर्गुणस्यापि व्यवच्छेदादिव्यापारसम्भवात् । विभूनां ज्ञानादिव्यापारस्य विद्यमानत्वात् । परिस्पन्दलक्षणस्तु व्यापारः तस्य न सम्भवत्येव ; न चासावस्माभिरपीष्यते । कस्तर्ह्यसौ व्यापारः? शब्दविषयज्ञानमेव । तद्योगी हि शब्दोऽर्थप्रतीतिं जनयति ॥ यथोक्तं 'शास्त्रं शब्दविज्ञानादसन्निकृष्टेऽर्थे विज्ञानम्' इति । यमागन्तुकं धर्मं प्राप्य कार्याय प्रभवति स तस्य व्यापार इति उच्यते । ज्ञाता हि लिङादयः पुरुषं प्रवर्तयन्ति । तस्माज्ज्ञानस्य शब्दव्यापारत्वमुपपन्नम् ॥

न च वाच्यं शब्दस्याभिधाव्यापारवत्त्वमयुक्तम् । शब्दं जानामीति शब्दकर्मकतयावगतस्य ज्ञानस्यैव शब्दोऽर्थमभिधत्त इत्यत्र तत्कर्तृत्वाभ्युपगमप्रसङ्गात् । न ह्येकस्यैवैक-

स्मिन्व्यापारे कर्मत्वं कर्तृत्वञ्चोपपद्यते इति । परशुवदुपपत्तेः । परशुर्हि उद्यमननिपातनयाः कर्मापि सन् द्वैधीभावफलावच्छेदलब्धछिनत्तिपदाभिधानयोस्तयोरेव कर्ता भवति । तथा ज्ञानस्य शब्दकर्मकस्यापि अर्थप्रतिपत्तिलक्षणफलावच्छेदलब्धाभिदधातिपदाभिधानस्यार्थः कर्म । शब्दस्तु फलार्थप्रवृत्तेस्तस्मिन्नेव व्यापारे स्वातन्त्र्यविवक्षया कर्तेत्यनवद्यम् ।

अनेनैव न्यायेनार्थकर्मकस्याभिधाव्यापारस्यापि पुरुषप्रवृत्तिभवनफलावच्छेदलब्धभावनाभिधानस्य पुरुषप्रवृत्तिफलावच्छेदलब्धप्रवर्तनाभिधानस्य च प्रवृत्तिकर्मत्वं पुरुषकर्मत्वञ्च व्याख्यातम् । तेन एक एव व्यापारो यदा जानातिना विषयप्रकाशफलावच्छिन्नोऽभिधीयते, तदा विषयभूतशब्द एव तत्फलभाक् कर्म भवति, शब्दं जानातीति । यदा तु स एवार्थप्रतीतिरूपफलावच्छिन्नोऽभिदधातिनाभिधीयते, तदा प्रतीतिरूपफलभागर्थः कर्म भवति, अर्थमभिदधातीति । यदा तु भावनावच्छिन्नो भावयतिनाभिधीयते, तथा भावनालब्धा प्रतीतिः (प्रवृत्तिः?) कर्म भवति, प्रवृत्ति भावयतीत्ति । यदा तु प्रवृत्त्यवच्छिन्नः प्रवर्तयतिनाभिधीयते, यथा प्रवृत्तिफलभाक्पुरुषः कर्म भवति, पुरुषं प्रवर्तयतीति । न हि व्यापारस्वरूपाक्षिप्तः कर्मभावः। तथा सति हि चलत्यभिहितापि क्रिया गच्छत्यभिहितेव सकर्मिका स्यात् । तस्मादेक एव व्यापारः फलभेदेन बहुधा रूप्यमाणः तत्तत्कर्म(मैको ?) भवति ।

अस्त्वभिधाव्यापारश्शब्दस्य ; नत्वस्य पुरुषप्रवर्तकत्वं लिङाद्यभिधेयत्वञ्च सम्भवति । न हि कस्यचिदपि लिङादेरभिधाव्यापारत्वज्ञानमात्रात्प्रवृत्तिर्दृश्यते ; समीहितसाधनत्वावगमात्सर्वत्र प्रवृत्तेः । न चासावर्थप्रतीतिलक्षणफलोन्नेयशब्दान्तराभिधावत्तदभिधेयो भवितुमर्हति ॥

उच्यते--सत्यं फलसाधनत्वं प्रवर्तकत्वम् । । तत्तु न शब्दस्याभिधेयम् । यजेतेत्यादेश्शब्दाद्यागादेस्समीहितसाधनत्वावगतेर्लिङादियुक्तवाक्यश्रवणसमनन्तरं प्रवृत्तेर्दर्शनात्प्रवृत्तिहेतुभूतोऽभिधाव्यापारः शब्दान्तरव्यापारविलक्षणो लिङादिभिरभिहित इति निश्चीयते । न चाभिधाया अभिधानासम्भवः ; अभिधाशब्दवदुपपत्तेः । तस्माच्छब्दभावना विधिरिति केचिदाचक्षते ॥

तदयुक्तम् ; तत्सद्भावे प्रमाणाभावात् । न तावल्लिङादिशब्दः प्रमाणम् ; तत्र तस्य व्युत्पत्त्यभावात् । न च लिङादिशब्दश्रवणानन्तरभाविनी प्रवृत्तिः प्रमाणम् ; प्रवृत्ते(वृत्तौ?) तस्य निबन्धनत्वात् । यन्निबन्धना हि स्वात्मप्रवृत्तिर्दृष्टा तदेव तां दृष्ट्वा अशक्यानुमानम् । किञ्च शब्दस्य व्यापारो न सम्भवति । स हि द्विधा प्रयत्नलक्षणः परिस्पन्दलक्षणश्चेति ॥ अचेतनत्वान्न तावत्स प्रयत्नस्सम्भवति । न च परिस्पन्दः ; गुणत्वाच्छब्दस्य । यदुक्तम- रुणिमादेरिव गुणान्यव्यापारत्वं सम्भवतीति, तदपि न ; तत्रापि व्यापारासम्भव- स्याविशिष्टत्वात् ।

यच्चोक्तं शब्दविषयज्ञानमेव शब्दस्य व्यापार इति, तदप्ययुक्तम् ; ज्ञानस्यात्मगुण- त्वोपपादनेन तस्य शब्दव्यापारत्वासम्भवात् । न च शब्दोऽर्थमभिधत्त इत्यभिधाव्यापारस्य शब्दकर्तृकत्वञ्च युक्तम् ; तस्य ज्ञानपर्यायत्वाङ्गीकारात् । ज्ञानस्यात्माश्रयत्वेन शब्दाश्रय- त्वानुपपत्तेः ।

यदपि केनापि प्राकट्यं शब्दस्य व्यापार इत्युक्तम्, तदपि प्राकट्यस्य निरस्तत्वादनुपपन्नम् । अपि च व्यापाररहितस्यापि शब्दस्याभिधाव्यापारबोधकस्य लिङादेरिव बोधकत्वञ्चानुपपन्नम् । किञ्च यथा निर्व्यापारं ज्ञानमर्थप्रकाशनसमर्थमङ्गीकृतम् , तथात्रापि स्यात्—यथोक्तं सौत्रं बुद्धिजन्मपदं व्याचक्षाणैः न्यायाचार्यैः ॥

' व्यापारः कारकाणां हि दृष्टो जन्मातिरेकतः ।
प्रमाणेऽपि तथा मा भूदिति जन्म विवक्ष्यते ' ॥ इति ॥

तथा वर्णैरुत्पद्यमानोऽभिव्यज्यमानो वा शब्दो बोधहेतुर्भवतीति किमनुपपन्नम्? अत इदमपि निरस्तम्—पुरुषप्रवृत्तिभवनानुकूला लिङ्ज्ञानकरणिकार्थवादोदितप्राशस्त्यलक्षणेति- कर्तव्यतावती शब्दभावना प्रेरणात्मा कल्प्यत इति । तस्मान्न शब्दभावना नाम काचित्सि- द्ध्यति । यद्यपि सिद्ध्येत्तथापि न तस्य विधित्वं सम्भवति ; प्रवर्तनात्वाभावात् । न हि शतकृत्वः कुरुष्वेत्युक्ते कश्चित्प्रवर्तते । तेन........मरार्तस्याचेतनस्य शब्दस्य प्रवर्तकत्वं(त्वं न?) सम्भवति ।यदि च शब्दः प्रवर्तकः स्यात् , प्रवर्तयेदव्युत्पन्नमपि । अस्तु शब्दः प्रवर्तकः,

तथापि तन्निबन्धनायाः प्रवृत्तेर्वायाद(त्तेर्यागा?)दिप्रवृत्तिवत्पुरुषार्थभावो न सम्भवति। तस्माच्छब्दभावना विधिरिति पक्षो निष्प्रमाणकः ॥

अन्ये तु वदन्ति—कार्यबुद्धिस्सर्वत्र प्रवृत्तिहेतुः। तथाहि—यः पुरुषः पुरुषान्तरेणाप्रवर्तितः प्रवर्तते, यश्च स्वयं कामात्क्रोधाद्भयाद्वा प्रवर्तते, स सर्वोऽपि ममेदं कार्यमिति प्रतीत्यैव प्रवर्तते। तस्मात्कार्यमेव लिङाद्यर्थो विधिः , साक्षात्प्रवृत्त्युपधानादितरेषां व्यभिचाराच्च। तच्च कार्यं कृत्यधीनात्मलाभम्। तच्च लोके क्रियैव। तत्र क्रियायाः कार्यत्वं लिङादिभिः प्रतिपाद्यमानं वेदेऽपि स्वर्गकामो यजेतेत्यस्मिन्वाक्ये प्रतिपत्तुं प्रवृत्तो विरोधं पश्यति ; कथं स्वर्गकामस्य यागक्रिया कर्तव्या भवेत्? स्वर्गकामो हि स्वर्गसाधने प्रवर्तते। न यागस्स्वर्गसाधनं भवति, क्षणिकत्वादिति। एवं विरोधं पश्यन् लिङाद्यर्थ एव नूनं क्रियाव्यतिरिक्तः कश्चिदलौकिक इति मन्यते। तस्य कार्यत्वात्तज्ज्ञानं प्रवृत्तिकारणम्; स्थायित्वात्स्वर्गसाधना(नत्वो?)पपत्तेः स्वर्गकामस्यानुष्ठेयः; अलौकिकत्वादपूर्वशब्दवाच्यः; स्वात्मनि पुरुषं नियुञ्जानो नियोग इति गम्यते। तस्मिंश्च क्रियातिरिक्तकार्यवाच्ये निश्चिते लिङादीनां यो लोकप्रयोगः स लाक्षणिको भवति ; अनेकार्थत्वस्यान्याय्यत्वात्। एवञ्च नैमित्तिकनिषेधाधिकारयोरसत्यपि फलेऽपूर्वमेव वाक्यार्थो भविष्यति ; तस्यैवाभिधेयत्वादिति ॥

एतदप्यनुपपन्नम् ; कार्यस्य दुर्निरूपत्वान्निष्प्रमाणकत्वाच्च। तथाहि—न तावत्कृतिसाध्यं कार्यम् ; यागादेर्धात्वर्थस्य कार्यत्वप्रसङ्गात्। न च कृत्युद्देश्यं कार्यम् ; स्वर्गादेः फलस्य तथात्वापातात् ॥ नापि कृतिसाध्यं कृत्युद्देश्यं वा यद् भवति तत्कार्यमित्यपि वक्तुं शक्यम् ; तस्य कृत्युद्देश्यत्वासम्भवात्। कृतिं प्रति प्रयोजनं कृत्युद्देश्यं भवति। पुरुषस्य कृत्यारम्भप्रयोजनं कृतेश्च प्रयोजनम्। तच्च सुखं दुःखनिवृत्तिर्वा। न हि कार्यं तयोरन्यद(न्यतरद?)पि भवति। तस्मात्तस्य कृत्युद्देश्यत्वासम्भवात् कार्यत्वञ्च न सिद्ध्येत्। अथ तस्य कृतिप्रयोजनत्वाभावेऽपि प्रयोजनभूतस्य स्वर्गादेः साधनत्वेनार्थ्यत्वात्तत्कृत्युद्देश्यमित्युच्यते, तथा सति इष्टसाधनस्य विधित्वमङ्गीकृतं स्यात्। तस्माद्दुर्निरूपं कार्यम् ॥

अपि चास्य कार्यस्य न विधेयत्वं(विध्यर्थत्वं ?)सम्भवति ; तज्ज्ञानस्य प्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वाभावात् । न हि बलवदुद्वाह्योऽयं तदभावः(मृद्वारः ?)निपुणविज्ञेयः सुवर्णस्य वर्ण इत्यत्र-कार्यत्वज्ञाने सत्यपि प्रवृत्तिर्दृश्यते ॥

अथोच्येत—इदं मम कार्यमिति यत्प्रतीयते तत्कृत्युद्देश्यमिति, तदप्ययुक्तम् ; इदं मम कार्यमित्येवंरूपस्यास्य प्रमाणज्ञानत्वाभावात् । किन्तर्हि ? इदं कार्यमिति पुरुषस्य चिकीर्षारूपस्सङ्कल्पः । तस्मान्न वाक्यार्थज्ञानमिदम् । वाक्यं हीदं यागस्य कार्यमिति वदति ; न ममेदं कार्यमिति । अत एव वाक्यार्थं प्रतिपद्यमानोऽपि ममेदं कार्यमिति सङ्कल्पानुपपत्तेः विधिमतिक्रामन् दृश्यते ॥

यदुक्तं स्वर्गकामो यजेतेत्यत्र स्वर्गसाधनत्वान्यथानुपपत्त्या क्रियाव्यतिरिक्तं किञ्चित्कल्पनीयमिति, तन्न ; यागादेरि(रे?)व स्वर्गसाधनत्वस्य वक्ष्यमाणत्वात् । तस्मान्नापूर्वमपि विधिर्भवति ॥

त्रय्यन्तनिष्ठास्त्वेवमातिष्ठन्ते—आप्तस्य हितकामस्य नियोगो विधिः प्रवर्तनेति पर्यायाः । प्रयोक्तृपुरुषधर्मत्वेन तस्य व्युत्पत्तिः । ननु च शक्तिग्रहणं हि व्युत्पत्तिः, कथं पुरुषप्रवर्तनायां सम्भवति ? उच्यते—न हि शक्तिग्रहणं व्युत्पत्तिः । किन्तर्हि ? सहदर्शनम् । तथाहि—बालः शब्दप्रयोगं परेषां प्रवृत्तिं बहुकृत्वः सह पश्यति । तथादृष्ट्या प्रौढसंस्कारस्सन् लोकोत्तरे(कालान्तरे?) यथा(दा?) शब्दं शृणोति, तदा तस्याजिज्ञासमानस्यैवार्थेषु स्मृतिरुपजायते । स्मृताश्चार्थास्स्वयमेव संसर्गप्रतीतिमुपजनयन्ति । तस्मात्सहदर्शनं व्युत्पत्तिः। अत एव लिङादियुक्तेषु वाक्येषु बालः प्रयोज्यपुरुषस्य प्रवृत्तिदर्शनात्प्रवृत्तिहेतुविज्ञानमनुमाय तत्र च शब्दसमूहस्य शक्तिमवधारयति । पुनरावापोद्वापाभ्यामर्थविशेषस्य(षे ?) शब्दविशेषस्य शक्तिविशेषं व्यवस्थापयतीत्येतन्न समीचीनम् ; बालस्य तथाविधोहापोहसामर्थ्याभावात् ॥

किञ्च प्रवृत्तेः कार्यज्ञानस्यैव भूयोदर्शनेन व्याप्त्यवगमात्प्रागेव काञ्चिच्छब्दात्प्रवृत्तिं पश्येदपि । कथं कार्यज्ञानमनुमीयते ; कथं वा शब्दस्य लिङ्गत्वमवगच्छेत् । न ह्यनुमानव्युत्प-

त्ति(त्ते ?)रूर्ध्वमेव शब्दानन्तरप्रवृत्तिदर्शनमित्येव स्थापयितुं शक्यम् । तस्माद्व्याप्तिग्रहणस्मरणाभ्यां पूर्वं समकालं वा शब्दं प्रवृत्तिं च सह दृष्टवतश्शब्दादर्थप्रतीतिर्भवति । स्मृताश्चार्था अनिर्ज्ञातशक्तयस्संसर्गप्रतीतिमुपजनयन्ति । सम्बन्धयोग्येन विभक्त्यर्थकारकादिरूपेण सहैव स्मृता अर्थास्संसर्गप्रतीतिं कुर्वन्ति । यदा चायं बालः प्रौढस्सन्नूहापोहसमर्थो भवति, तदा आत्मनश्शब्देभ्यो ज्ञानोत्पत्तिं दृष्ट्वा शब्दानां ज्ञानजनने शक्तिमवगच्छेदपि । तस्माच्छब्दार्थसम्बन्धज्ञानात्प्रागेव शब्दाज्ज्ञानोत्पत्तेः 'शब्दादर्थज्ञानमनुमानमेव ; न प्रमाणान्तरम्' इति बौद्धानां पक्षः प्रत्युक्तः । अवश्यं हि सम्बन्धावगमपूर्विका सम्बन्धिदर्शनेन सम्बन्ध्यन्तरे बुद्धिरनुमानेऽन्तर्भवत्येव । तस्मात्सहदर्शनमेव व्युत्पत्तिः ॥

ननु न हि प्रयोजकस्य पुरुषस्य प्रवर्तना प्रयोज्यपुरुषविषया लिङादिभिस्सह बालेन ज्ञायते ; येन लिङार्थौ (ङादीन् ?) श्रुत्वा बालस्तस्याः स्मरेत् ॥

अत्रोच्यते—यथा बालस्सहदर्शनेन व्युत्पन्नः परवचनात्परस्य प्रवृत्तिं पश्यन्स्वयमस्मान्प्रवर्तयितुकामो वाक्यं प्रयुङ्क्ते । तदात्मनि प्रत्यक्षेण परप्रवर्तनां पश्यति । तां दृष्ट्वैवमवगच्छति—नूनं सर्वेऽपि पुरुषाः परप्रवृत्त्यर्थं हि लिङादि प्रयुञ्जानाः परोऽस्मिन्नर्थे प्रवर्ततामिति सङ्कल्परूपामाज्ञानुज्ञादिशब्दवाच्यां प्रवर्तनां कृत्वैव प्रयुक्तवन्त इति । तदेवं सर्वमुपपन्नम् ॥

ननु च यदि पुरुषस्य हितप्रवर्तनां लिङादयोऽभिदध्युः, तदा वैदिकानि वाक्यानि पौरुषेयाणि प्रसज्येरन् । पुरुषस्य हितप्रवर्तना लोके स्वकृतादेव वाक्यात्प्रतीयते, स्वप्रयुक्तस्य वा पुरुषस्य वाक्यात् ॥

उच्यते—राजभृत्यानां हि राज्ञः केनापि कारणेन मतं जानतामप्रयुक्तानामपि राजवचनाज्ञापनदैः पुरुषै राजाज्ञायाः प्रतिपत्तिर्दृश्यते , तथा हि—राजभृत्या राजाज्ञां तेनाबोधिता अप्येवं राजा युष्मानाज्ञापयतीति परेभ्यः कथयन्ति । ततस्तेऽपि राजाज्ञां प्रतिपद्यन्ते । एवं वैदिकानि वाक्यानि पुरुषाज्ञां प्रतिपादयिष्यन्ति ।

अथ स्याद्वैदिकान्यपि वाक्यानि राजपुरुषवाक्यवत्पुरुष एवमाज्ञापयतीति प्रतिपादयेयुः; न पुनरित्थं कुर्यादिति । मैवम् ॥ राजमयतां (राजभयात् ?) कुरु माकार्षीरित्यपि

वचनदर्शनात् । अथवा विधिप्रतिषेधानामित्थमीश्वराज्ञेत्येवंविधेन वाक्येनैकवाक्यतया विधिप्रतिषेधा ईश्वरस्याज्ञाः स्युः । तथा 'वेदमनूच्याचार्योऽन्तेवासिनमनुशास्ति' इत्यादिकेन वचनेन धर्मान्विधाय 'एष आदेशः, एष उपदेशः, एषा वेदोपनिषत्, एतदनुशासनम्' इति हि विधीनामाज्ञारूपत्वं श्रूयते । किञ्च 'एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि ददतो मनुष्याः प्रशंसन्ति यजमानं देवान्दर्विं पितरोऽन्वायत्ताः' इति श्रुतिः पूर्वोक्तमनुशासनं परमपुरुषस्येति ज्ञापयति । किञ्च 'दिशः श्रोत्रे वाग्विवृताश्च वेदाः' इति वेदानामीश्वरवचनत्वं श्रूयते । न च नित्यत्वेऽपि वेदानामीश्वरनियोगत्वं विधीनामनुपपन्नम् । 'अग्नीदग्नीन्विहर' इत्यादिवदुपपत्तेः । तस्मात्पुरुषनियोगो विधिः । अत एव स्वर्गकामो यजेतेत्यत्र भङ्गुरयागस्य स्वर्गसाधनत्वानुपपत्त्या क्रियाव्यतिरिक्तं किञ्चित्कल्प्यमित्येतदपि परास्तम्; अतीतेऽपि यागे स्वाज्ञाकरणेनाराधितस्य परमपुरुषस्य हविर्भोजनेनाराधितानामिन्द्रादिदेवतानां च फलप्रदातृत्वेन यागस्य स्वर्गसाधनत्वोपपत्तेः ॥

ननु चापूर्वस्यानभ्युपगमे प्रयाजादीनामङ्गत्वन्न स्यात् । न हि देवतादि तत्करणशरीरं निष्पादयन्ति । नापि तस्योपकुर्वन्ति । काम्यानां फलसद्भावेऽपि नित्यनैमित्तिकानां फलाभावात् यावत्फलमनवस्थानाच्च ॥

उच्यते—तत्रापीश्वराज्ञया प्रवर्तमानस्येश्वरसन्तोषफलं भविष्यति; लौकिकसेवकस्य सेव्यसन्तोषवत् । न च वाच्यं कर्मणां देवताराधनत्वे देवतां प्रति कर्माण्युपसर्जनानि स्युः । ततः तस्य देवताप्रयुक्तत्वादनुष्ठानस्य देवतानां कर्मानङ्गत्वात् तदभिधायिनां मन्त्राणां कर्माङ्गप्रकाशरूपदृष्टकार्यस्याभावात्फलप्रकाशनस्य प्रोत्साहनस्यान्यस्यैव वाऽभावाददृष्टार्थानां सतां प्रयाजादीनामिव विकृतिषु अनूह एव स्यादिति । आराध्यभूतानां देवतानामेव कर्माणि प्रति कारकत्वरूपेणाङ्गत्वस्यापि विद्यमानत्वात् । यथा लोके वयस्यैः स्वसेनापतिभिस्सह कन्दुकमृगयादिलीलारसमनुभवतां राज्ञां तत्र तत्र गुणभावः, तत्रैव तेषामपराधदर्शने स्वाभाविकं प्रभुत्वं च विद्यते, तथा देवतानामपि क्रियानिर्वर्तकत्वेन क्रियाङ्गत्वं देवपूजाद्यात्मनो यागादेस्तदाराधनत्वेनाराध्यत्वं 'स एवैनं भूतिं गमयति' इत्यादिवाक्यत्रयोदितफलप्रदातृत्वेन प्रभुत्वञ्चाविरुद्धम् ॥

ननु च 'इष्टापूर्तं बहुधा जातं जायमानं विश्वं विभर्ति भुवनस्य नाभिः' 'अहं हि सर्वयज्ञानां भोक्ता च प्रभुरेव च' इत्यादिभिः परमपुरुषस्यैव सर्वेषु यागेषु हविर्भोक्तृत्वं फलप्रदातृत्वञ्चावगम्यते। तत्कथमिदमुपपद्यते। 'अङ्गान्यन्या देवता' इति श्रुतेः परमपुरुषस्य शेषभूतानीतराणि दैवतानि। तस्मात्तेषामाराधनमेव तदाराधनं, भोगश्च तथैवेति कृत्वा तस्य सर्वेषु यागेषु भोक्तृत्वाभिधानं प्रभुत्वाभिधानञ्च भवति। भृत्यपोषणे स्वामिनस्सन्तोषो भवत्येव ॥

एवं यागादिकर्मभिरुपासनेनाराधितस्य परमपुरुषस्य भोगापवर्गरूपफलप्रदातृत्वं श्रूयते—'स वा एष महानज आत्मान्नादो वसुदानः, 'एष ह्येवानन्दयाति' इति। एवमिन्द्रादिदेवतानां परमपुरुषस्य चाराध्यतया (ध्यता ?) स्वयं (?) उपपद्यते। तासां देवतानां तत्तदैश्वर्यफलप्रदातृत्वशक्त्यादिगुणयोगः परमपुरुषप्रसादलब्ध इति तासां तस्य च फलप्रदातृत्वञ्चोपपन्नम् ॥

तदेवं लोके प्रयोक्तृपुरुषनियोगो विधिः, वेदे तु परमपुरुषनियोग इति सर्वत्र पुरुषनियोगो विधिः। यत्सहदर्शनं व्युत्पत्तिरित्युपपादितम् , यश्च पुरुषनियोगो विधिरिति तदेतद् द्वयमपि 'तैरेव शब्दैस्तेषु तेष्वर्थेषु स्वात्मनां बुद्ध्युत्पत्तिं दृष्ट्वा शब्दार्थयोस्सम्बन्धान्तरादर्शनात्सङ्केतयितृपुरुषाज्ञानाच्च तेषु तेष्वर्थेषु शब्दानां प्रयोगो बोधकत्वनिबन्धन इति निश्चिन्वन्ति' इति भाष्यात् 'स्वशासनानुवर्तिनः परमपुरुषोऽनुगृह्णाति, तदतिवर्तिनो निगृह्णाति' इति भाष्याच्च **भगवता भाष्यकारेणा**ङ्गीकृतमिति गम्यते। तस्मात्सर्वं समीचीनम् ॥

इति नीतिमालायां

विधिस्वरूपनिर्णयाधिकारोऽष्टमः ॥



श्रीः

नीतिमालायां

नवमाधिकार आरभ्यते.



अथ निश्श्रेयससाधनभूतं वेदनं निर्णीयते—

> वेदान्तवाक्यजं ज्ञानमपवर्गस्य साधनम् ।
> केचिदाहुरथान्ये तु साङ्ख्ययोगसमुच्चयम् ॥
>
> विवेकाद्यैरनुद्धर्षपर्यन्तैस्सप्तहेतुभिः ।
> निष्पन्नं भक्तिपर्यायं वेदनं वेदवित्तमाः ॥

'वेदान्तविज्ञानसुनिश्चितार्थास्सन्न्यासयोगाद्यतयश्शुद्धसत्त्वाः। ते ब्रह्मलोके तु परान्तकाले परामृतात्परिमुच्यन्ति सर्वे' 'तरति शोकमात्मवित्' इत्यादिश्रुतिभिर्वेदान्तवाक्यजन्यं ज्ञानमविद्यानिवृत्तिलक्षणमोक्षसाधनतयावगतम् । तस्माद्वेदान्तवाक्यानि यज्ञादिनिबर्हितकल्मषस्य ब्रह्मविषयकाविद्यानिवर्तकं ज्ञानं जनयति। तज्ज्ञानं यावदन्तःकरणबहिःकरणजन्यविपरीतचेष्टा न शाम्यति, तावन्तं कालं प्रतिबद्धफलं तिष्ठति। तत्र श्रवणेन शक्तितात्पर्यावधारणे कृते मननिदिध्यासनाभ्यामसम्भावनाविपरीतसम्भावनानिरासे च कृते तदेव शब्दजन्यं ज्ञानमपरोक्षरूपं सदशेषाज्ञानं तत्कार्यनिर्लेपं निवर्तयति। न च शब्दस्य परोक्षज्ञानहेतुत्वन्न सम्भवतीति वाच्यम्; प्रमेयवैषम्यादुपपत्तेः। तथाहि—घटाद्यानात्मवस्तु स्वविषयाज्ञाननिवृत्तिव्यतिरेकेण स्वसंसर्ग(र्गि)प्रकाशमपि प्रमाणफलत्वेनापेक्षते; अस्वयम्प्रकाशरूपत्वात्। आत्मवस्तु स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वात्स्वाज्ञाननिवृत्तिव्यतिरेकेण प्रकाशसंसर्गं प्रमाणफलत्वेन नापेक्षते। ततश्चावधरितशक्तितात्पर्यैर्निश्चयशब्दजन्यविज्ञानेन स्वविषयाज्ञाननिवृत्तौ ब्रह्म स्वयमेवापरोक्षं

भवति। न च ध्यानेनाविद्यानिवृत्तिस्सम्भवति ; तस्य प्रमाणज्ञानत्वाभावान्मिथ्याभूतस्य संसारस्य प्रमाणज्ञानैकनिवर्त्यत्वाच्च। तस्माद्वाक्यार्थज्ञानं निश्श्रेयससाधनमिति केचिदाहुः।

तदयुक्तम्; 'आत्मा वा अरे ज्ञातव्यः' 'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः' इत्यादिभिरात्मध्यानस्य विधेयत्वावगमाद्वाक्यार्थज्ञानस्याविधेयत्वाच्च। न च वाक्यजन्यज्ञानेनाविद्यानिवृत्तिर्दृश्यते। यदुक्तं प्रथमं वाक्यार्थज्ञानं प्रतिबद्धफलं तिष्ठति; तत्र श्रवणादिभिः प्रतिबन्धे निवृत्ते तदेवाविद्यां निवर्तयतीति॥ तदप्ययुक्तम्; बाधकज्ञानेन प्रतिबन्धकहेतूनामपि मिथ्यात्वेन बाधितत्वात्प्रतिबन्धासम्भवात्। द्विचन्द्रज्ञानवत्सम्भवतीति चेत्, नैवम्; तत्र द्विचन्द्रज्ञानहेतोः पारमार्थिकस्य काचादेरौषधविनाश्यत्वेन ज्ञानसाध्यत्वाभावात्तत्सम्भव उपपन्नः। तस्माद्वाक्यार्थज्ञानस्य प्रतिबद्धफलत्वमनुपपन्नम्।

न चासम्भावनाविपरीतसम्भावनानिरसनयोः प्राग्बाधकज्ञानं नोत्पद्यत इति वाच्यम्; सामग्र्यां सत्यां ज्ञानानुत्पत्त्यनुपपत्तेः। यच्चोक्तं शब्दोऽपरोक्षज्ञानं जनयतीति, तदप्यसङ्गतम्; अदृष्टत्वात्।

यदप्युक्तं प्रमेयवैषम्यात्तदपरोक्षं भवतीति, तदपि न मनोहरम्; आत्मनः प्रमेयत्वानङ्गीकरणात्। प्रमाणज्ञानेन तद्गताज्ञाननिवृत्त्या तस्यापि प्रमेयत्वमौपचारिकं विद्यत इति चेत्, तदपि न सिद्ध्येत्; तस्याज्ञानतदाश्रयत्वादेर्निरस्तत्वात्। यच्चेदमुक्तं संसारस्य मिथ्यात्वेन प्रमाणज्ञानेन निवर्त्यते, न ध्यानेनेति; तदपि तस्य पारमार्थ्योपपादनान्निरस्तम्। 'वेदान्तविज्ञानसुनिश्चितार्थाः' इति श्रुतिश्च न वाक्यजन्यज्ञानस्यापवर्गसाधनत्वं ब्रूते; 'सन्न्यासयोगाद्यतयश्शुद्धसत्त्वाः' इति ज्ञानोत्तरकालभाविनस्सन्न्यासादेरपि परिकरतया प्रतिपादनात्। तस्मान्न वाक्यजन्यज्ञानं निश्श्रेयससाधनमिति॥

अन्ये तु वदन्ति—साङ्ख्ययोगोऽप(गाव?)वर्गस्य साधनम्। तत्त्वानामवधारणं साङ्ख्यम्। तद् द्विविधम्, श्रवणं मननञ्चेति। तत्र सविशेषध्यानं सम्भूतिरित्युच्यते। निर्विशेषध्यानं विनाश इत्युच्यते। कर्मयोगस्तु वाक्कायबाह्यार्थजः। तच्च त्रिविधमनुष्ठानम्—ईश्वरार्थानां कर्मणां करणम्, इतरेषाञ्च त्यागः, सर्वफलसन्न्यासश्चेति। एवंविधाभ्यां समुच्चिताभ्यां

साङ्ख्ययोगाभ्यामपवर्गप्राप्तिः। 'तत्कारणं साङ्ख्ययोगाधिगम्यम्' इति श्रुतेः। ज्ञानयोग-कर्मयोगयोस्तु समुच्चयोऽन्यत्र परिव्राजकेभ्यः। तेषां तु ज्ञानयोगः। सम्भूति-विनाशयोस्तु सर्वत्र समुच्चयो भवति। ज्ञानयोगकर्मयोगयोस्सम्भूतिविनाशयोश्च समुच्चयः श्रुतिसिद्धः। 'विद्याञ्चाविद्याञ्च यस्तद्वेदोभयं सह', 'अविद्यया मृत्युं तीर्त्वा विद्ययामृतमश्नुते।' सम्भूतिञ्च विनाशञ्च यस्तद्वेदोभयं सह। विनाशेन मृत्युं तीर्त्वा सम्भूत्यामृतमश्नुते' इति। यथोक्तं—'समुच्चयांस्त्रीनिह वर्णयन्ति साङ्ख्यस्य योगस्य च वै स पूर्वः। ज्ञानक्रियायोगगतो द्वितीयस्तथैव सम्भूतिविनाशजोऽन्यः।' इति। तस्मात्साङ्ख्ययोगाभ्यामपवर्ग इति॥

तदप्यनुपपन्नम्। 'तमेवं विद्वानमृत इह भवति, नान्यः पन्था अयनाय विद्यते' इत्यादिभिः श्रुतिभिर्वेदनस्यैवापवर्गसाधनत्वश्रवणात्, तदितरस्य साधनत्वनिषेधाच्च। तत्कारणं साङ्ख्ययोगाधिगम्यमित्याद्युक्तलक्षणयोस्साङ्ख्ययोगयोरपवर्गफले समुच्चयो न विधीयते। अपि तर्हि 'ज्ञानयोगेन साङ्ख्यानां कर्मयोगेन योगिनाम्' इति स्मरणात्साङ्ख्ययोगशब्दौ ज्ञानयोग-कर्मयोगवचनौ। ताभ्यामनुष्ठिताभ्यां परमात्मसाक्षात्कारो भवतीत्युच्यते; अधिगतेर्ज्ञानार्थत्वात्, पूर्वोक्तश्रुतिविरोधाच्च। विद्यां चाविद्यां चेत्यनेनापि विद्याविद्ययोर्नापवर्गफले समुच्चय उच्यते। मृत्युतरणामृतत्वप्राप्तिफलभेदस्य तयोः सुव्यक्तत्वात्। अत्राविद्याशब्देन विद्येतरत्वाद्विहितं वर्णाश्रमप्रयुक्तं कर्मोच्यते। मृत्युशब्देन च विद्योत्पत्तिविरोधि प्राचीनं कर्मोच्यते। सम्भूतिञ्च विनाशञ्चेत्यस्यापि वाक्यस्यायमेवार्थः—विदुषो विद्यासाध्यस्यापवर्गस्य सम्यगभिवृद्धिरूपत्वात्सम्यगभिवृद्धिपर्यायस्सम्भूतिशब्दो लक्षणया तत्साधनभूतविद्यावचनः। कर्मफलस्य विनाशगर्भत्वात्फलवचनो विनाशशब्दो लक्षणया तत्साधनकर्मवचनः। अनयोस्सम्भूतिविनाशशब्द-योस्सविशेषनिर्विशेषध्यानवाचित्वं लक्षणयापि न सिद्ध्यति। तस्माद्यथोक्त एवार्थः। अत-स्साङ्ख्ययोगौ समुच्चितावपवर्गसाधनमिति न युक्तम्॥

त्रय्यन्तविदग्रेसरास्त्वेवमभिदधति—'ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्' 'रुक्माभं स्वप्नधीगम्यं विद्यात्तु पुरुषं परम्' इत्यादिभिर्वाक्यार्थज्ञानविलक्षणं तन्मूलं विवेकादिपरिशुद्धमनोजन्यं ध्यानोपासनध्रुवानुस्मृतिशब्दवाच्यं साक्षात्कारसदृशञ्चेत्यद्भुतपरमपुरुषार्थप्रियत्वेन स्वय-मप्यत्यर्थप्रियत्वमापन्नं तत एव भक्तिशब्दवाच्यं वेदनमपवर्गसाधनतया विधीयते। कुत इद-

मवगम्यत इति चेत्, 'अनुविद्य विजानाति' 'विज्ञाय प्रज्ञां कुर्वीत' इति श्रुतेः विज्ञानपर्यायस्य वेदनस्य वाक्यार्थज्ञानमूलत्वं तत एव तद्वैलक्षण्यं चावगम्यते। 'आहारशुद्धौ सत्त्वशुद्धिः' 'शान्त उपासीत' 'सदा तद्भावभावितः' 'क्रियावानेष ब्रह्मविदां वरिष्ठः' 'यज्ञेन दानेन तपसानाशकेन' 'सत्येन लभ्यः' 'नायमात्मा प्रवचनेन लभ्यः' 'शान्तो दान्तः' इत्यादिशास्त्रैर्विवेकादिसप्तकसाचिव्यं मनसोऽवगम्यते। विवेकादिभ्यो वेदनलब्धिर्**ब्रह्मनन्दिना**भिहिता-'तल्लब्धिर्विवेकविमोकाभ्यासक्रियाकल्याणानवसादानुद्धर्षेभ्यः' इति। सात्त्विकाहारसेवया शरीरेन्द्रियशोधनं विवेकः। कामानभिष्वङ्गो विमोकः। उपास्यसंशीलनमभ्यासः। यथाशक्ति वर्णाश्रमधर्मानुष्ठानं क्रिया। आर्जवाद्यात्मगुणाः कल्याणानि। शोकहेतुषूपस्थितेष्वपि मनसोऽवसादराहित्यमनवसादः। हर्षहेतुषूपस्थितेष्वप्यतिसन्तोषराहित्यमनुद्धर्षः। परिशुद्धं मन एवास्य वेदनस्य साधनमिति च 'मनसैवानुद्रष्टव्यम्' 'दृश्यते त्वग्र्यया बुद्ध्या' 'न चक्षुषा गृह्यते नापि वाचा' 'मनसा तु विशुद्धेन' इति श्रुतेरवगम्यते। ध्यानोपासनध्रुवानुस्मृतीनां वेदनपर्यायत्वं तत्तच्छब्दनिर्दिष्टानामपवर्गसाधनत्वोपदेशाद्वेदनव्यतिरिक्तस्य साधनत्वनिषेधश्रुतेश्चावगम्यते। 'यदा पश्यः पश्यते रुक्मवर्णं' 'तस्मिन् दृष्टे परावरे' इत्यादिश्रुतिभिर्वेदनस्य साक्षात्कारदशापत्तिर्विज्ञायते। 'यमेवैष वृणुते तेन लभ्यस्तस्यैष आत्मा विवृणुते तनूं स्वाम्' 'मद्भक्तिं लभते पराम्' इत्यादिशास्त्रादस्य भक्तिरूपत्वमवगम्यते। तस्माद्भक्तिपर्यायं वेदनं निःश्रेयससाधनमिति निश्चीयते। एवं सति 'तमेवं विद्वानमृत इह भवति' 'भक्त्या लभ्यस्त्वनन्यया' 'भक्त्या त्वनन्यया शक्यः' इति श्रुतिस्मृतयस्सङ्गता भवन्ति ॥

ननु 'कर्मणैव हि संसिद्धिमास्थिता जनकादयः'

'वर्णाश्रमाचारवता पुरुषेण परः पुमान्।
विष्णुराराध्यते पन्था नान्यस्तत्तोषकारकः॥' इति

कर्मैकसाध्यत्वं निःश्रेयसस्यावगम्यते। तत्कथं भक्त्यैकसाध्यत्वम्?

उच्यते—'कर्मणैव हि संसिद्धिमास्थिता जनकादयः' इत्यनेन तावन्निःश्रेयसस्य न कर्मसाध्यत्वमुच्यते। अपि तर्हि ज्ञाननिष्ठायाः कर्मसाध्यत्वमुच्यते। 'स्वकर्मणा तमभ्यर्च्य सिद्धिं विन्दति मानवः' इत्यनेनैकार्थ्यात्। तत्र

सिद्धिं प्राप्तो यथा ब्रह्म तथा प्राप्नो निबोध मे।
समासेनैव कौन्तेय निष्ठा ज्ञानस्य या परा॥

इत्यादिना 'मद्भक्तिं लभते पराम्'

'भक्त्या मामभिजानाति यावान्यश्चास्मि तत्त्वतः।
ततो मां तत्त्वतो ज्ञात्वा विशते तदनन्तरम्॥'

इत्यन्तेन कर्मणां ज्ञाननिष्ठापरपर्यायसिद्धिहेतुत्वप्रतिपादनाद्ब्रह्मप्राप्तिलक्षणस्य निश्श्रेयसस्य परभक्तिलभ्यत्ववचनाच्च वर्णाश्रमाचारवतेत्यनेनापि त्रैवर्णिकैस्स्ववर्णाश्रमधर्मानुष्ठानेन भगवत्सन्तोषः कर्तव्यः (न ?) प्रकारान्तरेणेत्युच्यते; न तु कर्मणां निश्श्रेयससाधनत्वमिति नात्र कश्चिद्विरोधः॥

अथ स्यात्—उपासनस्य निश्श्रेयससाधनत्वे

'क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन् दृष्टे परावरे'।
'ज्ञानं हि सर्वपापानि नाशयिष्यत्यसंशयम्'॥

'ज्ञानाग्निस्सर्वकर्माणि भस्मसात्कुरुते तथा।
यथाग्निरुद्धतशिखः कक्षं दहति सानिलः।
तथा चित्तस्थितो विष्णुर्योगिनां सर्वकल्मषम्'॥

इत्यादिश्रुतिस्मृतिभिर्यत्तस्य पापक्षयहेतुत्वमवगम्यते, तदनुपपन्नं स्यात्। न चोभयत्र विनियोगात्तस्योभयफलत्वं युक्तम्; सन्ध्यावन्दनज्योतिष्टोमादीनां कर्मणामुद्गीथाद्युपासनानां चैकफलत्वनियमदर्शनात्॥

अथ सेतुदर्शनचान्द्रायणादिकर्मणामेकस्यैव पापक्षपणपुत्रादिनानाफलसाधनत्वं दृश्यत इति; सत्यम्। तत्र प्रयोगभेद उपपद्यते। इह त्वाप्रायणमावर्तमानस्योपासनस्यैकशास्त्रार्थत्वात्फलभेदो नोपपद्यते। तस्माद्ध्यानस्य पापक्षपणं ब्रह्मप्राप्तिर्वा फलं भवेत्। तत्राप्यक्षीणकल्मषस्य ब्रह्मप्राप्त्यसम्भवात्कल्मषक्षय एवोपासनफलमभ्युपेयमिति नोपासनस्य निश्श्रेयससाधनत्वमिति॥

नैतदेवम्; सकृत्प्रयुक्तस्यैकस्यैवानेकफलत्वोपपत्तेः। एकैको हि मणिमन्त्रौषधादिर्विषं हन्ति। अणिमाद्यैश्वर्यञ्चावहति। परं पीयमानं पयः पित्तमपहन्ति तृषं च वारयति (इति [2]) दृश्यते। वैदिकानामपि कर्मणां सकृदनुष्ठितानां नानाफलत्वमवगम्यते। 'ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेतैककामस्सर्वकामोऽपि' इत्यापस्तम्बवचनात्। एकस्मिन्प्रयोगे सर्वान्कामान्कामयीत प्रयोगप्रतीत्यैवैकैकमित्यार्षवचनाच्च। विशेषतो भगवन्माहात्म्यात्तदुपासनस्यानेकफलत्वमुपपन्नम्। स्मर्यते च तस्य नानाफलत्वम्—

'आयासः स्मरणे कोऽस्य स्मृतो यच्छति शोभनम्।
पापक्षयश्च भवति स्मरतां तमहर्निशम्॥

भावं मनोरथं यच्च स्वर्गवन्द्यञ्च यत्पदम्।
ददाति ध्यायतां नित्यमपवर्गप्रदो हरिः॥

रत्नपर्वतमारुह्य यथा रत्नं नरो मुने।
सत्त्वानुरूपमादत्ते तदा कृष्णान्मनोरथम्'॥ इत्यादिभिः

तस्माद्ब्रह्मोपासनस्य सकलकल्मषक्षपणमर्चिरादिगतिर्ब्रह्मप्राप्तिश्चेति त्रीण्यपि फलानि स्युः। तदेवं भक्तिपर्यायं वेदनं निश्श्रेयससाधनमिति सिद्धम्॥

अत्र केचिद्भगवद्गुणप्रवीणा एवं वर्णयन्ति—यतोऽभ्युदयनिश्श्रेयससिद्धिस्स धर्मः। स च द्विविधः सिद्धः साध्यश्चेति। तत्र साध्यो यागदानहोमोपासनादिः। सिद्धो ज्ञानशक्तिबलैश्वर्यादिगुणसम्पन्नो भगवान्। 'कृष्णं धर्मं सनातनम्' 'स हि धर्मस्सनातनः' इत्यादिस्मरणात्। तस्यापवर्गसाधनत्वं श्रूयते। 'यो ब्रह्माणं विदधाति पूर्वं यो वै वेदांश्च प्रहिणोति तस्मै। तं ह देवमात्मबुद्धिप्रकाशं मुमुक्षुर्वै शरणमहं प्रपद्ये' इति। स्मर्यते च—

'शरणं त्वां प्रपन्ना ये ध्यानयोगविवर्जिताः।
तेऽपि मृत्युमतिक्रम्य यान्ति तद्वैष्णवं पदम्॥

सोऽहं त्वां शरणमपारमप्रमेयं सम्प्राप्तः परमपदं यतो न किञ्चित्।
संसारश्रमपरितापतप्तचेता निर्वाणे परिणत धाम्नि साभिलाषे॥'

इत्यादिभिः। तस्माद्भगवानप्युपायतयोपादेयः। तदुपादानं नाम तत्प्रपदनम्। निवेदनं निक्षेपो न्यासः प्रपदनमिति पर्यायाः। तच्च तदेकोपायत्वप्रार्थनलक्षणम्। तत्र ये संसारोद्विग्नमानसाः भगवच्चरणद्वन्द्वाभिलाषिण उक्तलक्षणसाध्योपायेऽधिकारशक्तिवाञ्छानिवेशनं न लभन्ते, ते भगवत्प्रसादेन तस्मिन्विस्रम्भशालिनस्तमेवोपाददते। सोऽपि तेषां गुणदोषावविगणय्य योगक्षेमं विदधाति। यत एवमाह—

'अहं त्वा सर्वपापेभ्यो मोक्षयिष्यामि मा शुचः।'
'मित्रभावेन सम्प्राप्तं न त्यजेयं कथञ्चन॥' इति॥

न चैतदितरोपायोपादानवद्देशकालादिनियमापेक्षम्; प्रपदनीयमाहात्म्यात्। द्रुपदात्मजावृत्तान्तोऽपि भगवत्प्रपदनस्य नियमानपेक्षत्वं द्योतयति। सा हि स्त्रीधर्मिणी सत्येव परिषदि परपरिभवापजिहीर्षया भगवन्तं प्रापद्यत। सोऽपि तस्याः परिभवमसन्निधान एवापाचकारेति हि पञ्चमाम्नायप्रसिद्धिः। तत्प्रपदनं प्रपदनीयपुरुषविशेषेषु नियमा(मो?)पेतमपि क्रियते। यथा सागरतरणाभिलाषिणा भगवता दशरथात्मजेन प्राङ्मुखत्वदर्भासनादिनियमोपेतेन वरुणं प्रति। तदपि प्रपदनीयस्य लाघवेन वा प्रपद्यमानस्य वृत्तशालितया हि(वा?) सञ्जातमित्यवगन्तव्यम्॥

परमपुरुषे प्रपदनीये तु न नियमलेशोऽप्यपेक्षितः। तस्मात्तदनन्यगतिभिस्स एवोपादेयत्वेनोपादेय इति तस्मिन्नेतस्मिन् सिद्धोपाये महाभागधेये महाविस्रम्भशालिनां लोकोत्तराणामेवाधिकारः इति भगवान् **बादरायणः** पूर्वोक्तमुपासनमेवापवर्गसाधनं निरणैषीत् 'आवृत्तिरसकृदुपदेशात्' इत्यादिना। तस्माद्यथाधिकारमुपाय उपादेयः॥

इति नीतिमालायां

निश्श्रेयससाधननिर्णयाधिकारो नवमः॥

श्रीः

नीतिमालायां

दशमाधिकार आरभ्यते.



अथ निश्श्रेयसस्वरूपं निर्णीयते—

अविद्याया निवृत्तिं तु केचिन्मोक्षं प्रचक्षते।
निवृत्तसकलोपाधिब्रह्मभावमथापरे॥

अर्चिरादिकया गत्या परञ्ज्योतिरुपेयुषः।
विदुषः स्वात्मयाथात्म्यप्रादुर्भावपुरस्सरम्॥

परमव्योमनिष्ठस्य दिव्यमूर्तेः परात्मनः।
निरङ्कुशं त्वनुभवमाहुस्त्रय्यन्तवित्तमाः॥

अस्मिन्निश्श्रेयसे वादिनो बाह्या विवदन्ते। तथाहि—बौद्धैकदेशा माध्यमिकाः प्रकृष्टशून्यभावनया शून्यभावापत्तिं मोक्षमाचक्षते। योगाचारप्रभृतयस्तु स्वलक्षणभावनया क्षणिकत्वभावनया च विषयोपरागविधुरविज्ञानसन्तानम्। आर्हतास्तु सम्यग्दर्शनचारित्रैः प्रक्षीणाखिलमलस्याविर्भूतसकलगुणस्य लोकान्तरेऽवस्थानम्। अक्षपादकणादमतानुसारिणो वैशेषिका आत्मगुणोच्छेदम्। प्राभाकराश्च तथैव। भाट्टास्तु मनःकरणकेन ज्ञानेनानन्दानुभवम्। विवर्तवादिनोऽविद्यानिवृत्तिम्। उपाध्यवच्छिन्नजीववादिनस्तु निर्मुक्तोपाधेस्तस्य ब्रह्मभावम्। त्रय्यन्तार्थयाथात्म्यविदस्तु उपासनप्रीतपरमपुरुषप्रसादात्प्रक्षीणाखिलपुण्यपापसञ्चयस्यार्चिरादिना मार्गेण परञ्ज्योतिरुपसम्पन्नस्याविर्भूतस्वाभाविकापहतपाप्मत्वादिगुणस्य सविभूतिकभगवद्विषयो नित्यासङ्कुचितापरोक्षानुभवो मोक्ष इति वदन्ति॥

तत्र बौद्धपक्षे बन्धमोक्षान्वयिनः स्थायिनो भोक्तुरभावान्मोक्षो दुर्घटः । अर्हन्मतेऽपि चिद्रूपस्य वा अचिद्रूपस्य वा स्वयं परिणामरहितस्य तस्य स्वतोऽप्रतिसङ्क्रमत्वाच्चेतना(न [१])धिष्ठितत्वाच्च गमनानुपपत्तेस्तत्पूर्वकलोकान्तरावस्थानलक्षणं निश्श्रेयसमनुपपन्नम् ॥

ज्ञानसुखादिगुणोच्छेदलक्षणमोक्षपक्षेऽपि संज्ञा(विसंज्ञ [१])त्वात्सुखानुभवाभावात्तत्स्वरूपाव(पो [१])च्छेदकल्पत्वं मोक्षस्य स्यात्। अथ तत्र सुखाभावेऽपि दुःखाभावस्य विद्यमानत्वात्पुरुषार्थत्वमुच्यते। तन्न; दुःखाभावस्याप्यननुभाव्यत्वेनापुरुषार्थत्वस्यावर्जनीयत्वात्। न हि पाषाणादेर्दुःखाभावः पुरुषार्थतया प्रसिद्धः। भाट्टमतेऽपि संसारदशायां करणाधीनज्ञानस्य विषयाधीनसुखस्य चात्मनो मोक्षदशायामकरणकत्वाच्छब्दादिविषयाधीनत्वाच्च ज्ञानसुखयोरसम्भवादानन्दानुभवो न सम्भवति ॥

अथ तत्रापि मनसो नित्यत्वेन विद्यमानत्वात्स्वरूपस्यानुकूलत्वाच्च ज्ञानानन्दौ सम्भवेताम्। नैवं सम्भवतः; मनसो नित्यत्वेऽप्यात्ममनसोर्विभुत्वाभ्युपगमेनान्यतरकर्मजस्योभयकर्मजस्य वा सयोगस्यानुपपत्तेः ज्ञानोत्पत्त्यसम्भवात्। ज्ञानानन्दयोस्सम्भवेऽपि तयोरुत्पत्तिमत्त्वेनान्तवत्त्वमपि प्रसज्येत ॥

विवर्तवादेऽप्यविद्यानिवृत्तेर्दुर्निरूपत्वात्तस्य निश्श्रेयसत्वं दुरुपपादम्। तथाहि—केयमविद्यानिवृत्तिर्नाम [१] यद्यविद्यायाः प्रध्वंसः, तदा तस्याभावरूपत्वाङ्गीकाराद्घटादितुल्यत्वेन तत्प्रध्वंस इव निवृत्तिशब्देन तस्यावस्थान्तरप्राप्तिरुक्ता स्यात्। प्रध्वंसप्रागभावौ हि द्रव्यस्यावस्थाविशेषौ। मृद्द्रव्यस्य पृथुबुध्नोदराकारत्वं हि घटत्वम्। तस्यैवोत्तरकालभाविनी कपालत्वावस्था प्रध्वंसः। पूर्वकालभाविनी पिण्डत्वावस्था प्रागभावः। मृद्द्रव्यन्तूभयावस्थायामनुवृत्तम्। घट उत्पद्यते नश्यतीति व्यवहारौ तदवस्थानिबन्धनौ; तदतिरिक्तस्य कस्यचिदनुपलम्भात्। एवं सर्वेषु द्रष्टव्यम्। तस्मादविद्यानिवृत्तिरपि तद्द्रव्यस्यावस्थाविशेष इत्यङ्गीकर्तव्यम्। तथा सति तेनैव द्रव्येण ब्रह्म सद्वितीयमापतेत् ॥

अथाविद्या न द्रव्यमित्युच्यते, तथा सति तत्कार्यस्य प्रपञ्चस्यापि न द्रव्यत्वं स्यात्। यदि ब्रह्मैवाविद्यानिवृत्तिरिति मतम्, तदा तस्य नित्यत्वेन ब्रह्मज्ञानवैयर्थ्यं बन्धाभावश्च प्रसज्येत।

अस्त्वविद्यानिवृत्तिः, तथापि तस्य पुरुषैरर्थ्यत्वासम्भवान्न निश्श्रेयसत्वं सिद्ध्यति। तस्याभावरूपत्वेऽपि दुःखनिवृत्तिरूपत्वात्पुरुषार्थत्वं सम्भवतीत्यपि न वाच्यम्; दुःखनिवृत्तेः पुरुषार्थत्वासम्भवस्योक्तत्वात्।

अथ स्यान्नास्माभिरविद्यानिवृत्तिमात्रं निश्श्रेयसमित्युच्यते, किन्तर्हि निवृत्तायामविद्यायां सुखैकतानब्रह्मस्वरूपस्याविर्भावो भवति। स आविर्भावो निश्श्रेयसमिति। तदप्यनुपपन्नम्; आविर्भावस्यैवासम्भवात्। तत्त्वज्ञानात्पूर्वं ब्रह्मणः तिरोधानसम्भवे हि पश्चात्तस्याविर्भावस्सम्भवति। निर्विशेषस्य स्वयम्प्रकाशस्य ब्रह्मणस्तिरोधानं न सम्भवतीति हि पूर्वमेवोक्तम्। ब्रह्मण एव सुखरूपत्वञ्च निरस्तम्। यद्यपि सुखरूपस्य ब्रह्मण आविर्भावः, तथापि तस्य पुरुषार्थत्वन्न सिद्ध्यति; तत्स्वरूपस्यार्थ्यत्वाभावात्। न हि कश्चिदहं भूयासमित्याशास्ते; किन्तु सुखी भूयासमिति॥

स्यान्मतम्—येन सुखसम्बन्ध आशास्यते सुखी भूयासमिति, तेनापि न सुखसम्बन्धोऽर्थ्यते, किन्तर्हि? सुखापरोक्ष्यम्। तत्रापि तस्य विद्यमानत्वात्पुरुषार्थत्वं सम्भवतीति। तच्च नैवम्; विवेकहेत्वभावात्।

अस्तु सुखापरोक्ष्यं पुरुषार्थः; तदपि न सिद्ध्यति। सुखापरोक्ष्यं हि सुखसाक्षात्कारः। साक्षात्कर्तरि ज्ञातरि विद्यमाने हि साक्षात्कारो भवति। तस्मादविद्यानिवृत्तिर्मोक्ष इत्येतन्मतं न समीचीनम्॥

यन्निवृत्तोपाधेर्जीवस्य ब्रह्मभावो मोक्ष इति, तदपि चिन्त्यम्। कोऽयं जीवस्य ब्रह्मभावः? यद्युपाधिविगममात्रं, तदुक्तेन न्यायेन निश्श्रेयसं न स्यात्। अथोपाध्यवच्छिन्नस्यानवच्छिन्नब्रह्मैक्यं तदप्ययुक्तम्; अवच्छेदस्य निरस्तत्वात्। किञ्चायं ब्रह्मभावः उपाधिविच्छेदात्प्रागस्ति न वा? अस्ति चेदुपाधिविशेषव्यतिरेकेण न साधनानुष्ठानसाध्यं किञ्चिदस्ति। नास्ति चेत्तदानीमविद्यमानस्तत्त्वज्ञानसाध्यस्स कीदृशः? यदि ब्रह्मसारूप्यम्, जीवब्रह्मणोर्मुक्त्यवस्थायां भेदोऽङ्गीकृतः स्यात्। अथ संसारदशायां ब्रह्मविलक्षणस्य जीवस्य पश्चात्तेनैक्यं ब्रह्मभाव इति मतम्, तदसङ्गतम्; विलक्षणस्य द्रव्यस्य द्रव्यान्तरभावानुपपत्तेः। स्मर्यते च जीवस्य परमात्मैक्यनिषेधः।

निष्ठनित्यदिव्यविग्रहपरब्रह्मानुभवोऽवगम्यते। एवमनुभवतो मुक्तस्य 'स एकधा भवति द्विधा भवति स यदि पितृलोककामो भवति सङ्कल्पादेवास्य पितरः समुत्तिष्ठन्ति' 'जक्षन् क्रीडन् रममाणस्सर्वान् लोकानाप्नोति सर्वांश्च कामान्' इत्यादिश्रुतिभिः स्वेच्छानिमित्तबहुशरीरग्रहणं स्वसङ्कल्पायत्तपित्रादिसमुत्थानं भगवद्विभूतिभूतसकललोकानुगतिश्चावगम्यते ॥

एवं मुक्तस्य जगद्व्यापारवर्जं भगवदैश्वर्यं समानम्। न च वाच्यमेवंविधमैश्वर्यं सगुणोपासननिष्ठस्य तथाविध ब्रह्म प्राप्नुवतो मुक्तस्य; निर्गुणोपासननिष्ठस्य त्वाविर्भूतस्वरूपस्य विदुष· 'तमेवं विद्वानमृत इह भवति' 'अत्र ब्रह्म समश्नुते' इतीहैव ब्रह्मप्राप्तिवचनादिति। 'परञ्ज्योतिरुपसम्पद्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यते स तत्र पर्येति जक्षन् क्रीडन् रममाण' इति परविद्यानिष्ठस्याविर्भूतस्वरूपस्यैव भोगविहरणादिश्रवणात्परविद्यानिष्ठानामर्चिरादिगतिश्रवणाच्च। न च निर्गुणोपासन नाम किञ्चिदस्ति; 'आनन्दादय· प्रधानस्य' इति सर्वासु विद्यास्वानन्दादिगुणानामुपसंहारात्। ब्रह्मणस्सगुणत्वनिर्णयाच्च।

न च मुक्तस्य भोगविहरणादिसम्भवे सति रागादयोऽवर्जनीयाः स्यु·। ते च दुःखानुषक्ता भवन्ति। ततश्च पुरुषार्थत्व मोक्षस्य न स्यात्। उच्यते—सर्वत्र न रागादयो दुःखानुषक्ताः। कर्मनिमित्तानां तेषां दुःखावहत्वात्। ते प्रतिहतकार्याः पुरुषं क्लिश्यन्ति। ये त्वकर्मनिमित्ताः निरर्गळाः कार्यं कुर्वन्ति, ते सविभूतिकभगवदनुभवानुगुणत्वात्प्रत्युत सुखायैव भवन्तीति न किञ्चिदेतत्। अतः परमव्योमनिष्ठदिव्यविग्रहं भगवन्तमनुभवतो मुक्तस्यैश्वर्यं नानुपपन्नम्। न च भगवतो देशविशेषो दिव्यविग्रहश्च नास्तीति वक्तुं शक्यम्; 'ऋचो अक्षरे परमे व्योमन् यस्मिन्देवा अधिविश्वे निषेदुः' 'विज्ञानसारथिर्यस्तु, मनः प्रग्रहवान्नरः। सोऽध्वनः पारमाप्नोति तद्विष्णोः परमं पदम्' 'सदापश्यन्ति सूरयः' 'दिव्यं स्थानमजरं चाप्रमेयम्।'

'वैकुण्ठे तु परे लोके श्रिया सार्धं जगत्पति· ।
आस्ते विष्णुरचिन्त्यात्मा भक्तैर्भागवतैस्सह ॥'

'न तस्य प्राकृता मूर्तिः' 'न पञ्चभूतसंस्थानो देहोऽस्य परमात्मन·' इत्यादिश्रुतिस्मृतिभिर्विशिष्टदेशदेहाद्यवगतेः। एवंविधब्रह्मानुभवरूपस्य निश्श्रेयसस्य 'एतेन प्रतिपद्यमाना इमं मानवमावर्तं नावर्तन्ते'

'इदं ज्ञानमुपाश्रित्य मम साधर्म्यमागता ।
सर्गेऽपि नोपजायन्ते प्रळये न व्यथन्ति च ॥'

इत्यादिश्रुतिस्मृतिभिर्नित्यत्वञ्चावगम्यते। तदेवमसङ्कुचितो ब्रह्मानुभवो मोक्ष.॥

किञ्चान्यत्—अयं ब्रह्मानुभवः परिचर्यारसावहश्च भवति; प्रत्यक्परमात्मनोः शेषशेषिभावस्य स्वरूपप्रयुक्तत्वात्। पारार्थ्यलक्षणं हि शेषत्वम्। अत· शेषभूतो मुक्तः स्वप्रयुक्तेन केनचिदतिशयेन हि शेषिणं सयोजयति, अकिञ्चित्करस्य शेषत्वानुपपत्तेः।

अथ स्यात्—अयमात्मा संसारदशायामाध्यात्मिकादिदुःखैरतितप्तः कथमस्मादुत्तीर्णः सुखी भूयासम्' इति हि खलु खनिवृत्ति सुखप्राप्तिञ्चार्थयमान· मोक्षसाधनमन्वतिष्ठत्। सोऽयमपवर्गसमये स्वस्य दुःखमनादृत्य कथं परसन्तोष कुरुते। एव सति तत्क्रतुन्यायोऽपि भज्येत। किञ्च लोके सर्वैः स्वातन्त्र्य प्रशस्यते। पारतन्त्र्य निन्द्यते। शास्त्रेण पारतन्त्र्य निन्दापूर्वक निषिध्यते। 'सेवा श्ववृत्तिराख्याता तस्मात्तां परिवर्जयेत्' इति। तस्मादस्य निश्श्रेयसत्वमनुपपन्नमिति॥

नैतदेवम्; भगवत्परिचर्याया निरतिशयसुखावहत्वात्। सुखं स्वाधीनं पूर्वमाशासितम्। निवृत्तकल्मषस्यात्मनो भगवानत्यर्थप्रिय इति तत्परिचर्या निरतिशयसुखं भवति॥ तस्मात्स्वसुखमेव पूर्वमुद्दिष्टं मोक्षदशायां सिद्ध भवति।

यदुक्तं लोके स्वातन्त्र्यं प्रशस्यं पारतन्त्र्य निन्दितञ्चेति; एतन्न सार्वत्रिकम्; अप्राप्तषोडशवर्षाणां पुत्राणां पितृपारतन्त्र्यस्य, स्त्रीणा भर्तृपारतन्त्र्यस्य च श्लाघ्यत्वात्। तेषामेव स्वातन्त्र्यस्य निन्दितत्वाच्च। सेवा श्ववृत्तिराख्यातेत्यनेनाप्यनर्थहेतुभूतान्यसेवैव निषिध्यते, न सेवामात्रम्। इतरथा हि अन्तेवासिनामाचार्यसेवाया अशास्त्रीयत्वप्रसङ्गात्। तस्माज्ज्ञानानन्दाद्यसङ्ख्येयकल्याणगुणगणस्य सर्वस्वामिन. परमपुरुषस्यानुभवः शेषभूतस्य मुक्तस्य परिचर्यारसमावहतीति तथाविधो भगवदनुभव· परमनिश्श्रेयसमिति सर्वं समञ्जसम्॥

इति श्रीनारायणार्यानुगृहीतायां नीतिमालाया निश्श्रेयसनिर्णयाधिकारो दशम·॥

नीतिमाला सम्पूर्णा॥



ERRATA

Page	Line	For	Read
3	6	तस्यावन्तर	तस्यावान्तर
5	3	षन्ताति	षन्तीति
,,	14	तत्रोपसान	तत्रोपासन
8	8	कार्यज्ञानबुद्धि	कार्यबुद्धि
9	6	वाक्यसमनन्तर	वाक्यश्रवणसमनन्तर
12	20	यदुक्त	यदुक्तम्—
13	1	वाप्तिः	वाप्तेः
14	5	तद्ब्रह्म' इति इति	तद्ब्रह्मेति' इति
,,	8	देहोऽयम्	देवोऽयम्
,,	11	त्वस्य वा	त्वस्य चा
,,	17	तस्मात् सुदुर्निरूपम्	तस्मात्सद्दुर्निरूपम्
15	21	नेति नेति'	नेति नेति' इति
17	18	तज्जलानीति	तज्जलानिति
18	3	निकास्सत्य	निकास्सत्य (श्शक्य ?)
20	21	मस्मद्भिन्न	मस्माद्भिन्न
23	17	विषयम्	विषयो
25	1	केनचिद्	केनचित्
,,	2	प्रतिपपन्ने	प्रतिपन्ने
,,	16	वं	त्वं
,,	19	णाया	णीया
,,	21	मनिर्वचनीया	मनिर्वचनीया सत्या वा ?
26	6	सौम्ये	सोम्ये
29	12	व्यावृत्योभिन्ना	व्यावृत्त्योर्भिन्ना
,,	,,	वृ (व्य) त्ति	वृति (व्यक्ति ?)
,,	19	रागान्तुक	रागन्तुक
,,	23	श्रवणात्तयो	श्रवणात् । तयो

Page	Line	For	Read
30	11	इत्यवसेयुः	इत्यवस्येयुः
31	6	सद्त्	सद्
32	,,	त्मना विभागं	त्मना अविभागं
33	7	नुवृत्तेः। स	नुवृत्तेस्स
34	6	साम्येद्	सोम्येद
,,	13	परब्रशब्द	परब्रह्मशब्द
,,	15	प्रक्रियबा	प्रक्रियया
35	6	मद्रुपेणा	मद्रूपेणा
,,	9	प्रथगमात्मानं	पृथगात्मानं
36	3	राद्यवस्था	राद्यावस्था
,,	8	स्वगमन्त्र	स्वगमात्र
37	,,	वाचा	वाचो
38	23	महाविभूतिस्सुवीर्यः	महावबोधसुवीर्य
39	2	कुर्वन्ती	कुर्वती
,,	8	परमकाश	परमाकाश
,,	14	सूरिणां	सूरीणां
,,	17	शरीरत्व	शरीरित्व
40	,,	तेषां न स्व	तेषां न (तु ?) स्व
,,	24	तद्वद्वतुषु	तद्वद्वस्तुषु
,,	21	शराराणा	शरीराणा
42	4	तद्वता	तद्वतो
,,	20	समाना	सामाना
,,	22	मकुरत	मकुरस्त
43	3	उपादानयार्भेद	उपादानयोर्भेद
,,	16	माश्वरो	मीश्वरो
46	9	शरिर	शरीर
50	,,	पुरुषः नविज्ञा	पुरुषः ' 'न विज्ञा
51	7	प्रद्योतेनैव	प्रद्योतेनैष
,,	,,	मयति येवे	मति ' 'येवै '

Page	Line	For	Read
51	23	णोशित्वं	णोंऽशित्व
52	1	आपाधिक	औपाधिक
54	8	व्यापारत्वं	व्यापारवत्त्वं
55	1	निपातनयाः	निपातनयोः
,,	8	धायते	धीयते
,,	10	तथा	तदा
,,	12	यथा	तदा
56	6	गुणान्यव्या	(गुणस्यापि सव्या ?)
57	3	णाप्रवर्ति	ण प्रवर्ति
,,	17	द्वेश्यं वा	द्वेश्यं च
58	6	कार्यभिति	कार्यमिति
59	11	यथा	यदा
,,	12	प्रयुङ्क्ते	प्रयुङ्क्ते,
60	5	देवान्दर्वि	देवा दर्वि
,,	13	देवतादि त	देवतादि व
,,	16	सन्तोषफल	सन्तोष (:?) फल
,,	24	भूति	भूर्तिं
62	9	जनयति	जनयन्ति
,,	13	घटाद्यानात्म	घटाद्यनात्म
,,	16	वधरित शक्तितात्पर्यनिश्चय—वधारितशक्तितात्पर्य	
63	8	साध्यत्वा	बाध्यत्वा
,,	21	चेति। तत्र	चेति। (योगः प्रकृते ज्ञान योगः ध्यानम् ?) तत्र.
64	23	पुरुषार्थप्रियत्वेन	पुरुषात्यर्थप्रियत्वेन
,,	,,	चेत्य	चात्य
66	1	तथा प्राप्तो	तदाप्नोति
69	10, 11	वैशेषिका आत्म	वैशेषिकात्म
72	4	यदातद्भाव	तद्भावभाव
,,	5	भवत्यभेदेभेदश्च तस्माज्ञान	भवत्यभेदो भेदश्च तस्याज्ञान

Page	Line	For	Read
72	6	कथमुपपद्यते	तत्कथमुपपद्यते
”	14	च	पक्षे च
”	”	जक्षन्	जक्षत्
”	15	शब्दात्सङ्कल्पा	शब्दात्’ ‘सङ्कल्पा
”	18	प्रदूयन्ते—तद्यथा	प्रदूयन्ते’ ‘तद्यथा
”	23	सम्पद्यते	सम्पद्य....निष्पद्यते
73	14	क्लिश्यन्ति	क्लेशयन्ति
”	23	पञ्चभूत	भूतसङ्घ

A Index of Kārikās in the Text. Page

B Index of verses quoted in the text.

C Index of Quotations other than Verses.

D Index of Vedic Texts Quoted.

TEXTUAL READINGS

Page	Line	Reading in the book	Variant Reading
1	1	श्रीधरमच्युतम्	श्रीधरमग्रिमम्
4	10	मविरोधयन्नेव	मवबोधयन्नेव हि
5	11	परमपुरुषाराधन	परमपुरुषसमाराधन
9	3	साक्षात्कारेण	साक्षात्कारेण वा
,,	16	तेषु तेषु तेषां	तेषु तेष्वर्थेषु तेषां
11	2	कल्पनीयम्	कल्पनीयम् ; नत्वनुपपन्नं विरुद्धं च कल्पनीयम् .
,,	11	शरीराद्युपकरणवान्	शरीरेन्द्रियाद्युपकरणेवान्
14	8	देवोऽयं मनुष्योऽयं	देवोऽहम् , मनुष्योऽहम् .
16	1	त्यभिधीयते	त्यवगम्यते
,,	8	सामञ्जस्यात्	सामर्थ्यात्
17	22	श्रुत्यन्यथानुपपत्या	श्रुत्यर्थापत्त्या
18	7	इदमेव	इदमेव वाक्यं
19	13	प्रतियोगिस्मरण	प्रतियोगिग्रहणस्मरण
,,	14	सम्भवति	भवति
,,	18	भाव्यभयहेतु	भाव्युभयव्यवहारहेतु
,,	24	श्रयणीयः	श्रयणीयम्
20	13	संस्थानेन	सास्नादिसंस्थानेन
21	3	व्यावृत्तता	व्यावृत्तिः
,,	9	याथात्म्य	याथार्थ्य
,,	13	नुपपत्त्या	नुपपत्त्या च
23	8	ज्ञानसिद्धिः	ज्ञानं सिद्ध्यति
,,	18	भासार्थमज्ञान	भासार्थं हि अज्ञान
24	3	दोषानतिवृत्तिः	दोषानुवृत्तिः
63	76	ज्ञानेन निवर्त्यंते	ज्ञानेन तन्निवर्त्यंते

NOTES

Page 30 Line 11.

Cf Jigñāsādhikarana in *Śrī Bhāsya*

" निरस्ताखिलदुःखोऽहमनन्तानन्दभाक् स्वराट् ।
भवेयमिति मोक्षार्थी श्रवणादौ प्रवर्तते ॥
अहमर्थविनाशश्चेन्मोक्ष इत्यध्यवस्यति ।
अपसर्पेदसौ मोक्षकथा प्रस्तावगधतः ॥
मयि नष्टेऽपि मत्तोऽन्या काचित् ज्ञप्तिरवस्थिता ।
इति तत्प्राप्तये यत्नः कस्यापि न भविष्यति ॥"

Compare also *Siddhitraya* of Yāmunācārya, pp 60-1 (Annamalai University Edition)

" नहि मयि नष्टेऽपि कोऽपि प्रकाशः स्थास्यतीति कश्चित्प्रेक्षावान्प्रयस्यति ॥"

Page 44 Line 7.

Cf Vedānta Deśika's *Tātparya Candrikā*, an elaborate commentary on *Gītā Bhāṣya* by Bhagavān Rāmānuja

" नच लोके निमित्तोपादानभेददर्शनमात्राद्विरोधः; लौकिककारणविलक्षणत्वाच्छ्रुतिसिद्धस्य ब्रह्मणः अन्ततो वैशेषिकादिभिरपि घटेश्वरगतसंयोगविभागद्वित्वपृथक्त्वादिकार्येष्वीश्वरस्यैव निमित्तत्वमुपादानत्वं चाभ्युपगतमिति नास्मन्मते दोषः । तथा बुद्धिपूर्वकसुखोत्पादनादावपि द्रष्टव्यम् ॥"

Page 47, Line 20.

Cf. Vedānta Deśika's *Paramatabhanga* in the chapter *Lokāyatika Bhanga*—

" ஆகையால பலவாய் கரணங்களாய் தோற்றுகிற चक्षुरादिகளிற் காட்டில व्यतिरिक्तனை ஆத்மா ப்ரத்யக்ஷன. கண காணுகின்றது செவி கேளாநின்றது என்றுபோலே சொலலும व्यपदेशங்களும உपचारத்தாலே என்னுமிடம் என கண காணுகின்றதென்கையாலே सिद्धम् , सत्यतपாவின் வாக்யம शरणागतरक्षणाभिसंधिயாலே अन्यपरम् ॥"

Page 59.

For a refutation of the Bhātta view see Vedānta Deśika's *Seśvara Mīmāmsā*, p 15

" तथा च शाबरमुत्स्वप्नायितम् " etc

" यत्तु शब्दभावनेति कुमारिलकुसृतिः " etc.

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